

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS UPSALIENSIS

Studia Graeca Upsaliensia

11

JAN FREDRIK KINDSTRAND

BION OF BORYSTHENES

A Collection of the Fragments
with Introduction and Commentary



Uppsala 1976

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
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To Ulf, Carl and Sven



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PREFACE

This book was written mainly during my stay in Oxford from 1973 to 1975 as holder of a Florey European Studentship and was submitted as a doctoral thesis in 1976.

I here want to express my gratitude to the Provost and Fellows of The Queen's College, Oxford, for electing me to this scholarship, which made my work possible.

I am much indebted to many scholars but can here mention only a few. My greatest debt of gratitude is due to my supervisor, Mr. D.A. Russell, for his constant help, advice and kindness.

I should also like to thank my examiners, Professor R.G.M. Nisbet and Professor I.G. Kidd, for many valuable suggestions and criticisms, and my former teacher, Professor Jonas Palm, for kindly accepting this work for publication in *Studia Graeca Upsaliensia*.

Jan Fredrik Kindstrand

Uppsala, August 1976

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List of Works

cited in the introduction and commentary by author's name or other abbreviation.

I. Collections of Fragments

1. Collections of the fragments of Bion

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|-----------|--|
| Hoogvliet | J.M. Hoogvliet, <i>Specimen philosopho-criticum continens diatriben de Bione Borysthenita</i> (Diss. Leyden, 1821). |
| Mullach | <i>Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum</i> , ed. F.W.A. Mullach II (Paris, 1867) pp. 419–429. |
| Orelli | <i>Opuscula Graecorum Veterum sententiosa et moralia</i> , ed. I.C. Orelli II (Leipzig, 1821) pp. 174–184. |
| Rossignol | <i>Fragmenta Bionis Borysthenitae philosophi e variis scriptoribus collecta, emendavit, illustravit, et ad publicam disceptationem proponit ad doctoris gradum promovendus</i> J.P. Rossignol (Paris, 1830). |

2. Other collections of importance

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| Barigazzi | 'Favorino di Arelate: Opere: Introduzione, testo critico e commento a cura di A. Barigazzi', <i>Testi greci e latini con commento filologico</i> , 4 (Florence, 1966). |
| Caizzi | 'Antisthenis Fragmenta collegit F.D. Caizzi', <i>Testi e documenti per lo studio dell' antichità</i> , 13 (Milan, 1966). |
| Döring | 'Die Megariker: Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien von K. Döring', <i>Studien zur antiken Philosophie</i> , 2 (Amsterdam, 1972). |
| Edelstein-Kidd | <i>Posidonius I: The Fragments</i> , edited by L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (Cambridge, 1972). |
| FGrH | <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , ed. F. Jacoby I ff (Berlin-Leyden, 1923 ff). |
| FHG | <i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> , ed. C. Müller I–V (Paris, 1841–70). |

- FVS* *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz I—III, 8. ed. (Berlin, 1956).
- FPG* *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, ed. F.W.A. Mullach I—III (Paris, 1860—81).
- GGM* *Geographi Graeci Minores*, ed. C. Müller I—II and Atlas (Paris, 1855—61).
- Heinze R. Heinze, *Xenokrates: Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig, 1892).
- Kock *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, ed. T. Kock I—III (Leipzig, 1880—88).
- Mannebach *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta*, ed. E. Mannebach (Leyden-Cologne, 1961).
- Mensching 'Favorin von Arelate: Der erste Teil der Fragmente: Memorabilien und Omnigena Historia hrsg. und komm. von E. Mensching', *Texte und Kommentare*, 3 (Berlin, 1963).
- Nauck *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. A. Nauck 2. ed. (Leipzig, 1889).
- SVF* *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. H. v. Arnim I—IV (Leipzig, 1903—24).
- Usener *Epicurea*, ed. H. Usener (Leipzig, 1887).
- Wehrli *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar*, hrsg. von F. Wehrli I—X, 2. ed. (Basel, 1967—69).

II. Books and Articles

This list includes, besides the literature devoted especially to Bion, works which are of great interest and importance for a proper understanding of his literary form and philosophical standpoint. It also includes some works which are quoted so often as to justify a reference in abbreviated form, and abbreviations used for works of reference. When several works by the same author, or works by different authors with the same name are cited, they are distinguished by the addition of the year of publication. Works which are cited but not included here are given with full bibliographical references in the notes of the introduction and in the commentary.

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| Apelt | <i>Diogenes Laertius: Leben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen</i> , übers. und erl. von O. Apelt I—II (Leipzig, 1921). |
| v. Arnim 1898 | H. v. Arnim, <i>Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa: Mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jugendbildung</i> (Berlin, 1898). |
| v. Arnim 1899 | H. v. Arnim, 'Bion der Borysthenite' (no. 10) <i>RE</i> , III (1899) cols. 483—485. |
| Baldry | H.C. Baldry, <i>The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought</i> (Cambridge, 1965). |
| BD | F. Blass, <i>Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch</i> , bearbeitet von A. Debrunner 12. ed. (Göttingen, 1965). |
| Belin de Ballu | E. Belin de Ballu, <i>Olbia: Cité antique du littoral nord de la Mer Noire</i> (Leyden, 1972). |
| Bernays | J. Bernays, <i>Lucian und die Kyniker: Mit einer Übersetzung der Schrift Lucians: Über das Lebensende des Peregrinus</i> (Berlin, 1879). |
| Bickel | E. Bickel, <i>Diatriben in Senecae philosophi fragmenta I: Fragmenta de matrimonio</i> (Leipzig, 1915). |
| Bieler | L. Bieler, <i>ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ: Das Bild des "göttlichen Menschen" in Spätantike und Frühchristentum</i> I—II (Vienna, 1935—36). |
| Bompaire | J. Bompaire, <i>Lucien écrivain: Imitation et création</i> (Thèse Paris, 1958; also <i>Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome</i> , 190). |
| Bramble | J.C. Bramble, <i>Persius and the Programmatic Satire: A Study in Form and Imagery</i> (Cambridge, 1974). |
| Brown | T.S. Brown, 'Onesicritus: A Study in Hellenistic Historiography', <i>University of California, Publications in History</i> , 39 (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1949). |

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List of Works

- Bultmann R. Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (Diss. Marburg, 1910).
- Capelle W. Capelle, 'Diatribe', *RAC*, III (1957) cols. 990—1009.
- Christ-Schmid 'W. v. Christs Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur, umgearbeitet von W. Schmid und O. Stählin, Zweiter Teil I—II', 6. ed. *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, VII:2:1—2 (Munich, 1920—24).
- Colardeau T. Colardeau, *Études sur Épictète* (Thèse Paris, 1903).
- Crönert W. Crönert, 'Kolotes und Menedemos: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Philosphen- und Literaturgeschichte', *Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde*, 6 (Leipzig, 1906).
- Curtius E.R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* 7. ed. (Bern-Munich, 1969).
- Deferrari R.J. Deferrari, *Lucian's Atticism: The Morphology of the Verb* (Diss. Princeton, 1915).
- Derenne E. Derenne, 'Les procès d' impiété intentés aux philosophes à Athènes au V^{me} et au IV^{me} siècles avant J.-C.', *Bibliothèque de la faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'université de Liège*, 45 (Liège-Paris, 1930).
- Diehl E. Diehl, 'Olbia' (no. 4), *RE*, XVII:2 (1937) cols. 2405—2423.
- Dover K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality: In the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford, 1974).
- DS *Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines d' après les textes et les monuments*, ed. C. Daremberg and E. Saglio I—V (Paris, 1877—1919).
- Dudley D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London, 1937).
- Dümmler F. Dümmler, *Antisthenica* (Diss. Bonn, 1882).
- Dürr K. Dürr, 'Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu den Dialexeis des Maximus von Tyrus', *Philologus*, Suppl.b. 8 (Leipzig, 1899—1901) pp. 1—156.
- Duff J.W. Duff, *Roman Satire: Its Outlook on Social Life* (Cambridge, 1937).

- Dziech J. Dziech, 'De Gregorio Nazianzeno diatribae quae dicitur alumno', *Poznańskie towarzystwo przyjaciół nauk, Prace komisji filologicznej*, 3 (Posen, 1927) pp. 26–266.
- Fiske G.C. Fiske, 'Lucilius and Horace: A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation' *University of Wisconsin, Studies in Language and Literature*, 7 (Madison, 1920).
- v. Fritz K. v. Fritz, 'Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope', *Philologus*, Suppl.b. 18:2 (Leipzig, 1926).
- Geffcken 1909 J. Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes* (Heidelberg, 1909).
- Geffcken 1911 J. Geffcken, 'Studien zur griechischen Satire I–II', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 26 (14) (1911) pp. 393–411 and pp. 469–493.
- Geigenmüller P. Geigenmüller, *Quaestiones Dionysianae de vocabulis artis criticae* (Diss. Leipzig, 1908).
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- v. Geytenbeek A.C. v. Geytenbeek, 'Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe', *Wijsgerige teksten en studies*, 8 (Assen, 1963).
- Giangrande L. Giangrande, 'The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature', *Studies in Classical Literature*, 6 (The Hague-Paris, 1972).
- Giesecke A. Giesecke, *De philosophorum veterum quae ad exilium spectant sententiis* (Diss. Leipzig, 1891).
- Gigante *Diogene Laerzio: Vite dei filosofi*, a cura di M. Gigante (Bari, 1962).
- Gigon O. Gigon, 'Kommentar zu Xenophons Memorabilien I–II', *Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 5 and 7 (Basel, 1953–56).
- Gomperz T. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker: Eine Geschichte der antiken Philosophie I–III* (Leipzig, 1896–1909).

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- Heinze 1890 R. Heinze, 'Ariston von Chios bei Plutarch und Horaz', *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 45 (1890) pp. 497–523.
- Helm 1906 R. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1906).
- Helm 1924 R. Helm, 'Kynismus', *RE*, XII:1 (1924) cols. 3–24.
- Hense 1890 O. Hense, 'Ariston bei Plutarch', *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 45 (1890) pp. 541–554.
- Hense 1892 O. Hense, 'Bion bei Philon', *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 47 (1892) pp. 219–240.
- Hense 1909 *Teletis reliquiae*, ed. O. Hense 2. ed. (Tübingen, 1909).
- Hicks *Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, with an English translation by R.D. Hicks I–II (London-Cambridge, Mass., 1925; in *The Loeb Classical Library*).
- Highet G. Highet, *The Anatomy of Satire* (Princeton, 1962).
- Hirzel 1877–83 R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften* I–III (Leipzig, 1877–83).
- Hirzel 1895 R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch* I–II (Leipzig, 1895).
- Höistad R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King* (Diss. Uppsala, 1948).
- Joel 1893–1901 K. Joel, *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates* I–II (Berlin, 1893–1901).
- Joel 1921 K. Joel, *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie* I (Tübingen, 1921).

- KB R. Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*: Erster Teil: Elementar- und Formenlehre I—II, besorgt von F. Blass 3. ed. (Hanover, 1890—92).
- KG R. Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*: Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre I—II, besorgt von B. Gerth 3. ed. (Hanover-Leipzig, 1898—1904).
- Knoche U. Knoche, 'Die römische Satire', 2. ed. *Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 5 (Göttingen, 1957).
- KP *Der Kleine Pauly: Lexikon der Antike*, hrsg. von K. Ziegler und W. Sontheimer I ff (Stuttgart, 1964 ff).
- Lausberg H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft* (Munich, 1960).
- LAW *Lexikon der alten Welt*, hrsg. von C. Andresen, H. Erbse, O. Gigon, K. Schefold, K.F. Stroheker und E. Zinn (Zürich-Stuttgart, 1965).
- Lejay *Oeuvres d'Horace: Texte latin avec un commentaire critique et explicatif, des introductions et des tables: II: Satires*, par P. Lejay (Paris, 1911).
- Leo F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer literarischen Form* (Leipzig, 1901).
- Lesky A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* 3. ed. (Bern-Munich, 1971).
- Long *Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum*, ed. H.S. Long I—II (Oxford, 1964; in *Oxford Classical Texts*).
- LS *A Latin Dictionary*, founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary, revised, enlarged, and in great parts rewritten by C.T. Lewis and Ch. Short (Oxford, 1879).
- LSJ *A Greek-English Lexicon*, compiled by H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, revised and augmented throughout by H.S. Jones (1940), with a Supplement edited by E.A. Barber (Oxford, 1968).
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XVIII

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- Minns E.H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks: A Survey of Ancient History and Archeology on the North Coast of the Euxine from the Danube to the Caucasus* (Cambridge, 1913).
- ML *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, hrsg. von W. H. Roscher I–VI (Leipzig, 1884–1937).
- v. Müller H. v. Müller, *De Teletis elocutione* (Diss. Freiburg i.B., 1891).
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- PG *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca*, ed. J. P. Migne I–CLXI (Paris, 1857–66).
- PL *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina*, ed. J.P. Migne I–CCXVII (Paris, 1844–55).
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- Pohlenz 1964 M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* I–II, 3. ed. (Göttingen, 1964).
- Puelma Piwonka M. Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos: Zur Geschichte einer Gattung der hellenistisch-römischen Poesie* (Frankfort on-the-Main, 1949).

- RAC* *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, hrsg. von T. Klauser I ff (Stuttgart, 1950 ff).
- Radermacher 1925 L. Radermacher, 'Neutestamentliche Grammatik', 2. ed. *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*, I (Tübingen, 1925).
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- Rainfurt A. Rainfurt, *Zur Quellenkritik von Galens Protreptikos* (Diss. Freiburg i.B., 1904).
- RE* *Paulys Real-Encyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Neue Bearbeitung von G. Wissowa, fortgeführt von W. Kroll und K. Mittelhaus, hrsg. von K. Ziegler und W. John: Erste Reihe I:1 ff (Stuttgart, 1893 ff) und Zweite Reihe IA:1 ff (Stuttgart, 1914 ff).
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- Rohde E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* 3. ed. (Leipzig, 1914).
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- Tarn W.W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* (Oxford, 1913).
- Terzaghi N. Terzaghi, *Per la storia della satira* (Turin, 1932).
- Thumb A. Thumb, *Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus: Beiträge zur Geschichte und Beurteilung der Κοινή* (Strasburg, 1901).
- ThW *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, begründet von G. Kittel (I—IV), fortgesetzt von G. Friedrich I ff (Stuttgart, 1933 ff).

- TLG* *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae*, ab H. Stephano constructus, ed. C.B. Hase, W. Dindorf et L. Dindorf I–VIII 3. ed. (Paris, 1831–65).
- TLL* *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* I ff (Leipzig, 1900 ff).
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Introduction

I. Life

Bion,¹ usually known as the Borysthenite² in the ancient tradition, was born in the Greek city of Olbia,³ situated on the northern coast of the Black Sea, on the right bank of the river Hypanis and not very far from its confluence with the river Borysthenes.⁴ The inhabitants of Olbia and also their city were usually named by other Greeks from the latter river.⁵ Olbia was originally colonised

¹ This name is not among the most common; W. Pape—G.E. Benseler, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* I, 3. ed. (Brunswick, 1863—70) p. 214 gives 13 cases, *RE*, III (1899) s.v. Bion cols. 480—7 15 and Diog. Laert. in his catalogue of homonyms 10 (4.58). It is not found in any inscription from Olbia but once in an inscription from Chersonesus Taurica (*IPE* I² 410) from the 4th or 3rd century B.C. and in four from Panticapaeum (*IPE* II 302¹, 29 c, and *IPE* IV B 286 and B 291). Cf. L. Zgusta, 'Die Personennamen griechischer Städte der nördlichen Schwarzmeerküste: Die ethnischen Verhältnisse, namentlich das Verhältnis der Skythen und Sarmaten, im Lichte der Namenforschung', *Československá Akademie Věd, sekce jazyka a literatury, Monografie Orientálního Ústavu sv. 16* (Prague, 1955) p. 360 (§ 901).

² Cf. T1, T2B, T6, T20—21, T24, F1A, F14, F38B and F73.

³ For the history of Olbia see Minns, pp. 450 ff, Diehl, cols. 2405 ff, Ziebell, Schneider, I pp. 806 ff and Belin de Ballu. For a general survey of the countries and cities close to the Black Sea see also 'Griechische Städte und einheimische Völker des Schwarzmeergebietes: Eine Aufsatzsammlung besorgt von J. Irmscher und D.B. Schelow', *Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft*, 28 (Berlin, 1961) and *RE*, Suppl.b. IX (1962) s.v. Pontos Euxeinos cols. 866 ff (Dandoff). More references will be found in all these works, and for an annotated bibliography of the Russian literature between 1940 and 1962 see E. Belin de Ballu, *L'histoire des colonies grecques du littoral nord de la Mer Noire: Bibliographie annotée des ouvrages et articles publ. en URSS de 1940 à 1962* (Leyden, 1965). The inscriptions are published in V.V. Latyšev, *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae* I—II and IV (St. Petersburg, 1885—1916) (= *IPE*), V.V. Struve, 'Corpus inscriptionum Regni Bosporani', *Acad. Scient. USSR* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1965) (= *CIRB*) and T.N. Knipovič—Ė.I. Levi, 'Inscriptiones Olbiae/Nadpisi Ol'vii 1917—1965', *Acad. Scient. USSR* (Leningrad, 1968).

⁴ A correct description of the site of Olbia is given by Herodotus 4.53 and Dio of Prusa 36.1, who were the only ancient authors who visited the town; cf. Ziebell, pp. 10 ff.

⁵ It is a somewhat surprising fact that a city, situated at the river Hypanis, was named after the river Borysthenes, especially as the inhabitants call their city Olbia and themselves Olbiopolitai (cf. *IPE* I² Index s.v., Stephanus Byz. p. 176 Meineke: ἔστι δὲ πόλις Ἑλληνικὴ ἐσπέραν, Μιλησίων ἀποικία, ἣν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι Βορυσθένην, αὐτοὶ δὲ Ὀλβίαν (sc. καλέουσιν), Herodotus 4.18: Ἑλλήνες οἱ οἰκέοντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ὑπάνι ποταμῷ καλέουσιν . . . σφέας αὐτοὺς Ὀλβιοπολίτας, Ps-Scymnus 805 ff (= *GGM* I p. 229) and Anonymus Periplus P. Eux. 60 (= *GGM* I p. 417); the documents are collected in V.V. Latyšev, *Scythica et Caucasica e veteribus scriptoribus graecis et latinis colligit et cum versione rossica edidit Basilius Latyshev* I—II (St. Petersburg, 1890—1906)). For this question see F. Lindisch, *De rebus Olbiopolitarum* (Diss. Halle, 1888), pp. 5 ff, Ziebell, pp. 9 f, Treu, p. 140 and Belin de Ballu, pp. 20 ff, who attributes this custom to Herodotus.

from Miletus,⁶ being founded in 646/5 B.C.⁷ During the later part of the fourth century B.C., i.e. when Bion was born, the two cities renewed an agreement on isopolity.⁸ Olbia as a city was mainly Greek in character with different Greek institutions and a democratic form of government.⁹ Notwithstanding that Olbia was far from the centres of the Greek world, it cannot be described as isolated. During the period of interest here, the later part of the fourth century B.C., it was an important commercial centre,¹⁰ thanks to its excellent situation with good connections both to the north and the south.¹¹ Many Greeks from elsewhere lived in Olbia and the communications with their cities, especially Athens, were frequent.¹² There is therefore every reason to believe that life in Olbia was very active and that new ideas and impulses quickly found their way there. Moreover the importance of foreign neighbours, such as the Scythians, must be emphasized and these contacts were both of a commercial and a cultural character. Later on the Scythians gradually gained greater importance in Olbia.¹³

With one exception very little is known of the history of Olbia during this period. Olbia was attacked and besieged by Zopyrion, one of Alexander the Great's generals. Yet the city succeeded in resisting this attack with great effort and sacrifice—a fact which may be of a certain interest in Bion's biography.¹⁴

⁶ Cf. Herodotus 4.78: *οἱ δὲ Βορυσθενεῖται οὗτοι λέγουσιν σφέας αὐτοὺς εἶναι Μιλησίους*, Strabo 7.3.17, Stephanus Byz. p. 176 Meineke and Ps-Scymnus 808 f (= GGM I p. 229).

⁷ The date is given by Eusebius *Chron.* p. 95b Helm; cf. also Ps-Scymnus 808 f (= GGM I p. 229), Ziebell, p. 9 and Belin de Ballau, pp. 17 ff.

⁸ See W. Dittenberg, *Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum* I, 3. ed. (Leipzig, 1915), p. 498 no. 286; this event is dated to about 330 B.C. Cf. F. Bilabel, 'Die ionische Kolonisation: Untersuchungen über die Gründungen der Ionier, deren staatliche und kulturelle Organisation und Beziehungen zu den Mutterstädten', *Philologus*, Suppl. b. 14:1 (Leipzig, 1920), *RE*, XV:2 (1932) s.v. Miletos col. 1602 (Hiller v. Gaertringen) and Diehl, col. 2422.

⁹ For the constitution and government of Olbia see Minns, pp. 471 ff, Ziebell, pp. 34 ff and Belin de Ballu, pp. 183 ff.

¹⁰ Several centuries later Dio of Prusa can speak of *τὴν παλαιὰν δόξαν* of Olbia (36.4).

¹¹ Cf. Ziebell, pp. 61 ff, Diehl, cols. 2420 f and Belin de Ballu, pp. 58 ff.

¹² For Olbia's commercial relations with other Greek cities see Ziebell, pp. 63 ff.

¹³ On the Scythians in general see Minns, M. Ebert, *Südrussland im Altertum* (Bonn-Leipzig, 1921), M. Rostovtzeff, *Scythien und der Bosporus* I (Berlin, 1931), T.T. Rice, *The Scythians* (London, 1957), and J.A.H. Potratz, *Die Skythen in Südrussland* (Basel, 1963). For the contacts between Olbia and the Scythians see also Ziebell, pp. 13 ff, Belin de Ballu, pp. 85 f and for a later period Treu, pp. 137 ff.

¹⁴ Cf. Macrobius *Sat.* 1.11.33: *Borysthenitae, obpugnante Zopyrione servis liberatis dataeque civitate peregrinis et factis tabulis novis, hostem sustinere potuerunt*, which is the only source for this event. Here especially the date is very much discussed; as the year for this event 331 B.C. is given by Diehl, col. 2422, who also refers to Russian research on this point, and Belin de Ballu, p. 69, and 325 B.C. by K.J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* IV:1, 2. ed. (Berlin-Leipzig, 1925) pp. 44 f, H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* II (Munich,

As an introduction to this biographical survey I feel it appropriate to treat the whole chronology of Bion's life, although this will result in some repetition and things and persons will be briefly mentioned here and treated in more detail later.¹⁵ No definite dates are known. Our only guide is Bion's relations with others, whose lives are better known from a chronological point of view. The description in Diog. Laert. 4.23 and 4.51–52 (= T19–20) of Bion's philosophical education and development is extremely important here. I should like to say immediately that I see no reason to reject the description given by Diog. Laert., including its order of the different philosophical schools which Bion attended. I shall return to this controversial passage later. These notices provide us with two dates *ante quem*. Bion is brought together with Xenocrates by one anecdote (Diog. Laert. 4.5 = T22),¹⁶ which shows that he must have arrived in Athens before 314 B.C., the year of Xenocrates' death.¹⁷ Moreover Bion must have been the pupil of Theodorus before 307 B.C., as the Cyrenaic philosopher was probably exiled from Athens this year, at the latest.¹⁸ We can assume that Bion was fairly mature when he came to Athens, thanks to his previous experiences,¹⁹ so that I feel justified in dating his birth c. 335 B.C. So he would have arrived in Athens at the age of twenty.

As regards the date of his death, our only help is the notice in Diog. Laert. 4.54 (= T5) that he died in Chalcis in Euboea. It is extremely difficult to deduce a definite date. However, it seems obvious that Bion died before Antigonos Gonatas, whose death took place in 240/39 B.C.,²⁰ as Antigonos helped Bion during his last illness. This gives us a date *ante quem*. Furthermore the fact that Bion died in Chalcis in Euboea may be of some help. The chronology

1926) p. 164 (no. 340, *Ζωπυρίων*), Ziebell, p. 16 and *RE*, XA:1 (1972) s.v. Zopyrion (no. 1) cols. 763 f (Ziegler); cf. also Minns, pp. 459 f. The exact date is of little importance here, as it is obvious that the event must have occurred during, or just before, the early childhood of Bion.

¹⁵ Cf. especially Dudley, p. 63 and n. 3 (pp. 89 f); Soro, p. 63 dates Bion's life to 325–255 B.C. without comment and Fiske, p. 178 gives his *floruit* as c. 280 B.C.

¹⁶ The fact that this anecdote reflects a historical truth is generally accepted; cf. however Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 342 n. 2 and Leo, p. 70 n. 3 for a different view.

¹⁷ For this date see Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 988 n. 1 and *RE*, IXA:2 (1967) s.v. Xenokrates (no. 4) col. 1512 (Dörrie).

¹⁸ Cf. Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 341 n. 1 and Derenne, pp. 206 ff, who places the exile in the reign of Demetrius of Phaleron (317–307 B.C.); *RE*, VA:2 (1934) s.v. Theodoros (no. 32) col. 1826 (v. Fritz) remains sceptical both as to the year and the event. The two notices in Diog. Laert. 2.101–102 (= frs. 265 and 256 Mannebach) that on the one hand Theodorus was protected by Demetrius of Phaleron from being brought before the Areopagus, on the other that he was sent into exile, do not exclude each other, as he may very well have been banished from Athens after having lost the protection of Demetrius, because of the exile of the latter.

¹⁹ This fact is pointed out by Hirzel 1895, I p. 375 n. 1.

²⁰ See Tarn, p. 15 n. 2 and p. 409; Christ-Schmid, I p. 87 and Lesky, p. 755 wrongly believe that Bion survived Antigonos.

of this period is very obscure, but it seems probable that Corinth and Chalcis revolted from Antigonus in 253/2 B.C. It is also plausible that both towns were reconquered by Antigonus at about the same time, i.e. c. 246 B.C., although we do not know how or when.²¹ As it is not likely that Bion would have visited Chalcis, when it was ruled by Antigonus' enemy Alexander, Mensching²² assumed that Bion's death occurred in the period between the years 246 and 240/39 B.C., which is possible but not certain, as it could also have happened before 253/2 B.C., while Antigonus still ruled Euboea. To reach a definite answer here seems to be impossible but I am inclined to accept the later date. Various facts support this theory without proving it. Here the anecdote about Antigonus and Bion in Plutarch *De vitioso pudore* 7.531 E (= T4) may be of some help, although both text and interpretation are highly uncertain. The detailed interpretation will be found in the commentary, where I have tried to relate this anecdote to Corinth, after its recapture by Antigonus in his old age. As Bion was obviously present among the court-philosophers on this occasion, it follows that he was still alive c. 246 B.C., when the lost provinces were recovered. In all probability Antigonus also visited Chalcis during this period and Bion accompanied him. The notice that Bion followed in a litter (Diog. Laert. 4.54 = T5) can be understood in this connection as indicating that he was already ill. Obviously Bion's health deteriorated and he had to be left behind in Chalcis, where he died.²³ His poor state can be explained by the fact that his illness lasted longer than had been expected (cf. Diog. Laert. 4.55 = T6).

If the assumptions made above concerning the dates of Bion's birth and death are correct, he must have lived between 335 and 245 B.C. and have reached the age of about ninety years, which although very high is not so exceptional as to be excluded.

Almost the only information we have about Bion's early life is what he tells us in a reported conversation between Antigonus and himself, which may have formed part of a small discourse (Diog. Laert. 4.46–47 = F1).²⁴ Even if this piece of literature borders on inverted boasting, I see no reason to disbelieve the main points. Bion came of a most humble family. His father was originally a freedman, who may have gained his freedom as a result of the manumission

²¹ Cf. Beloch, op. cit. (n. 14) IV:1 pp. 619 ff and IV:2 pp. 518 ff, Tarn, pp. 372 ff, W.W. Tarn, in *The Cambridge Ancient History* VII (Cambridge, 1928) pp. 221 ff and E. Will, 'Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323–30 av. J.-C.)' I. *Annales de l'Est publiées par la faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines de l'université de Nancy*, 30 (Nancy, 1966) pp. 285 ff.

²² Mensching, p. 120 in his commentary on Favorinus F34.

²³ Fiske, p. 179 dates Bion's death in c. 240 B.C. and Dudley, p. 63 to the period 260–250 B.C.

²⁴ For an interpretation in detail see the commentary on F1.

during Zopyrion's attack on Olbia. He was a dealer in saltfish, which must have been a very common occupation in Olbia, where this trade was very important.²⁵ While such work could be lucrative, it was obviously not considered honorable. Furthermore it seems probable that Bion's father also had some connection with the customs, which later led to his ruin. This becomes clear from the participle *παρατελωνησάμενος* which implies that he as a *τελώνης* had acted dishonestly.²⁶ We cannot know for certain whether Bion's father combined these two occupations but it is possible, as we must assume that he was working as a tax-collector on a very low level. Even this occupation was highly despised and even hated. Bion's mother was originally a prostitute. Her name was Olympia, and she came from Lacedaemon (Athenaeus 13.591 F–592 A = T1). Nothing definite is known about her background, but it is plausible that she was a slave but later attained some sort of freedom which enabled her to marry.²⁷ This background²⁸ must have been of an enormous importance for Bion's whole life and his entire outlook. Therefore we may here to some extent find the ground and explanation both of his later literary style and his philosophical position. I shall have reason to return to this important fact several times later on.

A definite turning-point for Bion came with the catastrophe of his youth: his father, who had not fulfilled his duties as a *τελώνης*, was sold in slavery with his whole family according to what must have been a very harsh and old-fashioned law. Bion, then a good-looking boy, was bought by a rhetor "for obvious enough purposes" as Dudley²⁹ puts it. It seems probable from Bion's

²⁵ The importance of this trade in fish and salt is stressed already in such ancient sources as Herodotus 4.53 and Dio of Prusa 36.3; cf. Ziebell, p. 63 and Belin de Ballu, p. 33.

²⁶ For *τελώναι* in Olbia see Ziebell, p. 43.

²⁷ Nothing definite is known about the slaves in Olbia; the fact that they were set free during the siege by Zopyrion (Macrobius *Sat.* 1.11.33) may be interpreted as indicating that they were rather numerous; cf. Belin de Ballu, p. 35 and pp. 68 f.

²⁸ Nothing can be said with certainty about Bion's racial background. It seems probable that he was Greek on his mother's side and there is nothing to prevent this applying also to his father's side, as Olbia was a city with a mainly Greek character. Soro's statement p. 81: "Bione di Boristene era uno Scita" is completely without foundation (cf. also Soro, p. 64, where he discusses the Semitic mentality of Bion). Bion is only once associated with Scythia, i.e. in the poem of Diog. Laert. (4.55 = T6A), which however says nothing of Bion's own race. — In this connection I would like to stress that many scholars have overemphasized the fact that many philosophers belonging to the Cynic school had a foreign background (e.g. Antisthenes had a Thracian mother, and Diogenes came from Sinope) and have wrongly tried to regard the Cynic philosophy as an oriental movement; cf. e.g. Sayre 1938 and 1948 and Terzaghi, p. 43, who seeks to explain Greek satire from its assumed oriental background. Cynicism in its early form can only be understood as a Greek movement, deeply influenced by the Socratic tradition; cf. Höistad, pp. 18 f.

²⁹ So Dudley, p. 63.

own account that their relations were not innocent in nature, and this event may have provoked later slander of this type.³⁰ While this event may have benefited Bion by giving him of a better education, especially in rhetoric,³¹ his experiences at this time cannot have improved his character but must have made him more cynical. However, the rhetor died, while Bion was still young, and left his slave everything, including his freedom. Bion does not seem to have treated the memory of his former master with great piety. In order to stress his change of life he burnt all the *συγγράμματα* of the rhetor, which must refer to rhetorical treatises, and raised all the ready money he could. No estimates of the amount can be made. It does not seem to have been enough to make Bion economically independent for the rest of his life, as he later had to exact fees from his students and rely on the support of Antigonus Gonatas (cf. T4, F16A and F78). Notwithstanding that his behaviour does not seem to be particularly praiseworthy, Bion's aim was noble. He left Olbia for Athens in order to study philosophy, and here we enter upon a new phase of his life.

Bion probably came to Athens before 314 B.C., as we have seen. It was just at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, less than ten years after the death of Alexander the Great. Even if a new period had begun, the change cannot have been apparent at this very early stage.³² Athens was at this time ruled for Cassander by Demetrius of Phaleron (317–307 B.C.), who combined this activity with that of a Peripatetic philosopher.³³ This period seems to have been a peaceful and comparatively happy one. Athens was still recognized as the intellectual, and especially philosophical, centre of the Greek world and Antigonus Gonatas could later speak of the city as *τὰς δὲ Ἀθήνας, ὥσπερ σκοπὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης* (Plutarch *Demetrius* 8.2). So it attracted many students from other parts of the Greek world. When Bion arrived, the old philosophical schools, the Academy and the Peripatos, were still the most important, Aristotle having died only a few years before (322 B.C.). In addition the Cynic school must have been notable in Athens and the memory of Diogenes, who had died not long ago, still very vivid. But the two new schools of Epicurus and Zeno, which

³⁰ It may be of a certain interest that according to Dio of Prusa 36.8 Olbia took over the pederasty from Miletus and preserved it even during a much later period; cf. Treu, pp. 147 f.

³¹ Cf. Rudd, pp. 17 f: "Bion was lucky enough to be bought by a rhetorician who gave him an education."

³² For a general survey of Athens during this period see C.F. Angus, in *The Cambridge Ancient History* VII (Cambridge, 1928) pp. 224 ff and Schneider, I pp. 158 ff.

³³ For Demetrius see *RE*, IV (1901) s.v. Demetrios von Phaleron (no. 85) cols. 2817 ff (Martini), *RE*, Suppl.b. XI (1968) s.v. Demetrios von Phaleron cols. 514 ff (Wehrli) and E. Bayer, 'Demetrios Phalereus der Athener', *Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 36 (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1942). The fragments are collected in F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* IV, 2. ed. (Basel-Stuttgart, 1968).

were to have the greatest importance during the Hellenistic period, did not yet exist in Athens. Epicurus did not arrive in Athens until 307/6 B.C. Zeno, on the other hand, arrived at about the same time as Bion and they may very well have been fellow-students.³⁴ It is of great interest that Menander was already active at the time of Bion's arrival. The picture which he gave of contemporary life in Athens in his comedies cannot have been completely without influence on Bion, especially as the two men shared the same philosophical background.

Obviously Bion first turned his attention to the Academy³⁵ and Xenocrates, its head, was probably the first teacher he approached. The two men were obviously too different to be able to get on very well, as we can see from an anecdote in Diog. Laert. 4.10 (= T22).³⁶ Immediately after this anecdote Diog. Laert. gives another story: *πρὸς δὲ τὸν μήτε μουσικὴν μήτε γεωμετρίαν μήτε ἀστρονομίαν μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν φοιτᾶν, 'πορεύου,' ἔφη· 'λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας.' οἱ δὲ τοῦτό φασιν εἰπεῖν, 'παρ' ἑμοὶ γὰρ πόκος οὐ κνάπτεται' (Diog. Laert. 4.10). Who is this ignorant and anonymous student? We cannot know for sure, but I think it very likely that he is Bion,³⁷ who of course cannot have acquired a very thorough education and who was later known to deprecate all branches of the liberal education as completely worthless. Moreover the second reply — *παρ' ἑμοὶ γὰρ πόκος οὐ κνάπτεται*³⁸ — which may be proverbial,³⁹ conveys the same meaning, that there is a certain order in all things and that you cannot take up study of philosophy without a proper*

³⁴ For the chronology of Zeno's life see *RE*, XA:1 (1972) s.v. Zenon (no. 2) cols. 83 ff (v. Fritz).

³⁵ Cf. Dio of Prusa 36.26–27 for the devotion to Plato shown by the inhabitants of Olbia during a much later period.

³⁶ Xenocrates seems to have been a dignified character but completely devoid of all personal charm, as we can see from Plato's remark: *Ξενόκρατες, θῦε ταῖς χάρισι* (Diog. Laert. 4.6). Furthermore Xenocrates is described as *σεμνὸς . . . καὶ σκυθρωπός* (Diog. Laert. 4.6) and *tristis ac severus philosophus* (Lucilius fr. 754 Marx). There is also the interesting story that Crates the Cynic criticized Xenocrates for his *τῦφος* (Marcus Aurelius 6.13).

³⁷ This suggestion was hazarded already by Dudley, p. 63 n. 3 (p. 90).

³⁸ For the terminology cf. H. Blümner, *Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Künste bei den Griechen und Römern I* (Leipzig, 1875) p. 94 and p. 165 n. 1; cf. also R.J. Forbes, *Studies in Ancient Technology IV* (Leyden, 1956) pp. 82 ff.

³⁹ Cf. Galenus *De diff. puls.* 2.9 p. 624 Kühn VIII: *τὸ γὰρ τοῦ Ἀρκεσιλάου καλόν, ὥς οὐδεὶς πόκον εἰς γναφεῖον φέρει. τάξις γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἐρίων ἐργασίας, οὕτω καὶ μαθημάτων διδασκαλίας.* D. Müller, 'Handwerk und Sprache: Die sprachlichen Bilder aus dem Bereich des Handwerks in der griechischen Literatur bis 400 v. Chr.', *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie*, 51 (Meisenheim am Glan, 1974) p. 194 takes this to be the comedy-writer Arcesilaus, who is known only from the list of homonyms in Diog. Laert. 4.45. I believe this interpretation to be incorrect; in my opinion Arcesilaus here is the founder of the Middle Academy, which allows of the possibility that he is using an expression of Xenocrates. For another saying also wrongly ascribed to Arcesilaus the comedy-writer see F31 with commentary.

preparation. It may also possibly hint at Bion's origin in Olbia, as the countries round the Black Sea were famous producers and exporters of wool to different Greek cities, especially Miletus.⁴⁰

After this event the course of Bion's philosophical studies is given by Diog. Laert. 4.51–52 (= T19), the truth of which should be accepted as I have already pointed out. According to this description Bion first studied with the Academician Crates, probably only for a short period. This point in Bion's biography is among the most controversial,⁴¹ the chief stumbling-block being that Crates was not the head of the Academy at this period. Scholars have therefore here seen some confusion with Xenocrates or the Cynic Crates. Neither of these explanations is probable, and the fact that Bion studied with the Academician Crates belongs to the best documented in his biography (cf. also T20–21). It is obviously part of the philosophical tradition and should be accepted. The fact that Crates was not scholarch at this period cannot be said to have prevented Bion from being his pupil, as he was old enough to be teaching and his lectures may have attracted Bion more than those of Xenocrates.⁴²

After attending the Academy Bion, according to the intellectual biography given by Diog. Laert., joined the Cynic school, "put on the Cynic uniform." There is something of a mystery in this, as Diog. Laert. does not name any teacher from this school. Furthermore Bion is never called a Cynic and has hardly any known connections with this school or with other philosophers belonging to it. Therefore the fact that Bion is mentioned in one of Polystratus' attacks on the Cynic school (T27) is of special value. However there is no doubt that Bion actually studied with the Cynics, and was deeply impressed by their way of thought and expression. The most important Cynic at this time

⁴⁰ Cf. H. Blümner, 'Die gewerbliche Thätigkeit der Völker des klassischen Altertums', *Preisschriften der Fürstlich Jablonowski'schen Gesellschaft zu Leipzig*, 15 (Leipzig, 1869) p. 42 and n. 16, DS, III:2 (1904) s.v. Lana p. 916 (Thédenat) and *RE*, XII:1 (1924) s.v. Lana cols. 607 f (Orth).

⁴¹ I here give a survey of the opinions of the most important scholars: Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 342 n. 2 does not accept the order given by Diog. Laert. and believes there is some confusion between Crates the Academician and Xenocrates or Crates the Cynic; a similar opinion is found in Susemihl 1890, pp. 187 f and Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 33 and n. 98 and v. Arnim 1899, cols. 483 f; Dümmler, p. 70 and Soro, p. 70 also believe that Crates the Cynic is meant. Dudley, p. 63 thinks that Xenocrates was the teacher from the Academy, but cf. also n. 3 (pp. 89 f). The following scholars accept that Crates the Academician was Bion's teacher: Wachsmuth, p. 74, Hirzel 1877–83, II p. 60 n. 2 and Hirzel 1895, I p. 375 n. 1, Gomperz, II p. 198, Leo, pp. 70 f, Hense 1909, pp. LXVI f (after having expressed another opinion in his earlier edition), Tarn, pp. 234 f, Überweg-Praechter, p. 433, Fiske, p. 178 n. 126 and Capelle, col. 995. Hirzel, Gomperz, Leo, Hense and Überweg-Praechter, however, do not attach any importance to the order of the schools as given by Diog. Laert.

⁴² See Hirzel 1895, I p. 375 n. 1.

was Crates, the disciple of Diogenes, who had a very long life and spent most of it in Athens.⁴³ His pupils during this period probably included Zeno, later the founder of the Stoa.⁴⁴ It must be assumed that Bion had some teacher from the Cynic school and even if we cannot reach full certainty here, Crates would be the obvious choice, especially as his form of Cynicism seems to have been not without influence on Bion's own standpoint. There may be different reasons for this vagueness concerning Bion's relations with the Cynic school. One could be that the Cynic school did not acknowledge Bion as one of its members because of his later philosophical development. Therefore it is also possible that part of the tradition which was hostile to Bion originated with the Cynics. The refusal of the ancient philosophical tradition to regard him mainly as a Cynic is shown by the fact that Diog. Laert. placed him among the philosophers of the Academy. Of greater importance is the whole structure of the Cynic school, which like the small Socratic schools in general, did not have a very strict organization. It lacked a centre like the Academy or the Lyceum and a definite succession of leaders. The very prominent Cynic individualism may also have made teacher-pupil relations less important than in other schools.⁴⁵

After studying in the Cynic school Bion did something which has surprised many: he joined Theodorus, the follower of the Cyrenaic school, and must have studied with him before 307 B.C. This is very well testified⁴⁶ and may have been of importance both for Bion personally and for the later development of the Cynic school. The step, however, may be less surprising than is at first apparent, as the distinctions between the Cynic and the Cyrenaic schools were much smaller under men like Crates and Theodorus than they had been before.

Finally Bion completed his philosophical education by spending some time in the Peripatetic school,⁴⁷ which at this time was under the leadership of Theophrastus, a period which has also left a certain imprint on both his philosophy and his writings. We may note that Arcesilaus, who studied with the Academician Crates, was also Bion's fellow-student with Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. 4.29).

So Bion acquired his philosophical education in four different philosophical schools, which, while they may have been less different than is usually believed, is often unfavourably regarded as being evidence of mental instability. How-

⁴³ Cf. Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 285 n. 1, Susemihl 1891–92, I pp. 29 f, Schwartz, p. 18 and *RE*, XI:2 (1922) s.v. Krates (no. 6) col. 1625 (Stenzel).

⁴⁴ Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.2.–4 and *RE*, XA:1 (1972) s.v. Zenon (no. 2) col. 86 (v. Fritz).

⁴⁵ Cf. v. Arnim 1898, pp. 20 ff for the small Socratic schools in general, Brown, p. 25 and Döring, p. 94.

⁴⁶ Except for Diog. Laert. 4.52 (= T19), see also T20 and T23.

⁴⁷ Bion is referred to as *ὁ περιπατητικός* in F39A and C.

ever, this fact may be judged in a somewhat different way. It was obviously a scholarly tradition to attend different schools, and several other philosophers, roughly contemporary with Bion followed the same course. Indeed Arcesilaus, after studying with a mathematician and then with a musician, became a pupil of Theophrastus and ended up with Crantor from the Academy (Diog. Laert. 4.29). Metrocles was first a pupil of Theophrastus and later became a follower of the Cynics (Diog. Laert. 6.94). Zeno, who founded the Stoa, listened to Crates the Cynic and to Stilpon, Xenocrates and Polemon as well (Diog. Laert. 7.2). Obviously this habit was very common in Bion's time and therefore could not have been looked upon with contempt. The reason may be found in a more practical approach, i.e. of learning where opportunity offered, and in the fact that the schools here concerned did not have completely different philosophical systems and did not form closed groups of the type which we later find in the Stoic and the Epicurean schools.⁴⁸

For the rest of Bion's life, which is the greater part of it, we have no dates and no definite events. The period as such was extremely eventful, both from a political and a cultural point of view. People in general must have been most affected by the eternal wars in progress between the new Hellenistic kingdoms, which made this period very insecure and disturbed, a fact not without importance for the development of Hellenistic philosophy. Returning to Bion, we can only arrive at a very vague and general idea of his life as a philosopher. For this was the career Bion entered upon after finishing his studies. It seems that he adopted the life of a wandering philosopher, touring the Greek cities (Diog. Laert. 4.53 = T3). However we only know with full certainty that he visited Rhodes (Diog. Laert. 4.49 and 53 = T3 and F4). It may also be assumed that Bion visited Macedonia, thanks to his relations with its ruler Antigonus Gonatas (cf. below) but there is no definite information on this point. It may further be assumed that he spent much time in Athens as the philosophical centre of the Greek world, and that he was there at the same time as Eratosthenes, who however seems to have spent about twenty years there.⁴⁹ In this way of life and teaching he continued more the habit of the old sophists than the custom of the immediately preceding philosophers, who seem to have preferred to stay in one place.⁵⁰ This similarity, and others, between Bion and the old sophists were

⁴⁸ Cf. Geffcken 1909, pp. 56 ff and Döring, p. 95.

⁴⁹ Cf. Strabo 1.2.2 (= T12), which probably should be interpreted as meaning that Eratosthenes knew Bion personally; for another view see Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 342 n. 2. For the dates of Eratosthenes and his stay in Athens see Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 410, *RE*, VI (1909) s.v. Eratosthenes (no. 4) cols. 358 ff (Knaack), *FGrH* 241 T10 with the commentary of F. Jacoby ad loc. and P.M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* II (Oxford, 1972) pp. 489 f (n. 205).

⁵⁰ Cf. Guthrie, pp. 40 f and v. Arnim 1898, pp. 4 ff for a general survey.

noted and he is often called a sophist in the ancient sources.⁵¹ The same similarity to the sophists can also be found in members of the Cyrenaic school, such as Aristippus and Theodorus.

It seems probable that Bion, also in this respect a follower of the old sophists, gave two types of lectures, one intended for his real pupils and one of a more public character.⁵² It is obvious that Bion had a group of young students, who were able to pay for his lectures. This fact is stated even by Bion himself, and there is no reason to doubt him (F78; cf. also T3). This group was obviously very numerous (T3) and for it Bion reserved discussion of more intricate problems, such as questions of religion (T3 and F25). It may even have been this group of students which took notes during Bion's lectures and later published them, but this is very uncertain (cf. Chapter II). It is possible that this aspect was not the most important of Bion's teaching activity, as he can hardly be expected to have given complete courses, which becomes clear from both his way of life and his personality. Therefore Bion does not seem to have formed a group of followers, connected closely enough to form a real school, but the reason may be found in the difficulties arising from his travelling life. Moreover the old sophists did not form proper schools. But Bion also gave lectures to a more general audience, presumably at gymnasia and similar establishments (T3). We cannot say whether he charged the listeners on these occasions. It must have been these lectures to a larger audience which created Bion's fame and from which most, but not all, of the preserved fragments come.⁵³ Here too he seems to have followed more the example of the sophists and the Cyrenaics than of the old Cynics. Is it possible to say anything about Bion's audience? There is a common picture of Bion preaching what has been called a "philosophy of the proletariat"⁵⁴ to everyone who cared to listen at

⁵¹ Bion is called σοφιστής T2A–C, T15, T23, T28, F35A–B, F47A and E–F and F56; on the other hand he is called φιλόσοφος T15, F1B, F2 and F3. For the meaning of σοφιστής see C. Brandstaetter, 'De notionum πολιτικῶς et σοφιστής usu rhetorico', *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie*, 15 (Leipzig, 1894) pp. 129 ff, G.W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1969) pp. 10 ff and G.R. Stanton, 'Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification', *American Journal of Philology*, 94 (1973) pp. 350 ff.

⁵² See Guthrie, pp. 41 ff and Soro, p. 72 for Bion.

⁵³ Cf. Soro, p. 73.

⁵⁴ This expression of the Cynic philosophy seems to have been used for the first time by C.W. Goettling, 'Diogenes der Kyniker', *Gesammelte Abhandlungen aus dem classischen Alterthume I* (Halle, 1851) pp. 251 ff and has often been repeated by later scholars, both of the Cynic philosophy in general and of Bion's philosophical message. However, it conveys a completely wrong meaning. There is no evidence that the Cynics of the first generations directed their activity especially to the proletariat. That their philosophy is of a very simple and practical kind is something different. Furthermore as the Cynics did not intend to bring about a social change, I do not think that it is correct to regard them as revolutionaries or anarchists in any practical

streetcorners and in workshops. This could of course have happened but I think it grossly exaggerated. Bion's listeners were not to be found exclusively among the poorest and completely uneducated classes, which is obvious from his fragments.⁵⁵ On the contrary, I think that Bion intended his message to be useful to everyone, even those in a high social position.⁵⁶

During this period one event proved to be of special importance for Bion: his meeting and, as far as it is possible to judge, later friendship with Antigonus Gonatas, the ruler of Macedonia.⁵⁷ Because of his importance it seems appropriate to give some dates for Antigonus. He seems to have been about fifteen years younger than Bion and the limits of his life are the years 320/19 and 240/39 B.C. He was the ruler of Macedonia from 277/6 B.C. and later extended his power over parts of Greece proper. He was obviously an unusually talented and attractive character. He had in his younger days studied with both Menedemus of Eretria and the Stoic Zeno and always had a great interest in philosophy as well as in literature. He was in contact with many of the most outstanding men of this period and often invited them to his court in Macedonia.⁵⁸ Among philosophers may be noted the two Stoics Persaeus of Citium and Philonides of Thebes, who came instead of their master Zeno, who declined Antigonus' call. These two have a certain place in the biography of Bion (cf. F1 and F73). There was also a poet, Aratus of Soloi, and a historian, Hieronymus of Cardia, to mention some of the best known names. Bion must also have been a member of this circle. The date of his meeting with Antigonus is not known and he cannot have arrived at Pella earlier than 276 B.C. according to Tarn,⁵⁹ which is a very plausible guess. It may at first be surprising to find a Cynic as a court-philosopher, a position usually reserved for the Stoics, but this is due to the wrong conception of Cynicism as being a philosophy for the proletariat. We may remember that Alexander the Great was accompanied by

sense, as does e.g. L. Combes, 'Un précurseur anarchiste: Diogène', *Bibliothèque des "Temps Nouveaux"*, 19 (Brussels, 1899) and Joel 1921, p. 867. For a correction of this view see Dudley, p. XI, Høistad, p. 117 and n. 7, Baldry, p. 112, and Schouler, p. 34 n. 3.

⁵⁵ The common picture of Bion's listeners was first questioned by Pohlenz 1955, p. 86; cf. also Schouler, pp. 33 ff for popular philosophy in general.

⁵⁶ This has been stressed e.g. by v. Rooy, p. 109.

⁵⁷ For Antigonus Gonatas see especially Tarn and W. Fellman, *Antigonos Gonatas, König der Makedonen, und die griechischen Staaten* (Diss. Würzburg, 1930); cf. also C.F. Edson, 'The Personal Appearance of Antigonos Gonatas', *Classical Philology*, 29 (1934) pp. 254 f, M. Chambers, 'The First Regnal Year of Antigonus Gonatas', *American Journal of Philology*, 75 (1954) pp. 385 ff, and E. Manni, 'Antigono Gonata e Demetrio II: Punti fermi e problemi aperti', *Athenaeum*, N.S. 34 (1956) pp. 249 ff.

⁵⁸ For this so-called "circle of Antigonus" see Susemihl 1891–92, I pp. 3 f and Tarn, pp. 223 ff.

⁵⁹ Tarn, p. 235 n. 45.

a Cynic, Onesicritus.⁶⁰ Obviously the relations between Antigonus and Bion were not completely without difficulties in the beginning as Bion had to defend himself before the king against the slander of Persaeus and Philonides, his Stoic opponents at the court. Presumably he was successful and Antigonus completely accepted him in spite of his humble origin. Very little is known about their relations because of the character of the material.⁶¹ Bion gives the impression of remaining completely independent and very outspoken even before the king, and we cannot find any traces of personal warmth or gratitude. Antigonus, however, must have been of great help and support for Bion, who was not so rigid a philosopher as to refuse gifts from rulers. Bion refers to this in one of the fragments (F16A; cf. also T4), and it is also said that Antigonus sent the dying philosopher, who obviously was without means, two slaves to look after him (Diog. Laert. 4.54 = T5).

While Antigonus cannot be called “a philosopher on the throne”, he had a great interest in philosophy and tended to apply philosophical principles to himself and his exalted position. It is probable that the Stoic school was the most important to him but he was not so one-sided as to refuse to listen to members of other schools, when their teaching could be of any use. The character of the material makes it very difficult to say with any certainty whether Bion in any way influenced Antigonus.⁶² There are some anecdotes and sayings preserved, where Antigonus expresses an opinion very similar to what is known from Bion.⁶³ Although the foundation here is weak, some cases are so obvious that we may assume that Antigonus was influenced by his philosopher. Bion’s opinion that a man should be judged for what he is himself and not for his ancestry (F1–2) has an equivalent in Antigonus’ saying: ἀνδραγαθίας οὐ πατραγαθίας μισθὸν καὶ δωρεὰς δίδωμι (Ps-Plutarch *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*) (Antigonus no. 4) 183 D = Plutarch *De vitioso pudore* 14.534 C = Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.29b.39).⁶⁴ It must however be admitted that the idea is very common at this time. The most famous saying of Antigonus is one addressed to his son: ‘οὐκ οἶσθα’, εἶπεν, ‘ὦ παῖ, τὴν βασιλείαν ἡμῶν ἐνδοξον εἶναι δουλείαν;’ (Aelianus *VH* 2.20).⁶⁵ The underlying idea may derive

⁶⁰ Cf. Dudley, p. 69 for Cynics as court-philosophers during a later period, and H. Diels, *Doxographi graeci* 2. ed. (Berlin-Leipzig, 1929) p. 82 n. 2, where a list of philosophers at different courts during the Hellenistic period is given.

⁶¹ Apart from F1 we have only F16A, where Bion most probably refers to his relations with Antigonus.

⁶² Cf. Tarn, p. 235: “It is probable that Bion’s relations with Antigonus were very much closer than written tradition gives us any idea of.”

⁶³ See Tarn, pp. 235 and nn. 46–47 for different possibilities.

⁶⁴ Hense 1909, p. LXXXVIII believes this to come from Bion, who would have passed this off as Antigonus’ reply if asked.

⁶⁵ For the interpretation of this difficult saying see H. Volkmann, ‘Ἐνδοξος δουλεία als eh-

from Bion's philosophical concept of freedom and slavery (F11).

During his life Bion also came in contact with other persons of importance. Some have already been mentioned and I shall here only note a few, who were neither teachers nor pupils. I have already mentioned the Stoics Persaeus and Philonides, with whom Bion's relations were not of the best (F1 and F73). Obviously Bion must have been known to Menedemus of Eretria, who has passed a very shrewd judgement on him (F32) and who was probably in close personal contact with him (T3). They may have met, if not earlier, at the court of Antigonus. Another philosopher known to Bion was Arcesilaus, founder of the Middle Academy, who also studied with both the Academician Crates and Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. 4.22, 4.23 and 4.29) and their relations were evidently rather close (cf. T12, T20, T23 and F31).

Bion died at a very advanced age after a period of illness in Chalcis, which then must have belonged to Antigonus. He seems to have led a miserable existence there until his old protector sent two slaves to look after him. The inhabitants of Chalcis at this time had strange things to tell of his last days. Bion, who had been so critical of all popular and superstitious aspects of religion, is said to have succumbed to such a practice and to have repented his earlier critical attitude (Diog. Laert. 4.54 = T5). This is given as a rumour in Chalcis and is probably a malicious invention of Bion's enemies, by which a practice which Bion himself condemns (F30) is ascribed to him. Of course it is impossible to reach certainty on this point.⁶⁶

It is very difficult to describe Bion's personality,⁶⁷ as the material is very scanty and often of a very doubtful character to boot, since it consists largely of slander and produces a deliberately distorted picture. It seems obvious that the main document, the biography in Diog. Laert., represents for the most part a hostile tradition,⁶⁸ with regard to Bion's life, depicting him as an ostentatious and selfish man, primarily interested in the acquisition of money for a life of pleasure, and indulging in loose homosexual relationships.

It may here be useful to discuss the composition of this biography, before

renvoller Knechtdienst gegenüber dem Gesetz', *Philologus*, 100 (1956) pp. 52 ff and H. Volkmann, 'Die Basileia als ἐνδοξος δουλεία: Ein Beitrag zur Wortgeschichte der Duleia', *Historia*, 16 (1967) pp. 155 ff.

⁶⁶ Cf. Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 35 n. 104^b and Hense 1909, p. LIX, who are wholly convinced that this story is only a malicious invention.

⁶⁷ I do not think that comparisons with modern philosophers will bring us closer to an understanding of Bion's character and personality. Otherwise Bion has been compared with, e.g., both Voltaire (so Hirzel 1877–83, II p. 60, Gomperz, II p. 198, Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 34 and Summers, p. XXII) and Rousseau (so Soro, p. 65).

⁶⁸ This fact was pointed out already by Rodhe, p. 248 n. 1 and Wachsmuth, p. 75 and has been accepted by all later scholars, e.g. v. Arnim 1899, col. 485, Hense 1909, pp. LVIII ff and Tarn, p. 234.

entering upon the question of the sources.⁶⁹ It consists of the following parts:

46–47¹: The question of Bion's background is answered by a quotation from Bion himself, containing a small dialogue between him and Antigonus Gonatas, from which it is already obvious that Bion had previously been slandered.

47²: The preceding attack is supported by a short description of Bion as a sophist and an enemy of dogmatic philosophy; there is also a short and negative reference to his behaviour.

47³–51¹: A short item about the types of Bion's literary work is followed by a collection of sayings. They are given without any obvious order and may be taken over from different collections as some are rather similar.

51²–52¹: A survey of Bion's philosophical education, where his connections with the Cynic school in particular are considered in an unfavorable light.

52²: A description of Bion's style, which is described as being too theatrical, vulgar and flowery, with a reference to Eratosthenes. An example of his parody leads by association to a brief mention of his opinion of the liberal arts.

53–54¹: A description of Bion's way of life, where the stress is laid on his selfishness and ostentation, his immoral relations with young men, the absence of real pupils and his antireligious influence.

54²: Bion's fatal illness, his conversion, the support of Antigonus and his death. Finally there is a reference to Favorinus, the only source mentioned, apart from Eratosthenes.

55–57: The poem by Diog. Laert. himself on Bion, completely without any value.

58: A list of homonyms is given.⁷⁰

Much has been made of the sources in this biography by earlier scholars, who reached very different results, all of which are highly hypothetical. I shall here give a survey of the most notable theories. Already Bahnsch⁷¹ found two

⁶⁹ For different problems concerning Diogenes Laertius see *RE*, V (1905) s.v. Diogenes Laertius (no. 40) cols. 738 ff (Schwartz), R. Hope, *The Book of Diogenes Laertius* (Diss. Columbia, 1930), A. Biedl, 'Das grosse Excerpt Φ ', *Studi e Testi*, 184 (Città del Vaticano, 1955) and Mensching, pp. 8 ff. For examples of analyses of different biographies in Diog. Laert. see A. Delatte, 'La vie de Pythagore de Diogène Laërce', *Académie Royal de Belgique*, Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques, Mem. — Coll. in —8°, 2^e sér., 17:2 (Brussels, 1922) and A.-H. Chroust, 'An Analysis of the *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laertius (DL V 1–16)', in *Aristotle: New light on his Life and on some of his Lost Works* (University of Notre Dame, 1973) I pp. 25 ff. A substantial bibliography for Diog. Laert. will be found in Gigante, pp. XI ff.

⁷⁰ This may come from Demetrius of Magnesia, whose work is mentioned e.g. in Diog. Laert. 1.38 and 1.79; cf. Leo, pp. 39 ff, Crönert, pp. 134 f, and Hope, op. cit. (n. 69) pp. 86 f.

⁷¹ F. Bahnsch, *Quaestionum de Diogenis Laertii fontibus initia* (Diss. Königsberg, 1868) p. 29.

different sources both for the collection of apophthegmata and for the biography proper, without however discussing the problem in detail. The main result was accepted by the following scholars but in different ways. Susemihl⁷² divides the biography into two parts with the dividing line at § 52 *ἦν δὲ καὶ θεατρικός*. He assumed that the first part derived from the original biographer of the Academy and was friendly to Bion, with two exceptions: *καὶ τί — ἀπάθειαν* and *κατὰ πᾶν — σοφιστεύοντος* in § 52 came from the second, hostile source. The second part of the biography was completely hostile. The question of whether a Stoic was the source of this section was left open. Susemihl further assumed that *εἰς τὸ ἀποχρῆσθαι — ἡδονὰς καὶ* in § 53 and *καίτοι τινὰς — πεπονθένειαν* in § 54 came from Aristippus' *Περὶ παλαιᾶς τρυφῆς*, and *ἐνίστε καὶ φαντασίαν — περιβλεπτος ἦν* in § 53 from still another source.

Hense⁷³ also assumes two main sources but places the dividing line at *οὗτος τὴν ἀρχὴν* in § 51. The first part is friendly to Bion and the collection of apophthegmata included by the editor. The second part is hostile and Hense compares it with the biography of Arcesilaus. As possible sources he mentions Aristippus and a Stoic but stresses the uncertainty. Even in this part there is a combination of false and true statements.

Leo⁷⁴ too seems to accept the theory of two different sources in the biography of Bion, with § 47 and §§ 52–54 deriving from the one, characterized by key-words, while the rest comes from a single biography. Leo assumes that the second part comes from a biographical work on the members of the Academy after Plato, which incorporates the other part with its characterization. The author of this book is younger than Antigonos of Carystus⁷⁵ but imitates his style, and the biography is similar to those of Speusippus and Arcesilaus.⁷⁶

All these different theories instil a strong sense of uncertainty and it is impossible to reconstruct the different stages underlying the biography of Bion as it now stands with any degree of plausibility. On the whole I find the analysis of Leo the more probable. It is clear that § 47 and §§ 51²–54 come from the same source, as they display a great similarity of structure. Furthermore § 47 can hardly be described as flattering for Bion, and there is no real repetition of facts to exclude the possibility of the same source for the two parts. But I am less sure than Leo that the other parts are of a more objective character, consid-

⁷² Susemihl 1890, pp. 188 ff and Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 32 n. 96.

⁷³ Hense 1909, pp. LXII ff.

⁷⁴ Leo, pp. 65 ff.

⁷⁵ For this biographer see Wilamowitz, pp. 26 ff and A. Dihle, 'Studien zur griechischen Biographie', *Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 3. Folge, 37 (Göttingen, 1956) pp. 107 ff.

⁷⁶ For this unknown author see also Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 134 n. 665^c and Crönert, p. 134, who would identify him with Antisthenes.

ering their present form. The introductory, autobiographical fragment was probably originally a defence but it can, with its outspoken character, also be used by an enemy to show that Bion actually admitted everything for which he was condemned. The beginning of the following part — *καὶ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς* — seeks to stress the accuracy of the negative impression given by the introduction. The description of Bion's philosophical teachers is also hostile in tone, especially concerning his relations to the Cynic school; his sophistic leaning is stressed here (*σοφιστεύοντος*) as well as in § 47 (*σοφιστής*). Therefore it seems obvious to me that the whole biography with the exception of the collection of apophthegmata has acquired a hostile colouring, at least in the form found in Diog. Laert., which makes the assumption of two different sources uncertain. It seems impossible to discern a personality behind these different sources and every suggestion concerning Aristippus' *Περὶ παλαιᾶς τρυφῆς*⁷⁷ or a Stoic must remain a guess. Diog. Laert. only mentioned Eratosthenes (§ 52) and Favorinus (§ 54) as sources for two very short items. Even though Bion's relations to the Stoics Persaeus and Philonides were not of the best, I doubt if this episode can have been of such importance as to provoke a Stoic attack at a much later date.⁷⁸

Yet it is surprising that Diog. Laert. and his source included the biography of Bion among the biographies of the Academy; indeed the Academy may be said to be the philosophical school which had the least influence on Bion, who can in no way be considered as a typical exponent for the Academy. Here I think that the correct explanation is given by Leo,⁷⁹ who assumes that originally Bion was mentioned in the history of the Academy only as a pupil of Crates and that he was given a biography of his own first by the later historian, who wanted to include the amusing material about Bion in his book.

Leaving the question of sources it is beyond doubt that the accusations in the main represent slander by Bion's enemies or are based on a distorted interpretation of Bion's ideas or actions. If these stories were to be accepted it would create too wide a gap between the life and the doctrine of Bion as we know it from the fragments. On the other hand, one must beware of going too far in the other direction.⁸⁰ We have only scanty anecdotes and fragments to go on. Bion had a very long life, studied in different schools, and was subject to

⁷⁷ Cf. Wilamowitz, pp. 48 ff for this rather obscure work, which is quoted only by Diog. Laert. Leo, p. 66 n. 3 rightly stressed that it is impossible to distinguish certain passages of the Bion-vita as coming from this work.

⁷⁸ A Stoic source was assumed by Rohde, p. 248 n.1; Hense 1909, p. LXV is reticent on this point and Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 32 n. 96 very sceptical. Cf. however Dudley, pp. 64 f, who would make the Stoics responsible for all slander.

⁷⁹ Leo, pp. 70 ff.

⁸⁰ This seems to have happened especially to the picture of Bion given by Tarn, pp. 233 ff.

different impulses, which may have affected his outlook on life and created a change in his lifestyle on different occasions, without turning his life into the chaos, depicted by some modern scholars. The paradoxical and shocking utterances, to which he, like the Cynics in general, was prone, may easily have been taken seriously and transferred to his own life, and the same applies to some of his doctrines, given a malicious interpretation. His doctrine on adaptation to circumstances, his by no means rigid view of the use of wealth, and of the possibility of receiving support from others, as well as his custom of receiving payment from his pupils may have contributed to the picture of Bion as a selfish parasite. The way his use of the proverb *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων* was interpreted (T3) is a typical example. Bion seems to reject pederasty, except in one saying, which definitely has the character of a paradox, intended to shock. This could easily be exaggerated and transferred to his own life. We can here also remember Bion's early experiences as a young slave at the rhetor's house. The accusations we find of ostentatious behaviour may come from circles which demanded from a philosopher strict and worthy behaviour as well as literary style, and may have some foundation in so far as Bion's methods can be assumed to be far from conventional.

A knowledge of Bion's background is of great importance for a proper understanding of his personality — born in the lowest possible circumstances and sold as a young boy into slavery. This fact must have expressed itself in his behaviour, which cannot have been particularly refined and which must have shocked many and annoyed even more. He seems to have been a person of great self-confidence, who could never resist a joke, sometimes of a rather scornful kind, even at the expense of generally respected persons,⁸¹ and who loved a fight and aggression for its own sake, even when it was not necessary.⁸² He must have attracted many enemies as is obvious from his biography. On the other hand, there must have been something of value in the character of Bion. Otherwise we would not be able to explain his friendship with Antigonus Gonatas and the influence he actually possessed. The saying of Eratosthenes points in the same direction, viz. that you must go below the surface to find the real Bion (Strabo 1.2.2 = T12). When he attracted people it was probably more thanks to his teaching than to his character but the latter must have been inherent in the former. He must have been a very straightforward man with a very strong belief in his mission. There is also a warmer side in his strong feeling for his fellow-men and even for animals, which is something very rare. So Bion proves to be a man both of value and importance.

⁸¹ Cf. Gomperz, II p. 198, who comments upon Bion's contemptuous treatment of Archytas (Diog. Laert. 4.52 = F7): "was ihm in unseren Augen ernsteren Eintrag thut als all das schlimme Gerede, das über ihn in Umlauf war."

⁸² This had been noted already by Menedemus (Diog. Laert. 2.135 = F32).

II. Literary Work, Language, and Style

1. Literary work

It is by no means easy to form a clear picture of the form and character of Bion's literary work. The main reason is of course that his work consists for us only of tiny fragments, but the paucity of information in the ancient authorities is also a great obstacle.¹ There are, after all, only two short testimonies given by Diog. Laert. to guide us here: *πλεῖστά τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα χρειώδη πραγματείαν περιέχοντα* (4.47 = T7) and *ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς* (2.77 = T8), when Diog. Laert. reproduces an anecdote about Aristippus, originally told by Bion. What dates can be gathered from these two sentences about the work of Bion? From the first we derive the interesting and valuable information that the literary works left by Bion were very numerous. Furthermore they are described by Diog. Laert. as *ὑπομνήματα*. The original meaning of this word seems to be "memoranda" or "notes", taken down as a support for the memory.² We find the word with this meaning e.g. in Plato *Phaedrus* 276 D, *Politicus* 295 C, and *Theaetetus* 143 A. An interesting definition is given by Simplicius, *In Arist. Cat. comm.* p. 4 Kalbfleisch (*Comm. in Arist. Gr.* VIII, 1907): *τῶν δὲ καθόλου τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπομνηματικά, ὅσα πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν οἰκείαν καὶ πλείονα βάσανον συνέταξεν ὁ φιλόσοφος*. The contrast between *ὑπομνήματα* and literature which is more carefully written, is stressed in another definition by Ammonius, *In Arist. Cat. comm.* p. 4 Busse (*Comm. in Arist. Gr.* IV, 1897): *ὑπομνηματικά δὲ καλοῦνται ἐν οἷς τὰ κεφάλαια μόνα ἀπογράφονται...καὶ ταύτῃ διενήνοχε τὰ ὑπομνηματικά τῶν συνταγματικῶν τάξει τε καὶ ἐρμηνείας κάλλει*. The term can be used both of a lecturer's own notes as a support for his memory and of a student taking down notes from a teacher's lectures. I find it impossible at this stage to decide on the meaning applied by Diog. Laert. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the word can later be used with different meanings. It can

¹ It would however be unduly critical to doubt that Bion actually wrote; for a sceptical view on this point see Hirzel 1895, I p. 374 and n. 5 and Lejay, p. IX.

² For the meaning of the word *ὑπόμνημα* see E. Köpke, 'De hypomnematis Graecis', *Programm des Friedrichs-Werderschen Gymnasiums* (Berlin, 1842) pp. 1 ff, E. Köpke, *De Hypomnematis Graecis* (Brandenburg, 1863) Hirzel 1877–83, II p. 65 n. 1, Hirzel 1895, I p. 144 n. 3, Halbauer, p. 7, A. Schumrick, *Observationes ad rem librariam pertinentes* (Diss. Marburg, 1909) pp. 69 ff, Fiske, pp. 156 ff, F. Bömer, 'Der commentarius: Zur Vorgeschichte und literarischen Form der Schriften Caesars', *Hermes*, 81 (1953) pp. 210 ff and G. Avenarius, *Lukians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1956) pp. 85 ff.

refer to notes, exclusively for private use, which must in fact be assumed to have a very rough and unpolished style. It can also refer to works, which are published but with a neglected style. Finally it can, in a most confusing way, be used of literary works, thanks to false modesty or irony. In order to decide upon the meaning in Bion's case it may be of help to see how the term is used in other cases by Diog. Laert. It is used several times but apparently not always with the same meaning. In some cases it means "notes", but in others it refers to philosophical writings in general.³ There is actually one instance (8.78), where *ὑπομνήματα* is used as an alternative for *συγγράμματα*, which is usually regarded as its opposite. This makes a decision in the case of Bion very difficult, but the use of the term in another biography of an Academician may bring us nearer to an answer. There is a close parallel in 4.5, which says of Speusippus: *καταλέλοιπε δὲ πάνπλειστα ὑπομνήματα καὶ διαλόγους πλείονας* (cf. also 4.13 and 4.24), introducing the catalogue of his writings. Therefore the term must here refer to philosophical writings in general, and the similarity points to the same meaning in the case of Bion. The results of this investigation can be described as mainly negative. We know that Bion left many philosophical writings, but we cannot pass any judgement on their form or stylistic character. Nor is it possible to say whether the actual writing of the texts was done by Bion himself or his pupils, who took notes during his lectures.⁴

The general meaning of the second part of the first sentence is fairly clear, although it may be a later addition by Diog. Laert. himself or his source in order to introduce the following collection of apophthegmata.⁵ Hense⁶ has quite correctly pointed out that these apophthegmata are not to be regarded as written or collected as such by Bion himself. Instead they were collected by others from his philosophical discourses. The origin of the short, pointed and witty sayings in Bion's work is less clear. They may in some cases be created by Bion but there was also a rich supply to draw on. The Greeks were wont to use sayings and anecdotes, usually with a moral tendency,—a practice which became especially popular among the Cynics, where a great number of sayings and anecdotes arose around Diogenes. It can be assumed that Bion used them freely.⁷

³ Cf. *TLG*, s.v. *ὑπόμνημα*: "omnia philosophica et historica scripta . . . a Diogene Laertio in enumerandis philosophorum opusculis *ὑπομνήματα*, alias tamen *συγγράμματα* vel *βιβλία* promiscue vocata sunt".

⁴ So e.g. Halbauer, pp. 6 f and Schouler, p. 32 n. 1.

⁵ This is a plausible assumption, e.g. by Hense 1909, p. LXIII; cf. also Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 36 n. 105.

⁶ Hense 1909, pp. LXIII f; cf. also Dümmler, p. 70.

⁷ The Cynics found the *χρεία* very useful and used it freely, even though it would be wrong to see the *χρεία* as their special literary form. Their interest for the *χρεία* was noted already in an-

The second sentence also raises several questions. First of all what is meant by the phrase *οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα*, and secondly what are *ταῖς διατριβαῖς* and how are they related to the *ὑπομνήματα*? The first question is the easier. A comparison with other cases of this expression in Diog. Laert. indicates that it here refers to Bion alone and does not include his followers.⁸

When we come to the question of the character of the *διατριβαί* we have to face a very complicated and controversial problem. The best investigation is still the one by Halbauer,⁹ who shows that the word *διατριβή* refers to some sort of occupation and later to the actual teaching. It also became transferred to the written form of the given teaching. The name *διατριβή* tells us nothing of the literary form but refers exclusively to the circumstances under which this literary work was originally delivered. So the word *διατριβή* used of literary compositions has an extremely wide meaning, and does not imply a special stylistic character. As this use of *διατριβή* seems to be late, it is improbable that Bion himself used this title for his works.¹⁰ This being so, the *ὑπομνήματα* and the *διατριβαί* must obviously refer to the same literary works of Bion.¹¹ As the word *διατριβή* seems to look upon the occupation from the point of view of the pupil and not the teacher, Halbauer¹² concludes that *διατριβαί* refer to lecture-notes, taken and later published by the students. This seems to me to be far from clear. The matter ought to be somewhat clarified by a consideration of the use of the term in Diog. Laert. In 2.84 we find the following item on Aristippus: *ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ διατριβῶν αὐτὸν φασιν ἐξ γεγραμέναι, οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως γράψαι ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Σωσικράτης ὁ Ῥόδιος*. Even if these works were disputed, I do not see that we are in any way entitled to assume that the so-called *διατριβαί* were actually notes taken by the students.¹³ Furthermore, the *διατριβαί* are even given under the heading *συγγράμματα*. The term is also used of works by different Stoic philosophers (Diog. Laert. 7.34, 7.36 and 7.178), and there is nothing in these cases to indicate that they were not written down by the origina-

tiquity. So Demetrius *De eloc.* § 170, talking about *ὁ Κυνικὸς τρόπος*, remarks: *τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα γελοῖα χρειᾶς λαμβάνει τάξιν καὶ γνώμης*. Cf. Dümmler, pp. 69 ff, Gerhard 1909, pp. 248 ff and Dudley, p. 112 and for Bion's use of this Cynic form Fiske, p. 183 and Dudley, p. 68.

⁸ Cf. T8 with commentary.

⁹ Halbauer, pp. 3 ff; the literature on this question is often very confused; cf. however Hirzel 1895, I p. 369 n. 2, Hense 1909, pp. LXXIX f, Fiske, pp. 179 f, Capelle, cols. 991 f, Schouler, pp. 30 ff and Appendix 1.

¹⁰ Cf. however Terzaghi, p. 13 n. 1, who assumes that Bion himself used this title for his work.

¹¹ This is generally assumed without much investigation; cf. Halbauer, p. 7 and Schouler, p. 32 n. 1.

¹² Halbauer, p. 7, followed by Schouler, p. 32 n.1.

¹³ Halbauer, p. 6 is of this opinion; cf. also v. Arnim 1898, pp. 30 ff. Mannebach in his commentary to fr. 121 does not treat this difficulty.

tors. Therefore I would assume that the literary products of Bion, known under the names of *ὑπομνήματα* or *διατριβαί*, go back to notes not by his students, but by Bion himself. There are other facts to corroborate this assumption. Bion's closer pupils were wealthy young men, who cannot be assumed to have made the effort of publishing their lecture-notes. Furthermore, Bion was travelling the Greek world, giving lectures at different places and obviously not only to serious pupils but to wider circles as well. It is highly probable that Bion gave the same lectures at different places and that he therefore kept his notes or manuscripts. This is proved by the comment on philosophers of a more popular kind, that they always say the same things and repeat themselves (cf. for Bion Diog. Laert. 4.49 = F57 with commentary). These notes, which may have been unpolished in character, must have been the literary work, left to posterity, which may very well explain the designations. It is not clear whether Bion published his works himself but the possibility cannot be excluded.¹⁴ The expression used by Diog. Laert.: *πλεῖστά τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα* (4.47 = T7) seems to imply that Bion's works go back to himself and not to his pupils. Even clearer is the statement of Ps-Acro: *Bion, qui Sophistes cognominatus est in libro, quem edidit* (*Schol. in Hor. vet., ad Ep. 2.2.60* = T15), which however is too late and uninformed to be taken as definite proof.

It is possible to form any closer idea about the actual form of Bion's lectures? In the main there seem to have been two different literary forms used by popular philosophy, the *διάλογος* and the *διάλεξις*.¹⁵ From the preserved fragments it seems highly probable that Bion's works belonged to the type *διάλεξις*, as the element of dialogue is very small and purely stylistic. The two preserved titles *Περὶ τῆς ὀργῆς* and *Περὶ δουλείας* (T9–10) can also give an idea of the form. Bion's lectures were probably fairly short and each treated one moral concept or moral problem.¹⁶ We will learn to know the form in more detail in the following pages. These conclusions can be drawn from the extant material. There is no indication that Bion did not also use the *διάλογος*, but there is no proof, perhaps because this form, if it is philosophical and not exclusively literary, is closely connected with the actual situation, has a more improvised character and therefore may not have been preserved in notes, by either the teacher or the students.

Another question concerns the origin of this kind of lecture. According to Philostratus it seems to belong to the old sophists, the art of whom he describes as *τὴν ἀρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν ῥητορικὴν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν* (VS 1 p. 480 Kayser). He goes on to say: *ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀρχαία σοφιστικὴ καὶ τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα*

¹⁴ Cf. Heinze 1889, p. 6 n. 2, who assumes that Bion himself published his works.

¹⁵ See especially Halbauer, pp. 5 ff and Schouler, pp. 22 ff.

¹⁶ Cf. the definition in Hermogenes *Meth.* 5 p. 418 Rabe: *διατριβὴ ἐστὶ βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικοῦ ἑκτασις*.

ὑποτιθεμένη διήει αὐτὰ ἀποτάδην καὶ ἐς μῆκος, διελέγετο μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἀνδρείας, διελέγετο δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἡρώων τε πέρι καὶ θεῶν καὶ ὅπη ἀπεσχημάτιζται ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ κόσμου (VS 1 p. 481 Kayser). Even if the sophists did not confine themselves to exclusively ethical topics like Bion, they still treated subjects of this kind in the form of a lecture on a single moral concept.¹⁷ This practice was repudiated by Socrates and Plato, who instead preferred a dialogue.¹⁸ The two types are contrasted by Philostratus: διαλέγεται μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ ὧν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ἃ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ὑποκαθήμενοι καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ τῶν ζητουμένων προβιβάζοντες οὕτω φασὶ γινώσκειν, ταῦτα ὁ παλαιὸς σοφιστὴς ὡς εἰδὼς λέγει (VS 1 p. 480 Kayser). Now the sophistic tradition did not disappear, even in the Socratic schools, and some of the Socratic pupils, such as Aeschines, Aristippus, and Antisthenes, seem in their lives and their teaching to continue the methods of the sophists and also to combine their philosophical message with a rhetorical form. It therefore seems obvious that Bion continues the tradition of the sophists in this respect, which is in no way surprising as he had studied in the schools of both Aristippus and Antisthenes,¹⁹ and that the first origin of the *διάλεξις*, i.e. the much discussed *διατριβή*, is to be found in the epideictic oratory of the sophists. It is highly plausible that this method was continued in the Cynic school also by men like Diogenes and Crates, although there is little evidence thereof.

2. Language and style

The results of an investigation of Bion's language and style must always suffer from some uncertainty for several reasons. We can never be entirely sure that the preserved fragments in a literal and exact way reproduce what Bion once actually said or wrote. Even if the fragments generally seem to preserve a tone which we would tend to find typical of Bion, there must always remain the suspicion that those authors who quote Bion can have changed the text and adapt-

¹⁷ For the form of the lectures of the sophists see Weber 1887, pp. 199 ff, P. Hartlich, 'De exhortationum a graecis romanisque scriptarum historia et indole', *Leipziger Studien zur klassischen Philologie*, 11 (Leipzig, 1889) pp. 207 ff, v. Arnim 1898, pp. 11 ff, K. Gaiser, 'Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen Dialogs', *Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 40 (Stuttgart, 1959) pp. 33 ff and Schouler, pp. 22 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. Plato *Euthydemus* 275 A–B and Cicero *De fin.* 2.1.1, where Socrates' art of teaching is distinguished from the *scholae* of the sophists and later philosophers (cf. also Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 3.34.81 for *scholae*). For Socrates see v. Arnim 1898, p. 16 and Gaiser, op. cit. (n. 17) p. 47.

¹⁹ Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 36 n. 105 has drawn attention to a statement by Theopompus ap. Athenaeum 11.508 C (= T259 *FGrH* 115), where the term *διατριβή* is used of the works of Aristippus, Antisthenes and Bryson. This does not however prove that these authors used the same literary form as Bion, as the meaning of the word *διατριβή* is very vague.

ed it to their own language, style, and context. We know that ancient authors used to quote from memory and very freely, which applies especially to prose which is often given as a paraphrase or a report.²⁰ There is also the difficulty that so many of the fragments are preserved in the form of apophthegmata, which are often given a special and very pointed form and seem to follow a special pattern.²¹ Furthermore we have another difficulty in the fact that the apophthegmata are often ascribed to different persons. This of course renders the foundation for an investigation of language and style rather weak. However despite these difficulties I think it is necessary to try an investigation of this sort. So much has been said about the language and style of the so-called diatribe and about Bion as its supposed originator that it is necessary to examine the actual fragments of Bion in order to pass judgement on these theories.

Bion was writing in the Hellenistic period after the death of Alexander the Great, a period which saw the development of a common Greek language, the *Koinē*.²² He belongs to the early part of this period and the scanty remains make it very difficult to say in what degree he was influenced by the new tendencies.

As regards phonological matters there are a few points to be considered. Instead of *γίγνομαι* and *γινώσκω* Hellenistic Greek uses the originally Ionic forms *γίνομαι* and *γινώσκω*. We find an example of the later forms in *γίνεται* (F21 *bis*).²³

A typical feature of the *Koinē* is the use of *οὐθείς* instead of *οὐδεὶς*.²⁴ There is one example of the later *οὐθέν* (F68) but on the other hand we find several instances of the old Attic form (F3, F5, and F42 *bis*).

Instead of *ἐθέλω* the form *θέλω* became more common during the Hellenistic period.²⁵ There is one example of the second form in *θέλωσι* (F80).

In F17 we find the forms *πεινᾶ* and *διψᾶ*, which are also considered to be Hellenistic instead of the regular Attic *πεινῆ* and *διψῆ*.²⁶

For the combination *ρσ*, which is used in Ionic Greek, the Attic equivalent is

²⁰ For this stylistic demand see Stemplinger, pp. 241 ff and Bompaire, pp. 394 ff.

²¹ The literary form of apophthegmata is treated in Appendix 2.

²² For the Greek language during the Hellenistic period see Thumb, Radermacher 1925, Mayser, J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* (Diss. Lund, 1955), Meillet and Blass-Debrunner (=BD).

²³ Cf. Moeris p. 100 Koch: *γίνεται*, 'Αττικῶς. *γίνεται*, 'Ελληνικῶς, Deferrari, pp. 36 ff, Radermacher 1925, p. 49, Mayser, I:1 pp. 164 ff with more literature and BD, § 34:4.

²⁴ Cf. Mayser, I:1 pp. 180 ff with references and Meillet, pp. 277 ff.

²⁵ Cf. Deferrari, pp. 9 f, Mayser, I:2 p. 119 and BD, § 101, s.v. *θέλειν*.

²⁶ Cf. v. Müller, p. 4, Deferrari, p. 30, Radermacher 1925, p. 95, Mayser, I:2 p. 114 and BD, § 88.

usually *pp*.²⁷ We have one example of a non-Attic form in *εὐθαρσῶς* (F16A).

The combination *σσ* in Ionic Greek is used in Hellenistic Greek, while the Attic dialect uses *ττ*.²⁸ We have one example of the Ionic and Hellenistic form in *ἀπομυσσομένος* (F1). However there are more examples of the Attic form: *πράττη* and *παττάλω* (F30), *ἀπαλλαττομένους* (F56) and *ἀπαλλάττομαι* (F68).

There is one case of a deictic iota: *τουτουῖ* (F16A), which was rare in Hellenistic Greek and later revived as an Atticism.²⁹

In the case of word formation there are few divergences from Attic Greek. We can only note that there is one case of an imperative for the third person plural with *πανσάσθωσαν* (F1A), which is typical of Hellenistic Greek, where forms with *ν* are often replaced by *σαν*.³⁰

Diminutives are highly typical of the spoken language, especially in a more vulgar form.³¹ Therefore it is interesting to find that there are a certain number of diminutives in Bion's fragments: *γράφιον* (F17), known from Aristophanes and Xenophon, *θηρίον* (F21), which is a very common word and a diminutive only in form, *παιδάριον* (F76), which is a common Attic word, known from Aristophanes and Plato, *σακκίον* (F30), known from Menander and later from Josephus, and *σωμάτιον* (F68), which is to be found also in, e.g., Isocrates *Ep.* 4.11 and Epicurus fr. 181 Usener. We see that Bion uses nouns already well known in the Attic dialect and that they are neither numerous nor original.

There are no cases of the dual, which is not surprising as this number disappeared during the Hellenistic period.³²

There is little to be said of Bion's syntax. He tends to follow the ordinary Attic custom. Therefore it is of a certain interest to note one case, where he keeps to the Attic form of expression, although the Hellenistic was different. So we find one case of the accusative of respect: *γένος Βορυσθενίτης* (F1). Here the dative became increasingly popular in Hellenistic Greek.³³

²⁷ Cf. Thumb, pp. 77 f, Radermacher 1925, p. 46, Mayser, I:1 pp. 219 ff with references and BD, § 34:2.

²⁸ Cf. Moeris p. 94 Koch: *βήττειν*, 'Αττικῶς. *βήσσειν*, 'Ελληνικῶς, Thumb, pp. 78 ff, Deferrari, pp. 1 ff, Radermacher 1925, p. 46, Mayser, I:1 pp. 222 ff with references, Meillet, pp. 279 f and BD, § 34:1.

²⁹ Cf. Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 68 and p. 613, K. Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften* 3. ed. (Berlin, 1900) p. 155 and BD, § 64:2.

³⁰ Cf. Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 589, Deferrari, p. 20, Mayser, I:2 pp. 89 f, Meillet, pp. 298 ff and BD, § 84:1.

³¹ For diminutives in vulgar parlance cf. v. Müller, pp. 47 f, Thumb, p. 178 and p. 220 and Radermacher 1925, p. 37. It is of interest that diminutives are quite common in Epictetus; cf. Colardeau, p. 321 n. 2 and Halbauer, p. 34, and more general, Weber 1895, pp. 8 f and Seidel, p. 9.

³² Cf. Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 611, Radermacher 1925, p. 30, Meillet, pp. 287 f and BD, § 2.

³³ Cf. Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 609, Radermacher 1925, p. 122 and BD, § 160.

The verbs *πεινάω* and *διψάω* govern the genitive in Attic Greek. In Bion however we find the construction with accusative: *ἢ πεινᾷ τις πλακοῦντα ἢ διψᾷ Χῖον* (F17), which is the usual practice during the Hellenistic period.³⁴

The use of the preposition *μετά* in the following cases: *μετ' ὠφελείας χρῆσθαι . . . μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . καὶ ἀτυφίας* (F16A) does not seem to belong to the classical period, which would have preferred an adverb here.³⁵

It is of great interest that the optative is used both as potential optative (F1, F17, F34, and F50) and as oblique optative (F60). This mood tended to disappear during the Hellenistic period, but there is hardly any evidence for such a development in the fragments of Bion. The paucity of optatives can easily be explained from the form of the preserved fragments. As we have seen, this mood is fairly well represented in the longer fragments.³⁶

It is of a certain interest to note that the majority of forms typical of Hellenistic Greek are to be found in the fragments preserved in Teles, who belongs to the generation after Bion. Of course, as they are the longest, we should also expect to find most examples of everything there. However, this could possibly be interpreted as meaning that Teles is exact in his reproduction of Bion's text, while other authors, quoting Bion during a later period, may be less careful.

When we come to consider Bion's choice of words, I think that this is of the greatest importance, to arrive at an idea of his language and style, this being of greater significance than different phonological and grammatical details. We see immediately that the choice of words is an important source of help.

The reader is immediately struck by the number of words, which belong to the sphere of everyday life and ordinary occupations. They are not always post-classical nor always especially vulgar but their presence is nevertheless very important, as they stress the extent to which Bion took his language and his examples from everyday life, following the examples of Socrates and the Cynics. This fact however must not be interpreted as meaning that his listeners belonged to the lower classes (cf. below). I do not think it would be of great use to list words of this type so I refer instead to the actual text with its commentary.

There are in the fragments of Bion a certain number of post-classical words, i.e. words or meanings which have not been found in prose-writers earlier than Aristotle. As they will be more fully treated in the commentary, only a list of them is given here: *ἀδάπανος* (F17), *ἀτρύφερος* (F17), *ἀτυφία* (F16A),

³⁴ Cf. v. Müller, pp. 9 f and BD, § 171:1.

³⁵ Cf. Meisterhans, op. cit. (n. 29) p. 219.

³⁶ For the use of optative during the Hellenistic period cf. Thumb, p. 249, Radermacher 1925, pp. 164 f, Meillet, pp. 289 ff, BD, § 65:2 and G. Anlauf, *Standard Late Greek oder Attizismus? Eine Studie zum Optativgebrauch im nachklassischen Griechisch* (Diss. Cologne, 1960).

βαστάζω (F40A–B), δοξοκόπος (F34), ἐγκοπή (F20), εὐτάκτως (F17), τὸ ἱκανὸν ποιέω (F74), ἱκανόω (F34), καταδολεσχέω (F52), καταμύω (F66), κατασκελετεύω (F3), μεμψιμοιρέω (F16A), πάνοικος (F1), ποιήτρια (F16 A–B), πρόσωπον meaning “personality” (F1), πυξίς (F75), συντηρέω (F49), τερετίζω (F17) and ὑποπίπτω (F16A).

Another group of post-classical words are those which occur in the fragments of Bion for the first time or have an entirely new meaning: ἀγεννίζω (F16A), δευτερολόγος (F16A), παρατελωνέομαι (F1), πρωτολόγος (F16A), στρατουργία (?) (F13), συγγραφή meaning “brand” (F1), συγζύω with the metaphorical meaning “scrape together” (F1) and ταριχέμπορος (F1).

Finally there is a very small group of words which could be called poetical. Here it is always difficult to pass a definite judgement because of the character of the material, and words could have been used in the Ionic dialect without having a special poetical character. These words are: ἀποδρέπομαι (F57), ἐνδίκως (F29), εὐκαρπος (F50), εὐτεκνία (F29), λείψανον (F64) and φεῦ with genitive (F55). The appearance of two of these poetical words in one fragment indicates that Bion here aims at a special effect or that he is actually quoting a passage of poetry.

The language of Bion can be defined in the following terms, as far as the choice of words is concerned. It is mainly based on the everyday language and sometimes rather vulgar in character. It is also the language of Bion's own time as we can see from the post-classical words and the fact that poetical or unusual words are missing in a very high degree. Moreover Bion has given his language a personal character by his choice of words, which is both independent and creative.³⁷

As far as we can judge from the few and usually very short fragments Bion's style is very much influenced by rhetoric and we find many of the different tropes and figures represented in his writings.³⁸

The style of Bion is very lively. One of his methods of creating this effect, which also fits the philosophical nature of his work, is personification of abstract qualities, of which we find several examples: πενία (F17), πράγματα (F17), and τύχη (F16A, F38, and F39B–D). For other cases see also F22, F38 and F53. The use of τύχη is of special interest because of the importance of this concept during the Hellenistic period. The abstract concepts, which are personified in Bion's writings, are often used in order to spread Bion's own mes-

³⁷ For the choice of words cf. v. Müller, pp. 47 ff and Weber 1895, pp. 8 ff.

³⁸ For a survey of different rhetorical devices see Lausberg and J. Martin, ‘Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode’, *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, II:3 (Munich, 1974). Useful collections of material from authors more or less influenced by popular philosophy are to be found in Weber 1895, pp. 12 ff, v. Müller, pp. 64 ff, Dürr, pp. 123 ff, Seidel, pp. 12 ff and Bultmann, pp. 20 ff.

sage. This is a clever device, as it gives the audience the impression that Bion is just an objective observer, while the concept which he wants to defend, e.g. *πενία*, pleads its own cause before the public.³⁹

In this connection I think it would be useful to mention various other devices, intended to make the speech more lively. There is a certain element of dialogue, so that Bion addresses himself to the audience or to a fictive opponent. This aspect has been too strongly stressed by earlier scholars as the cases in the preserved fragments are comparatively few and of a completely rhetorical character.⁴⁰ We find some instances of dialogue in F1A–2, although extremely rudimentary. In these cases Antigonus Gonatas asks Bion a question, to which he gives an answer of a certain length. In these cases we are not faced with a letter, as is often said, but a philosophical treatise in the form of a very short dialogue. It is not possible to say whether it was originally delivered in front of Antigonus. In F16A–17 we have some cases, which may originally have been dialogues, but which in their present condition appear to be monologues, where however the speaker addresses a second person throughout. In F16A we find Bion himself addressing someone, who may very well be Antigonus, while he makes a thoroughgoing comparison between the two different lives, which nevertheless illustrate Bion's thesis about adaptation to circumstances. In F17 we find *πράγματα* and *πενία* introduced as acting and talking. The latter personification addresses an unnamed opponent, who has obviously been condemning poverty, in a vigorous self-defence, which serves as a mouth-piece for Bion's own opinion, and at the end Bion himself speaks to his anonymous opponent.

The rhetorical question also belongs to this lively style, and we have plenty of examples of this device in the self-defence of Poverty in F17. Another case is to be found in F31, where Bion asks his audience a question, which seeks to stress the stupidity of public opinion.⁴¹ This element always forms part of this type of question, to strengthen the position of the speaker in relation to the audience.

A more lively impression is created by the use of the imperative, which maintains the contact with the audience or the fictive opponent. We have cases of this in F1A, addressed to Antigonus Gonatas and the two Stoics, Persaeus and Philonides, and in F16A with *μὴ οὖν βούλου* addressed to an anonymous opponent.⁴²

³⁹ Cf. Weber 1895, pp. 20 ff and Bultmann, pp. 34 f. See also F17 with commentary, where more literature is given.

⁴⁰ This aspect will be more fully treated below; for dialogue in the so-called diatribe cf. Weber 1895, pp. 23 f and Bultmann, pp. 10 ff.

⁴¹ Cf. Weber 1895, pp. 29 f and Bultmann, pp. 30 f.

⁴² Cf. Bultmann, pp. 32 f.

Another method is the use of the exclamation, of which there is an example in F55: *φεῦ . . . τυραννίδος τριχὶ καταλυομένης*, where this ironical exclamation is used in order to refute a general opinion.⁴³

Comparisons and metaphors are typical of Bion's literary style. As the two types are so similar, they are here treated together. We find them in fairly large numbers and there is hardly anything, which Bion cannot clarify or amplify by using these rhetorical devices.⁴⁴ The formal introductions of the comparisons are different and it is typical of Bion's very short and pointed style that some begin abruptly. Otherwise the most common type uses *ὥσπερ . . . οὕτω*, a combination which occurs five times. Other expressions of the same corresponding type are *ὅταν . . . οὕτως*, *τοσοῦτον . . . ὅσον* and *καθάπερ . . . οὕτω*. We also find some cases where only one expression appears: *ὥσπερ*, *ὅμοιον . . . ὥς εἶ* and *ἀπείκαζε*. The comparisons usually draw on familiar phenomena. Here Bion and the Cynic school in general may be following a Socratic tradition, as Socrates was very fond of using comparisons from everyday life.⁴⁵

1) One group of comparisons comes from the field of medicine. Here it is worthy of note that this type of comparison is very popular among the Cynics, who liked to compare themselves to physicians, and the state of ignorance of philosophical truth with an illness etc.⁴⁶ Bion compares students with emaciated people (F3), a god who punishes the children for the sins of the fathers with a physician who tries to cure the children of parents who are ill (F27), the miser with a man suffering from dropsy (F34) and his own lectures with medicines (F75).

2) Another group consists of those comparisons which refer to everyday phenomena. So the personification of *πράγματα* can, when it is pleading its case, be compared with a slave, who has taken refuge at the house altar (F17), man in general with a field (F50), people who listen to flattery with jars, which

⁴³ Cf. Weber 1895, p. 24 and Bultmann, pp. 33 f.

⁴⁴ Cf. Joel 1921, p. 923 n. 4, who makes the interesting observation that the Cynics used pictures and comparisons instead of definitions.

⁴⁵ For the comparisons in Bion see Weber 1887, pp. 180 ff and Weber 1895, pp. 15 ff. and for Cynic comparisons in general see Weber 1887, pp. 173 ff, Bultmann, pp. 35 ff and Oltramare *passim*. For other authors who are of special interest in this case, cf. also for Dio of Prusa J. Oesch, *Die Vergleiche bei Dio Chrysostomus* (Diss. Zürich, 1916), for Epictetus Colardeau, pp. 309 ff and Halbauer, pp. 31 f, for Plutarch A.J. Dronkers, *De comparationibus et metaphoris apud Plutarchum* (Diss. Utrecht, 1892) and F. Fuhrmann, *Les images de Plutarque* (Diss. Paris, 1964), for Maximus of Tyre Dürr, pp. 124 ff and for Seneca D. Steyns, *Étude sur les métaphores et les comparaisons dans les oeuvres en prose de Sénèque le philosophe* (Gent, 1907). More material will be found in 'Bibliographie der antiken Bildersprache', *Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften* NF 1. Reihe (Heidelberg, 1964).

⁴⁶ Cf. Weber 1887, p. 179 and Weber 1895, p. 17.

can easily be dragged by the ears (F51), an effeminate boy with cheese (F58), the body with a house and life with a banquet (F68).

3) Some comparisons come from the commercial field, a type which must have been very familiar to Bion's audience and therefore very effective. We find Bion comparing the teaching of rhetoric or philosophy with the selling of corn or wheat (F4), *φρόνησις* with a market-place (F13), the avaricious man with a banker (F41) and rich men with purses (F42).

4) Military metaphors and comparisons were very popular with the Cynics⁴⁷ but we only find a few instances in Bion. So the way of choosing one's friends can be compared with the method of picking archers (F2) and *σωφροσύνη* with raising an army (?) (F13).

5) Some comparisons use a person, either a historical or mythical figure or a general type. People who devote themselves to the liberal arts without ever reaching philosophy are compared with the suitors of Penelope (F3), a spendthrift in a contrasting comparison with Amphiaraus (F45), the good man, i.e. the philosopher, with a good actor (F16A), *τύχη* with the author of a drama (F16A–B) and those who are rich or poor with those who are hairy or bald (F44).

6) Comparisons with animals are usually popular among the Cynics.⁴⁸ However, we find only one case in the fragments of Bion, when he compares the way of meeting external circumstances with the method of catching a snake (F21).

7) There are only very few comparisons left, which do not belong to any of these categories. So Bion likens the relation between *φρόνησις* and the other virtues to that between sight and the other senses (F12), old age to a harbour (F62) and death to the time before birth and to sleep (F67).

Generally speaking, the comparisons of Bion can be said to be chosen with great care and are therefore very effective. Their aim is to make a special point clearer to the audience, often by an unexpected comparison with something very familiar to the listeners and in this case Bion may have had great success.

The use of proverbs is very frequent in the art of literature which Bion represents. They were thought to represent ancient wisdom⁴⁹ and because of their popular character they were very effective in a speech intended for a wider public. They were also very much used by the Cynics.⁵⁰ Naturally it is difficult

⁴⁷ Cf. Weber 1887, pp. 138 f and Gerhard 1909, pp. 191 f with references.

⁴⁸ Cf. Weber 1887, pp. 106 ff and pp. 174 ff and Gerhard 1909, pp. 23 ff and pp. 48 ff.

⁴⁹ This is first expressed by Aristotle ap. Synesius, *Encom. calv.* 22 (= fr. 13 Rose).

⁵⁰ Cf. Weber 1887, p. 209 and n. 3, Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 493, T.W. Rein, *Sprichwörter und Sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Lucian* (Diss. Tübingen, 1894) p. 99, Weber 1895, pp. 12 f, Geffcken 1909, p. 123 and p. 146, Gerhard 1909, pp. 94 f, Oltramare, p. 14 and p. 101 and Bompaigne, p. 413.

to find all the proverbs because of the gaps in the sources and sometimes there is no certainty that they originated with Bion, as seems possible. We find the following proverbs in Bion's fragments: κοινὰ τὰ φίλων (T3), τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσομένο (F1), τὸν πλοῦτον νεῦρα πραγμάτων (F46), οὐχ οἶόν τε . . . ἀπαλὸν τυρὸν ἀγκίστρῳ ἐπισπᾶσθαι (F58) and τὸ γῆρας . . . ὄρμον εἶναι κακῶν (F62). There may be another influence besides the Cynic in Bion's use of proverbs. It is obvious that there was great interest in this type of popular wisdom in the Peripatetic school, as both Aristotle and Theophrastus made collections of them (Diog. Laert. 5.26, Athenaeus 2.60 D–E and Diog. Laert. 5.45). Moreover there may also be a stylistic reason for the use of proverbs, for they are considered to give χάρις and are the only form of wisdom to be used in letters (Demetrius *De eloc.* § 156 and § 232). According to Ps-Aristides they give γλυκύτης and are connected with a style which seeks ἀφέλεια (*Rhet.* 1.132 p. 52 Schmid and 2.121 p. 119 Schmid).⁵¹

When we come to the other rhetorical devices, I shall content myself with some examples of the more popular types.

Anaphora seems to be a common rhetorical device and also very popular in philosophical writings of the type, produced by Bion.⁵² A few examples will suffice: τοὺς ἐν . . . τοὺς ἐν (F6), ὅτε μὲν . . . ὅτε δὲ . . . ὅτε μὲν . . . ὅτε δὲ (F16A) and μή, introducing no less than five sentences in a row (F17).

Bion seems to have a highly developed sense for the different possibilities of using sounds to create different effects. Bion can sometimes be said to use this possibility in too high a degree, as he obviously cannot resist an opportunity to play on sounds.⁵³ Paronomasia is common, especially in compound words, which is very frequent in Cynic writings: συγγραφὴν . . . σύμβολον (F1), ἀδάπανον καὶ ἀτρύφερον (F17), περιεζωσμένος . . . περιθειόμενος . . . περιματτόμενος . . . περιάπτουσι . . . περιαρτῶσι (F30), ἀπολυθῆναι . . . ἀπολῦσαι (F34) and εὐφορον . . . εὐκαρπον (F50).

The use of a *figura etymologica* such as ἀποφορὰν . . . φέρω (F17) is similar.

Alliteration is also frequent; Bion here seems to have a special fondness for the sound π;⁵⁴ see e.g. F1A, F16A, F27, and F77.

Homoeoteleuton is very common, as can be expected: ἐπιμελεῖσθαι . . .

⁵¹ For a survey of the Greek concept of proverbs see P. Martini, *Studien auf dem Gebiete des griechischen Sprichwortes* (Diss. Erlangen, 1889) pp. 1 ff, W. Rhys Roberts, in *Demetrius On Style* (Cambridge, 1902) pp. 259 ff, W. Tschajkanovitsch, *Quaestionum paroemiographiarum capita selecta* (Diss. Munich, 1908) pp. 19 ff and *RE*, XVIII:2 (1949) s.v. παροιμία and Paroimiographoi cols. 1707 ff (Rupprecht).

⁵² Cf. Bultmann, p. 21.

⁵³ Cf. Hense 1909, pp. XCIX ff; the Cynics in general were very fond of all sorts of plays of this kind; see Wachsmuth, pp. 71 f, Norden 1892, pp. 279 f and Döring, pp. 147 f.

⁵⁴ The same applies, e.g., to Maximus of Tyre; cf. Dürr 136.

ὠφελεῖσθαι (F37), κεχρηῆσθαι . . . παρητηῆσθαι (F49), and τῶν γυναικῶν . . . τῶν ἀνδρῶν (F60).

An even more typical feature of Bion's writings is his habit of playing on words, so that he puts together words which sound similar or uses words with a double meaning. We can note examples of the former: ἥδιστα . . . ἥκιστα . . . ἥδιστα . . . ἥκιστα (F17), προκοπῆς ἐγκοπὴν (F20), ποινήν . . . κοινήν (F61) and κατακαόντων . . . παρακαόντων (F71). A play on the double meaning of a word is found in the following cases: ἔχων οὐ πρόσωπον, ἀλλὰ συγγραφὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου (F1A), πλάνης . . . πλανῶνται (F5), τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ἰχθῦς . . . τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ (F6), τῆς ὑπάτης ἔριδος (F7), τὰ ὦτα . . . τῶν ὠτων (F51), and Κιτιᾶ . . . οἰκετιᾶ (F73).

Antithesis is very common both in rhetorical and in philosophical literature and is also well represented in the fragments of Bion:⁵⁵ οἰκέται ἐλεύθεροι, ἐλεύθεροι δοῦλοι (F11), τὸν μὲν Ἀμφιάραον . . . ἡ γῆ κατέπιε, σὺ δὲ τὴν γῆν (F45), and ἡ τοῦτῳ μέγα κακὸν συμβέβηκεν ἡ ἄλλῳ μέγα ἀγαθόν (F47). We see, especially in the first example, how easily the antithesis develops into a paradox.

When we come to the question of how Bion forms the sentences of his speech,⁵⁶ we regret even more the lack of longer and continuous texts. However, it is possible to say that his style in this respect is very pointed and deliberate. The sentences are often short, although there are some examples of very artistically formed longer periods. To this style belong the asyndeton, e.g. τὰ ὦτα τὰς χεῖρας τοὺς πόδας (F68), the chiasmus: πλησιάζειν μὴ δυνάμενοι . . . μὴ δυνάμενοι κατατυχεῖν (F3) and ὁ ποιητὴς περιθῆ . . . περιθῆ ἡ τύχη (F16A), and the use of two synonyms in order to create a fuller expression: ἐνδείας καὶ σπάνεως (F34). It is very typical of Bion's style to use sentences which are built up in parallel, often in connection with other rhetorical devices, such as isocolon or antithesis. As the characteristic is so obvious to everyone who examines the fragments of Bion, I shall here mention only a few examples: τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ὅσον τὴν ὄρασιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων (F12), where the parallelism is also combined with isocolon, and ἡ οὐχ ὁ πεινῶν ἥδιστα ἐσθίει καὶ ἥκιστα ὄψου δεῖται; καὶ ὁ διψῶν ἥδιστα πίνει καὶ ἥκιστα τὸ μὴ παρὸν ποτὸν ἀναμένει (F17; cf. also F11, F21, F37, F42, F60, F61, F68, F71, and F80). The following examples of more carefully constructed periods can be noted:

ὥσπερ τὰ φαῦλα τῶν βαλλαντίων
 κᾶν μηδενὸς ἢ ἄξια
 τοσοῦτον ἐστὶν ἄξια

⁵⁵ Cf. Bultmann, pp. 24 ff., who very strongly stresses the importance of the antithesis as an expression for the Cynic way of thinking.

⁵⁶ For this question in general see Hense 1909, pp. XCVII ff and Bultmann *passim*.

ὅσον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ νόμισμα ἔχει
 οὕτω καὶ τῶν πλουσίων
 τοὺς οὐδενὸς ἀξίους
 καρποῦσθαι τὰς ἀξίας
 ὧν κέκτηνται (F42) and
 καθάπερ καὶ ἐξ οἰκίας . . . ἐξοικιζόμεθα
 ὅταν τὸ ἐνοίκιον ὁ μισθώσας οὐ κοιμίζόμενος
 τὴν θύραν ἀφέλῃ, τὸν κέραμον ἀφέλῃ, τὸ φρέαρ ἐγκλείσῃ
 οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σωματίου ἐξοικίζομαι
 ὅταν ἡ μισθώσασα φύσις
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀφαιρῇται, τὰ ὦτα, τὰς χεῖρας, τοὺς πόδας (F68).

Another typical feature of Bion's literary style is his use of poetical quotations or other references to literary works.⁵⁷ The author most frequently found is of course Homer⁵⁸ and we find the following Homeric references:

Homer <i>Il.</i>	1.146 etc.	F7
	2.216–219	F29
	3.182	F7
	6.55 etc.	F7
	6.211 = 20.241	F1
	9.502–503	F29
	10.15	F69
<i>Od.</i>	6.187	F15
	24.402	F15
	οἱ μνηστῆρες	F3
	τῆς Ὀδυσσέως πλάνης	F5

The number of quotations is far too small to enable us to draw any certain conclusions about Bion's knowledge of Homer. However, certain facts can be confirmed by the conditions in general. Bion seems to have known the *Iliad* better than the *Odyssey*, and the first part better than the second. This feature is highly typical of people quoting Homer and has its foundation in the school education.⁵⁹ The statement of Ps-Acro that Bion did not refrain from attacking

⁵⁷ For quotations in this kind of literature see Weber 1895, pp. 26 f and Bultmann, pp. 42 ff. The opinion of Hense 1909, pp. XCV f that all poetical quotations in Bion's fragments belong to an assumed opponent must obviously be wrong.

⁵⁸ It is of a certain interest to notice that people in Olbia, at a much later period, had a great veneration for Homer; cf. Dio of Prusa 36.9–14.

⁵⁹ For the Cynics', and especially Antisthenes', use of Homer see Dümmler, pp. 16 ff, Weber 1887 *passim*, F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Thèse Paris, 1956) pp. 372 ff, J. Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie: Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes* (Paris, 1961) pp. 105 ff, F. Caizzi, 'Antisthene', *Studi Urbinati*, 38, N.S.B., 1–2 (1964) pp.

Homer is not corroborated by the preserved fragments but is not improbable (T15).

The second author quoted is Euripides, but he occurs far less frequently, in only two quotations:

Euripides	<i>Hipp.</i> 424	F53
	<i>Bacchae</i> 1129	F81

Euripides was a frequently quoted author who became very popular in moral philosophy and in different anthologies and collections of *gnomai*.⁶⁰

There is only one reference to Hesiod in the preserved fragments (F78), where Bion uses his description of the different periods in *Erga* 109–155 in a comparison. Hesiod too had a certain fame among philosophical writers.⁶¹

There is one quotation of Theognis 177–178 in F52. Theognis also had a special place in popular philosophy.⁶²

Finally we find some quotations, which remain anonymous, as Bion does not give the origin and we have no parallels with the author's name:

Anonymus	F25
Anonymus	F68

In addition to these quotations there are some cases where Bion is perhaps referring to comedy-writers such as Menander and Antiphanes. However, we have no proper quotations of this kind and because of the great uncertainty, which has not been dispelled, they are not given here but noted in the commentary.⁶³

The poetical quotations and references are used by Bion for different rea-

66 ff and J.F. Kindstrand, 'Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik: Studien zu der Homerlektüre und dem Homerbild bei Dion von Prusa, Maximus von Tyros und Ailius Aristeides', *Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Graeca Upsaliensia*, 7 (Uppsala, 1973) *passim*. On the other hand it is very doubtful if the Cynics interpreted Homer allegorically, as is usually stated; cf. J. Tate, 'Antisthenes was not an Allegorist', *Eranos*, 51 (1953) pp. 14 ff and D. Babut, 'La religion des philosophes grecs', *Littératures anciennes*, 4 (Paris, 1974) pp. 142 f.

⁶⁰ For the importance of Euripides see H. Funke, 'Euripides', *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum*, 8–9 (1965–66) pp. 233 ff (Nachträge zum Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum (RAC)).

⁶¹ See C. Buzio, 'Esiodo nel mondo Greco sino alla fine dell'età classica', *Pubblicazioni della università cattolica del Sacro Cuore*, ser. 4, Scienze filologiche, 27 (Milan, 1938) with some more titles p. XI. This work however does not go further than the fourth century B.C.

⁶² There is a work *Περὶ Θεόγνιδος*, ascribed to Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.16 = fr. 1 Caizzi). For the importance of Theognis see A. v. Geyso, *Studia Theognidea* (Diss. Strasburg, 1892), Gerhard 1909, pp. 257 ff and A. Peretti, 'Theognide nella tradizione gnomologica', *Studi classici e orientali*, (Pisa, 1953).

⁶³ This subject, the influence of comedy on Cynic writings, will be treated more fully below.

sons. They may provide a witty retort (F1, F25, and F81),⁶⁴ a comparison (F1, F3, and F78), examples of different things and concepts which are under discussion (F5, F15, and F29 (?)), a description (F53 and F69), or they can be used for the purposes of criticism or refutation (F52 and F69). These different uses show that the quotations must have been natural for Bion and have belonged to polite conversation among educated people. Even if their use seems to be mainly rhetorical, as we find no authoritative quotations, I would think that the background for this custom is to be found among the philosophers. Earlier Greek prose-writers obviously avoided quotations of poetry in order to preserve the unity of style, but we find a greater number in the writings of Plato. This also emerges from an item in Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 2.9. 26, where he is speaking of Athens and its schools of philosophy: *animadvertetas . . . versus ab his admisceri orationi*.⁶⁵

A special type of quotation is the use of poetry in centos or parodies or even combined, which seems to be very popular among the Cynics.⁶⁶ This use is rare in Bion's preserved fragments. There is one case of a Homeric cento, rather loosely connected (F15) and one Homeric parody (F7), introduced in the following way: *εὐφυνῆς γὰρ ἦν καὶ παρωδῆσαι*. Could this possibly be interpreted as meaning that Bion sometimes used poetry to express his message, i.e. sarcastic verses, which at the same time parodied famous passages, as has been suggested?⁶⁷ I regard such an explanation as improbable; I believe it is obvious that Bion used parody as a part of his literary form, as a witty and entertaining form of self expression.⁶⁸

Prose-quotations are much more difficult to find; some possible cases will be noted in the commentary. A special problem in the case of Bion is the way in which many of his fragments have been preserved, i.e. as apophthegmata which can be ascribed to several philosophers. This could be explained by saying that Bion is plagiarizing a wise man of an earlier generation. However, this type differs from a proper quotation.

Akin to the quotation, especially when it has an authoritative bearing, is the

⁶⁴ Cf. Joel 1921, p. 873 and n. 5, where he emphasizes the Cynics' habit of answering with poetical quotations.

⁶⁵ For the use of quotations in general see Stemplinger, pp. 185 ff, Bompaire, pp. 382 ff and Kindstrand op. cit. (n. 59) pp. 105 f.

⁶⁶ For parodies see Wachsmuth, pp. 66 ff, Stemplinger, pp. 205 ff, O. Bouquiaux-Simon, 'Les lectures homeriques de Lucien', *Academie royale de Belgique*, Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques, Mem. — Coll. in 8°, 2^e ser., 59:2 (Brussels, 1968) pp. 337 ff and T7 with commentary.

⁶⁷ Cf. e.g. Wachsmuth, p. 77: "Bion etiam carmen parodicum scripsit", Geffcken 1911, p. 406 n. 3, Christ-Schmid, I p. 87 n. 8 and LSJ s.v. *ἀνθινός* II.

⁶⁸ This is the opinion of e.g. Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 39 and Terzaghi, p. 44.

method of referring to a wise man who by his speech or his actions has provided a pattern for the following generations. This is found in the use of Diogenes in F17 and of Socrates in F21. This use must have been very common in popular philosophy, founded on the correct assumption that examples from the real life are more effective than theoretical descriptions and admonitions, a fact which was stressed already by ancient authors like Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* 10: *sed haec videri possunt odiosiora cum lentius disputantur: vita et factis illustranda sunt summorum virorum haec quae verbis subtilius quam satis est disputari videntur* and Seneca *Controv.* 2.6.2: *nihil est mihi opus praecipientibus: habeo exemplum*.⁶⁹

The style of Bion has often been broadly characterized. Before I give my conclusions on the results reached above, I would like once more to stress the fragmentary state of Bion's work, which must make every judgement uncertain. In arriving at this conclusion I think it correct to use only the proper fragments of Bion. Too much has been said, and too many far-reaching conclusions drawn from a foundation found in authors, who rightly or wrongly have been supposed to be influenced by Bion.

Bion's language seems to be mainly Attic influenced to some extent by the Hellenistic development. The form and grammar of his language do not seem to possess any special late characteristics. The choice of words on the other hand has a more special character, and seems subject to a greater Hellenistic influence as well as personal taste. Even more important is the character of many words and expressions. They are very much everyday words, and sometimes vulgar in character. The reason for this can be found partly in Bion's own background, as he came from the lowest class of society, partly in the Cynic tradition. The influence of the audience will be discussed later.

When we examine Bion's style more closely it immediately appears to be highly rhetorical. This emerges from all the rhetorical devices, which are used to such a great extent. We can here especially note the use of personifications, the addressing of the audience, questions and exclamations, the great number of comparisons, mostly taken from everyday life, proverbs, quotations and examples. Finally the whole construction of the sentences and their combinations with all the strong feeling for the effects which can be achieved by combining sounds and words in a very conscious and sometimes artificial way, has produced a very special style. It can be said to be extremely vivid, entertaining and surprising. It could not fail to make a deep impression on the listeners. But on the other hand there is always the danger with this kind of style that the message is swamped by all the stylistic devices, which enthrall the audience. How-

⁶⁹ For this use of heroes in moral training see B.L. Hijmans, *ἈΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* (Diss. Utrecht, 1959).

ever I think there is a clear idea behind this form. Bion wanted to reach everyone with his message, not only those who were from the beginning interested in philosophical questions, but also persons previously unpervious to such problems. In order to catch the attention of, and to influence, everyone with his message he had to use a language and a style which would attract and amuse people. This explains all the very strong effects he has put into his literary form.

3. *The stylistic background*

On an introductory level it can be said that there are two main influences on the style of Bion, one rhetorical and one philosophical. As shown by the foregoing analysis of his language and his style, he is very much influenced by rhetoric and uses all possible rhetorical devices. I think that greater stress should be laid on this purely rhetorical aspect. It is worthy of mention in this connection that already in his early youth Bion came as a slave to the house of a rhetor in his home-town of Olbia (Diog. Laert. 4.46 = F1). In all probability he received a rhetorical education during that period, especially if we consider the favourable treatment otherwise meted out to him by his master. It is impossible to comment on the kind of rhetoric, practised in Olbia at the end of the classical and the beginning of the Hellenistic period, but it can be noted that Bion received his first instruction outside Greece proper. We have no statements about his connections with oratory after his arrival in Athens, and it should be noted that Bion himself refused to teach rhetoric (Diog. Laert. 4.49 = F4). However, the philosophical schools, in which he studied, were not inimical to rhetoric, or at least did not refuse to use it for their own purposes. We may remember that the Cynic school, to which Bion was closest, used all the weapons of rhetoric in order to attract and influence listeners. The founder of the Cynic school, Antisthenes, studied with the sophists and showed great interest in rhetoric.⁷⁰ Even later Cynics, who like Diogenes were hostile to all aspects of culture on principle, did not refuse the instruments provided by rhetoric in their preaching. This is quite obvious, even if the fragmentary state of the Cynic literature makes a more detailed judgement impossible.⁷¹

When we try to define Bion's form of rhetoric, we can already at an introductory stage assume that he adopted the rhetorical form of his own time, as there were then no classicistic movements, which would hardly have appealed

⁷⁰ Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.1 (= fr. 7 Cazzi): οὗτος κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἤκουσε Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος· ὄθεν τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς, H.J. Lulofs. *De Antisthenis studiis rhetoricis* (Diss. Amsterdam, 1900), v. Arnim 1898, pp. 36 f, Geffcken 1911, p. 403 n. 2 and Joel 1921, pp. 872 f and pp. 888 f.

⁷¹ Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.75 concerning Diogenes: θαυμαστή δέ τις ἦν περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα πειθῶ, ὥστε πάνθ' ὀντινοῦν ῥαδίως αἰρεῖν τοῖς λόγοις, Weber 1887, pp. 208 ff and Dudley, p. 29.

to him. Rhetoric at this early stage of the Hellenistic period must have differed but little from its classical form. Thus it is of interest to see whether any of the traits which are peculiar to Bion can be found in a classical orator. For the purposes of comparison I have chosen Demosthenes, who like Bion often has a very vivid style. Some similarities leap to the eye. Bion often has short sentences, usually of an antithetical character. This can be found also in Demosthenes, e.g. *De cor.* 265 and *Phil.* 3.39. A personification such as εἰ λάβοι . . . φωνὴν τὰ πράγματα (F17) has been considered typical of Bion. This type of expression can be found also in Demosthenes: ὁ . . . καιρός . . . μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφιεῖς (*Ol.* 1.2). The fictitious opponent or elements of a fictitious dialogue has been considered typical for Bion's style, notwithstanding that there are very few traces thereof in the preserved fragments (cf. F17). Demosthenes too can produce fictitious rejoinders from an assumed listener: 'Τί οὖν,' ἄν τις εἴποι, 'ταῦτα λέγεις ἡμῖν νῦν' (*Ol.* 1.14; cf. also *Ol.* 1.16, 1.19, 1.26, 3.10 and *Phil.* 2.13). Rhetorical questions and exclamations, which create a very vivid impression are typical of Bion's style. They are very common also in Demosthenes. These are just a few features, which are regarded as very typical of Bion's style but which have also been found in a classical orator such as Demosthenes. This makes one point clear. As far as the elements of his style are concerned Bion did not possess an original or creative mind, which could hardly be expected. He used the rhetorical devices at his disposal. Still the impression created by Bion's style is quite different from that conveyed by the speeches of Demosthenes. The structure of sentences and clauses is usually simpler and better balanced in Bion than in Demosthenes. Bion uses all the rhetorical devices much more often and in a much more obvious way. He plays on words and sounds, whenever possible, he uses comparisons and metrical quotations to very great extent and has in general a pointed style. All this is missing in Demosthenes.

Therefore the style of Bion must have appeared as something new, and we are entitled to ask whether there are any connections between Bion's form of rhetoric and the rhetorical movement of the Hellenistic period which is called Asianism.⁷² The concept as such is far from clear and seems later to have been used more as a term of general abuse than as a way of providing a real stylistic analysis. If we want to compare Bion with some of the most notable members of the Asiatic movement, we must rely to a great extent on later judgements of

⁷² There is a vast literature concerning this very much discussed concept. Cf. Susemihl 1891–92, II pp. 463 ff, U.v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Asianismus und Atticismus', *Hermes* 35 (1900) pp. 1 ff, Norden 1909, I pp. 126 ff and G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Grece* (Princeton, 1963) pp. 301 ff. For a survey of the discussion see R.G. Austin, in *Quintiliani Institutionis oratoriae liber XII* (Oxford, 1948) pp. 161 ff (on 12.10.16).

their style, as actual texts are almost completely lacking. I shall return once more in this chapter to the ancient criticism of Bion's style, but some points will be mentioned now. There are some similarities in the stylistic analyses of Bion's work to those of some famous exponents of the Asiatic style. Demetrius of Phaleron is said to link the old Attic rhetoric and the new Asiatic type.⁷³ His rhetorical style is described as *fucatus nitor* (Cicero *Brutus* 9.36), *est floridior* (Cicero *Brutus* 82.285 = fr. 177 Wehrli IV), *versicolore* . . . *vestem* (Quintilian 10.1.33 = fr. 178 Wehrli IV) and *χαρακτήρ δὲ φιλόσοφος, εὐτονία ῥητορικῇ καὶ δυνάμει κεκραμένος* (Diog. Laert. 5.82 = fr. 181 Wehrli IV). This does not convey a very clear picture, but the similarities to the analysis of Bion's style are obvious (T11–13). Both styles are described as flowery, as “being clad in the dress of a hetaera”, and as presenting philosophy in a very rhetorical form.

One of the best known exponents of the Asiatic style is Hegesias, who had a very bad reputation among later writers on stylistic questions.⁷⁴ It is of interest that both Hegesias and Bion are often called *σοφιστής* (Dionysius Hal. *De comp. verb.* 18 pp. 79 f U–R = T5 and F5 *FGrH* 142; cf. also T8b *FGrH* 142), which refers mainly to their style. A look at the preserved fragments of Hegesias shows that he too had a weakness for short sentences although he goes further than Bion here, and uses all manner of plays on words.

Cicero in *Brutus* 95.325 gives a general description of two kinds of Asiaticism, one of which is of special interest here: *genera autem Asiaticae dictionis duo sunt: unum sententiosum et argutum sententiis non tam gravibus et severis quam concinnis et venustis, qualis in historia Timaeus*. This style seems at first to be closely related to Bion's, which is extremely pointed, with short symmetric sentences, using all the effects, which combinations of words and sounds

⁷³ This assumption was made, e.g., by F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* III:2, 2. ed. (Leipzig, 1898) pp. 341 ff, Bultmann, pp. 16 f and Norden 1909, I pp. 130 f. Demetrius was also seen as an originator of the so-called diatribe but this connection was due mainly to a fragment ascribed to a *Δημητρίου* and preserved in Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.8.20. However, most scholars seem to regard this piece as not coming from Demetrius of Phaleron. Cf. K. Kupier, ‘De diatribe quadam immerito vindicata Demetrio Phalereo’, in *Festbundel Professor Boot* (Leyden, 1901) pp. 169 ff, HENSE, on Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.8.20, Crönert, pp. 45 ff, Wendland 1912, p. 85 n. 1, *RE*, IX:1 (1916) s.v. Ioannes Stobaios cols. 2582 f (Hense) and E. Bayer, ‘Demetrius Phalereus der Athener’, *Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 36 (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1942) pp. 117 ff. On the other hand, Bayer, op.cit. pp. 120 ff, seems to be mistaken in his complete denial of every connection between Demetrius of Phaleron and the Asiatic rhetoric. Cf., besides the ancient testimonies, C.F. Angus, in *The Cambridge Ancient History* VII (Cambridge, 1928) p. 255 and *RE*, Suppl.b. XI (1968) s.v. Demetrios von Phaleron cols. 521 f (Wehrli).

⁷⁴ The fragments of Hegesias are collected in *FGrH* 142; cf. also Susemihl 1891–92, II pp. 464 ff and Norden 1909, I pp. 134 ff.

can produce.⁷⁵ Thus this could suggest a similarity between Bion and one of the best known Asianists, viz. Timaeus, who as well as Hegesias had a very bad reputation.⁷⁶ The similarity is shown by the fact that the same expression can be ascribed to both writers (cf. Cicero *De nat. deor.* 2.27.69 and Plutarch *Alexander* 3.3). While it would be correct to describe Bion's style as pointed, a word of warning may not be out of place here, when we consider the present state of Bion's work. As most of his fragments are of the type apophthegmata, which were preserved simply because of their pointed form, we are inclined to assume that this was more typical for Bion's style than is actually the case. The few longer fragments do not give the same impression of being typical of a highly pointed style.

Furthermore we can draw attention to the Latin satirist Varro,⁷⁷ who seems to have combined an interest in Cynic philosophy with a style influenced by the sophists and the Asiatic movement. Quintilian 10.1.95 describes his style as *alterum . . . saturae genus . . . mixtum*, which is reminiscent of the comment on Bion's style: *τὸ παντὶ εἶδει λόγου κεκρᾶσθαι* (Diog. Laert. 4.52 = T11). However, I do not think it correct to assume that Bion produced writings of a Menippean character, as Puelma Piwonka seems to believe.⁷⁸

These facts do not provide us with a definite answer to the questions of the origin of Bion's rhetorical style and of whether it can be regarded as belonging to the Asiatic movement, as the terms, which could suggest such a relationship are very general. It should be remembered that Bion lived at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, but his style nevertheless differs from the common Attic rhetorical style of the classical period. His use of all the Gorgian figures and the similarity to the Asiatic style indicate that Bion was influenced by the new rhetorical tendencies and came to be regarded as a follower of the later severely condemned Asiatic movement.⁷⁹

As I have already pointed out, Bion's style also has a philosophical background. The Socratic dialogue is usually considered to be of great importance.⁸⁰ Here the dialogue has been strongly stressed, which I think distorts the picture. As we have seen, only traces of a very rudimentary dialogue remain in

⁷⁵ Cf. especially Summers, pp. XV ff, who regards Bion, as well as Hegesias and Timaeus, as exponents for the so called pointed style, and Norden 1909, I pp. 280 ff.

⁷⁶ The fragments of Timaeus are collected in *FGrH* 566; cf. also Susemihl 1891–92, I pp. 563 ff.

⁷⁷ Cf. Hirzel 1895, I p. 380 n. 1 and Puelma Piwonka, pp. 172 ff.

⁷⁸ Puelma Piwonka, p. 357.

⁷⁹ Such a relation was assumed by Norden 1909, I p. 130 and Puelma Piwonka, pp. 175 f.

⁸⁰ This idea seems to go back to Wilamowitz, p. 307, who saw in the diatribe a combination of rhetorical expidexis and Socratic dialogue. His idea has been repeated by many scholars but also rightly criticized by, e.g., Capelle, col. 992 and Schouler, p. 31 and n. 2.

the fragments of Bion. The Socratic dialogue is a real dialogue, which seeks to report a serious philosophical discussion, while the traces of dialogue in Bion are more of a rhetorical device.⁸¹ So the form of the Socratic dialogue cannot have been of very great importance for Bion's work, which can instead be described as a monologue.⁸² Furthermore I doubt if the style of the Socratic dialogue in general was of a critical significance for Bion. The εἶδος Σωκρατικόν is usually praised, and considered as a suitable pattern (Demetrius *De eloc.* §§ 297–298 and Cicero *De off.* 1.37.134: *sit ergo hic sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos*), while Bion's style is severely criticized. Already this fact makes a close relationship impossible. However I do not believe that the Socratic tradition was completely without influence on the language and style of Bion. Socrates' general attitude and his way of teaching, combining humour, irony and a mixture of the amusing and the serious, are similar in many respects to what we know about Bion. Yet it is uncertain whether this influence on Bion was direct or whether it passed through another source. As we have seen, the use of everyday, and even vulgar, terminology is typical of Bion's style. The same applies to Socrates' speech and is often criticized. So Socrates is blamed for using very ordinary professions in order to clarify his philosophical discussion: νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγεύρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύη, ὥς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον (Plato *Gorgias* 491 A; cf. also Plato *Symp.* 221 E and Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.37 and 4.4.5–6).⁸³ I would think that Socrates' use of everyday things for illustration and his effort to bring philosophy down to earth⁸⁴ must have been of great importance for Bion's literary form.⁸⁵ However the difference is great and we must assume that the old Cynics and their *παρησία* were intermediary.

The Cynic literature must have been of the greatest importance for the formation of Bion's style, a fact which becomes clear from all the Cynic motives and expressions, which we find in his fragments. Unfortunately very little is left of the old Cynic literature; and there is very little evidence from antiquity on the literary form and style of the Cynics in general.⁸⁶ It is known that they pro-

⁸¹ Cf. *RE*, VA:1 (1934) s.v. Teles (no. 2) col. 378 (Modrzejewski): "Die Dialogform ist also für die Diatribe nur stilistisch, nicht sachlich gerechtfertigt."

⁸² Cf. Lejay, p. XV and Puelma Piwonka, p. 101.

⁸³ It is of interest to see that Dio of Prusa even finds it necessary to defend this practice of Socrates (55.9).

⁸⁴ Cf. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.4.10: *Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus collocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coëgit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere.*

⁸⁵ Cf. Weber 1887, pp. 189 ff.

⁸⁶ For the Cynic literature in general see Wachsmuth, pp. 66 ff, Weber 1887, Gerhard 1909 and Dudley, pp. 110 ff.

duced a vast literature in many different forms, which is both surprising and contradictory, when we consider their general attitude to culture and civilization. Indeed it is clear that the most radical of all Cynics, Diogenes, expressed himself in writing. Most Cynic literature combined a serious purpose with a humorous form, so that the concept *σπουδαιογέλοιοι* can be taken as a way of characterizing the Cynic literature, which seems to have been a mixture of many different stylistic traits.

There is, as has already been stressed, a strongly rhetorical side. The Cynics use all kinds of rhetorical devices, and especially all possibilities of making a point or a joke by the combination of words and sounds. They also give their texts more colour by the use of poetical quotations, often in parody, proverbs, anecdotes, and sayings. This use of famous *χρεῖται* and *ἀποφθέγματα* was not invented by the Cynics but can be considered typical of their literary style. Their writings often reveal a strong satirical spirit. Their choice of words is a strange mixture, as they combine words from different stylistic levels, often with a humorous intention. Most typical however is their use of a straightforward vocabulary with both everyday and vulgar words, following the Cynic ideals of *παρρησία* and *ἀναίδεια* and their wish to shock their listeners. This applies to Antisthenes: *Πλάτωνα δὲ μετονομάσας Σάθωνα ἔσσυρῶς καὶ φορτικῶς* (Herodicus ap. Athenaeum 5.220 D–E = fr. 37A Caizzi) and is corroborated by a statement in Ps-Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 7.5 C: *φορτικῶς μὲν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἀληθῶς δὲ τοῖς πράγμασιν*, referring to Diogenes' way of expressing himself. Not even the Cynic literature can be considered as a completely original creation but must have a stylistic background. I have already emphasized the rhetorical aspect. Furthermore the Socratic tradition must have played a significant role. We have already noted the importance of Socrates in giving philosophy a more practical character and in using ordinary words and comparisons. The Cynics continue along these lines but often in a more radical fashion. Plato's description of Diogenes as *Σωκράτης ... μαινόμενος* may be true in more ways than one (Diog. Laert. 6.54; cf. Aelianus *VH* 14.33). Furthermore there is probably one difference which may be of some significance in Bion's case. As we have seen, Socrates is said to have repudiated the lecture-form and to have used the dialogue instead, in order to convey his philosophical message. The Cynics for their part must have used the lecture-type more often, although very little is known about the form of their teaching.⁸⁷ The Old Comedy is also of great importance as stylistic background for the literary work of the Cynics.⁸⁸ This fact was noted already by

⁸⁷ Cf. Dudley, p. 38.

⁸⁸ This subject has not yet been fully treated; cf. however Norden 1892, p. 270 n. 1 and p. 335 n. 4, Weber 1895, p. 8, Gerhard 1909 p. 142 n. 3 and Geffcken 1911, p. 404 n.7.

ancient authors. So Demetrius *De eloc.* § 259 combines ἐν ταῖς κωμωδίαις and πᾶς ὁ Κυνικὸς τρόπος and Marcus Aurelius expressly states in 11.6 that Diogenes was influenced by the old comedy: ἡ ἀρχαία κωμωδία παρήχθη, παιδαγωγικὴν παρρησίαν ἔχουσα καὶ τῆς ἀτυφίας οὐκ ἀχρήστως δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐνθυρρημοσύνης ὑπομιμνήσκουσα· πρὸς οἷόν τι καὶ Διογένης ταυτὶ παρελάμβανε. The association is fully correct as we find both in the Old Comedy and in the Cynic literature expressions of an unrestricted παρρησία, a very strong element of humour and satire, a combination of joking and seriousness, and subjects and expressions of an everyday or vulgar character.

The only writer to treat the Κυνικὸς τρόπος from a theoretical point of view is Demetrius in *De eloc.*, which fact makes his short notices the more valuable. Demetrius treats the elegant style in §§ 128–189, and the difference between τὸ εὖχαρι and τὸ γελοῖον in §§ 163–172. These two concepts differ in several respects. No definite judgement is passed and τὸ γελοῖον can be used for pedagogical purposes: χρήσονται δέ ποτε καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι γελοίοις πρὸς τε τοὺς καιροὺς, οἷον ἐν ἐορταῖς καὶ ἐν συμποσίοις, καὶ ἐν ἐπιπλήξεσιν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τρυφερωτέρους, ὡς ὁ τηλαυγὴς θύλακος, καὶ ἡ Κράτητος ποιητικὴ, καὶ φακῆς ἐγκώμιον ἂν ἀναγνῶ τις ἐν τοῖς ἀσώτοις· τοιοῦτος δὲ ὡς τὸ πλεον καὶ ὁ Κυνικὸς τρόπος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα γελοῖα χρειᾶς λαμβάνει τάξιν καὶ γνώμης (§ 170). The points of interest here are that Demetrius understands the moralistic intentions, underlying the Cynic jokes, and that he therefore compares them with χρειᾶι and γνῶμαι. However, the use of this kind of joke is very restricted (ἐν ἐορταῖς καὶ ἐν συμποσίοις . . . πρὸς τοὺς τρυφερωτέρους . . . ἐν τοῖς ἀσώτοις), which provokes the suspicion that Demetrius did not approve of this kind of humour in general, and especially not in literature. His judgement should perhaps be considered in connection with § 171, where the play on personal names is condemned, a habit which was foreign neither to the Cynics nor to Bion: ἡ γὰρ ἀντίθεσις ἢ περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ ἡ φροντίς ἐμφαίνει τινὰ ψυχρότητα ἥθους καὶ ἀναγωγίαν. The next time Demetrius treats the Κυνικὸς τρόπος is, surprisingly enough, in connection with the forcible style, in §§ 240–304 and more precisely under the heading of σύνθεσις in §§ 241–271. Once more it is the humorous side of the Cynic literature which comes to the fore, as δεινότης is produced by joking: καίτοι ἐστὶ πολλαχόῃ ἐκ παιδιᾶς παραμεμιγμένης δεινότης ἐμφαινομένη τις, οἷον ἐν ταῖς κωμωδίαις, καὶ πᾶς ὁ Κυνικὸς τρόπος ὡς τὰ Κράτητος (§ 259). It is of special interest here that Demetrius sees the similarities between the comedy and the Cynic literature. In the next paragraph a saying of Diogenes is given as an example with the following note: καὶ γὰρ γελᾶται τὸ εἰρημένον ἄμα καὶ θαυμάζεται, καὶ ἡρέμα καὶ ὑποδάκνει πῶς λεγόμενον (§ 260), which suggests that Demetrius perceived the difference between the two old Cynics and that Diogenes' humour was of a more bitter kind than Crates'. In § 261 he gives another witty remark of Diogenes, followed by the general reflection:

γελοῖον γὰρ τὸ πρόχειρον τοῦ λόγου, δεινὴ δ' ἡ κευθομένη ἔμφασις. καὶ ὅλως, συνελόντι φράσαι, πᾶν τὸ εἶδος τοῦ Κυνικοῦ λόγου σαίνοντι ἅμα εἰσὶ καὶ δάκνοντι. Demetrius had a clear knowledge of the character of the Cynic literature. He saw the strongly humorous aspect, maybe without complete approval, but also the pedagogic background, i.e. the serious and sometimes bitter message which was hidden under a joking surface. The Cynic literature is for him a form of *σπουδαιογέλοιοι*, even if he does not use this term.

The Cynic style must have encountered criticism. There may be a hint of this already in Demetrius and, e.g., Cicero is far more outspoken: *nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident . . . pluraque . . . ab eisdem contra verecundiani disputantur* (*De off.* 1.35.128) and: *Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum* (*De off.* 1.41.148). The Cynic combination of *ἀναίδεια* and *παρρησία* led many readers to reject their philosophy, as did Cicero.

From the preceding pages it is clear that the Cynic tradition must have been of the greatest importance for Bion, and probably the most decisive influence on his literary style. The humorous side is very important in Bion and his humour is sometimes of a rather grim character, even if his purpose is a serious and moral one. However, Bion has sometimes passed this limit, as he can hardly resist a joke, even if it has no moral value. In this respect he resembles Menippus.⁸⁹ There is also a very strong element of satire in Bion. His language and style are as manifold as that of the Cynics in general and in his choice of words he is completely in agreement with the Cynic tradition. This need not necessarily lead to the assumption that he is talking to people from the lowest social class. It may as well be a method of shocking his well-educated listeners, which is also a feature of the Cynic tradition. The second explanation is obviously correct. We have a parallel in Epictetus, who uses very simple language, even with vulgar traits, although addressing a well-educated audience.

Bion's style was also influenced by the comedy and kindred forms such as *μῦθος*. We must distinguish between different forms of influence here. Notwithstanding that Porphyrio pointed out the similarity between Aristophanes and Bion (T16), I think that the influence from the Old Comedy is mainly indirect and comes from the Cynic literature. The similarities are also clear. Both combine a humorous aspect with a serious one, i.e. they have a pedagogic intention under a joking surface, both are satirical, both are fond of parody and use expressions and words of an everyday and vulgar character. The Middle and New Comedy may have had a more direct influence on Bion, as there are

⁸⁹ For Menippus cf. Diog. Laert. 6.99: *φέρει μὲν οὖν σπουδαῖον οὐδέν· τὰ δὲ βιβλία αὐτοῦ πολλοῦ καταγέλωτος γέμει*, Riese, pp. 7 ff, Wachsmuth, pp. 78 ff and Helm 1906.

instances where Bion may be quoting e.g. Antiphanes or Menander. Bion's interest in the later comedy would be prompted by its ethical interests and its use of special types and characters. Nevertheless it is impossible to trace this influence exactly, as the drawing of characters may derive from Theophrastus, who was Bion's teacher and may also have influenced Menander.⁹⁰ The possible influence of the mime⁹¹ must have resembled that of the comedy and derived from the characters and motives and language, which were taken from life in general.

There are two other aspects of literary form, which were not independent literary arts but without having a form of their own could influence different forms to a very great extent, i.e. satire and the so-called *σπουδαιογέλοιοι*. Unlike its Latin counterpart, Greek satire⁹² did not acquire a definite literary form. Therefore the concept "Greek satire" is more historical than literary, and rather illusive, although a satirical element is very common in Greek literature. This is not the place for a survey of Greek satire but it deserves mentioning that both the Old Comedy and the Cynic literature are very satirical. Not surprisingly, we find the same in Bion, who sometimes shows a very bitter satiric spirit. However, it would be wrong to call his literary work satires, as the satire is only one element.

The concept *σπουδαιογέλοιοι*⁹³ expresses a combination of joking and seriousness, usually so that an amusing form is used to hide a serious content. It is a pedagogic method of giving information to those, who would have been unimpressed if presented merely with the bare facts. This means of expression, which shows a deep pedagogic insight, can be found in the Old Comedy. Cf. Aristophanes *Ranae* 391 f: *καὶ πολλὰ μὲν γέλοια μ' εἶπεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα*. The same combination also seems to be typical of Socrates: *ἐπαιζεν ἅμα σπουδάζων* (Xenophon *Mem.* 1.3.8; cf. also Xenophon *Mem.* 4.1.1 and Plato *Apol.* 20 D, *Symp.* 216 E, *Phaedrus* 234 D and *Gorgias* 481 B).⁹⁴ This method

⁹⁰ For the relations between Bion and the Middle Comedy cf. also introd. Chapter III:4.

⁹¹ For the mime in general see H. Reich, *Der Mimos: Ein litterar-entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Versuch* I:1–2 (Berlin, 1903), *RE*, XV:2 (1932) s.v. *Mimos* cols. 1727 ff (Wüst) and H. Wiemken, *Der griechische Mimos: Dokumente zur Geschichte des antiken Volkstheaters* (Bremen, 1972).

⁹² There is no exhaustive study of Greek satire; cf. however Geffcken 1911, pp. 393 ff and pp. 469 ff. Most books on Latin satire have a chapter on the Greek background; cf. e.g. Lejay, pp. VII ff, Duff, pp. 23 ff, Oltramare *passim*, Terzaghi, pp. 7 ff, Knoche *passim*, Highet, pp. 25 ff, v. Rooy, pp. 90 ff, Rudd *passim* and Witke, pp. 21 ff. Of interest is also C.W. Mendell, 'Satire as Popular Philosophy', *Classical Philology*, 15 (1920) pp. 138 ff.

⁹³ Cf. for a general survey Weber 1887, pp. 86 ff, Grant, pp. 57 ff, Radermacher 1947, and Giangrande, whose book however is not very illuminating.

⁹⁴ Cf. Geffcken 1911, p. 399 and Fiske, pp. 96 f for the influence of comedy on Cynic writings in this respect.

can be considered as highly typical of Cynic literature, which in this respect can have been influenced both by comedy and by the Socratic tradition.⁹⁵ The term is not used of the old Cynics but their approval of this stylistic principle is clear from their fragments and from the judgement of Demetrius (cf. above).⁹⁶ Later representatives provide explicit evidence: Monimus: *γέγραφε δὲ παίγνια σπουδῇ λεληθυῖα μεμιγμένα* (Diog. Laert. 6.86) and Menippus: *Μένιππος ὁ σπουδογέλοιος* (Strabo 16.2.29) and *γελῶν ἅμα ἔδακνεν* (Lucian *Bis accusatus* 33). This stylistic principle influenced Bion to a very high degree, which becomes clear even from a very quick look at his fragments.

There is one more literary aspect which should be mentioned, as it may have influenced Bion's style, viz. the so-called *χαρακτηρισμός*, which later became a special subject at rhetorical schools.⁹⁷ This interest in drawing of characters, especially bad ones, can be found both in the Middle and in the New Comedy and in rhetoric. Furthermore there is another possible source in the case of Bion, i.e. Theophrastus and his famous *Characters* (cf. introd. Chapter III). It seems clear that Bion knew and used the *Characters* of Theophrastus, but this influence would probably be more philosophical than stylistic. As far as we can judge from the fragments, the drawing of characters cannot have influenced Bion's style to a great extent, but when he uses traits of this origin, they serve to enliven his discourses.⁹⁸

When we see all these different influences on Bion's style, we may well assume that it must have made a very strong and even startling impression because of the combination of a highly rhetorical and even polished form with words and phenomena of an everyday and vulgar character,⁹⁹ with elements from comedy, satire and character-drawings. Strange as the form may be *per se*, it must have struck people as even stranger that it was used to deliver a philosophical message, which was serious enough for anyone, capable of penetrating the glittering surface, which was both attractive and entertaining. This combination is based on an understanding of educational psychology, as it is easier to win the attention of listeners by an attractive form than by a strictly philosophical lecture. However, this contrast between form and content — and it

⁹⁵ Cf. K. Praechter, 'Der Topos *περὶ σπουδῆς καὶ παιδιᾶς*', *Hermes*, 47 (1912) pp. 471 ff, Grant, pp. 20 f and Woldinga, II pp. 199 f.

⁹⁶ Diogenes' strong sense of humour is obvious from so many of the anecdotes told about him that I cannot understand Giangrande's denial of this, p. 8. For a sounder judgement see Geffcken 1911, p. 480: "Diogenes den grossen Humoristen."

⁹⁷ Cf. Ussher, pp. 9 ff and Bompaigne, pp. 203 ff.

⁹⁸ Cf. Giangrande p. 27 and pp. 81 ff; surprisingly enough he seems to believe that this device originated with Bion, who was followed by Theophrastus and Menander!

⁹⁹ Cf. Geffcken 1911, p. 407: "ein starker Wechsel zwischen äusserst feiner, rhetorischer Feilung und Nachlässigkeit in der Wortwahl."

must be admitted that the form sometimes gets the upper hand—must have appeared strange to many people, especially those who were used to a more conventional approach to philosophical problems, which may explain the negative criticism of Bion's style.

4. *The ancient criticism of Bion's style*

An attempt to understand, how the literary style of Bion was appreciated in antiquity, may well start from the judgement preserved in Diog. Laert. 4.52 (= T11) ; ἦν δὲ καὶ θεατρικὸς καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοίῳς διαφορῆσαι, φορτικοῖς ὀνόμασι κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμενος. διὰ δὲ οὖν τὸ παντὶ εἶδει κεκρᾶσθαι λόγου φασὶ λέγειν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἐρατοσθένην, ὡς πρῶτος Βίων φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθινὰ ἐνέδυσεν. Apart from this testimony we only have very short references, among which Horace *Ep.* 2.2.59–60 and its ancient interpretations hold pride of place (T14–18). The singular position of the testimony in Diog. Laert. justifies a detailed interpretation. It should be stressed that the testimony is exclusively negative, and forms part of the hostile tradition which is so obvious in the biography of Diog. Laert. Therefore the different terms are chosen because they have a pejorative meaning and they are intended to be terms of general abuse rather than an objective stylistic analysis. Therefore they cannot be used with any great certainty to connect the style of Bion with any other style which is characterized by the same terms, unless we possess strong corroboration.

Θεατρικός and its meaning have frequently been discussed. Wachsmuth¹⁰⁰ thought it referred to Bion's use of personifications; Hense¹⁰¹ rightly gave it a wider meaning, as referring to Bion's style in general and the structure of his work as well as to his way of appearing in public; this interpretation was accepted by Fiske¹⁰² and Dudley.¹⁰³ However, the term is here used in a rhetorical context so that I think we should start by finding its rhetorical meaning. As it is especially common in Dionysius of Halicarnassus,¹⁰⁴ it may be useful to examine his use of the term as an introduction. It may refer to composition and rhythm, but also to the use of different rhetorical figures of a Gorgian origin: εὖροι δ' ἄν τις οὐκ ὀλίγα καὶ τῶν θεατρικῶν σχημάτων κείμενα παρ' αὐτῷ, τὰς παρισώσεις λέγω (καὶ παρομοιώσεις) καὶ παρονομασίας καὶ ἀντιθέσεις, ἐν αἷς ἐπλεόνασε Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ οἱ περὶ Πῶλον καὶ Λικύμνιον (Dionysius Hal. *Thuc.* 24 pp. 362 f U–R; cf. also *Dem.* 18 p. 167 U–R, *Dem.* 25 p. 184

¹⁰⁰ Wachsmuth, p. 76, followed by Weber 1887, p. 162.

¹⁰¹ Hense 1909, p. LXX; cf. also Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 37 n. 107 and Hirzel 1895, I p. 377 n. 1.

¹⁰² Fiske, pp. 188 f.

¹⁰³ Dudley, p. 65 n. 1 (pp. 90 f).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Geigenmüller, pp. 78 f.

U—R, *Dem.* 43 p. 227 U—R, *Isocr.* 15 p. 77 U—R, *Thuc.* 29 p. 375 U—R and *De comp. verb.* 23 p. 113 U—R). The term can very well be applied in this sense to Bion, who employs all the Gorgian figures to a very great extent and especially those which are founded in the use of sounds, so-called “Klangfiguren.” The term *θεατρικός* can also be used of a special kind of rhetoric, and also here in a way highly appropriate to what we know of Bion’s appearance as an orator. It describes the rhetoric in question as ostentatious, and interested more in entertainment than in providing instruction and education, as the general audience was attracted and amused by the use of all the Gorgian figures. This is pointed out several times by Dionysius of Halicarnassus: οἱ δὲ τὴν γλαφυρὰν καὶ λιγυρὰν καὶ θεατρικὴν καὶ πολὺ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ μαλακὸν ἐπιφαίνουσιν (sc. τὴν ἁρμονίαν), ἥ πανηγύρεις τε κηλοῦνται καὶ ὁ συμφορητὸς ὄχλος (*Dem.* 36 p. 209 U—R) and τῶν δὲ σχημάτων διώκει τὰ κινητικώτατα τῶν ὀχλῶν . . . ὧν εἰσὶν αἶτε παρισώσεις καὶ παρομοιώσεις καὶ ἀντιθέσεις καὶ τὰ παρωνομασμένα τά τε ἀντιστρέφοντα καὶ τὰ ἐπαναφερόμενα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ποιητικῆς καὶ μελικῆς λέξεως ὄργανα (*Dem.* 40 p. 217 U—R; cf. also *Thuc.* 2 p. 327 U—R, *De comp. verb.* 22 p. 108 U—R and *De comp. verb.* 23 p. 120 U—R). This should be seen in combination with another statement concerning different types of oratory: ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίας ἀπαιτοῦσι κατασκευὰς λέξεως οἱ πρὸς τὰς πανηγύρεις καὶ σχολὰς συρρέοντες ὄχλοι τοῖς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ἀπαντῶσιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἀπάτης ὀρέγονται καὶ ψυχαγωγίας, οἱ δὲ διδασχῆς, ὧν ἐπιζητοῦσι, καὶ ὠφελείας (Dionysius Hal. *Dem.* 44 p. 228 U—R). It can also be combined with an expression such as: φιλοσοφῶν οὐ πρὸς ὄχλον καὶ θέατρον ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀμφιθαλῆ τὴν ἀλήθειαν (Ps-Plato *Axiochus* 370 D; cf. also *Axiochus* 371 C—D). The meaning of *θεατρικός* with reference to Bion seems therefore to be that he used a highly rhetorical style with all the different Gorgian figures and that he thus sought to attract and amuse the mob rather than to give serious philosophical instruction.

Πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοίῳς διαφορῆσαι refers to Bion’s humour and satiric spirit, his inability to resist a joke, often of a rather malicious nature, or to turn everything into ridicule. This view is corroborated by the Latin evidence, all of which implies criticism of Bion’s humour. *Τὸ γελοῖον* is not necessarily a negative concept but tends to be.¹⁰⁵ Here in combination with *διαφορῆσαι* it is apparently used with a negative meaning, and the whole phrase probably refers to violent personal attacks on Bion’s part, where the victim is covered with ridicule. This is also stated by phrases such as *mordacissimis salibus . . . laceravit* (T15), *fuit mirabilis reprehensor* (T18) and *σκωπτόμενος ὑπὸ Βίωνος . . .* (sc.

¹⁰⁵ *Τὸ γελοῖον* in its relation to *τὸ εὐχάρι* is treated by Demetrius *De eloc.* §§ 163–172; cf. Grant, pp. 103 ff and G.M.A. Grube, ‘A Greek Critic: Demetrius On Style’, *The Phoenix, Suppl.* vol. 4 (Toronto, 1961) pp. 30 ff.

Ξενοκράτης) (T22). The fact that Bion's humour is malicious in nature is also clear from various expressions such as *sale nigro, lividis et amaris iocis, mordacissimis salibus, amaris et asperis, amara iocularitate*, and *magnae dicacitatis* (T14–17), all of which stress the bitter side. There were rules and an ethical code even for τὸ γελοῖον, which Bion seems to have ignored. Instead he turned his jokes into σκῶμμα or λοιδορία. This kind of humour, which is usually severely criticized, can be found both in the Old Comedy and in Cynic writings. I shall return to the background of this criticism.

Φορτικοῖς ὀνόμασι is rightly interpreted by Hense¹⁰⁶ as “verba ad nudam vitae veritatem expressa eademque spurciora haud raro vel immundiora.”¹⁰⁷ As we have seen, Bion does not hesitate to use everyday and vulgar expressions, even if the vulgarity of his language has been somewhat exaggerated, as far as we can judge from the fragments. The same adjective is used of Bion's style also in Plutarch *Amatorius* 24.770 B (= F56) and of Antisthenes and Diogenes (Herodicus ap. Athenaeum 5.220 D–E and 11.507 A = frs. 37A–B Caizzi and Ps-Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 7.5 C). The use of vulgar words and expressions is found in both the Old Comedy and the Cynic literature. The choice of words also forms one of the differences between τὸ εὖχαρι and τὸ γελοῖον, as they use ὀνομάτων καλῶν and ὀνομάτων . . . εὐτελῶν καὶ κοινοτέρων (Demetrius *De eloc.* § 164) respectively. The use of vulgar words is criticized from Aristotle onwards, an aspect which will be discussed later.

So far Bion has been criticized partly for using a too high-flown rhetorical style in order to please the general audience, partly for malicious jokes and for using a vocabulary not suitable for his subject. It is improbable that these two kinds of criticism would be levelled at the same person, as the highly rhetorical style and the illiberal and vulgar would be considered mutually exclusive. However, this explains the next statement in the testimony in Diog. Laert., viz. that the style of Bion was a mixture of all styles, which should not be taken literally but nevertheless contains a grain of truth, as has been shown. A mixture of styles can also be found in Cynic writings, but the criticism may here refer especially to the combination of rhetoric with traits from the Old Comedy and Cynic writings.

Finally we have the testimony of Eratosthenes that because of this mixture of styles Bion was the first to clothe philosophy in a flowery dress,—a judgement preserved in two other places, one of them being attributed to Bion's teacher, Theophrastus (T12–13). First of all I do not think that the statement that

¹⁰⁶ Hense 1909, pp. LXX f; cf. also Fiske, p. 190 and Dudley, p. 65 n. 1 (pp. 90 f). A similar expression is found in Lucian *Rhetorum praeceptor* 22: τῷ φορτικῷ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

¹⁰⁷ The meaning “vulgar” of φορτικός seems to be quite common; cf. LSJ s.v. φορτικός II 2 b. For another rhetorical meaning of the adjective see Geigenmüller, p. 111.

Bion was the first to give philosophy this literary form should be too strongly stressed, as it was a common habit of the Greeks to find an originator for everything. The expression *ἀνθινά*¹⁰⁸ is a metaphor here, probably referring to the dress of the hetaera. It should be noted that it is stated that Bion gave philosophy a flowery dress, not that his style as such is flowery, although this could be implied. Therefore it is not immediately clear that Bion's style can be identified with other styles, which are described as flowery, especially as the adjective *ἀνθηρός*, and not *ἀνθινός*, is used in those cases.¹⁰⁹ Eratosthenes is saying instead that Bion gave his philosophy a dress which was not becoming for such a serious subject but more for a whore, i.e. that he was so interested in making his philosophy attractive to listeners, that the form to a large extent came to overshadow the content.

I do not believe that this short analysis of Bion's style allows of a more precise definition. Such terms as *θεατρικός* and *ἀνθηρός* are common in rhetorical analyses but seem to be used primarily of Isocrates, whose style could not be compared with Bion's. The most important fact is that Bion's style is criticized because it was used to deliver a philosophical message. There was a theory for the form of a philosophical message as we can see from a statement of Theophrastus: *διττῆς οὔσης τῆς τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως καθὸ διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεοφράστος τῆς τε πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους (οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι) καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πείσαι προτίθεται τοὺς ἀκροωμένους . . . τῆς δέ γε πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγουμένως ἐπιμελήσεται τό τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς* (fr. 65 Wimmer = pp. 14 f Mayer).¹¹⁰ Even more strict is Cicero's description of the philosophical style: *mollis est enim oratio philosophorum et umbratilis, nec sententiis nec verbis instructa popularibus, nec vincta numeris, sed soluta liberius; nihil iratum habet, nihil invidum, nihil atrox, nihil miserabile, nihil astutum: casta verecundia, virgo incorrupta quodammodo* (*Orator* 19.64). We see immediately that nothing could be further from this ideal philosophical style than the style which Bion had chosen, and which, far from being a *virgo incorrupta*, had been described as a hetaera. Posidonius too is criticized for using a rhetorical style for a philosophical message: *οὐκ ἀπέχεται τῆς συνήθους ῥητορείας, ἀλλὰ συνενθουσιᾷ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς* (Strabo 3.2.9 = T103 Edelstein-Kidd).¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Cf. T11 with commentary.

¹⁰⁹ For the rhetorical use of the adjective *ἀνθηρός* cf. Geigenmüller, pp. 80 ff and R.G. Austin, in *Quintiliani Institutionis oratoriae liber XII* (Oxford, 1948) p. 199 (on. 12.10.59).

¹¹⁰ Cf. for the interpretation W. Kroll, 'Randbemerkungen XII', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 62 (1907) pp. 86 ff.

¹¹¹ Cf. also Seneca *Ep.* 40.4, where the form of philosophy is described as *incomposita*. . . *et simplex*, *Ep.* 40.8, where the importance of preserving the *dignitas* of philosophy is stressed and the statement in *Ep.* 100.4: *oratio sollicita philosophum non decet*.

In this connection there is one natural question. Was this severe judgement on the style of Bion justified? To give a definite answer here is of course difficult, considering the very fragmentary state of his writings. Furthermore the answer depends very much on the norms we accept for philosophical writings. In the context of the very strict standards of Theophrastus and Cicero the criticism must be considered as justified. On the other hand I do not think that the few longer fragments prove the criticism to be fully correct. Even if they use all rhetorical devices, I cannot consider that they completely hide Bion's philosophical message, which is so simple in character that it is very easy to understand. Therefore I think that the stylistic criticism of Bion does not give a true picture of reality but that it is coloured by the hostile tradition.

Another problem is to find the origin of this criticism of Bion's style. Dudley¹¹² is so far the only author to discuss this question, and he assumes, following Fiske's theories concerning the plain style,¹¹³ that this critical attitude originated with the Stoic school, influenced especially by Diogenes of Babylon and Panaetius. I do not find this fully convincing. Even if Bion's relations with the Stoics at the court of Antigonos Gonatas were strained, this does not prove that this animosity would be kept alive at a much later date in the same school. This would seem to overestimate the importance of Bion. The only philosophical school, whose criticism of Bion has left any clear traces, is the Epicurean (cf. T27 and F26A–B). It is however hardly probable that they were sufficiently interested in stylistic problems to criticize Bion in this respect. It is more likely that they took over the weapons provided by others. We have seen that the general statement that Bion dressed philosophy in a flowery dress is twice ascribed to Eratosthenes (T11–12). Even if he received a part of his education from the Stoics, this does not apply to his literary criticism, as we can see from the way he treated Homer.¹¹⁴ Therefore I think that the fact that the same statement is once ascribed to Theophrastus (T13) cannot be completely without significance and may instead indicate that the criticism originated with the Peripatetic school.¹¹⁵

There are different aspects, suggesting a Peripatetic origin. Bion's style as such is not considered suitable for a philosophical message in general. Both Theophrastus and later followers of the Peripatetic school demand a very

¹¹² Dudley, p. 65 n. 1 (pp. 90 f).

¹¹³ Cf. Fiske, pp. 78 ff.

¹¹⁴ For Eratosthenes' educational background see Susemihl 1891–92, I pp. 409 ff and *RE*, VI (1909) s.v. Eratosthenes (no. 4) cols. 358 ff (Knaack).

¹¹⁵ Theophrastus as a literary critic is treated e.g. by J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi* (Diss. Leipzig, 1912), *RE*, Suppl.b. VII (1940) s.v. Theophrastus cols. 1522 ff (Regenbogen) and Kennedy, op. cit. (n. 72) pp. 273 ff. The collection of fragments by A. Mayer (Leipzig, 1910) is unfortunately of no great use.

simple and pure style for philosophy. It is also clear that Theophrastus does not approve of Gorgian figures in a serious speech, and that he demands a serious form for a serious content: *φαίνεται γὰρ ἀπρεπὲς σπουδάζοντα τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς ὀνόμασι παίζειν καὶ τὸ πάθος τῇ λέξει περιαιρεῖν ἐκλύει γὰρ τὸν ἀκροατὴν* (Dionysius Hal. *Lys.* 14 p. 24 U–R).

Unfortunately Theophrastus' theories on rhetoric in general and different styles are very imperfectly known and consequently highly controversial. It seems plausible that the demand for four virtues of style goes back to Theophrastus: 'Ελληνισμός, σαφήνεια, τὸ πρέπον and κατασκευή (or τὸ κεκοσμημένον).¹¹⁶ If Bion's style was criticized according to these criteria, it would be found lacking in most respects. It should be kept in mind that the criticism first of all refers to the fact that Bion used this style to express philosophical concepts. Therefore he must have offended especially against the demand for τὸ πρέπον, which was a very important concept in Peripatetic rhetoric.¹¹⁷ Furthermore Bion's use of *φορτικὰ ὀνόματα* contravened the demand for 'Ελληνισμός and for τὸ πρέπον. The demand for *καλὰ ὀνόματα* can be found already in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.2.13 p. 1405b and *EN* 4.8.6 p. 1128a) and also in Theophrastus (Demetrius *De eloc.* § 173 and fr. 65 Wimmer = pp. 14 f Mayer).¹¹⁸ An offence against the demand for *σαφήνεια* can be found in Bion's exaggerated use of metaphorical expressions and his great fondness of plays on words and sounds, usually giving a double meaning.

There is one more aspect suggesting a Peripatetic origin for this criticism. We have seen that Bion's satirical and humorous spirit was criticized: *πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοίῳ διαφορῆσαι* (T11) and *mordacissimis salibus . . . laceravit* (T15). A great interest in the laughable is found especially in the Peripatetic school from Aristotle. Theophrastus wrote *Περὶ γελοίου* (Diog. Laert. 5.46) and *Περὶ χάριτος* (Diog. Laert. 5.48). For Demetrius of Phaleron we know the title *Περὶ χάριτος* (Diog. Laert. 5.81 = fr. 88 Wehrli IV).¹¹⁹ As the Peripatetic philosophers were alone in treating this subject,¹²⁰ it is highly probable that their theo-

¹¹⁶ Cf. Stroux, op. cit. (n. 115) pp. 29 ff and Kennedy, op. cit. (n. 72) pp. 274 ff.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Stroux, op. cit. (n. 115) pp. 16 ff, M. Pohlenz, 'Τὸ πρέπον: Ein Beitrag zu Geschichte des griechischen Geistes', *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen aus dem Jahr 1933*, Phil.-hist. Klasse (1933) pp. 53 ff and F. Wehrli, 'Der erhabene und der schlichte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der Antike', in *Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühl* (Basel, 1946), pp. 25 ff.

¹¹⁸ Cf. W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1924) pp. 111 f and Döring, pp. 164 f.

¹¹⁹ For the ancient theories of the laughable see E. Arndt, *De ridiculi doctrina rhetorica* (Diss. Bonn, 1904), Grant, W. Süß, 'Das Problem des Komischen im Altertum', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 45 (23) (1920) pp. 28 ff, A. Plebe, 'La teoria del comico da Aristotele a Plutarco', *Università di Torino*, Pubblicazioni della facoltà di lettere e filosofia, 4:1 (Turin, 1952) and G. Monaco, *Quintiliano: Il capitolo de risu (inst. or. VI 3)* (Palermo, 1970).

¹²⁰ Cf. *RE*, Suppl.b. VII (1940) s.v. Rhetorik cols. 1076 f (Kroll).

ries can be found in later authors to discuss this aspect, such as Demetrius, Plutarch, Cicero and Quintilian. Already Aristotle assumes a difference between a liberal and an illiberal jest. So in *EN* 4.8.1 p. 1128a ff he describes and accepts *οἱ εὐτράπελοι* in opposition to *οἱ βωμωλόχοι* and *οἱ ἄγροικοί*. According to this analysis Bion could be regarded as a case of *βωμωλόχος*: *οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμωλόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον* (*EN* 4.8.3 p. 1128a4–8). The following description of *ὁ βωμωλόχος* could also be accepted as a description of Bion: *ὁ δὲ βωμωλόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσῃ, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν οὐθὲν ἄν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἄν ἀκούσαι* (*EN* 4.8.10 p. 1128a33–1128b2). The other theoreticians have pointed out different kinds of joke, which are not acceptable and which can be found in Bion. So Cicero condemns *obsenitas* and jokes on names (*De orat.* 2.61.252 and 2.63.256–7), Quintilian does not accept jokes, which try to wound (6.3.28), *dicacitas . . . scurrilis et scenica obsenitas* (6.3.29), *amphibolia . . . obscena* (6.3.46) and jokes on names (6.3.55). All these criticisms apply also to Bion's kind of humour. The same criticism of jokes on names can be found also in Demetrius *De eloc.* § 171: *ἡ γὰρ ἀντίθεσις ἡ περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ ἡ φρόντις ἐμφαίνει τινὰ ψυχρότητα ἥθους καὶ ἀναγωγίαν*. There is an interesting statement in Hermogenes *Id.* 2.5 p. 341 Rabe, who in speaking of *δριμύτης* comments upon the use of words with a double meaning: *ὅλως τε πολὺς ὁ κίνδυνος ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δριμύτησιν ἐκπεσεῖν εἰς ψυχρότητα*. This evidence shows that Bion's kind of humour was such that it could be criticized as *ψυχρόν*, an error of style, which was treated already by Aristotle and Theophrastus.¹²¹

¹²¹ Theophrastus' definition of *τὸ ψυχρόν* is preserved in Demetrius *De eloc.* § 114; cf. L. v. Hook, 'Ψυχρότης ἢ τὸ ψυχρόν', *Classical Philology*, 12 (1917) pp. 68 ff and D.M. Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius On Style* (Diss. Amsterdam, 1964) pp. 80 ff.

III. Philosophical Standpoint

Bion's relations with philosophy and his standpoint in this respect have been judged in very different ways, just as the question of whether he should be called a philosopher or a sophist has received many different answers.¹ In my view the best way of finding a comparatively reliable answer to these questions is to see what the different schools, in which Bion studied, actually taught at this period, and how far and in what way they may have influenced him. Only then will it be possible to define Bion's own philosophical standpoint more precisely and to decide whether he was more of a sophist than a philosopher, more of an eclectic than an adherent of a single school. I shall treat the different philosophical schools in the order followed by Diog. Laert. 4.51–52 (= T19).

1. *Bion and the Academy*

It is generally and rightly accepted that Bion studied in the Academy and it is also agreed that this period must have been of very little importance for his way of thinking. Unfortunately the history of the Academy after Plato is not very well known, but it seems to have become very rigid and orthodox. Xenocrates,² with whom Bion had so little success, was interested in things, which must have been alien to the young man from Olbia: logic, epistemology and mathematics; in addition he developed a demonology, which could hardly have provoked great interest. More important is the fact that Xenocrates also had a deep interest in ethics, which proved, so far as we can see, to be the only part of philosophy to interest Bion. However, so little is preserved of his ethical writings that it is impossible to say whether they influenced Bion or how far. It is interesting that Xenocrates considered virtue to imply happiness: τὸν εὐδαιμόνα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν (Aristotle *Top.* 7.1 p. 152a7–10 = fr. 82 Heinze; cf. also Seneca *Ep.* 85.18 = fr. 91 Heinze), an idea

¹ To give just a few examples of extreme views: Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 342 n. 2 calls him “mehr witziger Literat, als Philosoph” and Hirzel 1895, I pp. 378 f regards him as a sophist, while Weber 1887, p. 180 n. 2 finds in Bion a pure Cynic and Tarn, pp. 237 f describes him as “one, who, in all soberness, is preaching to those who will listen a very simple and manly form of morality”.

² For the Academy after Plato in general see Zeller, II:1⁴ pp. 982 ff, Gomperz, III pp. 1 ff and Überweg-Praechter, pp. 341 ff. For Xenocrates see also *RE*, IXA:2 (1967) s.v. Xenokrates (no. 4) cols. 1512 ff (Dörrie) and the collection of fragments in R. Heinze, *Xenokrates: Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig, 1892).

which could very well be accepted by a Cynic (cf. below).³ There is only one case, in which Xenocrates⁴ (Aelianus *VH* 13.31 = fr. 101 Heinze) and Bion (F76) are known to pronounce a similar sentiment — in their compassion for animals. It is difficult to say whether this really is a case of influence, because of the anecdotal character of the material.

Bion's real teacher at the Academy was Crates.⁵ Hardly anything is known about him, except that he led a very secluded life in the Academy, turned away from the world, but on very friendly terms with the successor of Xenocrates, Polemon.⁶ Therefore there is every reason to believe that Crates' opinions did not differ from those of Polemon, as he was not a creative or productive character. A little more is known about Polemon. He seems to have devoted less interest to mathematics and more to ethics than his predecessor. A very interesting saying is preserved in Diog. Laert. 4.18: *ἔφασκε δὲ ὁ Πολέμων δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς θεωρήμασι, καθάπερ ἀρμονικόν τι τέχνιον καταπιόντα καὶ μὴ μελετήσαντα, ὥς κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐρώτησιν θανμάζεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διάθεσιν ἑαυτοῖς μάχεσθαι*. This clearly shows that Polemon placed the main emphasis on practical ethics, and really despised an exclusive interest in theoretical knowledge, an almost Cynic attitude. Furthermore he stressed the importance of a natural life: *Πολέμων ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου συντάγμασι* (Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 7.6.32.9), which also implied that he opposed the eating of the flesh of animals,⁷ and considered virtue as identical with happiness: *τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι . . . τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι* (Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 2.22.133.7). All these sayings could without difficulty be accepted by e.g. the Cynic school, as can be shown by extant sayings. It is well known that the Cynics repudiated all branches of liberal education and only valued ethics of a very practical sort (cf. below). See e.g. the saying of Antisthenes: *τὴν ἄρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων* (Diog. Laert. 6.11 = fr. 70 Caizzi) and the general characterization of the Cynics: *ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περαιοῦν . . . μόνῳ δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἡθικῷ . . . παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα* (Diog. Laert. 6.103). Life according to nature was a Cynic topos; cf. e.g. the following saying of Diogenes:

³ On Xenocrates' ethics see Heinze, op. cit. (n. 2) pp. 147 ff.

⁴ Cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon I: Leben und Werke* (Berlin, 1919) p. 718: "Er war Vegetarier, schonte ein Vöglein, das sich in seinen Schoss geflüchtet hatte; seine Landsleute alter und neuer Zeit würden es unfehlbar gebraten haben".

⁵ Apart from the literature given above (n. 2) see also *RE*, XI:2 (1922) s.v. Krates (no. 8) cols. 1631 ff (v. Arnim).

⁶ Apart from the literature given above (n. 2) see also *RE*, XXI:2 (1952) s.v. Polemon cols. 2524 ff (v. Fritz).

⁷ Cf. v. Fritz, art. cit. (n. 6) cols. 2526 f.

· δέον οὖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων πόνων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν ἐλομένους ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως (Diog. Laert. 6.71). The tenet that virtue is sufficient for happiness belonged to the Cynic belief from the beginning, as we can see from a statement of Antisthenes: αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (Diog. Laert. 6.11 = fr. 70 Caizzi).

These ideas all fit in with Bion's system of thought. Consequently I do not accept the general statement that Bion can in no way have been influenced by the Academy. Of course his interest can only have been in the teaching on ethics but, as we have seen, this became more prominent during the leadership of Polemon. Therefore it is in no way excluded that Bion actually was to some extent influenced by the Academy in this respect, as Polemon's view of ethics seems to fit in very well with what we know of Bion. This possible influence may have simplified Bion's transition to the Cynic school, since he there found as the main and almost the only subject what after all only played one part in the teaching of the Academy, viz. the ethics.

2. *Bion and the Cynic school*

Bion left the Academy for the Cynic school, or, to follow the only source we have, Diog. Laert. 4.51–52 (= T19), for the Cynic way of life. There is something very meaningful in this seemingly scornful remark. According to Diog. Laert. 6.103 it was a very much debated question if Cynicism was to be regarded as a philosophy or a way of life. This shows that for the Cynic philosopher life and doctrine must have formed a unity of a type not common in other philosophical schools. It is also quite clear that the Cynics paid very little attention to a theoretical basis for their way of life, and that therefore their philosophical standpoints on many topics are obscure. However, enough is known to exclude the possibility of giving a complete survey here of the different beliefs held by the Cynic philosophers, so that I must confine myself to some of the main points.⁸ This is also justified by the fact that many aspects of

⁸ For Cynic philosophy the only full-scale work is still the book by Dudley; cf. also Zeller, II:1⁴ pp. 280 ff, Gomperz, II pp. 112 ff, Joel 1921, pp. 862 ff, Überweg-Praechter, pp. 159 ff, pp. 432 ff and pp. 503 ff and Helm 1924, cols. 3 ff. A vast material concerning the Cynic school is collected in Gerhard 1909. Cf. also for Antisthenes *RE*, I (1894) s.v. Antisthenes (no. 10) cols. 2538 ff (Natorp) and Guthrie, pp. 247 ff and pp. 304 ff, for Diogenes *RE*, V (1905) s.v. Diogenes von Sinope (no. 44) cols. 765 ff (Natorp) and *RAC*, III (1957) s.v. Diogenes von Sinope cols. 1063 ff (Kusch), and for Crates *RE*, XI:2 (1922) s.v. Krates aus Theben (no. 6) cols. 1625 ff (Stenzel). The works by Brown and Höistad are of great interest while the books by Sayre 1938 and 1948 have to be used with great care. A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London, 1974) does not treat the Cynic school at all. The fragments of Antisthenes are collected by F.D. Caizzi (Milan, 1966), but for the other Cynics the old collection by F.W.A. Mullach in *FPG* II (Paris, 1867) pp. 295 ff is still not replaced.

Cynic philosophy are discussed in detail in the commentary, where more material will be found. Despite the opinion of several modern scholars,⁹ I here accept the traditional view, which connects Antisthenes with the Cynics. Even if it is true that we cannot speak of a definite Cynic way of life until the appearance of Diogenes, I believe that Antisthenes had a decisive influence on its theoretical background.¹⁰

The Cynic philosophy¹¹ can be said to concentrate exclusively on ethics, and to reject all sciences and the liberal arts as being completely worthless for the leading of a virtuous life (Diog. Laert. 6.103). This attitude appears somewhat inconsistent, as it is difficult to combine with it the rich literary production, which is attested for the Cynics. Furthermore they can hardly have rejected the theoretical side *in toto*, as is also obvious from preserved fragments, in which true knowledge is regarded as essential for achieving happiness. The Cynics seem to have given their message in a mainly negative form, and their positive contribution is not very prominent.¹² This is founded in their whole outlook on, and way of, life. They seem to have had a certain weakness for the perpetual repetition of certain words and concepts which are of great importance in their philosophy. This gives their message a very one-sided character, as if they sought to instil these concepts into the minds of their listeners.

If we are to find a single concept to characterize the Cynics, I think that freedom would be the obvious choice.¹³ Freedom implies happiness and a complete freedom was their aim in life and the gift they sought to confer on their fellow-men. This freedom means a complete independence from everything—external circumstances, state, family, friends and even the gods. Therefore this freedom proves to be of a mainly negative character; it is essen-

⁹ The ancient report that Antisthenes was the founder of the Cynic school was criticized already by, e.g., Schwartz p. 10 and Wilamowitz, op. cit. (n. 4) I pp. 259 f and p. 268 n. 1 and II pp. 162 f. This criticism was later developed further especially by Dudley, pp. 1 ff, followed e.g. by Brown, pp. 25 f.

¹⁰ The traditional report was accepted by, e.g., Joel 1921, p. 881 n. 1, Überweg-Praechter, pp. 159 f, Höistad, pp. 8 ff (especially against Dudley), O. Gigon, *Sokrates: Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte* (Bern, 1947), p. 289 and P. v.d. Mühl, 'Interpretationen biographischer Überlieferung', *Museum Helveticum*, 23 (1966) p. 238.

¹¹ The only general ancient account of Cynic philosophy is to be found in Diog. Laert. 6.103–105, —a summary however supposed to be influenced by Stoic ideas, e.g. by Caizzi, p. 94, which does not seem convincing to me; cf. Höistad, pp. 38 ff. In the following I do not give references for every point in the Cynic doctrine. Plenty of material will be found in Diog. Laert. and in the literature given above (n. 8).

¹² Cf. Höistad, pp. 15 f, who, however, in his work tries to reach some of the positive aspects of the Cynic doctrine.

¹³ Cf. Pohlenz 1955, pp. 79 ff.

tially freedom *from* different things. It has an aspect of self-sufficiency and indifference, which is well expressed by two other Cynic key-words—*αὐτάρκεια* and *ἀπάθεια*.

The Cynics stress that the only foundation for a philosophical life is a proper understanding of one's self and one's situation. Therefore they make an extensive use of the Apollonian saying *γνώθι σαυτόν*. Only thus can people reach *φρόνησις*, which is the necessary background for any improvement and which has a practical and ethical meaning. The aim of the Cynic was to attain *ἀρετή*, which is the supreme good and the one real necessity. Their life was to be virtuous: *τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν* (Diog. Laert. 6.104). Furthermore, according to the Socratic tradition, this virtue could be taught and once acquired could not be lost: *ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι . . . καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν* (Diog. Laert. 6.105). This virtue was the only thing needed for a truly happy life according to Antisthenes: *αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν* (Diog. Laert. 6.11 = fr. 70 Caizzi) and furthermore it was a thing of deeds and not learning. This idea also led the Cynics to stress the importance of *πόνος*, and even give it a good interpretation, as well as of *ἄσκησις*, which had to be both spiritual and physical. Only the man who had virtue could be regarded as a *σοφός*, which was an important concept for the Cynics as well as for the Stoics, although the Cynics did not go to the same extremes: *ἀξιέραστόν τε τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ* (Diog. Laert. 6.105). The Cynic sage was completely independent in all respects and was closer to the gods than other people. According to Diog. Laert. 6.105 the Cynics held the same idea as the Stoics on the relation between virtue and vice: *τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν*.

When from this theoretical background we come to the Cynic way of life, we have already seen that *ἀρετή* is enough to produce contentment. The Cynics are here, as always, extremely self-confident, regarding the opinions of men in general with the greatest contempt. They stress the importance of a natural life and *τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν* becomes a very common slogan. As examples for such a life they point to the gods and the animals and show a great fondness for the use of shocking paradoxes. Their propaganda for a natural life leads them to condemn most of the things which people in general appreciate, and in this respect the Cynics must have made a very strange impression. Here their propaganda tends to be negative in form and can be said to attack three things, which are generally sought: 1) *ἡδονή*, 2) *χρήματα* and 3) *δόξα*.¹⁴ This negative attitude is extremely common in writings influenced by the Cynics. Let us start with *φιληδονία*! This deprecatory attitude refers to pleasure related either to sex or to eating and drinking. The Cynics tend to be fiercely hostile, as we can

¹⁴ Cf. Gerhard 1912, pp. 396 ff.

see from a saying of Antisthenes: *ἔλεγε τε συνεχές· μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην* (Diog. Laert. 6.3 = fr. 108 Caizzi). Concerning sexual pleasure the Cynics seem to have stressed independence and the importance of simply overcoming desire rather than abstinence, and their whole attitude is overlaid by anecdotes of an often surprising kind. Regarding food and drink they advocate mainly the simplest possible things: *ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ λιτῶς βιοῦν, αὐτάρκεσι χρωμένοις σιτίοις . . . ἔνιοι γοῦν καὶ βοτάναις καὶ παντάπασιν ὕδατι χρῶνται ψυχρῷ* (Diog. Laert. 6.104). *Φιλοχρηματία* was equally firmly rejected by the Cynics, and their attitude is well expressed by their comparison of avarice with dropsy (cf. F34 with commentary). This criticism seems to be common to all popular philosophical schools, but the Cynics went to extremes in their longing for a complete independence, which led them to strive for a life with as few belongings as possible. The possessions which are allowed are reduced to a minimum: *τρίβων, πήρα* and *βακτηρία*. Some Cynics even advocate begging as a method of supporting oneself. *Φιλοδοξία* was rejected or ridiculed by the Cynics: *πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονούσιν* (Diog. Laert. 6.104). Here the Cynics once more show their complete independence and their contempt for popular opinion as they regard *δόξα* as something without any value, which in typical Cynic terminology can be called *τῦφος*. I have here given a simplified version of the Cynic attitude and I shall return to the problem of whether their opinions on *ἡδονή*, *χρήματα* and *δόξα* are consistent.

The picture we have so far drawn represents the ideal of the Cynic philosopher or the man who has chosen the Cynic way of life. There is some doubt as to whether this extreme form was ever practiced. The demands are too strict and too unrealistic, and it must soon have become obvious that the ideal Cynic had to remain a pattern, on which one should try to form one's life even if it was clear from the outset that the aim was impossible of achievement. After all the ideal Cynic must have presented an almost monstrous picture to the ordinary man: a man living in extreme poverty without even the necessities of life who regards himself as the equal of kings and gods and treats everyone else with contempt. His abnormally strong feeling for independence and liberty makes him reject all ties with family and society and adopt an extremely selfish attitude, where his own happiness is all that matters. As the Cynics refuse to take part in political and religious life, you would expect them to lack interest for their fellowmen. But here we find one of the inconsistencies in the behaviour of the Cynic philosopher. He is very eager to spread his gospel, and has such a strong feeling for his fellowmen that his attitude can rightly be described as *φιλανθρωπία*.¹⁵ His attitude in general however must have appeared shocking,

¹⁵ Cf. Bernays, pp. 100 ff, Weber 1887, pp. 126 f and Gerhard 1909, pp. 32 ff.

as it is strongly influenced by the Cynic ideas of *ἐλευθερία* and *παρρησία*, which other people would regard as *ἀναισχυντία* and *ἀπέχθεια*.

This description of Cynic philosophy is of course an over-simplification as it ignores the inconsistencies in the Cynic doctrine and a possible development in time. However, I do not consider that this survey will lead us too far astray, when we now proceed to the main question, viz. to what extent was Bion influenced by the Cynic philosophy. A quick glance at the preserved fragments will show us immediately that Cynic ideas made a very deep impression on Bion's thought and this to a greater extent than is usually realized. We find the same exclusive interest in ethics, and rejection of the liberal arts, together with all dogmatic philosophy. The message of Bion, as well as of the Cynics in general, is of a mainly negative character, so that he attacks different things and ideas more often than he tries to point to a positive course to follow. Here we have to deal with a Cynic tradition and with Bion's own personality, which delighted in attack and criticism for its own sake. Freedom is also for Bion an extremely important concept, and even if the actual word occurs but rarely in the fragments, it is clear from the content. However, Bion's concept of freedom seems to be slightly different from that of the older Cynics, and not to be of the same abstract and uncompromising kind as in the early Cynic school. Instead he wants to help people to freedom on a more practical level by removing fear from things which usually cause ordinary people anxiety, such as religion and superstition, poverty, old age and death, and by removing states of mind which prevent this freedom, e.g. avarice, envy, dependence on a dogmatic philosophy, too great an interest in beauty and love. Bion too wants to lead people to *αὐτάρκεια*, which for him implies independence on a practical level.

Bion, as well as the earlier Cynics, gives very little of a theoretical background for his moral philosophy, and this may be due not only to the fragmentary character of his work. However, even he stresses the importance of true knowledge as a sound foundation for a philosophical life. *Φρόνησις* is an important concept and foremost among the virtues. The general concept *ἀρετή* does not hold such a prominent place as one could expect. Nor does the wise man play an extremely important role in the preserved fragments, perhaps because the concept of *ὁ σοφός* was found to be too unrealistic. Therefore this expression is missing altogether and Bion instead uses *ὁ ἀγαθός (ἄνθρωπος)*, who is the only truly free man, able to play every role assigned to him with dignity (F16A). Severely condemned are notions such as *δόξα* and *οἵησις*, which once more stresses the importance of real knowledge, and here Bion is faithfully following the Cynic tradition.

When we come to Bion's concept of a happy life, we see that his ideas are somewhat different from those of the first Cynics. Even if *ἀρετή*, especially as *φρόνησις*, is present in the background, it is not stressed as the only source of

happiness, which instead derives from the possibility of adapting oneself to the actual circumstances and from satisfaction with Fortune's gifts. This view diverges from the original Cynicism, which regarded circumstances as being of no importance, and which would not have stressed the necessity of adaptation. We find a more realistic attitude in Bion, and the same applies to the idea of a natural life. We find nothing in him of the shocking paradoxes, in which Diogenes indulged, and he is unlikely to have accepted the idea that the animals in reality could provide men with a pattern for life. We also find very few comparisons with animals in Bion's fragments. They are otherwise very dear to the Cynics.

Let us now compare Bion's attitude to *ἡδονή*, *χρήματα* and *δόξα* with the Cynic attitude in general! When it is a question of *φιληδονία* it should be stressed that Bion adopts a very strict and completely Cynic point of view. There is no praise or even acceptance of *ἡδονή*, either in sexual pleasure or in enjoyment of food and drink. His attitude in the first case seems to be rather contemptuous, and he ridicules all fuss about the matter, without advocating any form of abstinence. In the second case Bion's attitude is perfectly clear and he recommends his listeners to derive their *ἡδονὰς οὐ . . . ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης . . . ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν* (Athenaeus 10.421 E–F = F14). In Teles pp. 6.8–8.6 (= T17) we find a hymn to simple living, wholly in accordance with Cynic ideas, where vegetables and water are regarded as the only necessities. In this respect Bion proves to be a true Cynic, and there is no justification for describing his attitude as hedonistic in a pejorative sense, as has often happened. Bion's attitudes to *χρήματα* are somewhat diffuse. He firmly condemns avarice and delivers a spirited defence of poverty. Wealth, on the other hand, is neither praised nor condemned. Instead Bion stresses its very insecure character. He damns the inability to use wealth in a meaningful way, e.g. in order to do good, and the miser is often ridiculed. Here Bion seems to have departed from the ideals of the old Cynics but once more his attitude is more realistic. As we find no positive interest in wealth I doubt very much if we are entitled to call his attitude hedonistic in a negative sense. We can compare with the saying of another Cynic, who like Bion did not belong to the early generations, i.e. Metrocles: *τὸν πλοῦτον βλαβερόν, εἰ μὴ τις ἀξίως αὐτῷ χρῶτο* (Diog. Laert. 6.95). It seems obvious that Bion has given up the ideal Cynic life with all its extreme traits. Instead he accepts fees from his students and support from the rulers of the world. However, he stresses that he can do this without losing his freedom or independence, which are as valuable to him as to the older Cynics. When we come to *φιλοδοξία* there is very little material in Bion to enlighten us on his attitude to this longing. However, there is no reason to believe that the opinion of Bion differs from that of the Cynics in this respect, as he expresses his negative attitude by using the term *δοξοκόπος* (F34). On the other hand, Bion seems to

believe in a true and honorable *δόξα* (F43A–B), which may also be an acceptance of reality, even if Cynic parallels are not altogether lacking. So we see that Bion has slightly transformed the Cynic message but in a most sensible way and without changing the real content.

This seems an appropriate point to discuss certain problems concerning the development of the Cynic school and Bion's place therein, which so far has only been touched upon. Was Cynicism in the beginning ascetic or hedonistic? Did a development take place and how? Did Bion make any contribution here and is it correct to say that he transformed Cynicism and gave it a more hedonistic form?¹⁶

It has generally been assumed that the Cynic school was at first rigorous and strictly ascetic.¹⁷ However, we should here remember the importance of Socrates for the formation of the ethics of the Cynics, and the fact that Antisthenes was undoubtedly the founder of the Cynic school. Even scholars who do not accept this admit the importance of Antisthenes for the ethics of the Cynics.¹⁸ Socrates led a comparatively ascetic life but there were hedonistic traits in his eudaemonia.¹⁹ Even a simple life can involve pleasure. Therefore the distinction made by Höistad²⁰ between an eudaemonistic asceticism and a thoroughgoing asceticism is entirely correct and very important here. The most important thing is to be satisfied with, and able to use the gifts bestowed on you, even if they are small and simple, not to deny yourself as much as possible. This is expressed by the word-group *ἀρκεῖν*–*αὐτάρκης*–*αὐτάρκεια*, which plays a very important role also in the Cynic school.²¹ This belongs already to the picture of Socrates: *ἤδεσαν δὲ Σωκράτην ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα, τῶν ἡδονῶν δὲ πασῶν ἐγκρατέστατον ὄντα* (Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.14). The following saying ascribed to Socrates is also of interest: *Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθεὶς 'τίς σοι πλουσιώτερος εἶναι δοκεῖ;' εἶπεν 'ὁ ἐλαχίστοις ἀρκούμενος' αὐτάρκεια γάρ ἐστι φύσεως πλουτοῦς* (*Gnom. Vat.* 476).²²

¹⁶ This is the opinion of e.g. Gerhard 1909 *passim* and v. Fritz, pp. 42 ff.

¹⁷ On the other hand some scholars have stressed that the two tendencies, the rigorous and the hedonistic, may have been present from the beginning; cf. K. Praechter, 'Zur Frage nach der Composition der sechsten Rede des Dion Chrysostomos', *Hermes*, 37 (1902) p. 285 n.1; or that the early Cynicism was hedonistic; cf. Joel 1921, pp. 904 ff and A.O. Lovejoy–G. Boas, 'Primitivism and related Ideas in Antiquity', *A Documentary History of Primitivism and related Ideas*, 1 (Baltimore, 1935) pp. 120 f.

¹⁸ Cf. Dudley, p. 13.

¹⁹ So Überweg-Praechter, p. 175.

²⁰ Höistad, p. 134.

²¹ Cf. for a general survey e.g. *ThW*, I (1933) s.v. *ἀρκέω* etc. pp. 464 ff (Kittel), *RAC*, I (1950) s.v. *Autarkie* cols. 1039 ff (Wilpert), Gerhard 1909, pp. 56 f, Dziech, pp. 125 ff and Rich, pp. 23 ff.

²² Cf. also Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.1 and 2.3.2 and for Socrates' way of life Vischer, pp. 48 ff.

Before studying the attitudes of the early Cynic philosophers to this question, it should be pointed out that the Cynics indulge in paradoxical expressions and give old concepts such as *ἡδονή*, *εὐγένεια* and *δόξα* new meanings, by interpreting them in a new and moral sense. This can give their teaching the character of being hedonistic, which is in any case an unsuitable term here. We can consider the following saying of Antisthenes as an example: *ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνοὺς διωκτέον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.29.65 = fr. 113 Caizzi), which of course should not be taken to mean that Antisthenes is striving for *ἡδοναί* in any vulgar sense. Contrary to the common opinion *πόνοι* for them also imply *ἡδοναί*.²³

In this case we have the important testimony in Xenophon *Symp.* 4. 34–44 (= fr. 117 Caizzi) and there is no reason to doubt that this correctly reproduces Antisthenes' ideas.²⁴ Antisthenes is here describing his so-called wealth, which consists in the ability to be satisfied with what is provided, although it is very little: *ὁμῶς δὲ περίεστί μοι καὶ ἐσθίωντι ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ πεινῆν ἀφικέσθαι καὶ πίνοντι μέχρι τοῦ μὴ διψῆν* (4.37), *τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ* (4.38), *οὐδὲν οὕτως ὁρῶ φαῦλον ἔργον ὅποιον οὐκ ἀρκοῦσαν ἂν τροφὴν ἐμοὶ παρέχοι* (4.40), *πολυτελῆ* and *εὐτέλειαν* are contrasted in the common Cynic way (4.41–42), and *οἷς γὰρ μάλιστα τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖ ἥκιστα τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρέγονται* (4.42). This cannot be said to represent an aggressive asceticism,²⁵ the aim of which is to live in greatest possible poverty and privations. Instead he preaches the blessing of being satisfied with what is given, which means that an offering need not be rejected.

If we turn from Antisthenes to Crates, and ignore Diogenes for the moment, we find very much the same ideas in the picture of Crates, which is given in the fragments of Teles. There is no condemnation of property as such (cf. p. 14.4 ff), the consequence of philosophy is that you *βιώσῃ ἀρκούμενος τοῖς παροῦσι, τῶν ἀπόντων οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν, τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν οὐ δύσαρεστῶν* (pp. 38.10–39.1) and the life of a student of Crates is described as *οὐ σπανίζων ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ οὐδὲ ἐνδεὲς ὦν, ἀλλ' ἀρκούμενος τοῖς παροῦσι* (p. 41.11–12). It has been assumed that Bion is here expressing his own ideas through Crates.²⁶ As they are very similar to those of Antisthenes I doubt if this is the correct interpretation but in Teles we have a true picture of Crates' ideas. Furthermore it should be remembered that Crates probably softened the philosophy of Diogenes and that he had a warmer personality. Plutarch *Quaestiones convivales*

²³ Cf. Gerhard 1909, pp. 73 ff and Höistad *passim*.

²⁴ So Caizzi, p. 117; for a detailed commentary see Woldinga, II pp. 320 ff.

²⁵ For Greek ideals of asceticism see W. Capelle, 'Altgriechische Askese', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 25 (13) (1910) pp. 681 ff, *RAC*, I (1950) s.v. Askese I cols. 749 ff (Strathmann) and F17 with commentary.

²⁶ So Heinze 1890, p. 515 n. 2, Hense 1892, p. 240 and Helm 1906, p. 243 n. 2.

2.16.632 E describes his way of teaching as οὐ μετὰ πικρίας ἀλλὰ μετὰ χάριτος.²⁷ The statements preserved in Teles are by no means incompatible with what is known about Crates from other sources.²⁸

The main problem now is, whether Diogenes was an outsider in this development and practised an asceticism otherwise unknown during the first generations of the Cynic school. If not, the common picture of the rigorous Diogenes must be incorrect.²⁹ Even the picture of Diogenes displays so-called hedonistic traits, but these have generally been assumed to be a later invention, e.g. by Bion. This common picture of Diogenes has been questioned by Höistad,³⁰ who in Diogenes seeks to find an eudaemonistic rather than a thoroughgoing asceticism. The traits belonging to the latter aspect he supposes to be a secondary invention caused by the knowledge of oriental ascetics. The interpretation of Höistad has much to recommend it.³¹ If it is accepted we have a comparatively uniform picture of the Cynic school without any great differences between the three first generations of “leaders”. Support for the view that Diogenes was not an extreme ascetic can be found in the doxography (Diog. Laert. 6.71): δέον οὖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων πόνων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν ἐλομένους ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, παρὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν κακοδαιμονοῦσι. As this part of the biography is generally assumed to give the most accurate presentation of Diogenes’ ideas,³² this statement is of a very great value. It can also be noted that the idea that one should be satisfied with what one has is associated with Diogenes, who uses the typical Cynic phrase *χρῶ τοῖς παροῦσιν* (Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 122).³³ Furthermore it has been pointed out that the Cynic principle of living according to nature, which is attested also for Diogenes (cf. above), prevents any extreme asceticism.³⁴ Therefore it seems plausible that the true Diogenes was not as rigorous as he appears in the later tradition. It would also be impossible to combine this with what we know of his activity as an author and a teacher.³⁵

²⁷ Cf. Gerhard 1909, p. 41, Stenzel art. cit. (n. 8) col. 1627 and Dudley, pp. 48 ff.

²⁸ Cf. especially the collection of testimonies and fragments in *Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta* III:1: *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1901) pp. 207 ff.

²⁹ For Diogenes as an ascetic see Gerhard 1909 *passim*, Gerhard 1912, pp. 388 ff and v. Fritz, pp. 44 ff, who stresses that there would be no use in picturing Diogenes as a rigorous ascetic if he was not and that the development from rigorism to hedonism is natural enough: this view is accepted by Brown, pp. 29 ff.

³⁰ Höistad, pp. 132 ff; cf. also Lovejoy-Boas, op.cit. (n. 17) pp. 120 f.

³¹ Cf. however Reuters, p. 91 n. 72 (p. 146).

³² Cf. v. Fritz, pp. 54 ff and Höistad, p. 17.

³³ Reuters, p. 90 expresses doubts as to whether this precept really did emanate from Diogenes; cf. however Höistad, p. 135 n. 9. We have seen the precept ascribed to Socrates, Antisthenes and Crates. For the same or similar forms see also Dio of Prusa 30.33, Plutarch *De exilio* 16.606 D, Epictetus 4.4.45, Lucian *Toxaris* 34 and Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* 51.

³⁴ See Lovejoy-Boas, op. cit. (n. 17) pp. 120 f and Höistad p. 135 n. 9.

³⁵ For a sympathetic picture of Diogenes in these respects see v. Arnim 1898, pp. 37 ff.

However I think it probable that the life and principles of Diogenes were to some extent of a more austere character than those of the other early Cynics like Antisthenes and Crates. Otherwise it would be difficult to find a reason why just Diogenes later became a strict ascetic.

It should be pointed out that many of the anecdotes, which have been taken to support the idea of a hedonistic Cynicism in a more vulgar sense, are of very little value,³⁶ and should be compared with the pictures of different philosophers, which are given in Lucian. We do not have a true representation of a new doctrine but mere gossip about individual philosophers, which seems to be very common in the Greek literature from an early date.

If the picture given above is correct, we find that the Cynic school of the first generations was more uniform than is usually assumed, and was based on the foundations provided by Socrates' eudaemonistic asceticism. What is even more interesting here is that Bion proves to be mainly a Cynic, and that he fairly faithfully reproduces ideas which seem to have been shared by Cynic philosophers from Antisthenes to Crates. It seems plausible that Bion sometimes modified the Cynic doctrine and that he had a practical approach to problems. But in the main he remains faithful to Cynic principles and we are not entitled to assume that he created a new form of Cynicism, which could rightly be called hedonistic.

There is one aspect, where Bion's attitude may differ from the general Cynic one, i.e. concerning religious questions. He is extremely negative and heaps ridicule and contempt on all common religious beliefs and practices. The religious attitude of the early Cynics is far from clear, as the material is so highly fragmentary, but there seems to have been some positive aspects, such as monotheism and the belief in the divine mission of the philosopher. This is completely missing in Bion. On the other hand, the negative aspects predominate in other Cynics and there is nothing in the fragments of Bion on religious matters, which could not be said by a Cynic (cf. F25–33 with commentary).

3. *Bion and the Cyrenaic school*

The Cyrenaic school³⁷ in its old form was founded by Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates. Both Aristippus and his school earned a reputation for laxity and were regarded with almost as much contempt as the Epicureans at a later

³⁶ A rich material is collected in Gerhard 1912.

³⁷ For the Cyrenaic school see Zeller, II:I⁴ pp. 336 ff, Gomperz, II pp. 170 ff, Joel 1921, pp. 925 ff, Überweg-Praechter, pp. 170 ff and *RE*, XII:1 (1924) s.v. Kyrenaiker cols. 137 ff (Stenzel). Cf. also for Aristippus *RE*, II (1896) s.v. Aristippos cols. 902 ff (Natorp), E. Antoniadès, *Aristipp und die Kyrenaiker* (Diss. Göttingen, 1916), G.B.L. Colosio, *Aristippo di Cirene: Filosofo Socratico* (Turin, 1925), A. Mauersberger, 'Plato und Aristipp' I–II, *Hermes*, 61

period, because of their hedonism. The history of the school is not very well known, as the material is of a fragmentary character. So there is even some doubt whether the main points of this school are to be found already in the system of Aristippus or if we here have the influence of his grandson of the same name. Aristippus seems to have retained several traits which were typical of the old sophists, such as charging fees and travelling extensively. His philosophy was of a mainly practical and ethical character, at least as far as we can judge from the preserved fragments. Here it is important to separate the system as such from all the anecdotes which are told about the founder's person. Aristippus seems to have stressed freedom and complete independence from every state very strongly. The aim of the philosopher, according to his theory, is pleasure in a bodily form. However, one should remain master of one's pleasures, which forms part of the independence. When it is a question of knowledge, Aristippus adopted a sceptical point of view and seems to have regarded the liberal arts as being of little value. His attitude to religion is little known, except that, following a Socratic tradition, he did not consider praying necessary.

Bion's teacher from the Cyrenaic school was Theodorus, who was probably a pupil of the younger Aristippus. The fact that his followers were called *Θεοδώρειοι* (Diog. Laert. 2.97 = fr. 252 Mannebach) seems to indicate that they in some respect formed a special group, to some extent different from the old school. The theory of v. Fritz³⁸ that during his stay in Athens, when Bion was one of his pupils, Theodorus was exclusively a sophist, preaching atheism and immorality, and that he did not develop a philosophical system until he came back to Cyrene does not seem convincing to me. v. Fritz tries to prove his theory by the fact that the sophistical side of Theodorus' personality is stressed on those occasions when he is brought together with Bion. However, this stress upon Theodorus being a sophist may indicate that he, like Aristippus, took over some of the practices of the old sophists, and in Bion's case we must remember the hostile tradition, which may reflect on Theodorus. Therefore I think it is more probable that Theodorus had already developed his philosophical system during the period when Bion studied with him. The system differs in some respects from that of the founder. Theodorus is both more radical and more intellectual. For him *ἡδονή* is not the most important princi-

(1926) pp. 208 ff and pp. 304 ff, C.J. Classen, 'Aristippos', *Hermes*, 86 (1958) pp. 182 ff and Guthrie, pp. 490 ff, and for Theodorus *RE* VA:2 (1934) s.v. Theodoros (no. 32) cols. 1825 ff (v. Fritz) and R. v. Scala, 'Theodorus ἄθεος bei Polybios', *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 45 (1890) pp. 474 ff, who assumes a connection between Theodorus and Polybios through Bion. The fragments of the Cyrenaic philosophers are collected by G. Giannantoni, 'I Cirenaici', *Pubblicazioni dell'istituto di filosofia dell'università di Roma* (Florence, 1958) and E. Mannebach (Leyden-Cologne, 1961).

³⁸ v. Fritz, art. cit. (n. 37) cols. 1828 f.

ple, but *χαρά* and its opposite *λύπη*. Both of these have an intellectual foundation in *φρόνησις* and *ἀφροσύνη*. Theodorus seems to be more radical in that he tries to find not the pleasure of the moment but a more constant delight. He is also radical in so far as he completely rejects everything enforced by *νόμος*, which implies all moral principles. This is closely connected with his religious attitude. Theodorus is one of the best known atheists, who rejects not only the popular gods but the idea of God in general. This is the picture which is commonly presented but it is extremely difficult to judge whether it really represents the whole truth. Gomperz³⁹ has expressed doubts on this point. There is one saying of Theodorus which may indicate that his radicalism had been misunderstood: *Θεόδωρος μὲν γὰρ ὁ κληθεὶς ἄθεος ἔλεγε τῇ δεξιᾷ τοὺς λόγους ὀρέγοντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ δέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀκρωμένους* (Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi* 5.467 B = fr. 264 Mannebach).

To what extent was Bion influenced by his teacher Theodorus, and which of his ideas can be called Cyrenaic? The problem is more difficult than one would believe at first, as the similarities between the Cynics and the Cyrenaics become greater than before in the period of men like Crates and Theodorus.⁴⁰ I shall return later to the question how to make a distinction here, when influence from both sides is possible. Here I shall merely indicate the points on which Bion differs from the Cyrenaics and the possible similarities. The basic ideas of the Cyrenaic school do not seem to hold a very prominent place in Bion's philosophy, as far as we can judge from the fragments. The terminology of Theodorus, *χαρά* and *λύπη*, based on *φρόνησις* and *ἀφροσύνη*, is not to be found. However I think it is possible to find this more intellectual outlook in one fragment, where the reader is recommended to derive the *ἡδοναί* from *φρονεῖν* (F14). There is also a similarity in the deprecation of the liberal arts and the high value attributed to ethics, although this is more prominent in Bion than in the Cyrenaic school, which after all had an interest in epistemology. The concepts of freedom and independence are very prominent on both sides, but whether Bion really adopts as radical a position as Theodorus is far from clear. We do not find the very common antithesis between *νόμος* and *φύσις*⁴¹

³⁹ Gomperz, II pp. 196 f; for this problem see also P. Decharme, *La critique des traditions religieuses chez les grecs des origines au temps de Plutarque* (Paris, 1904) pp. 173 f, A.B. Drachmann, *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity* (London, 1922) pp. 75 f, Derenne, pp. 206 ff and A.S. Pease, in *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955) p. 123 (on 1.1.2).

⁴⁰ For similarities between the Cynics and the Cyrenaics see Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 372 and p. 378, Gomperz, II p. 174 and p. 196, Überweg-Praechter, p. 171 and p. 176, Antoniadès, op. cit. (n. 37) p. 116 ff and Dudley, pp. 104 ff. Cf. also the saying of the Cynic Demonax: *ἐγὼ δὲ Σωκράτη μὲν σέβω, θαυμάζω δὲ Διογένη καὶ φιλῶ Ἀρίστιππον* (Lucian *Demonax* 62).

⁴¹ Cf. F. Heinemann, 'Nomos und Physis: Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts', *Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 1 (Basel, 1945) and M. Pohlenz, 'Nomos und Physis', *Hermes*, 81 (1953) pp. 418 ff.

expressed in Bion, but this may be because it was outmoded and uninteresting by his time. Furthermore it is difficult to believe that Bion would have gone so far as to condemn all moral principles. A special question here concerns the problem of religion, and there is a possibility that we have an influence on Bion's thought, even though he has not explicitly advocated atheism. Much of the criticism of popular religion can as well have a Cynic background. However the complete absence of every positive statement, e.g. about the monotheism or the divine mission of the philosopher, makes it probable that in his exclusively negative attitude Bion is influenced by Theodorus. The Cyrenaics do not condemn possessions *per se*, but dependence on them or the inability to use them aright. The same idea is clearly expressed both by Bion and by the Cynics in general.

But Bion was perhaps even more influenced by the way of life of the Cyrenaic philosophers than by their doctrine. They stressed their cosmopolitanism, like the Cynics, but were at home in the world in quite another way than the old Cynic philosopher. So we find them in contact with leading men of their time, holding an independent and respected position. Furthermore they were more realistic than the old Cynics in economic questions and did not try to follow a mendicant life, but could accept fees from their students and support from prominent men without thereby losing their liberty. These traits are all to be found in Bion, who could obviously see these matters from a more practical point of view.

4. *Bion and the Peripatetic school*

The last school Bion attended was the Peripatos and here Theophrastus was his teacher.⁴² Theophrastus must have been an old man by this time but he was extremely popular among the Athenians (cf. Diog. Laert. 5. 37). It is not easy to find an obvious reason for Bion's transfer from the Cyrenaic school to the Peripatetic, unless a highly hypothetical explanation is assumed, e.g. a wish to find a sounder foundation for his philosophy or a great interest, already developed, in character study. Theophrastus was the pupil and successor of Aristotle and his interests were very wide and also of purely scientific kind. Nevertheless we can without doubt assume that only the ethical part of his teaching was of interest to Bion. Ethics formed a very important part of Theophrastus' philosophical system and gave him the subject for many literary works, now

⁴² For Theophrastus see Zeller, II:2³ pp. 806 ff, especially pp. 854 ff, Gomperz, III pp. 375 ff, Überweg-Praechter, pp. 401 ff and *RE*, Suppl.b. VII (1940) s.v. Theophrastos (no. 3) cols. 1479 ff, (Regenbogen), where also the older literature is given, to which can be added C.O. Brink, 'Οικείωσις and Οικειότης: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral Theory', *Phronesis*, 1 (1955–56) pp. 123 ff.

unfortunately lost, except for fragments. Thus it is difficult to form a clear picture of Theophrastus' ethical doctrines. He seems to have based his ethics on natural science, regarding *φύσις* as a norm. It is of great interest that his ethical studies concentrated upon the practical virtues rather than *θεωρία*. He regarded *εὐδαιμονία* as the aim and also attributed some importance to external circumstances. Some of his works on ethical problems should be mentioned here: *Περὶ γήρωος*, *Περὶ πένθους*, *Περὶ φιλίας*, *Περὶ κολακείας*, *Περὶ πλούτου*, and *Περὶ γάμου*. We see immediately that these topics were of great interest to anyone, who devoted himself to moral philosophy or practical morality. Very little is known about the content of these works, but it is of a certain interest that Theophrastus' attitude towards *ἡδονή* and *πλοῦτος* was not particularly rigid but more tolerant.

From the very few items we possess on Theophrastus' ethics, it is very difficult to say if, and to what extent, he influenced Bion. It seems to me most probable that he not so much changed as corroborated Bion's way of thinking and ideas. Some elements of his teaching must have appealed to Bion, such as his stress on the practical rather than the theoretical, and his seemingly tolerant and realistic attitude to certain aspects, which were condemned by philosophers with more rigid views. It does happen that Theophrastus and Bion express the same view on different moral issues, but in most cases it is merely a question of philosophical commonplaces, which cannot tell us anything about the influence of Theophrastus on Bion's thought. For example, they both seem to adopt a negative attitude to marriage, at least as far as the wise man is concerned. There are also some cases, where the same or similar sayings are ascribed to both philosophers (cf. F47 and F77). It may well be that Bion is here quoting his teacher, although we cannot be absolutely certain, as the sayings are so general in character. So far we have no proof that Theophrastus really influenced or changed the thought of Bion, as all the similarities can be explained by Bion's earlier philosophical education.

However there remains one work of Theophrastus, which really seems to have had some influence on Bion, and if not the work *per se* then at least the ideas behind it. This is of course Theophrastus' best known work, his famous *Characters*.⁴³ The date of composition for this collection of character-studies is by no means definite, but it seems obvious that it appeared before Bion joined the Peripatetic school. The purpose of this work is very much discussed and the main question is, whether it should be understood as belonging to Theophrastus' ethics or his poetics, or possibly also rhetoric. The question is not of very great importance for the understanding of Bion's use of the *Characters*.

⁴³ Cf. apart from the literature given above (n. 42) the editions of the *Characters* with commentary by R.G. Ussher (London, 1960) and P. Steinmetz (*Das Wort der Antike*, 7 (Munich, 1960–62)), where most of the earlier literature is given.

However his undoubted use points to an ethical background. Thus the idea that the *Characters* belonged to the poetics seems somewhat unlikely. However it would be possible to combine an ethical background with a rhetorical, so that the *Characters* were intended to support a philosophical discourse.⁴⁴ Leaving this question aside it seems obvious that Bion knew and used the *Characters*.⁴⁵ As his work is preserved only in fragments, the main criteria, which we have to guide us here, are somewhat weak and superficial, as we have to fall back on the terminology. Even here there are too many similarities to be accidental. We find references to the following characters: ἀδολεσχία (F52 and F74), ἀνελευθερία (F38), δεισιδαιμονία (F30), κολακεία (F51), μεμψιμοιρία (F16A) μικρολογία (F36 and F37), and φιλαργυρία (F35). The use of βάσκανος (F48) may resemble the character of κακολογία. Usually there is no real definition or description of the different character-types in Bion, but this may be due to the mutilated condition of his work. So we have to grasp the character mostly from some witty remark of Bion. Of interest however is his description of the μικρολόγος: ἔλεγε τοὺς μικρολόγους τῶν μὲν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἰδίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὡς δ' ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι (Diog. Laert. 4.50 = F37). There is also his description of ὁ φθονερός as συγκεχυμένος or κεκυφώς (F47) and ὁ βάσκανος as ἐσκυθρωπακώς (F48), even though these types are not treated in Theophrastus. These expressions are completely in his style. The use of external characteristics to describe an individual's moral attributes recalls that the Peripatetic school had a certain interest in physiognomics, which may very well have attracted Bion.⁴⁶ Short definitions of different ethical concepts in Peripatetic style are of frequent occurrence in Bion's writings. We can easily understand why Bion was attracted by the *Characters* and used them in his discourses. They must have suited both his practical philosophical outlook and

⁴⁴ Of interest in this connection is also the question of whether Theophrastus influenced Menander, as there are some similarities between Menander and Bion; for this problem see T.B.L. Webster, 'Studies in Menander' 2. ed., *Publications of the University of Manchester*, 309, Class. Ser., 7 (Manchester, 1960) pp. 195 ff, P. Steinmetz, 'Menander und Theophrast', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 103 (1960) pp. 185 ff, A. Barigazzi, 'La formazione spirituale di Menandro', *Università degli studi di Torino, Ist. di filol. class.*, 2 (Turin, 1965) pp. 69 ff and K. Gaiser, 'Menander und der Peripatos', *Antike und Abendland*, 13 (1967) pp. 8 ff.

⁴⁵ This has been pointed out especially by Dudley, p. 68 n. 3 (p. 92); cf. also P. Wendland, 'Zu Theophrasts Charakteren', *Philologus*, 57 (11) (1898) p. 118 and p. 122.

⁴⁶ For a survey see *RE*, XX:1 (1941) s.v. Physiognomik cols. 1064 ff (Schmidt), where also the older literature can be found, and E.C. Evans, 'Physiognomics in the Ancient World', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society N.S.*, 59:5 (Philadelphia, 1969). —It is of a certain interest that the Cynic school also showed interest in physiognomics, as Antisthenes is reported to have written *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός* (Diog. Laert. 6.15 = fr. 1 Caizzi; cf. also Athenaeus 14.656 F = fr. 16 Caizzi); cf. Norden 1893, pp. 368 ff and Oltramare, pp. 174 ff.

his literary style, as they could produce a very vivid effect, and also contribute greatly to the humorous and satirical element in Bion. The fondness for short, epigrammatic definitions and expressions in general, which can be found in the *Characters*, must have attracted Bion, who shows a great weakness for short and often somewhat paradoxical definitions.

5. *Bion's own philosophical standpoint*

Here an attempt will be made both to define Bion's own philosophical standpoint more closely and to see to what extent Bion is dependent in this respect on the different philosophical schools, in which he studied and which therefore can have influenced him. First of all let it be clearly stated: Bion is basically a philosopher, not a sophist or a rhetor. When scholars reach a different judgement, they are misled by the style and tone of his literary work, which on this point is highly influenced by rhetoric, and they do not pay enough attention to the content. We have seen the same thing happen in antiquity, giving rise to a severe and somewhat unfair criticism of Bion. It is quite correct that as regards his literary form Bion learnt much from non-philosophical quarters, but his message remains that of a philosopher.

When we come to the actual philosophy of Bion, we are immediately aware that it is exclusively ethical in character, and consists of a very basic and simple doctrine. Therefore we could with good reason speak of Bion's ethics rather than his philosophy.⁴⁷ Bion has no interest in theoretical speculations concerning physical, logical or metaphysical problems, so common among Greek philosophers of another type. But he goes even further and repudiates the ordinary Greek education with its different branches as being of no value for a philosophical life. It is also clearly stated that he did not discuss questions concerned with laws and constitutions (T28), perhaps because not only of his philosophical attitude but also of the actual political situation in the Hellenistic monarchies. However, this fact is noteworthy as Bion is known to have had

⁴⁷ There is a vast literature concerning Greek ethics and I can only give a limited number of titles here: L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen* I–II (Berlin, 1882), M. Wundt, *Geschichte der griechischen Ethik* I–II (Leipzig, 1908–11), O. Dittrich, *Die Systeme der Moral* I–II (Leipzig, 1923), E. Howald, 'Ethik des Altertums', *Handbuch der Philosophie*, 3 (Munich-Berlin, 1931), F. Wehrli, *ΛΑΘΕ ΒΙΩΣΑΣ: Studien zur ältesten Ethik bei den Griechen* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1931), L. Robin, *La morale antique* (Paris, 1947), E. Schwartz, *Ethik der Griechen*, hrsg. von W. Richter (Stuttgart, 1951), A. Dihle, 'Die goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgäarethik', *Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 7 (Göttingen, 1962), *LAW*, (1965) s.v. Ethik cols. 880 ff (Gigon) and *RAC*, VI (1966) s.v. Ethik cols. 646 ff (Dihle) with a rich bibliographie. For popular, non-philosophical ethics see A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek values* (Oxford, 1960) and Dover.

close relations with one of the Hellenistic rulers. Even here his teaching was of an ethical character, without trying to give some sort of instruction for rulers.

A philosophical ethical system starts to develop, when an old form of society with its popular ethics is being destroyed. The beginning of ethics based on philosophy can be found in the fifth century B.C. and the sophists and especially Socrates can be regarded as important stages on the way to a more methodological approach by Plato and Aristotle. However, the different philosophical schools all seem to combine a theoretical approach with a practical, although the stress is somewhat different.

Little remains of a theoretical foundation for Bion's ethics, and it is highly uncertain if he had developed a clear and consistent system. We may remember that the early Cynics were very radical and showed little interest in theoretical speculations. For Bion the practical side is much more important than any theory. However, he, like the Cynics in general, does not altogether disregard the scientific foundation for his ethics. Here an intellectual approach becomes obvious, as true knowledge is regarded as indispensable for a correct action. There is no explicit statement that this is the opinion of Bion but it emerges from what he says about the opposite of true knowledge, stressing the negative side more than the positive. The opposite state, by Bion called *ἄνοια*, *οἷησις* or *δόξα* is the reason for suffering and unhappiness and prevents every improvement.

The ethical system of every philosophical school usually, when it has become systematized, has a *τέλος*. There is no clear information on this point in the fragments of Bion. However, it was the common aim of the entire Socratic school to strive for *εὐδαιμονία*, and there is no reason not to accept this as the aim of Bion's ethics too. *Εὐδαιμονία* seems to be the result of a life according to nature. There are two concepts of importance which can be used to elucidate *εὐδαιμονία*, i.e. *αὐτάρκεια* and *ἀπάθεια*. The actual terms are not preserved in the fragments of Bion, no doubt because they are so untechnical and untheoretical in character, but the meaning of these concepts is clearly illustrated by the content of his writings, which show that self-sufficiency and freedom from passions give happiness. The first concept, which is common to all Hellenistic ethics, seems in the main to have a practical meaning—be satisfied with what you have, even if it is very little.

The contrast between the two concepts *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν*, which is central in all Socratic philosophy, is not clearly treated by Bion, except that *φρόνησις* is said to be the source of all good. Otherwise even here the negative side is emphasized more than the positive and from these utterances we gather that *κακόν* is the result of an unsatisfactory insight or of failure to attain complete *ἀπάθεια*. It is of interest also that Bion finds a reason for unhappiness in the person's own character, which probably refers to different passions.

When we come to the question of the different virtues and their inner relations, we cannot expect to find a very systematic treatment by Bion. The four cardinal virtues⁴⁸ are mentioned on different occasions but without any analysis. The only point, which is clearly stated, is the superiority of *φρόνησις*, meaning practical wisdom, in relation to the other virtues, and it is also regarded as the source of all good. The problem, which could arise from the relations between the virtues, which are thought of as being responsible, and *τύχη*, is not treated at all by Bion, so far as we know.

Philosophers generally assumed three sources of virtue: 1) the natural disposition of the person in question, 2) practice and 3) instruction. We find no information whatsoever on the first source in the fragments of Bion. His belief that instruction is of great importance emerges from his own work as a teacher. Nothing is clearly stated about the importance of practice — *ἄσκησις* — but the importance Bion attaches to this aspect is obvious from the form and content of his teaching, with its definitions and examples from mythology and history, to be used at times of crisis. It is also stated that Bion accepts the idea of moral progress (F15).

The man, who attains complete happiness and full independence, is the philosopher (*ὁ σοφός*). This is a very important concept in several philosophical schools but it is rarely found in the preserved fragments of Bion. We do not find the two terms just mentioned, but the same person is referred to as *τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα* (F16A). The reason for this omission may not only depend on the character of the material. The philosopher or *ὁ σοφός* was an ideal of a very uncompromising and unrealistic character. Therefore it cannot have been suited for use in philosophical ethics, which are intended for people who are not professional philosophers but who want a philosophical background for a more practical life. Therefore Bion acts in a very sensible and realistic way, when he does not present his pupils with a picture of the wise man who is completely independent, to an almost abnormal degree and who regards society and its demands with nothing but contempt.

The typical feature of Bion's ethics is the character of extreme individualism, one could almost say egoism. Here we have a Cynic tradition. Man is to attain happiness and virtue for himself alone. Complete independence is regarded as the real good. When Bion presents altruistic traits, which are very rare, they are obviously assumed to favour the recipient less than the originator. Therefore we find hardly anything on social ethics, on how you are to behave to your family, your friends or your neighbours in general. Bion seems to adopt a negative attitude to marriage. As regards friendship, we find no condemna-

⁴⁸ For the cardinal virtues see O. Kunsemüller, *Die Herkunft der platonischen Kardinaltugenden* (Diss. Munich, 1935).

tion but no positive remarks either. The question of the relation to one's fellowmen is not treated at all.

This leads us to the question of whether any other ethical traits, which we would expect to find in an ethical system, are missing. There are, but their absence seems to be common to all philosophical schools. Apart from relations with one's fellowmen, Bion does not seem to include, e.g., the idea of humility in his ethical system. More interesting is the idea of conscience, which is usually said to be missing in earlier Greek philosophy. However, there are indications that the idea was present in philosophy from the Hellenistic period, probably under the influence of popular morality. This concept may occur once in the fragments of Bion.⁴⁹ As it depends on a textual conjecture, I do not think it is worthy of emphasis.

After these somewhat theoretical reflections upon the ethics of Bion we may very well ask what was the aim of his philosophy. As has already been stressed several times, it is extremely practical and realistic in character. Bion wants to help his fellowmen to be happy, without necessarily becoming professional philosophers, which explains the very basic character of his teaching. On the whole happiness for Bion implies freedom and independence. He wants his listeners to attain freedom from all the different passions, which beset mankind, such as fears and expectations: fear of things like poverty, old age, and death and longings for their opposites. Bion seeks to make people independent of such external circumstances and to enable them to accept the actual situation. So people should accept both wealth and poverty and in both cases act in the same sensible and philosophical way. This attitude, to regard all changes with the same tranquillity, must have created a deep feeling of peace and independence, which must have been much desired during the Hellenistic period with all its violent events and changes and its belief in *τύχη*.

An interesting question in this connection concerns, how Bion's ethics are related to non-philosophical ethics, be they called popular or vulgar.⁵⁰ It is self-evident that such a system existed both before and beside the different systems of philosophical ethics. This popular form must have been exclusively practical in character. There are different aspects, which would allow of an influence from this popular wisdom on Bion's ethics. Bion is mostly interested in what is practically possible. He is greatly influenced by rhetoric, which was affected more by popular ethics than by its philosophical and theoretical form. Furthermore the Cynics had a great interest and understanding for different aspects of popular culture, which they regarded as traces of ancient wisdom. Nevertheless I do not think that Bion's ethics are based on popular morality, although

⁴⁹ Cf. F53 with commentary, where the literature is given.

⁵⁰ For a survey see especially Dover.

the two forms may coincide in some cases. Without being as rigid and extreme as some Cynics, his attitude is in most cases more radical than the popular beliefs, which he could harshly criticize or ridicule. In this respect we see clearly the importance of Bion's philosophical background.

When we try to define the extent to which Bion is influenced by the different philosophical schools, which he attended, we can say immediately that the Cynic school was of overwhelming significance. Therefore I believe that Bion can be called a Cynic without the usual reservations.⁵¹ This is clear not only from the content of his philosophy but also from the literary form of his discourses, which possess a strong Cynic character with many typically Cynic expressions and ideas. The Academy may perhaps have aroused his interest in ethics, which made his "conversion" to the Cynic school more natural, but it can hardly be assumed to have had any greater importance. The Peripatetic school may have influenced Bion in its interest in character drawing but hardly in any other respect, as his ethics must have already been formulated when he joined. The real problem is the relation between the Cynic and the Cyrenaic schools. We have seen that Bion's form of Cynicism is modified in some respects. Is this change to be understood as a result of the influence of the Cyrenaic school? Bion's brand of Cynicism has often been called hedonistic, which is a completely misleading term, as there are hardly any traits of hedonism in his doctrine. It may be pointed out that a slight transformation of the Cynic school did not call for external influence. A more practical and realistic outlook combined with a wish to give the school a greater importance than that of a curiosity can suffice. Even though the Cyrenaic school in the form given by Theodorus had come closer to the Cynics, important differences still remained and we find none of Theodorus' basic ideas in Bion. Therefore I think that the influence of Cyrenaic ideas on the doctrine of Bion has been grossly exaggerated and when the ideas of the two schools coincide, it is a sound procedure in the case of Bion to assume that we are faced with a Cynic influence.⁵² The influence of the Cyrenaic school therefore probably did not affect Bion's doctrine as much as his way of life both as man and as teacher.

It may be pointed out that the philosophy of Bion has some sceptical traits.⁵³ Bion attacks all dogmatic philosophers like Plato (F9) and the Pythag-

⁵¹ Even the word "eclectic", which is used to describe Bion by e.g. v. Arnim 1899, col. 483, Fiske, p. 185 and Dudley, p. 65, is not correct.

⁵² This course was adopted already by Hense 1909, pp. LXXVI f; cf. v. Fritz, pp. 44 f, who takes exactly the opposite view.

⁵³ For the Sceptics in general see Zeller, III:1⁴ pp. 494 ff and pp. 609 ff and III:2⁴ pp. 1 ff, Überweg-Praechter, pp. 461 ff, M.M. Patrick, *Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism* (Diss. Bern, 1899), A. Goedeckemeyer, *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* (Leipzig, 1905), E. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford, 1913), V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, 2. ed.

oreans (F7), and there may also be traces of hostility toward the Stoics (F27). Bion probably attacked the Epicureans as well, since they prove to be his enemies (cf. T27 and F26), although there are no clear traces.⁵⁴ Furthermore Bion emphasizes that every problem has two sides (F10) and it is actually stated that Arcesilaus was so afraid of Bion's attacks that he withdrew every judgment and practiced *ἐποχή* (T23). The background for this attitude is perhaps to be found in the Academy but it is more likely that we have here the influence of the Cynic school, which showed signs of scepticism.⁵⁵

A question which arises in this connection, is whether there is a contradiction between Bion's life and doctrine. It is a common complaint in the ancient sources that the life and doctrine of philosophers do not coincide (cf. e.g. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 2.4.11–12).⁵⁶ In the case of the Cynic school it appears feasible to preach the philosophical doctrine without exactly living the life demanded. Many young men must have studied with the Cynics without therefore adopting the ideal Cynic life.⁵⁷ This may to some extent apply to Bion, but is further complicated by the character of the sources for his life. His doctrine, as we know it from the preserved fragments, produces an entirely different picture from the one found in various anecdotes and items, especially in the biography, given by Diog. Laert. If true, they would make the difference between life and doctrine too great so that I am of the opinion that they represent mainly gossip and malicious interpretation, and that the real Bion is found in the fragments, which present us with a surprisingly uniform picture, and not in the biographical anecdotes.

(Paris, 1932), M. Dal Pra, *Lo scetticismo greco* (Milan, 1950), C.L. Stough, *Greek Scepticism* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1969) and A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London, 1974) pp. 75 ff.

⁵⁴ Cf. Timon of Phlius, who in his *Σίλλοι* attacks all dogmatic philosophy; the fragments are given by Wachsmuth, pp. 89 ff and in *Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta* III:1: *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1901) pp. 173 ff and for Timon in general see Wachsmuth, pp. 8 ff, Susemihl 1891–92, I pp. 109 ff, Gerhard 1909, p. 243, Geffcken 1911, pp. 409 f, Dudley, pp. 107 ff and *RE*, VIA:1 (1937) s.v. Timon (no. 13) cols. 1301 ff (Nestle).

⁵⁵ For the connections between the Cynics and the Sceptics see Helm 1906, p. 88 and n. 4 and p. 196 and Gerhard 1909, p. 243 n. 7.

⁵⁶ Cf. Geffcken 1909, p. 139 and n. 2.

⁵⁷ Cf. G. Süpfle, 'Zur Geschichte der cynischen Secte', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 4 (1891) p. 419.

IV. Influence

Bion is one of those authors to whom a very far-reaching influence was attributed in the last century. Scholars managed to find traces of his writings in a vast literature expressing philosophical ideas of a more popular kind, usually with very little foundation.¹ It is clear that many scholars went too far,² but the matter cannot be considered as settled and we still have reason to ask, whether Bion had an actual, still traceable, influence on his contemporaries and successors. It may be useful here to remember a comment in Diog. Laert. 4.53 (= T3): *παρ' ὃ καὶ οὐδεὶς μαθητῆς αὐτοῦ ἐπιγράφεται, τοσούτων αὐτῷ σχολασάντων*. Notwithstanding that this occurs in a part of Bion's biography, which is coloured by a hostile tradition, it may still contain something of the truth, and I think it does. Bion did not create a proper philosophical school. He was prevented from this by his Cynic background, which stressed individualism above all, and by his own way of teaching. His travelling life and his closer pupils, wealthy young men, were not a suitable starting-point for the formation of a real school. Moreover his philosophy, which is mostly negative in character, was not of such a kind as to inspire a school.

The result is that only one person is explicitly attested as an imitator, if not a pupil, of Bion; the statement is in Strabo's account of famous persons coming from Ceos: *καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσόφων Ἀρίστων, ὁ τοῦ Βορυσθενίου Βίωνος ζηλωτής* (10.5.6. = T24). Let us first see what is meant by the expression *ζηλωτής*!³ It seems to have a rather strong meaning, indicating an emulator, which means that a person tries to follow the pattern or even surpass it. It is very often connected with words like *μιμητής* and *μαθητής*. Cf. e.g. Plato *Protagoras* 343 A: *οὔτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας*, and Isocrates 1.11: *μιμητὴν δὲ καὶ ζηλωτὴν τῆς*

¹ Cf. the very sound judgement of E. Hoffmann, 'Platon: Eine Einführung in sein Philosophieren', *Rowohlt's Deutsche Enzyklopädie*, 142 (Hamburg, 1961) p. 112: "Es war wie eine Krankheit, die im neunzehnten Jahrhundert endstand und die noch immer weiter wuchert, dass man von antiken Persönlichkeiten, je weniger man von ihnen weiss, um so anspruchsvollere Bilder entwarf, von denen aus dann, als ob es Realitäten wären. Schlüsse für die Interpretation ganzer Richtungen und Schulen gezogen wurden."

² This fact was pointed out very early; cf. G. Seifert, 'Plutarchs Schrift *Περὶ εὐθυμίας*', *Beilage zum Jahresbericht der Königl. Landesschule Pforta 1908* (Naumburg a.S., 1908) p. 3 n. 4, who refers to an expression of Ribbeck—"Biomanie", Crönert, p. 34 and v. Geytenbeek, p. 150 and p. 161.

³ Cf. *ThW*, II (1935) s.v. *ζῆλος* etc. pp. 879 ff (Stumpff) and W. Bühler, *Beiträge zur Erklärung der Schrift vom Erhabenen* (Göttingen, 1964) pp. 86 ff.

πατρῶας ἀρετῆς γενόμενον. There is also an interesting definition in Dio of Prusa 55.4: εἶπερ οὖν ζηλωτής, καὶ μαθητῆς εἴη ἄν. ὁ γὰρ ζηλῶν τινα ὀρθῶς ἐπίσταται δῆπου ἐκεῖνον ὅποῖος ἦν καὶ μιμούμενος τὰ ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους ὡς οἶόν τε ἐπιχειρεῖ ὅμοιον αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν.⁴ It seems from this definition to be a question of a conscious form of imitation, referring both to way of life and manner of expression. We find the expression used of pupils of philosophers⁵ but often also referring to a stylistic imitation⁶. The main problem in this case, however, is whether the notice in Strabo is correct and if the Peripatetic Ariston from Ceos⁷ is the emulator of Bion, or if the author is mistaken and the Stoic Ariston from Chios⁸ is the man in question. The problem has been very much discussed and cannot be said to be definitely settled, although scholars nowadays tend to accept the notice in Strabo and to give more material to the Peripatetic in general.⁹ The starting-point is not very favourable, as we only have fragments from all the persons concerned. The situation becomes even more confused, when we learn that the two Aristons and their works were already confused in antiquity, and that their fragments are in many cases still disputed (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.163). Therefore there is no reason to accept Strabo's statement without any further proof and there are facts, which can explain a mistake of this kind. There was a Greek literature *Περὶ εὐρημάτων*, which also in some cases treats the *ζηλωταί*.¹⁰ If Strabo found an item in a work of this kind to the effect that Ariston was the *ζηλωτής* of Bion, he may easily have connected it with the wrong Ariston.¹¹

⁴ Cf. also Lucian *Scytha* 4, Herodian 6.8.2 and Diog. Laert. 8.55 for more combinations of this kind.

⁵ Cf. Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 125, Lucian *Hermotimus* 14 and *Peregrinus* 15, Galenus *Phil. hist.* 3 (p. 227 Kühn XIX = p. 606.6 Diels) and Diog. Laert. 2.113, 4.59, 8.56, 9.38, and 9.64.

⁶ Cf. Philodemus *Rhet.* 2.262 Sudhaus, Dionysius Hal. *Lysias* 14 p. 23 U-R, Lucian *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 15 and Athenaeus 8.352 C.

⁷ For Ariston of Ceos see Zeller, II:2³ pp. 925 ff, Überweg-Praechter, p. 485 and *RE*, II (1896) s.v. Ariston (no. 52) cols. 953 ff (Gercke). The fragments are collected in F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* VI, 2. ed. (Basel-Stuttgart, 1968).

⁸ For Ariston of Chios see Zeller, III:1⁴ p. 36 n. 2, Überweg-Praechter, pp. 412 f and *RE*, II (1896) s.v. Ariston (no. 56) cols. 957 ff (v. Arnim). The fragments are to be found in frs. 333–403 *SVF* I pp. 75 ff.

⁹ The discussion has especially concentrated upon the source of Cicero's *Cato maior De senectute*, where the best MSS. have *Aristo Chius* (§ 3) but where most of the editors receive *Aristo Ceus* into the text. Cf. P. Willeumier, in *Cicero, Caton l'ancien (De la vieillesse)* 2. ed. (Paris, 1955) p. 48 and n. 4 with discussion of the problem and references to recent literature and C.W. Fornara, 'Sources of Plutarch's "An seni sit gerenda res publica"', *Philologus*, 110 (1966) pp. 119 ff, who tries to defend the transmitted *Aristo Chius*.

¹⁰ Cf. E. Wendling, 'Zu Posidonius und Varro', *Hermes*, 28 (1893) pp. 242 f and T11 with commentary.

¹¹ For Strabo's use of his sources see *RE*, IVA:1 (1931) s.v. Strabon (no. 3) cols. 97 ff (Högnigmann).

Of the two philosophers with the same name the Stoic Ariston of Chios is the older, and only ten to fifteen years younger than Bion. His biography is given by Diog. Laert. 7.160–164 and more is known about him from other sources. He resembles Bion in various ways.¹² As regards doctrine, the following points can be noted: Ariston regards everything between ἀρετή and κακία as adiaphora (Diog. Laert. 7.160 = fr. 351 *SVF* I; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.105); he despises the liberal arts and concentrates on ethics (Diog. Laert. 7.160 = fr. 351 *SVF* I; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.103 = fr. 354 *SVF* I); he is obviously influenced by the Cynics, which also emerges from the fact that he was teaching in the Cynosarges (Diog. Laert. 7.161). There are also some close resemblances between the two: they both ridicule the idea that the gods have a human shape (Cicero *De nat. deor.* 1.14.37 = fr. 378 *SVF* I and F26A–B); they both compare the person, who does not attain philosophy with the suitors of Penelope (Diog. Laert. 7.160 = fr. 351 *SVF* I and F3); they compare the wise man with the actor (Diog. Laert. 7.160 = fr. 351 *SVF* I and F16A); they both hold that wrong opinions lead to suffering: *opinionēs falsas, quibus laboramus* (Seneca *Ep.* 94.6 = fr. 359 *SVF* I) and ἀνιάση . . . ὑπὸ . . . τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης (F21). There is little evidence as regards style. However, Ariston was obviously a successful speaker, as he is called Σειρήν (Diog. Laert. 7.160 = fr. 333 *SVF* I) and described in the following terms: ἥν δέ τις πειστικὸς καὶ ὄχλῳ πεποιημένος (Diog. Laert. 7.161 = fr. 333 *SVF* I). This reminds us of what is known about Bion. There are also some facts from Ariston's life, which can connect him with Bion: he tried to get in touch with Antigonus Gonatas through Persaeus (Athenaeus 6.251 B = fr. 342 *SVF* I) and he was not on good terms with the philosophers Persaeus and Arcesilaus (frs. 343–347 *SVF* I); Bion was not either. Furthermore, Ariston was the teacher of Eratosthenes, who was also well acquainted with Bion (Strabo 1.2.2 = T12).

When we come to the Peripatetic Ariston from Ceos, we immediately note that much less is known about him. Therefore he shares no attributes with Bion as does Ariston of Chios, as regards either expression or ideas, but the possible similarities are of a very commonplace nature. There is one fact, which has been taken as an argument for the Peripatetic, viz. Cicero's judgement on his style in *De fin.* 5.5.13 (=fr. 10 Wehrli VI):¹³ *concinus deinde et elegans huius* (sc. *Lyconis*), *Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem non habet.* This can hardly be taken as proof that Ariston of Ceos was the emulator of Bion, as this description does not fit the style of Bion very well.

¹² See especially Heinze 1890, pp. 513 f, who gives a survey of the most obvious similarities.

¹³ Cf. W. Knögel, 'Der Peripatetiker Ariston von Keos', *Klassisch-Philologische Studien*, hrsg. v. E. Bickel und Ch. Jensen, 5 (Leipzig, 1933) pp. 48 f and pp. 73 ff.

So most facts point to the Stoic Ariston of Chios as the follower of Bion, and this is corroborated by the use of *ζηλωτής*. As it is such a strong expression, and can refer to imitation of both doctrine and style, I think it can have been used only about Ariston of Chios in his relation to Bion. Ariston of Ceos was a member of the Peripatos and in addition to his ethical and characteriological works, he wrote several works, which can in no way have been influenced by Bion. I would think that Bion was not sufficiently Peripatetic to have influenced Ariston of Ceos to any great extent. The different statements about their styles do not prove a closer relation. Therefore I would think that the item in Strabo is erroneous and that Ariston of Chios, the Cynic Stoic, is the man, who tried to emulate Bion.¹⁴ The possibility that Bion influenced both cannot be completely ruled out,¹⁵ but it seems unlikely that both were influenced to such an extent that the expression *ὁ ζηλωτής* could have been applied to more than one.

An author, on the other hand, who was clearly influenced by Bion, is Teles.¹⁶ The word "influence" is not perhaps correct in this connection, as he seems to be quoting Bion literally rather than trying to adapt his own style and way of thinking to those of Bion. The problem of Bion's influence on Teles is further complicated by the fact that we do not possess the fragments of Teles in their original form but in extracts made by a certain Theodorus,¹⁷ from which Ioannes Stobaeus later made his extracts. To reach a definite answer to the question of the original form of the fragments seems to be impossible. The fact that he is mentioned at all indicates that Theodorus acted with a certain in-

¹⁴ This is the opinion of e.g. Heinze 1890, p. 515 n. 4, A. Körte, in 'Teletis reliquias ed. O. Hense 1889', *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie* (1891) col. 350 and A. Giesecke, 'Der Stoiker Ariston von Chios', *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, hrsg. von A. Fleckeisen 145 (1892) pp. 206 ff. The correctness of Strabo's testimony, on the other hand, is favoured by A. Gercke, 'Ariston', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 5 (1892) pp. 198 ff, Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 150, v. Arnim, art. cit. (n. 8) col. 959, Mayer, p. 562 and Knögel, op.cit. (n. 13) p. 75. Other scholars would leave the question open, e.g. Hense 1890, p. 542 and Hense 1909, p. CVIII (cf. also p. CXVII) or merely stress the relation between Bion and the Stoic Ariston of Chios, such as Weber 1887, pp. 185 ff and Oltramare, pp. 119 ff.

¹⁵ For this idea see Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 885, Mayer, p. 562, Christ-Schmid, I p. 88 and Willeumier, op. cit. (n. 9) p. 48: "ils ont subi tous les deux l'influence de la diatribe cynique."

¹⁶ The foundation for every study of Teles is the edition of the fragments by Hense 1909; cf. also Wilamowitz, pp. 292 ff, Weber 1887, pp. 212 ff, Giesecke, pp. 3 ff, Crönert, pp. 37 ff, W. Crönert, 'Ein Telesstelle und Anderes', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 62 (1907) pp. 620 ff, *RE*, VA:1 (1934) s.v. Teles (no. 2) cols. 375 ff (Modrzejewski) and R. Nickel, 'Die ἀρχαῖοι des Teles', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 116 (1973) pp. 215 ff.

¹⁷ For the importance of Theodorus see Hense 1909, pp. XVI ff, Modrzejewski, art. cit. (n. 16) cols. 376 f, *RE*, VA:2 (1934) s.v. Theodoros (no. 34) cols. 1831 ff (Modrzejewski) and A. Barigazzi, 'Note al "De exilio" di Telete e di Musonio', *Studi Italiani di filologia classica*, 34 (1962) pp. 70 ff.

dependence. Very little is known about Teles, but there is some probability that he came from Megara and was writing shortly after 242 B.C.¹⁸ Therefore it is chronologically possible that he himself had heard Bion and not only read his discourses. The character of the material makes it impossible to say whether he is using lecture-notes which he has taken himself, or the discourses in a published form. All scholars seem to agree that Teles was without any importance or influence of his own and merely reproduced the material which he found in others.¹⁹ It is also generally believed that Teles quoted Bion from personal reading and probably Stilpon, but that other quotations came through Bion.²⁰ I think it is necessary to be extremely cautious here, and to beware of underestimating Teles' capacity. The fact that he produced these philosophical treatises shows that he must have had some interest in, and knowledge of, literature and philosophy and consequently at least rather more than an ordinary education. Thus it is plausible to assume that he read more widely than is usually believed. What he lacked in originality he may very well have tried to compensate by rich material collected from different sources.²¹ However, no certainty on this point is possible and every answer will remain an uncertain assumption.

Teles is the most important source for the fragments of Bion, apart from the biography in Diog. Laert. Therefore it is of great importance to know 1) if he carefully reproduces Bion, 2) if he quotes more material from Bion than emerges from those cases where Bion's name is mentioned, and 3) if Teles can give us a fairly accurate picture of Bion's literary work. There are a few cases where Teles seems to use the same text twice, and where one example is to be found in an attested quotation from Bion. We find on pp. 5.2.—6.1 the famous comparison between the wise man and an actor, between life and a play, in a quotation from Bion. The same comparison also occurs on p. 16.4—7 and p. 52.2—4. The actual details differ, but the main points remain. In all cases it is *ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ*, who is compared with an actor. The main difference, however, is that the passage where Bion's name is given is much longer and more detailed than the other two.²²

We have a similar case of similarity between two passages, one of which belongs to an attested quotation:

¹⁸ Cf. Wilamowitz, pp. 300 ff, Hense 1909, pp. XXIX ff and Modrzejewski, art. cit. (n. 16) col. 381.

¹⁹ Cf. e.g. Wilamowitz, p. 313, Dümmler, p. 70, Wendland 1912, p. 78 and Capelle, cols. 994 f.

²⁰ For the sources of Teles see especially Hense 1909, pp. XLIV ff and pp. CXXI ff and also Giesecke, pp. 3 ff.

²¹ See Crönert, p. 43 and Nickel, art. cit. (n. 16) p. 215: "Der zitierfreudige Teles."

²² Cf. Hense 1909, pp. CX f.

p. 6.1–3:

σὺ μὲν ἄρχεις καλῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ
ἄρχομαι, φησι, καὶ σὺ μὲν πολλῶν,
ἐγὼ δὲ ἐνὸς τουτουῖ παιδαγωγὸς
γενόμενος,

p. 24.4–6:

σὺ πολλῶν [ἢ ὀλίγων] καὶ ἡβώντων
βασιλεύεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ὀλίγων καὶ ἀν-
ήβων παιδαγωγὸς γενόμενος, καὶ
τὸ τελευταῖον ἐμαυτοῦ.

Here the difference is not so much a question of length as of the general structure of the two sentences. There can hardly be any doubt that the first case reproduces Bion more carefully than the second. This emerges from the well-balanced construction with its sharp and well worked out contrasts. The second passage combines the two pairs of contrasts and adds some details, which do not add anything to the picture.²³

Ancient writers in general are very careless concerning their sources and rarely give the names of the authors they are quoting.²⁴ Therefore it is very difficult to say whether Teles treated those passages with Bion's name attached to them in a different way from those without a name. The mutilated condition of the text makes a decision even more hazardous. However, I do not think that the possibility should be completely ruled out that the name Bion was used by Teles in order to indicate that he accurately reproduces, or actually quotes, the original. When the name is not mentioned we may have a paraphrase or just a loan of an idea or an expression in such a general way that the author is not fully aware that he is quoting.

To answer the second question, whether Teles contains more material from Bion than is actually known, is extremely difficult. Hense²⁵ tends to find a "color Bioneus" at many places, and later scholars have facilely assumed that Teles merely reproduces Bion throughout the fragments, and that whatever is found in Teles can also be claimed for Bion. It must be admitted that it is impossible to reach any form of certainty here, and that every effort to find more material from Bion than what is attested can only remain a guess, made on the assumption that whenever Teles' style is more vivid, refers to an earlier philosopher or quotes from poetry or mythology, he is just copying Bion. I regard this method as unpermissible as we have so little material to guide us, either from Bion or from other, more popular philosophers. They must have been numerous, and their literary output abundant; but nothing is left except the discourses of Teles, which are therefore so valuable and have consequently been very much exploited. While there is a strong probability that Teles contains

²³ Cf. Wilamowitz, p. 306, who here finds a reference to Teles' occupation as a teacher for beginners. However, this is doubtful; cf. F16A with commentary.

²⁴ Cf. Stemmlinger, pp. 177 ff and *RE*, XX:2 (1950) s.v. Plagiat cols. 1962 ff (Ziegler).

²⁵ Hense 1909 *passim*.

more of Bion than meets the eye, I think the question is better left open, as we have *no* possibility of reaching a definite answer.²⁶

Great interest lies in the third question, whether we can arrive at any idea of Bion's literary form from the treatises of Teles, mutilated as they are. The most probable place to look would be Teles fr. II — *Περὶ ἀνταρκείας*, where Bion is quoted no less than four times, and where the quotations are comparatively substantial. As the style in this fragment does not differ in any obvious way, and as we can assume that the testified quotations are fairly literal, this may be the closest we can come to a lecture of Bion. The striking feature is that there is hardly any element of dialogue and this cannot be blamed only on one of the excerptors. It is delivered in a very rhetorical form with well-balanced and often very short sentences.

When we come to the question of Bion's influence on other and later authors the situation becomes even worse, though this has not prevented earlier scholars from finding extensive influence of Bion.²⁷ There is no doubt that the importance of Bion has been grossly exaggerated and on a very weak foundation. It does not necessarily follow that Bion is used or quoted whenever a later author treats a subject which could be said to belong to popular philosophy, uses a more vivid style than usual, employs words or themes which are of an everyday or even vulgar character. The idea that Bion's works were especially "vulgar" is very common but is not supported to any great extent by the preserved fragments.

Bion's influence may have been of two different kinds, viz. philosophical or stylistic. There is nothing to prevent these occurring in combination. When we come to the philosophical influence, we must remember that Bion's philosophy is extremely simple and basic. He is in no way an original thinker and tends to content himself with reproducing commonplaces. When we find the same or similar ideas in other authors we have no way of proving a dependence on Bion, which assumption may also in many cases be wholly unnecessary. It

²⁶ Cf. Döring, p. 152.

²⁷ For the assumed influence of Bion on such authors as Philo, Plutarch, Horace and Seneca see e.g. Heinze 1889, Heinze 1890, pp. 497 ff, Hense 1890, pp. 541 ff, Giesecke, Hense 1892, pp. 219 ff, Weber 1895, Seidel, Fiske, and Oltramare. All results remain highly hypothetical and are often contradictory. So Weber 1895, p. 5 assumes that Seneca has read Bion, while Oltramare, p. 261 thinks that he received his knowledge of Bion through Ariston of Chios. A personal knowledge of Bion's work has been assumed for Horace by Oltramare, p. 146, while Lejay, p. X proposes Lucilius as an intermediary. Hirzel 1895, II p. 13 n. 3 and p. 29 n. 2 does not think that either Horace or Seneca used the discourses of Bion. All this clearly shows that the problem is insoluble. For some sound remarks on the question of sources in literature influenced by popular philosophy see Wendland 1895, pp. 62 ff, who says of Philo, p. 62: "Nach einem bestimmten Namen zu suchen, nach einer Quelle wäre fruchtlos und wohl auch verkehrt" and Wendland 1912, pp. 75 ff.

seems to be true that Bion slightly transformed the Cynic doctrine. However, it is more difficult to say whether his influence was decisive and whether he had any real followers, as there is hardly anything left of the Cynic literature from the following centuries. When Cynic ideas later become very popular, they are usually to be found in authors, who from a philosophical point of view are eclectics, which makes a decision about the influence of Bion almost impossible.

Bion's style is a very strange mixture, where the combination of elements is more original than the different elements themselves. Even here we are prevented by the lack of literature from the same period and of a similar character from discovering how original Bion was and to what extent he could have influenced later philosophical writers. We should be careful not to overestimate his stylistic influence. Even if Bion's style was personal, it was created from elements that existed already before him. Furthermore, his style also belongs to his period, the Hellenistic, which must have made later authors with other stylistic ideals less eager to imitate it. When we come to later philosophers like Dio of Prusa and Maximus of Tyre, we see that in spite of similarities of content and of style the general impression is very different. Obviously any imitation of Bion's style was restricted to the adoption of some typical, stylistic elements. But even these elements, typical as they are of Bion's style, may have their origin in an earlier author.

The fact that an author is quoting Bion does not necessarily imply that he is influenced by Bion's thought or style. The work of Bion must have had a certain popularity and been widely read. I would assume that many of the earlier quotations arose in this way, from personal reading, and that the authors quoting him were led not so much by the deep philosophical truth of different statements or by the general stylistic character of the treatises as by striking expressions, comparisons and anecdotes, which were easily remembered and therefore later quoted.

This provokes a further question. For how long were the actual works of Bion read, and when did he begin to be confined exclusively to collections of apophthegmata?²⁸ Authors quoting Bion before the Christian era, besides Teles, are Cicero and Horace, and it is plausible that they knew him from personal reading. In the first century A.D. Bion is quoted especially by Plutarch and Seneca. Many of the sayings, which they quote, have a pointed form so that they may originate in some florilegium. However, this does not apply to all of them, and therefore I would assume that both Plutarch and Seneca had some knowledge of the actual work of Bion and that they were not drawing

²⁸ Cf. Hirzel 1895, I p. 368 n. 1, who thinks that Teles took his Bion-quotations from a collection of extracts, an assumption which seems highly improbable.

exclusively on a collection of extracts. This is made even more plausible by the fact that they were both widely read.²⁹

This seems to be the last period with a knowledge of Bion founded on personal reading. The disappearance of his work may have been caused by the general stylistic development, with its classicistic and atticistic tendencies. When Diog. Laert. was writing his biography of Bion about 200 A.D. he seems to have derived his knowledge of, and his quotations from, Bion's work exclusively from a collection of sayings. This habit of collecting sentences of a witty and pointed character must have started very early in the case of Bion, as his whole style invites such a practice and he himself liked using apophthegmata, even without giving the name of the original creator.

²⁹ Cf. for Plutarch *RE*, XXI:1 (1951) s.v. Plutarchos (no. 2) cols. 914 ff (Ziegler) and for Seneca. F. Mewis, *De Senecae philosophi studiis litterarum* (Diss. Königsberg, 1908), who however on p. 77 leaves undecided the question, of whether Seneca knew Bion from personal reading.

V. Principles for the Collection of Fragments

1. Previous collections

No one will deny that there is a need for a new collection of the fragments of Bion, although older ones are not altogether lacking.¹ The first editor to try to give a complete picture of Bion was Hoogvliet in 1821. His work included a number of fragments but does not give any deeper interpretation. In the same year I.C. Orelli published a collection of the fragments of Bion, to the number of 46, in his work *Opuscula Graecorum Veterum sententiosa et moralia* II (Leipzig, 1821), which incorporates the results of the earlier published florilegia and collections of fragments.² In 1830 Rossignol published a new collection of Bion's fragments, which differs from the earlier ones by the larger number of fragments and by a richer commentary. The compilation of F.W.A. Mullach from 1867 in his *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* II (Paris, 1867), which numbers 52 fragments, can hardly be regarded as a step forward and is founded completely on the earlier collections.³

A definite turning-point for the research on Bion and his fragments came with Hense's excellent edition of the fragments of Teles (1889 and 1909), thanks especially to its very long and detailed, even if sometimes somewhat confused, introduction, which is really a work more on Bion than on Teles, where many of the problems concerning Bion are treated in a very illuminating way.⁴ Hense has an almost complete collection of the fragments;⁵ the present

¹ Cf. Capelle, col. 997: "Doch fehlt bis jetzt eine wissenschaftliche Fragmentsammlung von Bions Diatriben, für die aber durch Henses Sammlung der Fragmente des Teles schon die feste Grundlage geschaffen ist."

² Cf. *RE*, Suppl. b. VI (1935) s.v. Gnome etc. col. 85 (Horna): "Die erste Zusammenfassung der gedruckten Florilegien wird dem Züricher Kanonikus I.C. Orelli verdankt."

³ The work of Mullach is usually severely criticized; cf. e.g. Mannebach, p. IX: "Sed cum opus eius vitiis apertis — sive magnum numerum omissorum locorum, sive textum neglegentissime constitutum spectas — nimis scateret."

⁴ The reviews of Hense's edition are also of great interest; see H. v. Arnim, in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* (1890) pp. 124 ff, F. Blass, in *Literarisches Centralblatt* (1890) cols. 1034 f, H. Diels, in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (1890) cols. 1159 f, A. Körte, in *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie* (1891) cols. 347 ff, K. Praechter, in *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, begr. v. C. Bursian, 96, Jahrg. 26 (1898) pp. 16 ff, J. Sitzler, in *Neue Philologische Rundschau* (1890) pp. 275 ff, P. Wendland, in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 4 (1891) pp. 679 ff and P. Wendland, in *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* (1891) cols. 456 ff.

⁵ Hense 1909, pp. 100–102.

edition will only be able to add parallels from the gnomological literature. But Hense contents himself with an index of references where to find the fragments, without any kind of arrangement or classification. While Hense's work will always remain of the greatest importance for everyone working on Bion, it cannot be said—and was not intended—to satisfy the demands for a collection of Bion's fragments. Nor can it, as principally a work on Teles, be said to give a complete picture of Bion. After Hense little work of interest for a collection of Bion's fragments has been done and the very few scholars, who have been working on Bion, have relied on the well-laid foundation of Hense.⁶

2. *Content and context*⁷

The first and most important problem connected with a collection of fragments is the decision of what should be included. Here different principles have been used at different times,⁸ but it seems obvious to me that only those passages should be included where Bion is referred to by name, i.e. a passage which is attested by the ancient author.⁹ To act in any other way would create great uncertainty and would adversely affect further research on Bion, who is one of these authors about whom earlier scholars especially were tempted to issue wild theories and to assume an enormous influence.¹⁰ Many later Greek and also Latin authors were thought to reproduce the works and ideas of Bion, although the foundation for such an assumption was extremely weak. Such an influence may have existed in some cases but all research on Bion must start from the proper fragments, i.e. those which are attested by Bion's name and a collection of fragments cannot at the same time be an investigation of sources.¹¹ Hense¹², in his first edition of the fragments of Teles, published an "Index Bioneus", which contains all cases where an influence of Bion is possible, even if his name is not mentioned. In the second edition, however, Hense¹³ wisely gave only those cases where Bion is mentioned with the following moti-

⁶ Cf. Sayre 1948, pp. 102–109, who gives an English translation of 74 fragments.

⁷ Collections of fragments rarely treat questions of principle. A remarkable exception however is the introduction to L. Edelstein-I.G. Kidd, *Posidonius I: The Fragments* (Cambridge, 1972) pp. XV ff, where many questions of principle are treated in a very illuminating way. Cf. also M.L. West, *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique* (Stuttgart, 1973) pp. 95 ff.

⁸ Cf. e.g. R. Heinze, *Xenokrates: Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig, 1892) p. XI: "Ich habe selbstverständlich auch die Stellen aufgenommen, an denen, wie ich glaube, auf Xenokrates hingewiesen wird, ohne dass sein Name genannt wäre."

⁹ Cf. Edelstein-Kidd op. cit. (n. 7) pp. XV ff.

¹⁰ Cf. introd. Chapter IV.

¹¹ Cf. F. Jacoby, in *FGrH* I p. VIII: "Eine Fragmentsammlung kann sich nun einmal nicht mit der Aufgabe der Quellenuntersuchung belasten."

¹² O. Hense, *Teletis reliquiae* (Tübingen, 1889) pp. 88–94.

¹³ Hense 1909, pp. 100–102.

vation:¹⁴ “nam quos in proecdosi paulo liberalius addidi Bioni coniectura plus minus probabili vindicatos vindicandosve, ei, ut dudum mihi persuasi, veram utilitatem non habebunt, nisi si plena planaue argumentatione extra dubitationis aleam positi erunt.” On the other hand, it must be remembered that the very mention of Bion’s name does not prove immediately and beyond doubt that this passage actually comes from Bion. This is especially true of an author whose fragments are mostly to be found in collections of sayings, where we often find a great confusion about the originator. I shall return to this important point later.

Another problem concerns the question of the length of a fragment and how much of the context should be given. The first question seldom creates any problems in the case of Bion, thanks to the special character of the material, as many fragments consists of short sentences or anecdotes, which are clearly separated from the surrounding text. The problem only arises, when we have to deal with the longer fragments, especially in Teles, as they are integrated in the text as a whole, which also may reproduce Bion to a larger extent than is clear from the cases where Bion is referred to by name. As these cases are comparatively few, they will be discussed in the commentary. The question of the context rarely creates problems for the same reasons. I have been very restrictive in other cases in order to avoid the impression that material belongs to Bion unless this fact can be proved. However, when the context is of immediate importance for a proper understanding of the fragment it has been quoted and there is hardly any risk that this will create any misconception. Even here the more crucial and important cases will be discussed in the commentary.

3. Arrangement and classification

Many different methods can be used, when it is a question of arranging an author’s fragments, so that some comment should be made on the way in which the material will be presented. The material can be said to consist of three different groups: 1) the biography of Bion in Diog. Laert., 2) testimonies and 3) fragments, the biography containing material belonging to both the latter groups. The biography in Diog. Laert. will be given as a whole but the different parts of it will also be found at their proper places among the testimonies and the fragments. This may seem superfluous but can be motivated on different grounds. As the biography in Diog. Laert. is the only lengthy text devoted to Bion which is extant, it is both natural and useful that it should be given as a whole. This will also tell us something about the methods used by Diog. Laert., when he was compiling his biographies.¹⁵ The division of the biography in its

¹⁴ Hense 1909, p. VI.

¹⁵ For an analysis of the biography in Diog. Laert. see introd. Chapter I.

component parts, each in the group of the testimonies or the fragments where it belongs, will, in my opinion, be a definite advantage, as we shall find collected in one place all the material, which bears upon one aspect. This will give us a clearer picture of Bion both as a person, an author, and a philosopher.

The dividing-line between testimonies and fragments may seem self-evident, but can sometimes be rather difficult to draw,¹⁶ although in most cases it is perfectly clear. Generally speaking, I should like to define testimonies as comments by other people on the author in question, i.e. about his life, his education, his relations to other authors or philosophers, his writings, his style and the content of his philosophy. Fragments, on the other hand, contain something written or said by the author in question, i.e. a quotation, paraphrase or reference from a work written by him or a saying ascribed to him. It is almost impossible in Bion's case to decide with full certainty whether we have a literal quotation or some other form of presenting the material, as the material is very limited. Therefore I have not tried to divide the fragments into different categories according to these criteria. I would like to refer to the manner of quotation by the ancients.¹⁷ It was generally very free and made from memory and different kinds of adaptations were very common. Therefore we must be aware that we may not always find the original form in the fragments of Bion, but a decision here must be based on completely subjective criteria and a preconceived notion about Bion's way of expressing himself. So I think that the dividing-line between testimonies and fragments in most cases will create no difficulty. However, in the presentation of the material I shall sometimes depart from this principle of division, because the connection with the other group is so clear that the piece in question is better given there even if it contravenes the definition given above.

When we come to the arrangement of the material in these two main groups I think this is easy and obvious, in the case of the testimonies. However, this does not apply to the fragments, where different methods would be feasible. The easiest solution is of course to arrange the material in alphabetical order according to the name of the source, as Diels does,¹⁸ but this seems very unsatisfactory to me. It is not possible to divide the fragments of Bion between different written works, as we only have two titles and only one fragment can be assigned to a definite work. I do not think that a division after general philosophical criteria would be possible in the case of Bion, as his philosophy, unlike

¹⁶ Cf. J.H. Waszink, in 'Favorin von Arelate: Hrsg. u. komm. v. E. Mensching. Berlin 1963', *Gnomon*, 39 (1967) p. 38: "die öfters so schwer zu bestimmende Grenze zwischen Fragment und Testimonium."

¹⁷ For a general survey see Stemplinger, pp. 242 ff.

¹⁸ H. Diels, in *FVS* I p. VIII.

the Stoic,¹⁹ does not fall easily into a few main groups. Despite these difficulties I think that a division of the material is both necessary and useful, and that the most obvious method is to arrange it according to content. Such a division can of course always be criticized on various grounds, and there will always be cases, which belong to several groups, the placement of which remains uncertain. This difficulty can be remedied by cross-references and most of the fragments will easily fit into a special group. As regards the actual grouping of the fragments it seemed convenient to establish certain comparatively general titles and to divide the fragments into these groups. Almost all the titles contain topics which must have taken a prominent place in the teaching of Bion. The ranking of these titles and the order within the different groups are of course highly subjective. I have followed the order which seems to me the most natural.

4. *Bion and the apophthegmata-literature*

A very special difficulty in connection with Bion is that many of the fragments ascribed to him are to be found in collections of sayings of wise men, poets and philosophers. So people had selected short, often witty, sayings and anecdotes from the discourses of Bion, which were later included in larger collections.²⁰ This custom of collecting sayings and anecdotes outstanding from an ethical standpoint, called *ἀποφθεγμα*, *χρεία* or *γνώμη* with certain, not always clear distinctions,²¹ is very old in the Greek world. At first poets may have held a pride of place but later prose-writers contributed as well. This art of literature later became very common, especially during the post-classical and the Byzantine periods, thanks to the general literary activity of the time, which was very much devoted to making excerpts and collections. The purpose of this activity was to have handy sayings with an ethical implication for use in a critical situation.

All scholars dealing with this literature are now faced with great problems.

¹⁹ Cf. here the arrangement in *SVF* and in the collection of Posidonius' fragments by Edelstein-Kidd.

²⁰ Cf. Diog. Laert. 4.47 (= T7): *καταλέλοιπεν ... ἀποφθέγματα χρειώδη πραγματείαν περιέχοντα* and introd. Chapter II:1.

²¹ For the distinctions between these different forms cf. the Greek writers of *progymnasmata*: Hermogenes pp. 6 ff Rabe, Aphthonius pp. 3 ff Rabe, Theon pp. 96 ff Spengel II and Nicolaus pp. 17 ff Felten; cf. also Gerhard 1909, pp. 247 ff and Horna, art. cit. (n. 2) cols. 75 f. See further for *ἀποφθεγμα* W. Gemoll, *Das Apophthegma: Literarhistorische Studien* (Vienna-Leipzig, 1924), for *χρεία* G. v. Wartensleben, *Begriff der griechischen Chreia und Beiträge zur Geschichte ihrer Form* (Heidelberg, 1901), H.-R. Hollerbach, *Zur Bedeutung des Wortes χρεία* (Diss. Cologne, 1964) and Lausberg, §§ 1117 f, and for *γνώμη* RE, Suppl.b. VI (1935) s.v. Gnome, Gnomendichtung, Gnomologien cols. 74 ff (Horna-v. Fritz) and KP, II (1967) s.v. Gnome cols. 823 ff (Spoerri), which gives a bibliography.

Its history is not complete²² and great parts of it are even unedited, i.e. we have no fairly complete collection nor has there been a critical investigation of the material as a whole. Apart from an inability to survey the total material, which may include sayings of Bion, which are hitherto unknown, although this is unlikely,²³ the attribution of the sayings forms the most serious problem. It must have happened many times that sayings were attributed to the wrong author, which is easily explained by the usual arrangement of the material. It is often given in alphabetical order, where the first saying is introduced by the author's name and the following merely by τοῦ αὐτοῦ. If a name was omitted from the MS. a whole series of sayings could be connected with the wrong name. We can definitely assume that this and similar accidents occurred many times. So we find in Bion's case a number of sayings, thirteen altogether, which are also ascribed to other authors. This leaves some uncertainty but the number can be reduced as we shall see later. However, by way of introduction I would like to make some general remarks about material of this kind. It may be argued that sayings or anecdotes which are ascribed to different persons are of little value and should, if not completely omitted, at least be marked as *dubia* or *spuria*. I think this attitude is unnecessarily critical. An anecdote would not have been attached to a person if it implied a contradiction of everything known about him. Even if the anecdote in question did not prove to be historical, it may still tell us something about the person with whom it was connected, because of an inner relationship. This leads me to a categorical defence of the anecdote and the saying, even when they are ascribed to several persons, and I have not hesitated to include them in this collection.²⁴

When we come to the actual cases in Bion, there can be several explanations

²² For a survey see C. Wachsmuth, *Studien zu den Griechischen Florilegien* (Berlin, 1882), A. Elter, *De Gnomologiorum Graecorum historia atque origine commentatio* 1–8 (Programm Bonn, 1893–95), Horna-v. Fritz, art. cit. (n. 21), J. Barns, 'A New Gnomologium: With some Remarks on Gnomonic Anthologies' I–II *The Classical Quarterly*, 44 (1950) pp. 126 ff and 45 (1951) pp. 1 ff and P. Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich, 1954). Much useful information is also given in the different encyclopedias concerning the ancient world, such as *RE*, s.v. Anthologia, Ioannes Stobaios, and Gnome etc., *RAC*, s.v. Apophthegma and Florilegium, *LAW*, s.v. Apophthegma, Chrie, and Gnome, and *KP*, s.v. Gnome. Cf. also the literature given in the previous note.

²³ So e.g. the unpublished *Florilegium Baroccianum*, which is preserved in five MSS., contains at least in one of them (Baroccianus 143 fol. 64^v) Bion F38 and probably also in Patmos MS. 6 (cf. J. Sakkelion, *Πατμιακή βιβλιοθήκη* (Athens, 1890) pp. 3 f). For this florilegium in general see *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, V (1964) s.v. Florilèges spirituels grecs cols. 494 f (Richard).

²⁴ Cf. the aphorism of T.R. Glover that an anecdote, to pass currency, must be true to type (quoted in J. Ferguson, *Utopias in the Classical World* (London, 1975) p. 90). See also Bieler, II pp. 78 ff, Radermacher 1947, pp. 109 f and F. Wehrli, 'Gnome, Anekdote und Biographie', *Museum Helveticum*, 30 (1973) pp. 193 ff.

for this confusion, apart from a mistake in the MS.-tradition, which has been treated above. Bion may be quoting an earlier author and passing off his wisdom as his own. This is not at all surprising, when one considers the Greek attitude to literary borrowings. It was very common to omit the source, yet this kind of borrowing was not considered to be in any way shameful.²⁵ Of course cases like these should be presented among the fragments of Bion as he obviously considered them as his own literary property. We have a comparatively clear case in F3, where Bion is obviously quoting Aristippus. We may have a similar case in F77, which is closely connected with Theophrastus, so that Bion may be quoting his teacher.

In other cases the confusion may derive from a custom prevalent in the popular philosophy of the Hellenistic period, of giving one's own sayings greater importance by ascribing them to the old philosophers and wise men of Greece. This may indeed be regarded as a sort of literary forgery but seems to have been very common, especially among the Cynics. This is why we find so many sayings ascribed to such philosophers as Xenophanes, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Democritus and the Seven wise men, including Anacharsis.²⁶ This may very well explain, why some of the fragments of Bion are also ascribed to the old philosophers (cf. F20, F35, F47, F61 and F67).

These general reflections apart, there are some cases or groups of cases in Bion, which deserve separate treatment.

Freudenthal²⁷ published a collection of apophthegmata, which are supposed to come from Favorinus' collection. Of these nos. 12–20 are anonymous, but since no. 12 is introduced by a *τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, they may have been regarded as sayings of Solon, to whom no. 11 belongs. So in the gnomological literature they can be found wrongly attributed Solon. A strange coincidence is that nos. 12–20 occur, and exactly in this order, in Diog. Laert.; this fact led Freudenthal²⁸ to the assumption that these apophthegmata were collected from Diog. Laert. and did not at all come from Favorinus' collection, a view accepted by Wachsmuth.²⁹ This assumption has, not entirely convincingly to my mind,

²⁵ Cf. Stemplinger, H. Peter, *Wahrheit und Kunst: Geschichtschreibung und Kunst im klassischen Altertum* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1911) pp. 416 ff, W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1924) pp. 139 ff, and *RE*, XV:2 (1950) s.v. Plagiat cols. 1956 ff (Ziegler).

²⁶ Cf. Gerhard 1909, pp. 248 ff and Z. Stewart, 'Democritus and the Cynics', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 63 (1958) pp. 179 ff.

²⁷ J. Freudenthal, 'Zu Phavorinus und der mittelalterlichen Florilegienliteratur', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 35 (1880) pp. 408 ff.

²⁸ Freudenthal, art. cit. (n. 27) pp. 415 f and pp. 422 f.

²⁹ Wachsmuth, op. cit. (n. 22) p. 133.

been rejected by Sternbach³⁰ and Barigazzi.³¹ It seems improbable that the apophthegmata would be in the same order in Diog. Laert. and *Cod. Par.*, i.e. Favorinus, just by accident.³² However this may be, it is quite obvious that nos. 14–16 in *Cod. Par.* belong to Bion, although they appear in later collections under the name of Solon. Therefore it seems right that they should be included in a collection of Bion's fragments.

Another difficulty consists in the fact that some names are sufficiently similar to *Βίων* to create mistakes in the MSS. This applies especially to the names *Δίων* and *Βίας*. Since both contributed to the literature of apophthegmata it is easy enough to assume a confusion, when the same saying is ascribed to Bion and one of these. On the other hand it would be too rash in these cases always to substitute Bion for Dio or Bias. Each case must be judged on its merits.

There are three cases of fragments of Bion, which are also ascribed to Dio (F5, F38, and F47).³³ Two of these come from *Gnom. Par.* (242 and 320), and are there attributed to Dio. However, the first case is ascribed to Bion five times, and to Dio only by one later source (*Gnom. Bas.*) except for the *Gnom. Par.* Therefore it seems quite clear that we have a mistake here and that the saying really belongs to Bion. The second case is not as clearcut, but it seems correct to attribute this saying to Bion too, as Hense³⁴ did, since it cannot be found in any work of Dio. The third case (F38) is ascribed to Bion three times and to Dio twice. One of these sources is very late (*Gnom. Bas.*). The saying cannot be found in Dio's work, so that it seems rather obvious that also this saying should be ascribed to Bion alone.

This difficulty is even more pronounced in the case of the name Bias. There are five instances, where a saying is attributed to both Bion and Bias (F23, F35, F43, F61, and F67). Here we can assume both a confusion in the MSS. and a later attribution to one of the wise men of Greece.³⁵ In most cases the attribution to Bias is rather weak (only one source in F35, F43, F61, and F67). In a case like F61 the attribution to Bias is unbelievable, but on the other hand the saying is so common that nothing can be said about its origin. A somewhat different case is found in Plutarch *De vitioso pudore* 7.531 E (= T4), where Antigonus Gonatas is connected with a certain Bias, who is completely unknown in

³⁰ L. Sternbach, in 'Gnomologium Vaticanum', *Texte und Kommentare*, 2 (Berlin, 1963) pp. 5 f.

³¹ Barigazzi, p. 19 and pp. 541 f.

³² This difficulty has not been treated by Mannebach, p. 70, p. 72 and p. 75.

³³ These fragments are not to be found among the other fragments of Dio which are collected by H. v. Arnini, in *Dionis Prusaensis quem vocant Chrysostomum quae extant omnia* II (Berlin, 1896) pp. 309 f.

³⁴ Hense 1909, p. 101.

³⁵ Cf. *RE*, III (1899) s.v. Bias (no. 10) cols. 388 f (Crusius).

the king's biography, according to the MSS. Therefore it is obvious that we here have a mistake in the MSS. and that Bion is the correct reading.

5. *The text*

A collection of an author's fragments, which are to be found in works of many different writers, cannot be founded on an independent investigation into the text-history and MSS. of all these authors. Instead an editor of fragments has to rely on the best available texts for the authors in question. These are also carefully noted and can be consulted by every scholar seeking further information on the condition of the text. However, I have supplied an apparatus criticus in order to make this collection somewhat more self-contained. It is very selective but is intended to make the immediate use of the standard edition unnecessary. I regarded a detailed description of the MSS. and textual criticism of the actual authors as unnecessary with an author like Bion, but must also here refer to the standard editions. Only the sigla for the most important sources, i.e. Diog. Laert. and Stobaeus, including Teles, will be given.³⁶

³⁶ Cf. also Edelstein-Kidd, *op. cit.* (n. 7) pp. XXIII ff, where many facts are given which are of great interest also for the background of the fragments of Bion, as many of the quoting authors are the same.

Appendices

1. The question of the so-called diatribe

A question which was mentioned *en passant* in Chapter II:1 but which deserves a more explicit treatment concerns the so-called diatribe. Few literary concepts have been more misused. The development seems to have started with Usener's statement in 1887:¹ "Bio Borysthenita sermonibus suis (διατριβαί nomen erat) genus cynicum severitate risuque mixtum perfecit", which in no way justifies the far-reaching conclusions drawn by later scholars, who assumed that the word διατριβή stood for a special literary form with a special style. Thanks mainly to the research of Halbauer² we now have a better understanding of the meaning of the word διατριβή. It seems that it refers exclusively to the situation in which a teacher is instructing his students, as seen from the students' point of view, and tells us nothing about the content or the style. Therefore the idea that there existed in antiquity an art of literature with the name διατριβή is a construction without any real foundation. This being so, the best thing to do would of course be to abandon this special use of διατριβή³ and Halbauer⁴ would instead call the genre "popularis philosopha dialexis".⁵ However, the concept διατριβή with its special meaning has become so deeply rooted that it would hardly be possible to abolish it altogether. So long as it is clearly realized that the concept διατριβή, meaning popular philosophical dialexis, is a modern construction, I do not think that this use would do any harm, especially as the concept διατριβή seems to fill a need.⁶

As far as Bion is concerned there are some special questions. Was there a special style for this so-called διατριβή i.e. popular philosophical dialexis, and can Bion be considered as its originator? The answer has usually been an unreserved affirmative. No definite answer can be given, mainly because of the lack of sources. The definition of the genre, as given by Halbauer, is too wide to imply a clearly defined style and the different works, which can be included,

¹ H. Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887) p. LXIX.

² Halbauer, pp. 3 ff, especially pp. 10 ff; cf. also Schouler, pp. 30 ff.

³ For a critical view, stressing the vague and unhistorical aspects of the term διατριβή see Fiske, p. 118, Überweg-Praechter, p. 433, P. Valette, 'Lucretius et la diatribe', *Revue des Études Anciennes*, 42 (1940) p. 533, Capelle, col. 992 and Highet, p. 40.

⁴ Halbauer, p. 17.

⁵ Cf. Suda, s.v. διατριβή, 797 where the term is explained as διάλεξις φιλόσοφος.

⁶ Cf. e.g. D.A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London, 1973) p. 29 n. 25 concerning διατριβή: "A useful term much used . . . Definition is difficult; but there is a distinct tradition which needs a name."

differ too much in terms of style. Therefore we are not entitled to refer to a style of the diatribe but of stylistic traits, which seem to form part of a popular philosophical dialexis.⁷ As these traits belong to different philosophical schools, the styles as a whole must have varied widely. The fact that there is no special style of the diatribe also answers the second question, and Bion cannot be considered as the originator of a completely new style. This is in no way surprising. Bion was not an original character. As we have seen from the investigation of his language, style, and stylistic patterns, most of the things considered peculiar to him can be found in earlier authors and are explained by Bion's rhetorical and Cynic background. The ancient sources are of no great help here. Notwithstanding that Bion is said to be the first to clothe philosophy in a flowery dress (T11–13), this cannot be interpreted as meaning that he created a new style which was otherwise unknown to the critics of antiquity. However Bion was probably a well known exponent of this style which combined rhetorical and Cynic elements in such a strange mixture and he perfected it in order to attract listeners.

There are some other aspects of the term diatribe which should be noted. The term has a very wide meaning, covering popular philosophical dialexis in general. This indicates that we cannot expect to find a uniform style ranging from Bion and his predecessors to men like Dio of Prusa and Maximus of Tyre, as has already been pointed out. These later authors have different traits of both style and content, which can be found in Bion or have counterparts in his fragments. However, the stylistic impressions in general, which we get from Bion and these later authors, are completely different. The similarities are usually of a very commonplace character so that these literary works cannot be assigned to one strictly defined category nor can any conclusions on influence be drawn.⁸

We frequently meet the expression "Cynic-Stoic diatribe". It must be realized that this expression cannot refer to the popular philosophical writings of Bion's time but only of a later period. The style of the Stoic writings of an earlier period must have been completely different from that used by Bion. This emerges from different descriptions of the Stoic style, e.g. Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* 2: *in ea est haeresi, quae nullum sequitur florem orationis neque delectat argumentum sed minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis quod proposuit efficit* (cf. also Cicero *De orat.* 3.66, *Brutus* 114 and *De fin.* 3.2.5).⁹ The very

⁷ For a characterization of the so-called diatribe see Wendland 1895, pp. 3 ff. Wendland 1912, pp. 75 ff. and for a general survey Capelle, cols. 990 ff.

⁸ The difference has been noted and scholars therefore tend to distinguish between the diatribe of the Hellenistic period and that of the Roman period; cf. Wendland 1895, p. 4 and Capelle, col. 997.

⁹ Cf. Weber 1895, pp. 54 ff.

common combination of Cynics and Stoics, both from a literary and a philosophical point of view, cannot be considered particularly appropriate, as far as the Hellenistic period is concerned. It belongs exclusively to a much later and more eclectic period.¹⁰

2. *The literary form of the apophthegmata*

When discussing the style of Bion, the form in which a great number of his sayings are preserved is of great importance. Several fragments are what would be classified as apophthegma, chreia or gnome. From this fact it follows that they have a rather stereotyped literary form. This form does not go back to Bion himself, but I still think it can be of a certain interest to see, in what way this type of sayings as well as quotations from Bion are generally introduced.¹

The simplest and most common form is the use of the name with a verb of speech, followed by an accusative with infinitive, a sentence introduced by *ὅτι*, or direct speech. The most common combination is *Βίων ἔλεγε*, mostly followed by an accusative with infinitive. I have noted fifteen cases of this very simple formula. Another common expression is *φησιν ὁ Βίων*, of which twelve cases are noted; this word order seems to be the most popular. It can also be noted that this expression is used especially in a parenthesis, where it does not influence the construction of the sentence. Seven cases have been noted of the verb *ἔφη* with the name Bion, usually followed by an accusative with infinitive. There are two cases of the form *ἔφασκεν*, while only one example has been found of each of the following verbs: *ἀπείκαζε*, *διέβαλλε λέγων*, *δοκεῖ*, *τὸ . . . εἰρημένον*, *ἐκάλει*, *ἐπεῖπεν*, *ἡξίου*, *κατεγίνωσκε*, *φάναι*, *ait*, *dicit* and *dixit*. Another very simple way of introducing a quotation is the use of an article or pronoun, followed by the genitive of the name: *τὸ τοῦ Βίωνος*, *τὰ τοῦ Βίωνος* and *illud Bionis*.

A general characteristic of the rest of the cases is that they incorporate an element of dialogue, so that Bion addresses someone, after having been asked a question, or in some other way comes into contact with another person. The forms are more varied here. A rather common type seems to be when a participle is connected with the name, which is followed by a verb of speech, as *Βίων ἐρωτηθεὶς . . . εἶπε* or *ἔφη* or *Βίωνα ἐρωτηθέντα . . . εἶπεῖν*. The participle

¹⁰ Usually the difference between the Cynic and the Stoic schools is not stressed; cf. however Dudley, pp. 102 f and Z. Stewart, 'Democritus and the Cynics', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 53 (1958) pp. 184 f.

¹ For the literary form of apophthegmata etc. see especially A. Packmohr, *De Diogenis Sinopensis apophthegmatis quaestiones selectae* (Diss. Münster, 1913) pp. 17 ff, G. Rudberg, 'Zur Diogenes-Tradition', *Symbolae Osloenses*, 14 (1935) pp. 33 ff and K.J. Dover, in *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford, 1968) pp. 114 f.

can be of another character and also refer to the person to whom Bion is speaking: *πρὸς οὖν τὸν αἰτιασάμενον . . . ἔφη, ὄνειδιζόμενος . . . εἶπεν* or *μεμφόμενος ἔλεγεν*. There are the slightly different cases, where the element of dialogue is clearly preserved: *ἤρετο . . . κάκεινος εἶπεν* or *τῶν δὲ εἰπόντων . . . φησιν*. Even vaguer is the dialogue in cases like *πρὸς . . . ἔφη, ἔλεγε* or *φησίν*, followed by direct speech. Finally there are cases, where the dialogue has disappeared completely, even though it is clearly indicated that Bion is provoked by something or someone outside himself: *Βίων . . . ἰδὼν . . . εἶπεν*.

Text

Sigla

Only the sigla for the two most important texts, Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus, are given here; for the other texts the reader is referred to the standard editions.

Diogenes Laertius

B	cod. Neapolitanus Burbonicus III B 29, s. XII
F	cod. Laurentianus 69. 13, s. XIII.
P	cod. Parisinus gr. 1759, s. XIII in.
$\alpha=$	$B^{ac}F^{ac}P^{ac}$
d	cod. Neapolitanus Burbonicus III B 28, s. XV.
g	cod. Laurentianus 69. 28, s. XV ex.
n	cod. Monacensis gr. 159, s. XVI in.
q	cod. Parisinus gr. 1758, s. XIV in.
t	cod. Vaticanus Urbinas gr. 109, s. XV.
w	cod. Vaticanus gr. 140, s. XIV.
φ	cod. Vaticanus gr. 96, s. XIII.
fr	editio princeps Graeca, quae prodit apud Frobenium, Basileae, 1533.

Stobaeus (including Teles)

S	cod. Vindobonensis gr. 67, s. XI in.
M	cod. Escorialensis 90, s. XII in. vel XI ext.
M^d	cod. Escorialensis collatio Dindorfiana.
A	cod. Parisinus gr. 1984, s. XIV.
L	cod. Laurentianus florilegii sacri profani VIII n. 22, s. XIV.
Br	cod. Bruxellensis n. 11360, s. XIV.
Mac.	Macarii Chrysocephali rosetum (cod. Marcianus n. 452), s. XIV.
Tr.	editio Trincavelliana ex codice Marciano expressa, Venetiis, 1535—36
Frob.	gnomae Frobenii

I. Diogenis Laertii Vita Bionis (4.46—58)

- 46 Βίων τὸ μὲν γένος ἦν Βορυσθενίτης, ὦντινων δὲ γονέων καὶ ἀφ' οἷων πραγμάτων ἤξεν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, αὐτὸς Ἀντιγόνῳ διασαφεῖ. ἐρομένου γὰρ αὐτὸν τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἡδὲ τοκῆες; αἰσθόμενος ὅτι προδιαβέβληται, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτόν “ἐμοῦ ὁ πατὴρ μὲν ἦν ἀπελευθέρος, τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος (διεδήλου δὲ τὸν ταριχέμπορον) γένος Βορυσθενίτης, ἔχων οὐ πρόσωπον, ἀλλὰ συγγραφὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου, τῆς τοῦ δεσπότης πικρίας σύμβολον· μήτηρ δὲ οἷαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἂν γῆμαι, ἀπ' οἰκῆματος. ἔπειτα ὁ πατὴρ παρατελωνησάμενός τι πανοίκιος ἐπράθη μεθ' ἡμῶν. καὶ με ἀγοράζει τις ῥήτωρ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ εὐχαριν· ὃς καὶ ἀποθνήσκων κατέλιπέ μοι πάντα. κἀγὼ κατακαύσας αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα καὶ πάντα συγξύσας Ἀθήναζε ἦλθον καὶ ἐφιλοσόφησα.

ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὐχομαι εἶναι. ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἐμέ. ὥστε παυσάσθωσαν Περσαῖός τε καὶ Φιλωνίδης ἱστοροῦντες αὐτά· σκόπει δέ με ἐξ ἑμαυτοῦ.”

- Καὶ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ Βίων τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολύτροπος καὶ σοφιστὴς ποικίλος καὶ πλείστας ἀφορμὰς δεδωκώς τοῖς βουλομένοις καθιππάζεσθαι φιλοσοφίας· ἔν τισι δὲ καὶ πότιμος καὶ ἀπολαῦσαι τύφου δυνάμενος. πλείστὰ τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα χρειώδη πραγματεῖαν περιέχοντα. οἷον ὀνειδιζόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ θηρᾶσαι μεϊράκιον, “οὐχ οἷόν τε,” εἶπεν, “ἀπαλὸν τυρὸν ἀγκίστρῳ ἐπισπᾶσθαι.” ἐρωτηθεὶς ποτε τίς μᾶλλον ἀγωνιᾷ, ἔφη, “ὁ τὰ μέγιστα βουλούμενος εὐημερεῖν.” ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ γῆμαι—ἀναφέρεται γὰρ καὶ εἰς τοῦτον—ἔφη, “ἐὰν μὲν γήμης αἰσχρὰν, ἔξεις ποινήν· ἂν δὲ καλήν, ἔξεις κοινήν.” τὸ γῆρας ἔλεγεν ὄρμον εἶναι κακῶν· εἰς αὐτὸ γοῦν πάντα καταφεύγειν. τὴν δόξαν ἀνιῶν μητέρα εἶναι· τὸ κάλλος ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν· τὸν πλοῦτον νεῦρα πραγμάτων. πρὸς τὸν τὰ χωρία κατεδηδοκότα, “τὸν μὲν Ἀμφιάραιον,” ἔφη, “ἡ γῆ κατέπιε, σὺ δὲ τὴν γῆν.” μέγα κακὸν τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν κακόν. κατεγίνωσκε δὲ καὶ τῶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κατακαόντων μὲν ὡς ἀναισθήτους, 48 παρακαόντων δὲ ὡς αἰσθανομένους. ἔλεγε δὲ συνεχῆς ὅτι αἰρετώτερόν ἐστι τὴν ὥραν ἄλλῳ χαρίζεσθαι ἢ ἀλλοτρίας ἀποδρέπεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ εἰς σῶμα βλάπτεσθαι καὶ εἰς ψυχὴν. διέβαλλε δὲ καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην, λέγων ὡς εἰ μὲν εἶχεν Ἀλκιβιάδου χρειάν καὶ ἀπείχετο, μάταιος ἦν· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἐποίει παράδοξον. εὐκόλον ἔφασκε τὴν εἰς ἄδου ὁδὸν καταμύοντας γοῦν ἀπιέναι. τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην μεμφόμενος ἔλεγεν ὡς νέος μὲν ὢν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀπάγοι τῶν γυναικῶν, νεανίσκος δὲ γενόμενος τὰς γυναῖκας τῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐν Ῥόδῳ τὰ ῥητορικὰ διασκοῦντων Ἀθηναίων τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα ἐδίδασκε· πρὸς οὖν τὸν αἰτιασάμενον ἔφη, “πυροὺς ἐκόμισα καὶ κριθὰς πιπράσκω;”

- 50 Ἐλεγε δὲ τοὺς ἐν ἄδου μᾶλλον ἂν κολάζεσθαι εἰ ὀλοκλήροις καὶ μὴ

τετρημένοις ἀγγείοις ὑδροφόρουν. πρὸς τὸν ἀδολέσχην λιπαροῦντα αὐτῷ συλλαβέσθαι, “ τὸ ἱκανόν σοι ποιήσω,” φησίν, “ ἐὰν παρακλήτους πέμψης καὶ αὐτὸς μὴ ἔλθῃς.” πλέων μετὰ πονηρῶν λησταῖς περιέπεσε· τῶν δέ, “ ἀπολώλαμεν,” εἰπόντων, “ ἐὰν γνωσθῶμεν,” “ ἐγὼ δέ γε,” φησίν, “ ἐὰν μὴ γνωσθῶμεν.” τὴν οἴησιν ἔλεγε προκοπῆς ἐγκοπὴν. πρὸς πλούσιον μικρολόγον, “ οὐχ οὗτος,” ἔφη, “ τὴν οὐσίαν κέκτηται, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὐσία τοῦτον.” ἔλεγε τοὺς μικρολόγους τῶν μὲν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἰδίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὡς δ’ ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι. τῇ μὲν ἀνδρεία νέους ὄντας ἔφη χρῆσθαι, τῇ δὲ φρονήσει
 51 γηράσκοντας ἀκμάζειν. τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ὅσον τὴν ὄρασιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. μὴ δεῖν ἔφασκεν ὀνειδίζειν τὸ γῆρας, εἰς ὃ, ἔφη, πάντες εὐχόμεθα ἐλθεῖν. πρὸς τὸν βάσκανον ἐσκυθρωπακότα, “ οὐκ οἶδα,” ἔφη, “ πότερον σοὶ κακὸν γέγονεν ἢ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθόν.” τὴν †δυσσέβειαν πονηρὸν ἔλεγεν εἶναι σύνοικον τῇ παρρησίᾳ·

δουλοῖ γὰρ ἄνδρα, κἂν θρασὺς πλαγχνός τις ᾗ.
 τοὺς φίλους ὅποιοι ἂν ὦσι συντηρεῖν, ἵνα μὴ δοκοίημεν πονηροῖς κεχρηῆσθαι ἢ χρηστοῖς παρητῆσθαι.

Οὗτος τὴν ἀρχὴν μὲν προηρεῖτο τὰ Ἀκαδημαϊκά, καθ’ ὃν χρόνον ἤκουε
 52 Κράττους· εἴτ’ ἐπανείλετο τὴν κυνικὴν ἀγωγὴν, λαβὼν τρίβωνα καὶ πήραν. καὶ τί γὰρ ἄλλο μετεσκεύασεν αὐτὸν πρὸς ἀπάθειαν; ἔπειτα ἐπὶ τὰ Θεοδώρεια μετῆλθε διακούσας Θεοδώρου τοῦ ἀθέου κατὰ πᾶν εἶδος λόγου σοφιστεύοντος· μεθ’ ὃν Θεοφράστου διήκουσε τοῦ περιπατητικοῦ. ἦν δὲ καὶ θεατρικὸς καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοιῷ διαφορῆσαι, φορτικοῖς ὀνόμασι κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμενος. διὰ δὴ οὖν τὸ παντὶ εἶδει κεκρᾶσθαι λόγου φασὶ λέγειν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἐρατοσθένην, ὡς πρῶτος Βίων φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθινὰ ἐνέδυσεν. εὐφυῆς γὰρ ἦν καὶ παρωδῆσαι· οἷά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῦτα·

ὦ πέπον Ἀρχύτα, ψαλληγενές, ὀλβιότυφε,
 τῆς ὑπάτης ἔριδος πάντων ἐμπειρότατ’ ἀνδρῶν.

53 καὶ ὅλως καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γεωμετρίαν διέπαιζεν. ἦν τε πολυτελής· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἤμειβεν, ἐνίοτε καὶ φαντασίαν ἐπιτεχνώμενος. ἐν γοῦν Ῥόδῳ τοὺς ναύτας ἔπεισε σχολαστικὰς ἐσθῆτας ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῷ· σὺν οἷς εἰσβάλλων εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον περιβλεπτοὺς ἦν. εἰώθει τε νεανίσκων τινῶν νίθεσις ποιεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ ἀποχρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ἕς τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ὥστε φυλάττεσθαι ὑπ’ εὐνοίας αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλαυτος ἦν ἰσχυρῶς καὶ πολὺς ἐγκείμενος τῷ Κοινῷ τὰ φίλων. παρ’ ὃ καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτοῦ μαθητὴς ἐπιγράφεται,
 54 τοσοῦτων αὐτῷ σχολασάντων· καίτοι τινὰς εἰς ἀναισχυντίαν προῆγεν. ὁ γοῦν Βητίων εἷς τῶν συνήθων αὐτῷ πρὸς Μενέδημόν ποτε λέγεται εἰπεῖν, “ ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ Μενέδημε, νύκτωρ συνδέομαι Βίῳ καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον δοκῶ γε πεπονθέναι.” πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀθεώτερον προεφέρετο τοῖς ὁμιλοῦσι, τοῦτο Θεοδώρειον ἀπολαύσας. καὶ ὕστερόν ποτε ἐμπεσὼν εἰς νόσον, ὡς ἔφασκον οἱ ἐν Χαλκίδι—αὐτόθι γὰρ καὶ κατέστρεψε—περίαπτα λαβεῖν ἐπέισθη καὶ μεταγινώσκειν ἐφ’ οἷς ἐπλημμέλησεν εἰς τὸ θεῖον. ἀπορία δὲ καὶ τῶν νοσοκομούντων δεινῶς διετίθετο, ἕως Ἀντίγονος αὐτῷ δύο θεράποντας ἀπέστειλε. καὶ

ἡκολούθει γε αὐτῷ ἐν φορείῳ, καθά φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ.

55 Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κατέστρεψε καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὸν οὕτως ἡττιάσαμεθα·

Βίωνα, τὸν Βορυσθένης ἔφυνε γῇ Σκύθισσα,

λέγειν ἀκούομεν θεοὺς ὡς οὐδέν εἰσιν ὄντως.

κεῖ μὲν τὸ δόγμα τοῦτ' ἔχων ἔμιμνεν, ἦν ἂν εἰκὸς

λέγειν, φρονεῖν ὅπως δοκεῖ· κακῶς μὲν, ἀλλ' ἔδοξε.

νῦν δ' ἐς νόσον πεσὼν μακρὴν καὶ μὴ θάνῃ δεδοικῶς

ὁ μὴ θεοὺς εἶναι λέγων, ὁ νηὸν οὐδὲ βλέψας,

56 ὁ πολλὰ χλευάσας βροτούς, ὅσοι θεοῖς ἔθυσον,

οὐ μούνον ἐσχάρης ὑπὲρ βωμῶν τε καὶ τραπέζης

κνίσῃ, λίπει, θυήμασιν θεῶν ἔδαισε ρίνας·

οὐδ' εἶπε μούνον, Ἥλιτον, σύγγνωτε τοῖς πρὶν· ἀλλὰ

καὶ γραῖ' δῶκεν εὐμαρῶς τράχηλον εἰς ἐπωδὴν

καὶ σκυτίσιν βραχίονας πεπεισμένως ἔδησε·

57 ῥάμνον τε καὶ κλάδον δάφνης ὑπὲρ θύρην ἔθηκεν,

ἅπαντα μᾶλλον ἢ θανεῖν ἕτοιμος ὢν ὑπουργεῖν.

μωρὸς δ' ὅς ἤθελέν τινος μισθοῦ τὸ θεῖον εἶναι,

ὡς τῶν θεῶν ὄντων ὅταν Βίων θέλῃ νομίζειν.

τοιγὰρ μάτην φρονῶν, ὅτ' ἦν ἅπας ὁ λέμφορ ἄνθραξ,

τὴν χεῖρα τείνας ὧδέ πως, Χαῖρ', εἶπε, χαῖρε, Πλουτεῦ.

58 Γεγόνασι δὲ Βίωνες δέκα· πρῶτος ὁ Φερεκύδῃ τῷ Συρίῳ συνακμάσας, οὗ

φέρεται βιβλία δύο Ἰάδι· ἔστι δὲ Προκοννήσιος, δεύτερος Συρακούσιος, τέχνας

ῥητορικὰς γεγραφώς· τρίτος αὐτὸς οὗτος· τέταρτος Δημοκρίτειος καὶ μαθημα-

τικός, Ἀβδηρίτης, Ἀτθίδι γεγραφώς καὶ Ἰάδι· οὗτος πρῶτος εἶπεν εἶναί τινας

οἰκῆσεις ἐνθα γίνεσθαι ἐξ μηνῶν τὴν νύκτα καὶ ἐξ τὴν ἡμέραν. πέμπτος Σολεύς,

Αἰθιοπικὰ γεγραφώς· ἕκτος ῥητορικός, οὗ φέρεται ἐννέα βιβλία Μουσῶν

ἐπιγραφόμενα· ἑβδόμος μελικὸς ποιητής· ὀγδοὸς Μιλήσιος ἀνδριαντοποιός, οὗ

μένηται καὶ Πολέμων· ἕνατος ποιητής τραγωδίας τῶν Ταρσικῶν λεγομένων·

δέκατος ἀγαλατοποιὸς Κλαζομένιος ἢ Χῖος, οὗ μένηται καὶ Ἰππῶναξ.

II. Testimonia

1. Life

- T1** Nicias Nicaeensis ap. Athenaeum 13.591 F—592 A (= *FHG* IV p. 464)
Καὶ Βίων δ' ὁ Βορυσθενίτης φιλόσοφος ἑταίρας ἦν υἱὸς Ὀλυμπίας Λακαίνης, ὥς φησι Νικίας ὁ Νικαιεὺς ἐν ταῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων Διαδοχαῖς.
- T2A** Diogenes Laertius 4.47
Καὶ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ Βίων τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολύτροπος καὶ σοφιστῆς ποικίλος καὶ πλείστας ἀφορμὰς δεδωκὼς τοῖς βουλομένοις καθιππάζεσθαι φιλοσοφίας· ἔν
3 *τισι δὲ καὶ πότιμος καὶ ἀπολαῦσαι τύφου δυνάμενος.*
3 *πότιμος codd. : πομπικός Cobet: φιλότιμος Menagius: πόριμος Bochartus*
3 *ἀπολαῦσαι τύφου codd.: ἀποκλύσαι τύφου Reiske: ἀποπαῦσαι τύφον Casaubon*
- T2B** Eudocia Augusta, *Violarium* 235, p. 162 Flach
Δέκατος ὁ Βορυσθενίτης φιλόσοφος, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολύτροπος καὶ σοφιστῆς ποικίλος, καὶ πλείστας ἀφορμὰς δεδωκὼς τοῖς βουλομένοις καθιππάζεσθαι
3 *φιλοσοφίας, ἔν τισι δὲ καὶ πότιμος καὶ ἀπολαῦσαι τύφου δυνάμενος.*
- T2C** Suda, s.v. *Καθιππάζεσθαι*, 112
Καθιππάζεσθαι: συνελαύνειν, ἐρίζειν, συντρέχειν. ὁ δὲ Βίων ὁ σοφιστῆς ποικίλος ἦν, πλείστας ἀφορμὰς δεδωκὼς τοῖς βουλομένοις καθιππάζεσθαι
3 *φιλοσοφίας.*
1 *Καθιππάζεσθαι A': Καθιπτάζεσθαι bis F*
- T3** Diogenes Laertius 4.53—54
Ἦν τε πολυτελής· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἤμειβεν, ἐνίοτε καὶ φαντασίαν ἐπιτεχνώμενος. ἐν γοῦν Ῥόδῳ τοὺς ναύτας ἔπεισε σχολαστικὰς ἐσθῆτας
3 *ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτῶ· σὺν οἷς εἰσβάλλων εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον περιβλεπτος ἦν. εἰώθει τε νεανίσκων τινῶν υἱοθεσίας ποιεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ ἀποχρῆσθαι αὐ-*
τοῖς ἕξ τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ὥστε φυλάττεσθαι ὑπ' εὐνοίας αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλ-
6 *αὐτος ἦν ἰσχυρῶς καὶ πολὺς ἐγκείμενος τῷ Κοινῷ τὰ φίλων. παρ' ὃ καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτοῦ μαθητῆς ἐπιγράφεται, τοσούτων αὐτῶ σχολασάντων· καίτοι τινὰς εἰς*
ἀναισχυντίαν προῆγεν. ὁ γοῦν Βητίων εἰς τῶν συνήθων αὐτῶ πρὸς Μενέδημόν
9 *ποτε λέγεται εἰπεῖν, 'ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ Μενέδημε, νύκτωρ συνδέομαι Βίῳ καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον δοκῶ γε πεπονθέναι.' πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀθεώτερον προεφέρετο τοῖς ὁμι-*
λοῦσι, τοῦτο Θεοδώρειον ἀπολαύσας.
1 *τε BF: δὲ P*
3 *εἰσβάλλων α : εἰσβαλὼν φ*
8 *προῆγεν BP : προσῆγεν F*

- 8 *Βητίων* fr : *βιτ(τ)ίων* a
 8 *συνήθων* BP : *σ. ὑπάρχων* F
 9 *συνδέομαι* codd. : *συνδέδεμαι* Reiske
 10 *προεφέρετο* fr : *προσεφέρετο* codd.

- T4** Plutarchus, *De vitioso pudore* 7.531 E
 Ὡσπερ Ἀντίγονος ὁ γέρων ὑπὸ Βίωνος ἐνοχληθεὶς πολλάκις ‘δοτ’ εἶπεν ‘Βία
 τάλαντον καὶ Ἀνάγκη.’
 1 *Βίωνος* Casaubon : *βίαντος* codd. (*βίαντι* N)
 1 *Βία* LCG^{ras}WXY^{1ss} : *βίαντα* J : *βίαντι* cet.
- T5** Favorinus, *Omnigena historia* ap. Diogenem Laertium 4.54 (= fr. 66 Barigazzi
 = fr. 34 Mensching)
*Καὶ ὕστερόν ποτε ἐμπεσὼν εἰς νόσον, ὥς ἔφασκον οἱ ἐν Χαλκίδι — αὐτόθι γὰρ
 καὶ κατέστρεψε — περίαπτα λαβεῖν ἐπείσθη καὶ μεταγινώσκειν ἐφ’ οἷς ἐπλημμέ-*
 3 *λησεν εἰς τὸ θεῖον. ἀπορία δὲ καὶ τῶν νοσοκομούντων δεινῶς διετίθετο, ἕως*
Ἀντίγονος αὐτῷ δύο θεράποντας ἀπέστειλε. καὶ ἠκολούθει γε αὐτῷ ἐν φορείῳ,
καθὰ φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ.
 2 *μεταγινώσκειν* BP : *μετεγίνωσκεν* g (cf. *μεταγίνωσκεν* F)
 4 *αὐτῷ*² codd.: *αὐτός* Reiske
- T6A** Diogenes Laertius 4.55–57 (= *Anthologiae Graecae Appendix* 5.37)
vid. supra.
- T6B** Hesychius Milesius, *De viris illustribus* 13, pp. 12–13 Flach
Βίων ὁ Βορυσθενίτης ἔλεγε μὴ εἶναι θεοῦς, διὸ καὶ ἐστὶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπίγραμμα
vid. supra.
2. *Literary work, language, and style*
- T7A** Diogenes Laertius 4.47
Πλεῖστά τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα χρειώδη πρα-
γματεῖαν περιέχοντα.
 2 *περιέχοντα* B : *ἔχοντα* FP
- T7B** Eudocia Augusta, *Violarium* 235, p. 162 Flach
Πλεῖστά τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα χρειώδη πρα-
γματεῖαν ἔχοντα.
- T8A** Diogenes Laertius 2.77
 Ὡς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς.
- T8B** Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 116 Walz
 Ὡς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς.

- T9A** Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 3.2.38
Βίωνος ἐν τῷ Περὶ δουλείας.
βίωνος M : δίωνος A : om. Br
- T9B** Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.19.42
Βίωνος ἐν τῷ Περὶ δουλείας.
βίωνος SM : ^βδίωνος A
ἐν τῷ Περὶ δουλείας om. S
- T10** Philodemus, *De ira, Pap. Herc.* 182 col. 1.16–17, (*VH*² I p. 24), p. 17 Wilke (= p. 32 Crönert)
Ὡς Βίων ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς ὀργῆς.
- T11** Diogenes Laertius 4.52
Ἦν δὲ καὶ θεατρικὸς καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοίως διαφορῆσαι, φορτικοῖς ὀνόμασι κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμενος. διὰ δὲ οὖν τὸ παντὶ εἶδει κεκρᾶσθαι λόγου
 3 *φασὶ λέγειν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἐρατοσθένην, ὡς πρῶτος Βίων φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθινὰ ἐνέδυσεν.*
 1 *γελοίως nw : γελοίω a*
- T12** Eratosthenes ap. Strabonem 1.2.2 (=T10 *FGrH* 241)
Ὁ δ' (sc. Ἐρατοσθένης) Ἀρκεσίλαον καὶ Ἀρίστωνα τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἀνθησάντων κορυφαίους τίθησιν, Ἀπελλῆς τε αὐτῷ πολὺς ἐστι καὶ Βίων, ὃν φησι
 3 *πρῶτον ἀνθινὰ περιβαλεῖν φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς πολλάκις εἰπεῖν ἄν τινα ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο*
οἶην ἐκ ῥακέων ὁ Βίων (Od. 18.74).
 1 *Ἀρκεσίλαον a : —σίλαν ω' [def. s] Ἀρκεσίλ(. . .)bis A*
 3 *ἀνθινὰ a Casaubon : ἄν τινα A ω'*
 3 *περιβαλεῖν Aldina : —βάλλειν A ω'*
 3 *ὁμῶς codd. : ὁμῶς Welcker*
 4 *αὐτοῦ Casaubon : αὐτὸ A ω'*
- T13** Demetrius Lacon *Pap. Herc.* 1055 col. 18.1–5, p. 75 De Falco (= p. 31 Crönert)
. . . οὐ[δὲ]ν πιθανὸν [ο]ὔν
ἐστιν ὥσ᾽ ἂν Βίωνος τοῦ
 3 *κατὰ Θεόφραστον πρῶ-*
του φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθι-
νοῖς κοσμήσαντος . . .
- T14** Horatius, *Epistulae* 2.2.59–60
Carminē tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis,
ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro.

- T15** Ps-Acro, *Scholia in Horatium vetustiora, ad Ep. 2.2.60*
 Inde Bioneis (b)] Lividis et amaris iocis, idest satyra. Sunt autem disputationes
 Bionis philosophi, quibus stultitiam vulgi arguit, cui p(a)ene consentiunt carmi-
 3 na Luciliana. Hic autem Bion, qui Sophistes cognominatus est in libro, quem
 edidit, mordacissimis salibus ea, quae apud poetas sunt, ita laceravit, ut ne Ho-
 mero quidem parceret (I(r)a) bfV
 6 *⟨Bioneis⟩] Satyricis, amaris et asperis; Bion enim poeta satyricus fuit (I(r)a) b
 fE
 *⟨Sale nigro⟩] Amara iocularitate (a)
- T16** Porphyrio, *Commentum in Horatium Flaccum, ad Ep. 2.2.60*
 Ille Bioneis s. Bion Aristophanis comici par dicitur fuisse magnae dicacitatis,
 quam vul(t) intellegi de nigro sale. An 'nigrum' malum intellegemus, 'salsum'
 3 autem facetum et iocularium?
 1 par Bücheler: pater codd.
 2 intellegemus Petschenig: intellegimus codd.
- T17** *Scholia Parisina in Horatium, ad Ep. 2.2.60*
 Bioneis sermonibus] Bion par fuit Aristophanis magnae dicacitatis homo.
 par Bücheler: pater codd.
- T18** *Scholia Parisina in Horatium, ad Ep. 2.2.60*
 Ille Bioneis] idest satura. Bion fuit mirabilis reprehensor: hoc est quod determi-
 nat 'nigro sale.' Illi dico sic poscentes diversa carmina videntur mihi ut tres
 3 convivae, idest comparabiles convivis poscentibus varios cibos.

3. Relations to other philosophers

- T19** Diogenes Laertius 4.51–52
 Οὗτος τὴν ἀρχὴν μὲν προηρεῖτο τὰ Ἀκαδημαϊκά, καθ' ὃν χρόνον ἤκουε
 Κράτητος· εἴτ' ἐπανεῖλετο τὴν κυνικὴν ἀγωγὴν, λαβὼν τρίβωνα καὶ πήραν. καὶ
 3 τί γὰρ ἄλλο μετεσκεύασεν αὐτὸν πρὸς ἀπάθειαν; ἔπειτα ἐπὶ τὰ Θεοδώρεια μετ-
 ἤλθε διακούσας Θεοδώρου τοῦ ἀθέου κατὰ πᾶν εἶδος λόγου σοφιστεύοντος· μεθ'
 ὃν Θεοφράστου διήκουσε τοῦ περιπατητικοῦ.
 1 προηρεῖτο vel προήρητο Hirzel: παρητεῖτο codd. : προήρητο Reiske: ἐπανηρεῖτο Lennep
 1 ἤκουε BP: ἤκουσε F
 2 ἐπανεῖλετο BF: ἀνεῖλετο P
- T20** Diogenes Laertius 4.23
 Ὁ Κράτης ... ἀπέλιπε βιβλία ... ἀλλὰ καὶ μαθητὰς ἐλλογίμους· ὧν Ἀρ-
 κεσίλαον περὶ οὗ λέξομεν — διήκουσε γὰρ καὶ τούτου — καὶ Βίωνα τὸν
 3 Βορυσθενίτην ὕστερον δὲ Θεοδώρειον ἀπὸ τῆς αἵρέσεως ἐπικαλούμενον, περὶ οὗ
 καὶ αὐτοῦ λέξομεν ἐχομένως Ἀρκεσιλάου.

- T21** Anonymus, *Acad. Phil. Ind. Herc., Pap. Herc.* 1021 col. 16.30–38, pp. 62–63
Mekler (= p. 31 Crönert)
... τιν[ἐς δὲ Βίωνα
τὸν Β]ορυσθενί[την καὶ τὸν Ἀ-
32 σπ]ένδι[ο]ν Εὐμέν[ην, οὗ τὰ
Περὶ κωμωδίας εἶναι, καὶ [τὸν
Κῶ[ιο]ν Εὐρύπυλον καὶ τὸν
35 Χ]ηναῖον Κράτητα καὶ [τὸ]ν
Πι]ταναῖον Ἀρ[κ]εσίλα[ν ...
καὶ] τὸν Κύπ[ριον ...
38 [Κράτητός φασι γεγονέναι μαθητάς
- T22** Diogenes Laertius 4.10 (= fr. 104 Heinze)
Σκωπτόμενος ὑπὸ Βίωνος οὐκ ἔφη (sc. Ξενοκράτης) αὐτῷ ἀποκρινεῖσθαι μηδὲ
γὰρ τὴν τραγωδίαν ὑπὸ τῆς κωμωδίας σκωπτομένην ἀποκρίσεως ἀξιοῦν.
- T23** Diocles ap. Numenium (=fr. 25 Des Places) ap. Eusebium, *Praeparatio evange-*
lica 14.6.6
Οὐ γὰρ πείθομαι τοῦ Κνιδίου Διοκλέους φάσκοντος ἐνταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Δια-
τριβαῖς Ἀρκεσίλαον φόβῳ τῶν Θεοδωρείων τε καὶ Βίωνος τοῦ σοφιστοῦ
3 ἐπεξιόντων τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ οὐδὲν ὀκνούντων ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐλέγχειν, αὐτὸν
ἐξευλαβηθέντα, ἵνα μὴ πράγματα ἔχη, μηδὲν μὲν δόγμα ὑπειπεῖν φαινόμενον,
ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ μέλαν τὰς σηπίας προβάλλεσθαι πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐποχὴν. τοῦτ' οὖν
6 ἐγὼ οὐ πείθομαι.
3 ἐπεξιόντων Wilamowitz : ἐπεισιόντων codd.
4 ἐξευλαβηθέντα IN² : ἐξεβλαβηθέντα ON¹D
4 ὑπειπεῖν ID : ἐπειπεῖν ON
5 δὲ : γὰρ I
- T24** Strabo 10.5.6
Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰουλίδος ὃ τε Σιμωνίδης ἦν ὁ μελοποιὸς καὶ Βακχυλίδης, ἀδελφι-
δοῦς ἐκείνου, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα Ἐρασίστρατος ὁ ἱατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου
3 φιλοσόφων Ἀρίστων, ὁ τοῦ Βορυσθενίτου Βίωνος ζηλωτής.
1 ὃ τε Aldina : ὅτι DCWvg : om. St. Byz. senx
2 μετὰ ταῦτα δ : μετ' αὐτὸν [—τῶν codd. AR] St. Byz.

4. Opinions on Bion's teaching

- T25** Philodemus, *De ira, Pap. Herc.* 182 col. 1.12–20 (VH² I p. 24), p. 17 Wilke (= p. 32 Crönert)

... εἰ μὲ-

ν οὖν ἐπετίμα[ι] τοῖς

14 ψέγουσι μ[ό]νον, ἄλλο

δὲ μηδὲ ἐν ποιουῖσιν

ἢ βαι[ό]ν, ὥς Βίων ἐν τῷ

17 Περὶ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ Χρύσιπ-

πος ἐν τ[ῶ]ι Πε[ρ]ὶ πα-

θῶν θεραπευ[τι]κῶι, καὶ

20 μετρίως ἴστατο.

T26 Philodemus, *De adulatione*, *Pap. Herc.* 223 fr. 7.1–16 (*VH²* VIII p. 141), p. 34
Crönert

... ὁ δ' ἐν πᾶσι σ[οφ]οῦς

καὶ π[ρ]οηγ[ο]ύμενος ἐκεί-

3 νου τάνδρως συλλ[α]β[ὼν] ἀστεί-

ους ὀλοσχερῶς, φησὶν, [συν-

κατέγραψε τοὺς ΜΗΣ...

6 μένους. ὅλως δὲ κα[ὶ] ἀλλάτ-

τοντας τῶν ἐκείνου ἢ πα-

ραλείποντας τὸ π[ρ]ότερον

9 καὶ τὸ συνέχον π[α]σῶν ποι-

εῖ τῶν χαρίτω[ν] μετέχον-

τας, ὥς ὑμῖν ἐξ[ε]σ[τι] κατὰ τὰ-

12 κο[λ]ουθ[ο]ν θεωρεῖν. ἡμεῖς δὲ

μ[ά]λ' ἀπ[ο]δ[ε]ξ[ά]μενοι [τοῦτον] ὅ-

μως] τὰ τοῦ Βίωνος [προαιρού-

15 μεν]οι λέγειν ὑπογρ[ά]φομεν

ἢ δ]η, διότι...

T27 Polystratus, *De philosophia*, *Pap. Herc.* 1520 col. 4.3–7 (*VH²* V p. 200), p. 36
Crönert

... καὶ ἀπὸ τῆ[ς] αὐ-

τῆς αἰτίας π[ε]ρὶ πάν[τα]

5 μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ χρησιμώ-

τατ[α] τῷ Βίῳ σπεύ[δ]ον-

τες ὁ[σ]φρήσονται...

T28 Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem* 32.1126 A

Εἰ γὰρ πρὸς Ἀντίδωρον ἢ Βίωνα τὸν σοφιστὴν γράφων ἐμνήσθη νόμων καὶ
πολιτείας καὶ διατάξεως, οὐκ ἂν [τις] εἶπεν αὐτῷ

3 'μὲν, ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις (Euripides *Or.* 258)

περιστέλλων τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων <οἱ> οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς
βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείωσαν;’ εἰσὶ δὲ <τοι>οὔτοι πάντες οἷς Κωλώτης λελοι-
6 δόρηκεν.

2 τις del. Reiske

3 ἀτρέμα E : ἀτρέμας B

4 οἱ add. Bachet de Meziriac

5 τοι add. Usener

III. Fragmenta

1. Bion to Antigonus Gonatas

F1A

Diogenes Laertius 4.46—47

Βίων τὸ μὲν γένος ἦν Βορυσθενίτης, ὠντινων δὲ γονέων καὶ ἀφ' οἷων πραγμάτων ἤξεν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, αὐτὸς Ἀντιγόνῳ διασαφεῖ. ἐρομένου γὰρ αὐτὸν (*Od.* 1.170 etc.)

- 3 τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἡδὲ τοκῆες;
αἰσθόμενος ὅτι προδιαβέβληται, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτόν· ἔμοῦ ὁ πατήρ μὲν ἦν
ἀπελεύθερος, τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος (διεδήλου δὲ τὸν ταριχέμπορον) γένος
6 Βορυσθενίτης, ἔχων οὐ πρόσωπον, ἀλλὰ συγγραφὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου, τῆς τοῦ
δεσπότης πικρίας σύμβολον· μήτηρ δὲ οἶαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἂν γῆμαι, ἀπ' οἰκῆματος.
ἔπειτα ὁ πατήρ παρατελωνησάμενός τι πανοίκιος ἐπράθη μεθ' ἡμῶν. καί με
9 ἀγοράζει τις ῥήτωρ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ εὐχαριν· ὅς καὶ ἀποθνήσκων κατέλιπέ
μοι πάντα. καὶ γὰρ κατακαύσας αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα καὶ πάντα συγξύσας
Ἀθήναζε ἦλθον καὶ ἐφιλοσόφησα.
12 ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὐχομαι εἶναι (*Il.* 6.211 etc.).
ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἐμέ. ὥστε παυσάσθωσαν Περσαῖός τε καὶ Φιλωνίδης ἱστο-
ροῦντες αὐτά· σκόπει δέ με ἐξ ἑμαντοῦ.'

4 αἰσθόμενος BP : αἰσθανόμενος F

4 ἐμοῦ codd. et Suda : ἐμοῖ Cobet

7 γῆμαι q^{pc} : γῆμαι α

F1B

Suda, s.v. Ἀγκῶν, 249

Καὶ παροιμία· τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος. Βίων φησὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος· ἐμοῦ ὁ
πατήρ μὲν ἦν ἀπελεύθερος, τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος· διεδήλου δὲ τὸν
3 ταριχέμπορον.

1 ἀπομυσσόμενος A Prov. : ἀπομυσσόμενοι GIT : ἀπομασσόμενοι S

F1C

Suda, s.v. Σύμβολον, 1377

Σύμβολον· περὶ Βίωνος τοῦ πατρός· ἔχων οὐ πρόσωπον, ἀλλὰ συγγραφὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ
προσώπου, τῆς τοῦ δεσπότης πικρίας σύμβολον. μήτηρ δὲ οἶαν ὁ τοιοῦτος γῆμαι,
3 ἀπ' οἰκῆματος.

τῆς — οἰκῆματος om. F

F2

Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.29a.13

Ἀντιγόνης ὁ βασιλεὺς Βίωνα τὸν φιλόσοφον διαβληθέντα ὡς δυσγενῆ
ἤρετο (*Od.* 1.170 etc.)

- 3 τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἡδὲ τοκῆες;

- κάκεϊνος εἶπεν· ἄλλ' ὀρθῶς <οἴμαι σ'>, ὡ βασιλεῦ, ὅταν τοξοτῶν χρεῖαν ἔχῃς, οὐκ ἐρωτῶντα τὸ γένος, ἀλλὰ τιθέντα τὸν σκοπὸν τοὺς ἀρίστους τοξευτάς
- 6 παραλαμβάνειν· οὕτως οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων ἐξέταξε οὐ πόθεν εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ τίνες.
- 2 ἤρετο MATr. : εἶρετο S¹ corr. m. rec.
 3 εἶς S¹M : ἥς A: ex εἶς fecit S m. rec.
 3 πτόλις SMA : πόλις Tr. Hom.
 4 ἄλλ' ὀρθῶς <οἴμαι σ'> vel ἄλλ' <οἴμαι σ'> ὀρθῶς Hense : ἄλλ' ὀρθῶς SMATr. : ἄλλ' ὀρθῶς <ἔχει> Gesner¹ f. 437^v

2. On philosophy and sciences

F3 Ps-Plutarchus, *De liberis educandis* 10.7 C–D

- Ἀστεῖως δὲ καὶ Βίων ἔλεγεν ὁ φιλόσοφος ὅτι ὥσπερ οἱ μνηστῆρες τῇ Πηνελόπῃ πλησιάζειν μὴ δυνάμενοι ταῖς ταύτης ἐμίγνυντο θεραπαίναις, οὕτω καὶ οἱ
- 3 φιλοσοφίας μὴ δυνάμενοι κατατυχεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις παιδεύμασι τοῖς οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις ἑαυτοὺς κατασκελετεύουσι.

F4 Diogenes Laertius 4.49

- Ἐν Ῥόδῳ τὰ ρητορικὰ διασκούντων Ἀθηναίων τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα ἐδίδασκε· πρὸς οὖν τὸν αἰτιασάμενον ἔφη, 'πυροὺς ἐκόμισα καὶ κριθὰς πιπράσκω;'
- 1 Ἀθηναίων BF φ: τῶν Ἀθηναίων P

F5A Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 3.4.52

- Βίων ἔλεγε τοὺς γραμματικὸς ζητοῦντας περὶ τῆς Ὀδυσσεύως πλάνης μὴ ἐξετάζειν τὴν ἰδίαν μηδὲ καθορᾶν ὅτι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ πλανῶνται πονοῦντες περὶ τὰ
- 3 μηδὲν χρήσιμα.
- 1 τῆς om Tr.

F5B *Gnomologium Parisinum* 320

- Βίων ἔλεγε τοὺς γραμματικὸς ζητοῦντας περὶ τῆς Ὀδυσσεύως πλάνης τὴν ἰδίαν μὴ καθορᾶν, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ πλανῶνται πονοῦντες περὶ τὰ μηδὲν χρήσιμα.
- 1 Βίων Hense : Δίων cod.

F6 Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.1.20

- Βίων ἔλεγε γελοιοτάτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστρονομοῦντας, οἱ [τοὺς παρ ποσὶ] τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ἰχθῦς οὐ βλέποντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φάσκουσιν εἰδέναι.
- 1 τοὺς παρ ποσὶ del. Meineke
 2 ἰχθῦς codd. : ἀστέρας Herwerden

F7 Diogenes Laertius 4.52 (= Wachsmuth, pp. 201–202)

- Εὐφυῆς γὰρ ἦν καὶ παρωδῆσαι· οἷά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῦτα·
 ὦ πέπον Ἀρχύτα, ψαλληγενές, ὀλβιότυφε,
 3 τῆς ὑπάτης ἐριδος πάντων ἐμπειρότατ' ἀνδρῶν.

- 2 ψαλληγενές codd. : ψαλμηγενές Reiske
3 ἐμπειρότατ' dt : ἐμπειρότατε a

F8 Diogenes Laertius 4.53
Καὶ ὅλως καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γεωμετρίαν διέπαιζεν.

F9A Olympiodorus, *In Platonis Phaedonem commentaria* p. 158.1–5 Norvin (= Plutarchus, fr. 216 f. Sandbach)
Ὅτι Βίων ἠπόρει περὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸ κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν, ὥς τὸ ἐναντίον γε, ἢ οὐ; καὶ τίς ἢ ἀλογία; ἢ ῥητέον, ὥς καὶ τοῦτο γίνεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδωλον τοῦ
3 ἀληθοῦς· τὸ δὲ εἶδωλον εἶναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἂν τις νομίσειεν, εἰ μὴ πη εἰδεῖη τὸ ἀληθές.

F9B Olympiodorus, *In Platonis Phaedonem commentaria* p. 211.14–17 Norvin
Εἰ καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις, ὥς ἠπόρει Βίων; ἢ τῇ ἀναμνήσει καὶ αὐτὸ συνυφίσταται κατὰ τὴν ἀδιάρθρωτον ἔννοιαν καὶ ἔτι σφαλλομένην, ἐπεὶ ὃ γε
3 τυφλὸς ἐκ γενετῆς οὐκ ἂν ψευσθεῖη περὶ χρωμάτων.

F10 Plutarchus, *De Pythiae oraculis* 5.396 E
Ἐκλαβὼν γὰρ ὥς ἔοικεν ἵππον ἀλινδούμενον γράψαι, τρέχοντα ἔγραψεν ἀγανακτοῦντος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γελάσας ὁ Παύσων κατέστρεψε τὸν πίνακα,
3 καὶ γενομένων ἄνω τῶν κάτω πάλιν ὁ ἵππος οὐ τρέχων ἀλλ' ἀλινδούμενος ἐφαίνετο. τοῦτό φησιν ὁ Βίων ἐνίους τῶν λόγων πάσχειν, ὅταν ἀναστραφῶσι.
4 τοῦτό codd. : ταῦτό Fuchs
4 ἀναστραφῶσι Perizonius : ἀναστρέφωσι codd.

3. On ethical concepts

F11A Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 3.2.38
Φησὶν ὁ Βίων· οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκέται ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ πονηροὶ ἐλεύθεροι δοῦλοι πολλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

- 2 πολλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν del. Meineke

F11B Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.19.42
Φησὶν ὁ Βίων· οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκέται ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ πονηροὶ ἐλεύθεροι δοῦλοι πολλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

- 1 φησὶν (φησὶ A) ὁ βίων om. S
2 πολλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν del. Meineke

F12A Diogenes Laertius 4.51
Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ὅσον τὴν ὄρασιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων.

F12B *Codex Parisinus Graecus* 1168 no. 16, p. 413 Freudenthal (= *Corpus Parisinum* 377 Elter = Favorinus fr. 123 Barigazzi)

Τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν ἔλεγεν ὅσῳ ὄρασιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων.

F13 *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 162

‘Ο αὐτὸς τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν ἔφη παντοπώλιον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην †στρατουρίαν.

1 παντοπώλιον Sternbach : παντοπώλειον cod.

2 στρατουρίαν cod. : στρατουργίαν Sternbach : ἐργαστήριον Giesecke

F14 *Athenaeus* 10.421 E—F

Διὸ καλῶς ἔλεγεν ὁ Βορυσθενίτης Βίων οὐ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέξης τὰς ἡδονὰς πορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν.

F15 *Plutarchus, Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 11.82 E

Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε Βίωνος καὶ Πύρρωνος οὐ προκοπῆς ἂν τις ἀλλὰ μείζονος ἕξεως σημεῖα θεῖτο καὶ τελειότερας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡξίου τοὺς συνήθεις οἶεσθαι προκό-

3 πτειν ὅταν τῶν λοιδορούντων οὕτως ἀκούωσιν ὥς λεγόντων

‘ὦ ξέν’, ἐπεὶ οὔτε κακῶ οὔτ’ ἄφρονι φωτὶ ἔοικας, (*Od.* 6.187)

οὐλέ τε καὶ μέγα χαίρε, θεοὶ νύ τοι ὄλβια δοῖεν’ (*Od.* 24.402).

4 φωτὶ : ἀνδρὶ xFC²

F16A *Teles, Περὶ αὐταρκείας* ap. *Stobaeum, Florilegium* 3.1.98 (= fr. II, pp. 5.2—6.8 Hense)

Δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑποκριτὴν ὃ τι ἂν ὁ ποιητὴς περιθῇ πρόσωπον τοῦτο ἀγωνίζεσθαι καλῶς, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα ὃ τι ἂν περιθῇ ἡ τύχη. καὶ γὰρ

3 αὕτη, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, ὥσπερ ποιήτρια, ὅτε μὲν πρωτολόγου, ὅτε δὲ δευτερολόγου περιτίθῃσι πρόσωπον, καὶ ὅτε μὲν βασιλέως, ὅτε δὲ ἀλήτου. μὴ οὖν βούλου δευτερολόγος ὢν τὸ πρωτολόγου πρόσωπον εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάρμοστόν τι ποιήσεις.

6 σὺ μὲν ἄρχεις καλῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρχομαι, φησί, καὶ σὺ μὲν πολλῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐνὸς τουτοῦ παιδαγωγὸς γενόμενος, καὶ σὺ μὲν εὐπόρος γενόμενος δίδως ἐλευθερίως, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνω εὐθαρσῶς παρὰ σοῦ οὐχ ὑποπίπτων οὐδὲ ἀγεννίζων οὐδὲ

9 μεμψιμοιρῶν. σὺ κέχρησαι τοῖς πολλοῖς καλῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς ὀλίγοις· οὐ γὰρ τὰ πολυτελῆ, φησί, τρέφει, οὐδὲ ἐκείνοις μὲν ἔστι μετ’ ὠφελείας χρῆσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ὀλίγοις καὶ εὐτελέσι μετὰ σωφροσύνης οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀτυφίας.

1 Δεῖ ὥσπερ — καὶ ἀτυφίας om. Br

3 δευτερολόγου Meineke : ὑστερολόγου MATr.

4 ἀλήτου : ἀλείτου A

5 εἰ δὲ μή — καὶ ἀτυφίας om. M

6 καὶ del. Nauck

6 καὶ σὺ μὲν πολλῶν — γενόμενος del. Sitzler

9 σὺ (μὲν) κέχρησαι fortasse Hense

10 φησὶ Meineke : φασὶ vel φασὶ ATr.

10 τρέφει Hense : τρέφειν ATr.

10 ὠφελείας codd. : ὠφελίας Crönert : ἀφελείας Giesecke

F16B Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 150 Walz

‘Ο αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν, ἡ τύχη ὥσπερ ποιήτρια, ὅτε μὲν πρωτολόγου, ὅτε δὲ ὑστερολόγου περιτίθῃσι πρόσωπον, καὶ ὅτε μὲν βασιλέως, ὅτε δὲ ἀλήτου.

F17 Teles, *Περὶ αὐταρκείας* ap. Stobaeum, *Florilegium* 3.1.98 (= fr. II, pp. 6.8—8.6 Hense)

Διὸ καὶ εἰ λάβοι, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, φωνὴν τὰ πράγματα, ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ δύναιτο δικαιολογεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴποι, φησὶν, [πρῶτον ἢ πενία, ἄνθρωπε, τί μοι μάχη;] ὥσπερ οἰκέτης πρὸς τὸν κύριον ἐφ’ ἱερὸν καθίσας δικαιολογεῖται ‘τί μοι μάχη; μὴ τί σοι κέκλοφα; οὐ πᾶν τὸ προσταττόμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ ποιῶ; οὐ τὴν ἀποφορὰν εὐτάκτως σοι φέρω;’ καὶ ἡ πενία (ἂν) εἴποι πρὸς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα ‘(ἄνθρωπε,) τί μοι μάχη; μὴ καλοῦ τινος δι’ ἐμὲ στερίσκη; μὴ σωφροσύνης; μὴ δικαιοσύνης; (μὴ) ἀνδρείας; ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεὴς εἶ; ἢ οὐ μεσταὶ μὲν αἱ ὁδοὶ λαχάνων, πλήρεις δὲ αἱ κρῆναι ὕδατος; οὐκ εὐνάς σοι τοσαύτας παρέχω 9 ὁπόση γῆ; καὶ στρωμνὰς φύλλα; ἢ εὐφραίνεσθαι μετ’ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾶς γράδια φυστὴν φαγόντα τερετίζοντα; ἢ οὐκ ὄψον ἀδάπανον καὶ ἀτρυφερον παρασκευάζω σοι τὴν πείναν; ἢ οὐχ ὁ πεινῶν ἥδιστα ἐσθίει καὶ ἥκιστα ὄψου 12 δεῖται; καὶ ὁ διψῶν ἥδιστα πίνει καὶ ἥκιστα τὸ μὴ παρὸν ποτὸν ἀναμένει; ἢ πεινᾷ τις πλακοῦντα ἢ διψᾷ Χῖον; ἀλλ’ οὐ ταῦτα διὰ τρυφὴν ζητοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι; ἢ οἰκήσεις οὐ παρέχω σοι προῖκα, τὸν μὲν χειμῶνα τὰ βαλανεῖα, θέρους δὲ τὰ 15 ἱερά; ποῖον γάρ σοι τοιοῦτον οἰκητήριον, φησὶν ὁ Διογένης, τοῦ θέρους, οἷον ἐμοὶ ὁ Παρθενὼν οὗτος, εὐπνοὺς καὶ πολυτελής;’ εἰ ταῦτα λέγοι ἡ πενία, τί ἂν ἔχοις ἀντειπεῖν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ (ἂν) δοκῶ ἄφωνος γενέσθαι.

1 ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἡμεῖς epitomatori dedit Crönert

1 καὶ ἡμεῖς Tr.Br : ἡμεῖς A

2 πρῶτον ἢ πενία — μάχη del. Hense : πρῶτον ἢ πενία (sic ABr : ἢ πενία Tr.) del. Cobet et Wilamowitz

2 πρῶτον codd. : πρὸς τὸν (ἐγκαλοῦντα) Crönert

3 πρὸς τὸν κύριον Hense : πρὸς κύριον ABr : τὸ κῆ Tr.

3 καθίσας ATr. : καθήσας Br

3 τί μοι μάχη; codd.: (ἄνθρωπε) τί μοι μάχη Cobet

4 μὴ τι Tr. : τί ABr

4 οὐ πᾶν τὸ Dobree : οὐκ ἂν τὸ ATr. : οὐ τὸ Br

5 ἂν add. Cobet : (οὕτω) κᾶν ἢ πενία εἴποι Sitzler

6 (ἄνθρωπε,) τί μοι μάχη; mavult Hense

7 μὴ add. Hense

7 ἀνδρείας Tr. : ἀνδρίας ABr

7 εἶ, ἢ Bücheler : εἵης ABrTr. : εἶς Halm : εἶ Cobet

9 στρωμνὰς φύλλα codd. : στρωμνὰς (ὁπόσα) φύλλα Crönert

9 ἔστιν Tr.Br : ἔστι σοι A : ἔστιν σοι Gaisford et Meineke

9 ἢ οὐχ ATr. : οὐχ Br

10 γράδια φυστὴν Toup : γράδιαφύρτην A : γραδιοφύρτην Br : γραδιαὶ φύρτην Tr. : φύρτην conservandum esse putat Crönert

11 οὐχ ὁ Tr.Br : οὐχὶ ὁ A

11 πεινῶν ABr : πινῶν Tr.

- 12 ἡ πεινᾷ τις — ἄνθρωποι om. A
 13 Χῖον Nauck : χιόνα codd.
 13 ἄνθρωποι Tr.Br : οἱ ἄνθρωποι A
 14 προῖκα (sic Bücheler), τὸν μὲν χειμῶνα Hense : πρῶτον μὲν χειμῶνα (χειμῶνι BrTr.) ABrTr. : πρῶτον μὲν χειμῶνος Gaisford : [πρῶτον μὲν] χειμῶνος Wilamowitz
 14 τὰ¹ Tr.Br : εἴτα A
 15 ποῖον γάρ codd. : πῶς γάρ Sitzler
 15 οἶον codd. : οἶος Sitzler
 16 λέγοι Halm : λέγει ABrTr.
 16 ἔχοις ABr : ἔχεις Tr.
 17 ἄν add. Meineke : ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ δοκῶ ἄφωνος γενέσθ' ἄν Crönert
 17 ἄφωνος ABr : εὐφρονος Tr.

F18 Dio Prusaensis 66.26

Τῷ Βίωνι δοκεῖ μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν, εἰ μὴ πλακοῦντα γενόμενον ἢ Θάσιον. εὐήθως [ὥς] ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν.

- 1 Βίωνι : βίῳ καὶ B
 1 δοκεῖ : δοκεῖν B
 2 ὥς del. Casaubon

F19 Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 3.4.87

Βίων ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστὶν ἄνοια, εἶπε 'προκοπῆς ἐμπόδιον.'

εἶπε om. M^d
 ἐμπόδιον codd. : ἐγκοπή Nauck et Meineke

F20 Diogenes Laertius 4.50

Τὴν οἴησιν ἔλεγε προκοπῆς ἐγκοπήν.

F21 Teles, *Περὶ αὐταρκειᾶς* ap. Stobaeum, *Florilegium* 3.1.98 (= fr. II, p. 9.2—8 Hense)

‘Ο δὲ Βίων, ὥσπερ τῶν θηρίων, φησί, παρὰ τὴν λῆψιν ἡ δῆξις γίνεται, καὶ μέσου τοῦ ὄφεως ἐπιλαμβάνη, δηθθήσῃ, ἐὰν τοῦ τραχήλου, οὐδὲν πείσῃ· οὕτω καὶ τῶν
 3 πραγμάτων, φησί, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἡ ὁδύνη γίνεται, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν οὕτως ὑπολάβῃς περὶ αὐτῶν, ὥς ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκ ὁδυνήσῃ, ἐὰν δὲ ὥς ἐτέρως, ἀνιάσῃ, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τρόπων καὶ τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης.

- 1 Καὶ (μὲν) μέσου Sitzler
 2 ἐπιλαμβάνη Cobet : ἐπιλαμβάνοις ABr : ἐπιλαμβάνῃς tacite Gaisford
 2 ἐὰν (δὲ) τοῦ τραχήλου fortasse Hense et Sitzler
 4 ὥς ὁ Σωκράτης ABr : ὥσπερ ὁ Σ. tacite Gaisford : ὥς ἄνκρατῆς Bücheler : del. Nauck et v. Arnim
 4 ἐὰν δὲ ὥς ἐτέρως codd. : ἐὰν δὲ οὕτως [ἐτέρως] Nauck : ἐὰν δὲ (οὕτως), ὥς ἕτερος Crönert
 5 οὐχ A : οὐχὶ Br

F22 Diogenes Laertius 4.48

Τὴν δόξαν ἀνιῶν μητέρα εἶναι.

ἀνιῶν Reiske : ἐτῶν codd. : ἀρετῶν Hirzel et Richards : ἀτῶν Casaubon : θεῶν Crönert

F23 Diogenes Laertius 4.48
Μέγα κακὸν τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν κακόν.

F24 Diogenes Lertius 4.48
'Ερωτηθεῖς ποτε τίς μᾶλλον ἀγωνιᾷ, ἔφη, 'ὁ τὰ μέγιστα βουλόμενος εὐημερεῖν.'

4. On religion and mythology

F25 Diogenes Laertius 2.117 (= fr. 177 Döring)
Κράττητος γοῦν αὐτὸν (sc. Στίλπωνα) ἐρωτήσαντος εἰ οἱ θεοὶ χαίρουσι ταῖς προσκυνήσεσι καὶ εὐχαῖς, φασὶν εἰπεῖν, 'περὶ τούτων μὴ ἐρώτα, ἀνόητε, ἐν ὁδῷ,
3 ἀλλὰ μόνον.' τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ Βίωνα ἐρωτηθέντα εἰ θεοὶ εἰσιν εἰπεῖν
'οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ σκεδάσεις ὄχλον, ταλαπείριε πρέσβυ;'

F26A Demetrius Lacon *Pap. Herc.* 1055 col. 18.1–13, p. 75 De Falco (= p. 31 Crönert)

... οὐ[δὲ]ν πιθανὸν [ο]ὔν
ἐστιν ὥσάν Βίωνος τοῦ
3 κατὰ Θεόφραστον πρῶ-
του φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθι-
νοῖς κοσμήσαντος, ἀ-
6 σύνθετον δὲ ΤΑΝΥΛΟΥ
ΘΟΥ διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσε-
ως τῶν ὄντων ἀγνω-
9 σίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιχει-
ρημα τοῦτο· 'πᾶν γένος
ζῳῳ[ν φαμὲν ἰδί]αν ἔχει[ν
12 τὴν] μορ[φὴν ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ
γένει.']

F26B Demetrius Lacon *Pap. Herc.* 1055 col. 22.1–12, pp. 78–79 De Falco (= p. 31 Crönert)

... ἐκ δὲ τῶν προεισαγομένων]
τοῦτον ἐχόντων
3 τὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τοῦ λό-
γου τοῦ Βιωνήου τοῦ-
το μὲν θήσω*, διότι γέ-
6 νος ἕκαστον ζῳων
ἰδίαν ἔχει μορφὴν ἐν
τῷ ἰδίῳ γένει*, πάν-

- 9 τως δ', οὐ καθάπαξ, ἵνα
τὰτὰ συνβαίνη[ι κ]αὶ ἐν
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν
12 τοῖς λόγῳ θεωρητοῖς

F27 Plutarchus, *De sera numinis vindicta* 19.561 C

‘Ο γὰρ Βίων τὸν θεὸν κολάζοντα τοὺς παῖδας τῶν πονηρῶν γελοιότερον εἶναί
φησιν ἱατροῦ διὰ νόσον πάππου καὶ πατρὸς ἔκγονον ἢ παῖδα φαρμακεύοντος.

F28 Diogenes Laertius 4.50

Ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς ἐν ἄδου μᾶλλον ἂν κολάζεσθαι εἰ ὀλοκλήροις καὶ μὴ τετρημέ-
νοις ἀγγείοις ὑδροφόρουν.

F29 Clemens Alexandrinus, *Protrepticus* 4.56.1

Ταῦθ' ὑμῶν οἱ θεοὶ τὰ εἶδωλα, αἱ σκιαὶ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις <αἱ> ‘χωλαὶ’ ἐκεῖναι
καὶ ῥύσαι, παραβλῶπες ὀφθαλμῷ, αἱ Λιταὶ αἱ Θερσίτου μᾶλλον ἢ Διὸς θυγατέ-
3 ρες, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖν χαριέντως φάναι τὸν Βίωνα, πῶς ἂν ἐνδίκως οἱ ἄνθρωποι
παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς αἰτήσαιντο τὴν εὐτεκνίαν, ἣν οὐδ' αὐτῷ παρασχεῖν ἴσχυσεν;

- 1 αἱ add. Kroll
2 ὀφθαλμῷ Homerus : ὀφθαλμῶν P
2 αἱ¹ : ex καὶ corr. P¹
2 ἢ P* : αἱ P²M
3 ἂν codd. : οὖν Mayor : δὴ Schwartz
4 αἰτήσαιντο Dindorf : αἰτήσωνται P : αἰτήσονται Cobet

F30 Plutarchus, *De superstitione* 7.168 D

- Ἐξω κάθηται (sc. ὁ δεισιδαίμων) σακκίον ἔχων ἢ περιεζωσμένος ράκεσι
ῥυπαροῖς, πολλάκις δὲ γυμνὸς ἐν πηλῷ κυλινδούμενος, ἐξαγορεύει τινὰς ἀμαρ-
3 τίας αὐτοῦ καὶ πλημμελείας ὡς τόδε φαγόντος ἢ πιόντος ἢ βαδίσαντος ὁδὸν ἣν
οὐκ εἶα τὸ δαιμόνιον. ἂν δ' ἄριστα πράττη καὶ συνῇ πράῳ δεισιδαιμονία,
περιθειόμενος οἴκοι κάθηται <καὶ> περιματτόμενος, αἱ δὲ γρᾶες καθάπερ
6 παττάλῳ φησὶν ὁ Βίων ὅτι ἂν τύχῳσιν αὐτῷ περιάπτουσι φέρουσαι καὶ
περιαρτῶσι.

- 1 ἔξω : ἔξωθεν Θ n
1 ἢ : καὶ Dh
4 πράῳ codd. : πραεῖα Reiske : πράως Abernethy
5 περιθειόμενος Hercher : περιθυόμενος (-θεόμενος n) codd.
5 καὶ add. Reiske
5 γρᾶες : γραεῖς WYN

F31A Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* 7.4.24.5

- ‘Τί δὲ καὶ θαυμαστόν, εἰ ὁ μῦς’, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, ‘τὸν θύλακον διέτραγεν, οὐχ
εὐρὼν ὅτι φάγη; τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν θαυμαστόν, εἰ, ὥσπερ Ἀρκεσίλαος παίζων ἐνε-
3 χεῖρει, τὸν μῦν ὁ θύλαξ κατέφαγεν.’

- 2 εἰ Sylburg : ἢ L

F31B Theodoretus, *Graecarum affectionum curatio* 6.19

Ἦοικε δὲ τοῦτω καὶ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ Βίωνος εἰρημένον. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὰ τοιάδε γελῶν ‘τί θαυμαστόν’, ἔφη, ‘εἰ καὶ ὁ μῦς τὸν θύλακον διέτραγεν, οὐκ ἔχων ὃ τι φάγη; τοῦτο δὲ ἦν θαυμαστόν, εἰ, ὥσπερ Ἀρκεσίλαος παίζων ἐνεχείρει, τὸν μὲν ὁ θύλακος κατέφαγεν.’

2 εἰ καὶ : ἔρκαί K

2 διέτραγεν : διέτρωγεν SV

3 εἰ : ἦ L¹

F32 Diogenes Laertius 2.135

Βίωνός τε ἐπιμελῶς κατατρέχοντος τῶν μάντεων, νεκροὺς αὐτὸν ἐπισφάττειν ἔλεγε (sc. Μενέδημος).

F33 Seneca, *De beneficiis* 7.7.1

Bion modo omnes sacrilegos esse argumentis colligit, modo neminem. Cum omnes de saxo deiecturus est, dicit: ‘Quisquis id, quod deorum est, sustulit et consumpsit atque in usum suum vertit, sacrilegus est; omnia autem deorum sunt; quod quisque ergo tollit, deorum tollit, quorum omnia sunt; ergo, quisquis tollit aliquid, sacrilegus est.’ Deinde, cum effringi templa et expilari inpune Capitolium iubet, dicit nullum sacrilegum esse, quia, quidquid sublatum est, ex eo loco, qui deorum erat, in eum transfertur locum, qui deorum est.

1 arg. esse G : esse arg. esse P

4 quod : quid G

5 effringi : fringi N¹

5 expilari : explicari G¹

6 dicit : dicet N¹

6 sacrilegum : sacrilegium ς

5. On avarice and wealth

F34 Teles ap. Stobaeum, *Florilegium* 4.33.31 (= fr. IV^A, p. 39.1–7 Hense)

Καὶ εἴ τις βούλεται ἢ αὐτὸς ἐνδεΐας καὶ σπάνεως ἀπολυθῆναι ἢ ἄλλον ἀπολῦσαι, μὴ χρήματα αὐτῷ ζητείτω. ὅμοιον γάρ, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, ὥς εἴ τις τὸν ὕδρω-
3 πικὸν βουλόμενος παῦσαι τοῦ δίψους, τὸν μὲν ὕδρωπα μὴ θεραπεύοι, κρήνας δὲ καὶ ποταμοὺς αὐτῷ παρασκευάζοι. ἐκεῖνός τε γὰρ ἂν πρότερον πίνων διαρραγεῖ ἢ παύσαιτο τοῦ δίψους, οὗτός τε οὐκ ἂν ποθ’ ἱκανωθείη, ὅταν ἢ
6 ἄπληστος καὶ δοξοκόπος καὶ δεισιδαίμων.

1 καὶ¹ : ὥς mavult Meineke

1 ἀπολῦσαι Hirschig : παραλῦσαι SMA

2 αὐτῷ Blass : αὐτῷ codd.

2 τὸν ὕδρωπικόν : τὴν μὲν ὕδρωπα proposuit Meineke

4 αὐτῷ MA : αὐτῷ S

4 ἐκεῖνός τε Frob. (unde κεῖνός τε Gaisford) : κείμενός τε SMA

- 5 διαρραγείη S : καὶ διαρραγείη MA
 5 παύσαιτο SA : παῦσαι τὸ M
 5 οὗτός τε Frob. : οὕτως τε (vel τε) SMA : οὔτω τε Tr.
 5 ποθ' A, Frob.Tr. : ποτ' i.e. ποτων S : ποτ' M

F35A Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 3.10.37

Βίων ὁ σοφιστὴς τὴν φιλαργυρίαν μητρόπολιν ἔλεγε πάσης κακίας εἶναι.

βίων SM^d A² : δίων A¹ Mac.

ὁ σοφιστὴς : ὁ σοφὸς Mac.

μητρόπολιν ἔλεγε (-εν M^d) SM^d Mac. : ἔλεγε μητρόπολιν A

F35B Theon Rhetor, *Progymnasmata* 5, p. 99.17–19 Spengel II

Γνωμολογικῶς μὲν οἷον Βίων ὁ σοφιστὴς τὴν φιλαργυρίαν μητρόπολιν ἔλεγε πάσης κακίας εἶναι.

F35C Theon Rhetor, *Progymnasmata* 5, p. 105.6–9 Spengel II

Ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ψευδοῦς, ὅτι μὴ ἀληθῶς ὁ Βίων ἔλεγε τὴν φιλαργυρίαν μητρόπολιν εἶναι τῆς κακίας μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀφροσύνη ἐστίν.

F36 Diogenes Laertius 4.50

Πρὸς πλούσιον μικρολόγον, ‘οὐχ οὗτος’, ἔφη, ‘τὴν οὐσίαν κέκτηται, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὐσία τοῦτον.’

1 πλούσιον μικρολόγον BP : τὸν μ.π. F

F37 Diogenes Laertius 4.50

Ἔλεγε τοὺς μικρολόγους τῶν μὲν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἰδίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὡς δ’ ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι.

F38A Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.31c.87

Βίων ἔλεγε καταγελάστους εἶναι τοὺς σπουδάζοντας περὶ πλοῦτον, ὃν τύχη μὲν παρέχει, ἀνελευθερία δὲ φυλάττει, χρηστότης δὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.

F38B Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 149 Walz

Βίων ὁ Βορειοθενίτης ἔλεγε καταγελάστους εἶναι τοὺς σπουδάζοντας περὶ τὸν πλοῦτον, ὃν τύχη μὲν παρέχει, ἀνελευθερία δὲ φυλάττει, χρηστότης δὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.

F38C Maximus Confessor, *Loci communes* Sermo 12 (= PG, 91 col. 800 C)

Βίων καταγελάστους ἔλεγεν τοὺς σπουδάζοντας περὶ τὸν πλοῦτον, ὃν τύχη μὲν παρέχει, ἀνελευθερία δὲ φυλάττει, χρηστότης δὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.

F39A Favorinus, *Florilegium* ap. *Cod. Par. Gr.* 1168 no. 6 p. 412 Freudenthal (= *Corpus Parisinum* 367 Elter = fr. 115 Barigazzi)

Βίων ὁ περιπατητικὸς ‘τὰ χρήματα’, ἔφη, ‘τοῖς πλουσίοις οὐ δεδῶρηται, ἀλλὰ δεδάνεισται.’

- F39B** Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.41.56
Βίων ἔφη ‘τὰ χρήματα τοῖς πλουσίοις ἢ τύχη οὐ δεδώρηται, ἀλλὰ δεδάνεικεν.’
Βίων SMA : Δίων Mac.
τοῖς πλουσίοις MA Mac. : τοῖς πολλοῖς S
δεδώρηται SMA : δεδώρηκεν Mac.
- F39C** *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 161
Βίων ὁ περιπατητικὸς ‘τὰ χρήματα’, ἔφη, ‘τοῖς πλουσίοις ἢ τύχη οὐ δεδώρηκεν, ἀλλὰ δεδάνεικεν.’
 1 *τοῖς πλουσίοις Sternbach : τῆς πλουσίας cod.*
- F39D** Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 150 Walz
‘Ο αὐτὸς ἔφη, ‘τὰ χρήματα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ τύχη οὐ δεδώρηται, ἀλλὰ δεδάνεικεν.’
- F40A** Diogenes Laertius 2.77 (= fr. 68A Mannebach)
Τοῦ δὲ θεράποντος ἐν ὁδῷ βαστάζοντος ἀργύριον καὶ βαρυνομένου, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς, ‘ἀπόχεε,’ ἔφη (sc. Ἀρίστιππος), ‘τὸ πλεόν καὶ ὅσον δύνασαι βάσταζε.’
 3
- F40B** Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 116 Walz
‘Ο αὐτὸς (sc. Ἀρίστιππος) τοῦ θεράποντος ἐν ὁδῷ βαστάζοντος ἀργύριον καὶ βαρυνομένου, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς, ‘ἀπόχεε,’ ἔφη, ‘τὸ πλεόν, ὅσον δύνασαι, βάσταζε.’
 3
 1 *θεράποντος Laur. : θεραπεύοντος Mosc.*
- F41** Teles ap. Stobaeum, *Florilegium* 4.33.31 (= fr. IV^A, p. 36.6–9 Hense)
Καὶ πῶς σπανίζουσιν οὗτοι τούτων ἃ ἔχουσι; — Πῶς δὲ οἱ τραπεζῖται, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, χρημάτων, ἔχοντες αὐτά; οὐ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὄντα ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ ἄρα οὗτοι αὐτῶν.
 3
 1 *δὲ ex γὰρ corr. S¹ : δὲ A : δαὶ M*
 2 *αὐτῶν S : αὐτῶν MA*
 2 *οὐδὲ ἄρα οὗτοι Wilamowitz : οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοὶ SMA*
 3 *αὐτῶν Meineke : αὐτῶν SMA*
- F42A** Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.31a.33
Βίων ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ τὰ φαῦλα τῶν βαλλαντίων, κἂν μηδενὸς ἢ ἄξια, τοσούτου ἐστὶν ἄξια ὅσον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ νόμισμα ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς οὐδενὸς ἀξίους καρποῦσθαι τὰς ἀξίας ὧν κέκτληται.
 3
 1 *βαλλαντίων S : βαλαντίων MA (λ add. A²) Mac. Tr.*
 1 *τοσούτου MA Mac. ex τοσοῦτον corr. S¹ : τοσοῦτόν Tr.*
 2 *ἔχει tacite Helm : ἔχουσιν codd.*
 3 *οὐδενὸς ATr. : οὐδὲν SM Mac.*
- F42B** Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 149 Walz
‘Ο αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ τὰ φαῦλα τῶν βαλαντίων, κἂν μηδενὸς ἢ ἄξια, τοσούτου

εἰσὶν ἄξια, ὅσον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ νόμισμα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς
3 οὐδενὸς ἀξίους καρποῦσθαι τὰς ἀξίας ὧν κέκτηνται.

1 τοσούτου Walz : τοσοῦτον codd.

F43A Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.5.23

Βίων ἔφη τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα πανόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς μὴ πλουσιώτερον ἀλλ’
ἐνδοξότερον γεγενῆναι.

F43B Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 150 Walz

‘Ὁ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε, δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα πανόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς μὴ πλουσιώτερον, ἀλλ’
ἐνδοξότερον γεγενῆναι

F44 Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 8.3

Bion eleganter ait non minus molestum esse calvis quam comatis pilos velli.
Idem scias licet de pauperibus locupletibusque, par illis esse tormentum: utri-
3 que enim pecunia sua obhaesit nec sine sensu revelli potest.

2 utrique A : utrisque ζ et volg.

F45 Diogenes Laertius 4.48

Πρὸς τὸν τὰ χωρία κατεδηδοκότα, ‘τὸν μὲν Ἀμφιάραον’, ἔφη, ‘ἡ γῆ κατέπιε, σὺ
δὲ τὴν γῆν.’

F46 Diogenes Laertius 4.48

Τὸν πλοῦτον νεῦραπραγμάτων.

6. On envy

F47A Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 3.38.50

Βίων ὁ σοφιστῆς ἰδὼν τινα φθονερὸν σφόδρα κεκυφότα εἶπεν ‘ἡ τούτῳ μέγα
κακὸν συμβέβηκεν ἢ ἄλλῳ μέγα ἀγαθόν.’

1 βίων (βίον M) codd.: δίων Mac.

1 ὁ σοφιστῆς et mox τινα om. S

1 τούτῳ SABr Mac. : τούτο M

2 ἄλλῳ SABr : ἄλλο M : ἐτέρῳ Mac.

F47B *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 158

‘Ὁ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν τινα φθονερὸν σφόδρα συγκεχυμένον ‘ἀδύνατον’, εἶπεν, ‘εἰ μὴ
τούτῳ μέγα κακὸν γέγονεν ἢ ἄλλῳ (μέγα) ἀγαθόν.’

2 τούτῳ Sternbach : τοῦτο τὸ cod.

2 μέγα add. Sternbach.

F47C *Gnomologium Parisinum* 242

Βίων ἰδὼν τινα φθονερὸν σφόδρα κεκυφότα εἶπεν ‘ἡ τούτῳ μέγα κακὸν συμβέ-
βηκεν ἢ ἄλλῳ μέγα ἀγαθόν.’

1 Βίων Hense : Δίων cod.

- F47D** Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 150 Walz
 ‘Ο αὐτὸς ἰδὼν τινα φθονερὸν σφόδρα κεκυφότα εἶπεν ‘ἢ τούτῳ μέγα κακὸν συμβέβηκεν, ἢ ἄλλῳ μέγα ἀγαθόν.’
- F47E** Antonius Melissa, *Locī communes* I Sermo 62 (= PG, 136 col. 969 B)
 Βίων ὁ σοφιστῆς, ἰδὼν τινα φθονερὸν σφόδρα κεκυφότα, εἶπεν ‘ἢ τούτῳ μέγα κακὸν συμβέβηκεν, ἢ ἄλλῳ μέγα ἀγαθόν.’
- F47F** Maximus Confessor, *Locī communes* Sermo 54 (= PG, 91 col. 962 B)
 Βίων ὁ σοφιστῆς, ἰδὼν τινα φθονερὸν σφόδρα κεκυφότα, εἶπεν ‘ἢ τούτῳ μέγα κακὸν συμβέβηκεν, ἢ ἄλλῳ μέγα ἀγαθόν.’
- F48** Diogenes Laertius 4.51
 Πρὸς τὸν βάσκανον ἐσκυθρωπακότα, ‘οὐκ οἶδα’, ἔφη, ‘πότερον σοι κακὸν γέγονεν ἢ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθόν.’
- 1 ἐσκυθρωπακότα BP : σκυθρωπάζοντα F

7. On friendship and outspokenness

- F49** Diogenes Laertius 4.51
 Τοὺς φίλους ὅποιοι ἂν ᾧσι συντηρεῖν, ἵνα μὴ δοκοῖμεν πονηροῖς κεχρηῆσθαι ἢ χρηστοὺς παρητῆσθαι.
- 1 ὅποιοι codd. : ὅμοιοι Hense
- F50** Plutarchus, *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* 16.59 A
 Εὐήθη τοίνυν καὶ ἀβέλτερα τὰ τοῦ Βίωνος ‘εἰ τὸν ἀγρὸν ἔμελλεν ἐγκωμιάζων εὐφορον ποιεῖν καὶ εὐκαρπον, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνειν ἐδόκει τοῦτο ποιῶν μᾶλλον ἢ σκάπτων καὶ πράγματα ἔχων· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ’ ἄνθρωπον ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη ἐπαινῶν, εἰ τοῖς ἐπαινοῦσιν ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν καὶ πάμφορος.’ ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγρὸς οὐ γίνεται χείρων ἐπαινούμενος, ἄνθρωπον δὲ τυφοῦσι καὶ ἀπολλύουσιν οἱ ψευδῶς καὶ παρ’ ἀξίαν ἐπαινοῦντες.
- 1 Βίωνος (ὡς) ? Pohlenz
 2 οὐκ ἂν : εἴτ’ οὐκ D : οὐκ ἂν δὲ G^{pc} JCY²
 2 ποιῶν : μὴ ποιῶν D
 3 ἄνθρωπον (ἀνθρώπους Dobree) Paton : ἄνθρωπος codd.
 3 εἴη om. C
 4 ἐπαινοῦσιν Γ (pr. Α) Z : ἐπαινουμένοις codd. omnes praeter cit.
 4 γὰρ om. G
- F51** Plutarchus, *De vitioso pudore* 18.536 A
 Οἱ τὰ ὤτα τοῖς κολακεύουσι παραδιδόντες ... διὸ καὶ Βίων ἀπείκαζε τοὺς τοιούτους ἀμφορεῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὧτων ῥαδίως μεταφερομένοις.
- 1 τοὺς τοιούτους : τοῖς τοιούτοις G¹
 2 ἀμφορεῦσιν: ἀμφιφορεῦσιν G¹X

- 2 ἀπὸ Da : ὑπὸ codd. omnes praeter cit.
 2 μεταφερομένοις : μεταφερομένους LCM² ΠΣΘ

F52A Plutarchus, *Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat* 4.22 A
 Χάριεν δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Βίωνος πρὸς τὸν Θεόγνιν λέγοντα
 ‘πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος οὔτε τι εἰπεῖν
 3 οὔθ’ ἔρξαι δύναται, γλῶσσα δέ οἱ δέδεται’ (Theognis 177–178)
 ‘πῶς οὖν σὺ πένης ὦν φλυαρεῖς τοσαῦτα καὶ καταδολεσχεῖς ἡμῶν;’

F52B Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 149 Walz
 ‘Ο αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν Θεόγνιν λέγοντα
 ‘πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος οὔτε τι εἰπεῖν
 3 οὔθ’ ἔρξαι δύναται, γλῶσσα δέ οἱ δέδεται’
 ‘πῶς σὺ πένης ὦν’, ἔφη, ‘φλυαρεῖς τοσαῦτα καὶ καταδολεσχεῖς ἡμῶν;’

F53 Diogenes Laertius 4.51
 Τὴν †δυσσέβειαν πονηρὸν ἔλεγεν εἶναι σύνοικον τῇ παρρησίᾳ·
 δουλοῖ γὰρ ἄνδρα, καὶ θρασύσπλαγχνός τις ἦ (Euripides *Hipp.* 424).
 1 δυσσέβειαν codd. def. Casaubon : δυσγένειαν Menagius : εὐσέβειαν Welcker : δυσχέ-
 ρειαν Gercke : συνείδησιν malim
 2 θρασύσπλαγχνος F et Euripides : θρασύστομος BP

8. On beauty and love

F54 Diogenes Laertius 4.48
 Τὸ κάλλος ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν.

F55 Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.21b.23
 Βίων πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι [τὸ κάλλος] τυραννίδα ἔχει τὸ κάλλος, ‘φεῦ’, ἔλε-
 γε, ‘τυραννίδος τριχὶ καταλυομένης.’
 1 τὸ κάλλος del. Jacobs
 2 τριχὶ Jacobs : τριχῇ SMA

F56 Plutarchus *Amatorius* 24.770 B
 Ἦτι δὲ φορτικώτερον ὁ σοφιστὴς Βίων τὰς τῶν καλῶν τρίχας Ἀρμοδίου ἐκά-
 λει καὶ Ἀριστογείτονας, ὡς ἅμα καλῆς τυραννίδος ἀπαλλαττομένους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν
 3 τοὺς ἐραστάς.
 1 ἔτι Stephanus : ἐπεὶ EB
 2 ἅμα καλῆς codd. def. Hartman et Hubert : ἅμα . . . lac. ind. Weber : ἄν ἀπαλῆς Bernar-
 dakis : ἄν χαλεπῆς Wilamowitz : ἀλλοκότου Post : ἅμα τῷ καρῆναι Mullach

F57 Diogenes Laertius 4.49
 Ἦλεγε δὲ συνεχὲς ὅτι αἰρετώτερόν ἐστι τὴν ὥραν ἄλλω χαρίζεσθαι ἢ ἀλλοτρίας
 ἀποδρέπεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ εἰς σῶμα βλάπτεσθαι καὶ εἰς ψυχὴν.
 2 σῶμα : σῶμα τοιοῦτον φ

- F58** Diogenes Laertius 4.47
Οἶον ὀνειδιζόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ θηρᾶσαι μεράκιον, ‘οὐχ οἶόν τε,’ εἶπεν, ‘ἀπαλὸν τυρὸν ἀγκίστρῳ ἐπισπᾶσθαι.’
 1 εἶπεν fr : εἶπεῖν codd.
- F59** Diogenes Laertius 4.49
Διέβαλλε δὲ καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην, λέγων ὥς εἰ μὲν εἶχεν Ἀλκιβιάδου χρειάν καὶ ἀπείχετο, μάταιος ἦν· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἐποίει παράδοξον.
 1 διέβαλλε BP^{pc} φ : διέβαλε FP^{ac}
- F60** Diogenes Laertius 4.49
Τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην μεμφόμενος ἔλεγεν ὥς νέος μὲν ὦν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀπάγοι τῶν γυναικῶν, νεανίσκος δὲ γενόμενος τὰς γυναῖκας τῶν ἀνδρῶν.
- F61A** Diogenes Laertius 4.48
Ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ γήμαι — ἀναφέρεται γὰρ καὶ εἰς τοῦτον — ἔφη, ‘ἐὰν μὲν γήμης αἰσχρὰν, ἔξεις ποιήν· ἂν δὲ καλήν, ἔξεις κοινήν.’
- F61B** *Codex Parisinus Graecus* 1168 no. 14, p. 413 Freudenthal (= *Corpus Parisinum* 375 Elter = Favorinus fr. 122 Barigazzi)
Ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, εἰ γήμαι, ἔφη ‘ἐὰν μὲν αἰσχρὰν γήμης, ἔξεις ποιήν· ἐὰν δ’ ὠραίαν, ἔξεις κοινήν.’
 1 γήμαι Freudenthal : γήμη cod.
 1 ἐὰν δ’ Freudenthal : εἰ δ’ cod.
9. *On old age*
- F62A** Diogenes Laertius 4.48
Τὸ γῆρας ἔλεγεν ὄρμον εἶναι κακῶν· εἰς αὐτὸ γοῦν πάντα καταφεύγειν.
κακῶν BP : κακόν F : τῶν κακῶν fr
πάντα codd. : πάντα(ς) malim
- F62B** *Codex Parisinus Graecus* 1168 no. 15, p. 413 Freudenthal (= *Corpus Parisinum* 376 Elter = Favorinus fr. 11 Barigazzi)
Τὸ γῆρας ἔλεγεν ὄρμον εἶναι κακῶν· εἰς αὐτὸ γοῦν πάντα καταφεύγειν.
αὐτὸ γοῦν Freudenthal : αὐτοῦ οὖν cod.
πάντα(ς) καταφεύγει(ν) malim
- F63** Diogenes Laertius 4.51
Μὴ δεῖν ἔφασκεν ὀνειδίξειν τὸ γῆρας, εἰς ὃ, ἔφη, πάντες εὐχόμεθα ἐλθεῖν.
- F64** *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 163
‘Ο αὐτὸς ἔφη τὸ γῆρας λείψανον εἶναι τοῦ βίου.
λείψανον cod. : λειψανοθήκην Usener

- F65** Diogenes Laertius 4.50
Τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείαᾳ νέους ὄντας ἔφη χρῆσθαι, τῇ δὲ φρονήσει γηράσκοντας ἀκμάζειν.
- 10. On death*
- F66** Diogenes Laertius 4.49
Εὐκόλον ἔφασκε τὴν εἰς ἄδου ὁδὸν καταμύοντας γοῶν ἀπιέναι.
- F67** *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 160
Βίων ἔλεγε δύο διδασκαλίας θανάτου εἶναι, τὸν τε πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι χρόνον καὶ τὸν ὕπνον.
- F68** Teles, *Περὶ αὐταρκείας* ap. Stobaeum, *Florilegium* 3.1.98 (= fr. II, pp. 15.11–16.4 Hense)
Καθάπερ καὶ ἐξ οἰκίας, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, ἐξοικιζόμεθα, ὅταν τὸ ἐνοίκιον ὁ μισθώσας οὐ κοιμζόμενος τὴν θύραν ἀφέλῃ, τὸν κέραμον ἀφέλῃ, τὸ φρέαρ ἐγκλείσῃ, οὕτω, φησί, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σωματίου ἐξοικίζομαι, ὅταν ἡ μισθώσασα φύσις τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀφαιρῇται τὰ ὥτα τὰς χεῖρας τοὺς πόδας· οὐχ ὑπομένω, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐκ συμποσίου ἀπαλλάττομαι οὐθὲν δυσχεραίνων, οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βίου, ὅταν [ἡ] ὥρα ἧ, ‘ἔμβα πορθμίδος ἔρμα.’
3 οὕτω, φησί Hense : φησὶν οὕτω M^dA : φησὶν tacite del. Gesner²
3 οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σωματίου, φησὶν, ἐξοικ. fortasse Hense
3 ἐξοικίζομαι M^d : ἐξοικιζόμεθα A
4 ἀφαιρῇται M^d : ἀφαιρεῖται A
4 οὐχ ὑπομένω codd. : κοὐχ ὑποστένω Crönert
6 ἡ del. Nauck
6 ὅταν ἡ ὥρα, ‘εἴ’ ἔμβα Diels : ὅταν ὥρα ἦκη ‘ἔμβα’ v. Müller
6 ἔρμα Nauck : ἔρυμα M^dA def. Wilamowitz
- F69** Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 3.26.62
Ex hac opinione sunt illa varia et detestabilia genera lugendi: paedores, muliebres lacerationes genarum, pectoris feminum capitis percussiones; hinc ille Agamemno Homericus et idem Accianus ‘scindens dolore identidem intonsam comam;’ in quo facetum illud Bionis, perinde stultissimum regem in luctu capillum sibi evellere, quasi calvitio maeror levaretur.
- F70** Teles ap. Stobaeum, *Florilegium* 3.40.8 (= fr. III p. 30.1–2 Hense)
‘Ἄλλ’ ἡ περὶ ταφῆς ἀγωνία, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, πολλὰς τραγωδίας ἐποίησεν.
ἀγωνία Jacobs et Nauck : ἄγνοια SLMA : ἔγνωια Mullach : πρόνοια Orelli
- F71** Diogenes Laertius 4.48
Κατεγίνωσκε δὲ καὶ τῶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κατακαόντων μὲν ὥς ἀναισθήτους, παρακαόντων δὲ ὥς αἰσθανομένοις.

- 2 παρακαόντων codd. : παρακαλούντων Menagius : παρακλαιόντων Gassendus : κατακλαιόντων vel ἐπικλαιόντων Gatakerus
2 αἰσθανομένοις Casaubon : αἰσθανομένους codd.

F72 Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 15.4

- Singula propter quae laeti ac tristes sumus sibi quisque proponat et sciet verum esse quod Bion dixit: 'omnia hominum negotia simillima initiis esse nec vitam
3 illorum magis sanctam aut severam esse quam conceptum, (in nihilum redigi ex) nihilo natos.'
3 (in nihilum redigi ex (recidere de Bücheler)) nihilo natos Reynolds : conceptum. nichilo nat; A : nichilo nat; del. Fichert : vigile nocte Müller : e titillo natum Schultess

11. Anecdotes

F73 Athenaeus 4.162 D (= fr. 452 SVF I)

- Χαριέντως γὰρ ἔφη Βίων ὁ Βορυσθενίτης θεασάμενος αὐτοῦ (sc. Περσαίου) χαλκῇν εἰκόνα, ἐφ' ἧς ἐπεγέγραπτο 'Περσαῖον Ζήνωνος Κιτιᾶ', πεπλανῆσθαι εἶπε
3 πε τὸν ἐπιγράψαντα· δεῖν γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν 'Περσαῖον Ζήνωνος οἰκετιᾶ.' ἦν γὰρ ὄντως οἰκέτης γεγονὼς τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὡς Νικίας ὁ Νικαεὺς ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἱστορίᾳ καὶ Σωτίων ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς ἐν ταῖς Διαδοχαῖς.
3 οἰκετιᾶ : οἰκετιαία (i.e. —έα) A

F74 Diogenes Laertius 4.50

- Πρὸς τὸν ἀδολέσχην λιπαροῦντα αὐτῷ συλλαβέσθαι, 'τὸ ἱκανόν σοι ποιήσω', φησίν, 'ἐὰν παρακλήτους πέμψης καὶ αὐτὸς μὴ ἔλθης.'
2 καὶ αὐτὸς μὴ ἔλθης del. Hense

F75 *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 157

- 'Ο αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τίνος διὰ τί αὐτὸν οὐκ ὠφελεῖ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα 'οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ πυξίδες', εἶπεν, 'αἱ τὰ χρηστότατα φάρμακα ἔχουσαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν
3 ὠφελοῦνται.'
2 ἀπ' αὐτῶν Wendland : ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν cod.

F76 Plutarchus, *De sollertia animalium* 7.965 A—B

- Τὸν γὰρ παίζοντα καὶ τερπόμενον οἶμαι συμπαίζουσι δεῖν χρῆσθαι καὶ ἱλαροῖς, οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ Βίων ἔλεγε τὰ παιδάρια παίζοντα τῶν βατράχων τοῖς λίθοις ἐφίεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ βατράχους μηκέτι παίζοντας ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς ἀποθνήσκειν.
3 τερπόμενον : παίζόμενον QihK
1 τερπόμενον : παίζόμενον QihK

F77 *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 159

- 'Ο αὐτὸς ζητήσεως γενομένης παρὰ πότον ἰδὼν νεανίσκον σιγῶντα εἶπεν 'εἰ μὲν πεπαιδευμένος σιωπᾶς, ἀπαίδευτος εἴ· εἰ δὲ ἀπαίδευτος ὢν, πεπαιδεύσαι.'

- 1 *παρὰ πότον* Hense : *παρὰ πάντων* cod.
- 2 *πεπαιδευμένος* Sternbach : *πεπαιδευμένως* cod.

F78A Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.31.97

Βίων ἔλεγε κατὰ ῾Ησίοδον τρία γένη εἶναι μαθητῶν, χρυσοῦν, ἀργυροῦν, χαλκοῦν· χρυσοῦν μὲν τὸ τῶν διδόντων καὶ [μὴ] μανθανόντων· ἀργυροῦν δὲ τὸ τῶν διδόντων καὶ <μὴ> μανθανόντων· χαλκοῦν δὲ τὸ τῶν μανθανόντων μὲν, οὐ διδόντων δέ.

- 1 *ίων* L : *Βίων* Nauck
- 1 *μαθητῶν* Pflugk et Bergk : *μαθημάτων* L
- 2 *μὴ* del. Bergk : *ᾄμα* Meineke
- 3 *μὴ* add. Bergk

F78B Ioannes Damascenus, *Excerptae Florentinae* 2.13.97, p. 202 Meineke

Βίων ἔλεγε κατὰ ῾Ησίοδον τρία γένη εἶναι μαθητῶν, χρυσοῦν, ἀργυροῦν, χαλκοῦν· χρυσοῦν μὲν τὸ τῶν διδόντων καὶ μανθανόντων, ἀργυροῦν δὲ τὸ τῶν διδόντων καὶ μὴ μανθανόντων, χαλκοῦν δὲ τὸ τῶν μανθανόντων μὲν, οὐ διδόντων δέ.

F79 Diogenes Laertius 4.50

Πλέων μετὰ πονηρῶν λησταῖς περιέπεσε· τῶν δέ, ῾ἀπολώλαμεν᾽, εἰπόντων, ῾ἐὰν γνωσθῶμεν᾽, ῾ἐγὼ δέ γε᾽, φησίν, ῾ἐὰν μὴ γνωσθῶμεν᾽.

F80 *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 156

Βίων ἐρωτηθεὶς ῾πότε χρὴ ἀριστᾶν;᾽ ἔφη ῾τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους, ὅταν θέλωσι, τοὺς δὲ πένητας, ὅταν ἔχωσιν᾽.

F81 Hegesander ap. Athenaeum 8.344 A (= fr. 19 *FHG* IV p. 417)

Βίων δὲ προαρπάσαντός τινος τὰ ἐπάνω τοῦ ἰχθύος στρέψας καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ δαψιλῶς φαγὼν ἐπεῖπεν

- 3 ῾Ἴνῳ δὲ τὰπὶ θάτερ᾽ ἐξεργάζετο (Euripides *Bacchae* 1129).

Commentary

Testimonia

1. *Life (T1–6)*

T1

ὁ Βορυσθενίτης

The fact that Bion came from Borysthenes, i.e. Olbia, is often pointed out in the ancient sources; cf. introd. Chapter I n. 2.

ἑταίρας

This statement should be compared with Bion's own information that his mother came ἀπ' οἰκήματος (F1). The two items are to some extent contradictory as women kept in brothels were usually not called ἑταῖραι; cf. H. Licht, *Sittengeschichte Griechenlands* II (Dresden-Zürich, 1926) p. 47. It is probable that Bion's mother was to some degree independent and not a slave in a brothel all her life, as it otherwise would have been impossible for her to marry. It is impossible to say whether Bion's mother practised her trade as a ἑταῖρα before her arrival in Olbia. However, her choice of Olbia cannot have been made at random, as it was a harbour and a commercial centre, which could provide her with a market, as was pointed out by Rossignol, p. 3; cf. also Licht, op. cit. p. 52. For prostitution in antiquity in general see DS, III:2 (1904) s.v. Meretrices pp. 1823 ff (Navarre), *RE*, VIII (1913) s.v. Hetairai cols. 1331 ff (Schneider), Licht, op. cit. pp. 43 ff, *RAC*, III (1957) s.v. Dirne cols. 1149 ff (Hermann-Herter) and R. Flacelière. *Love in Ancient Greece*, translated from the French by James Cleugh (London, 1962) pp. 115 ff.

Ὀλυμπίας Λακαίνης

The name Ὀλυμπία, which usually signifies a place or a heroine, is not very common as a name for a person. It was probably given to Bion's mother in order to indicate her place of origin; cf. W. Pape-G.E. Benseler, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* II, 3. ed. (Brunswick, 1863–70) p. 1050.

Names of this type, created from ethnics, were common, especially for slaves but used also for other categories. It may be noted that Aristotle had a slave called Ὀλύμπιος (Diog. Laert. 5.15). Cf. *RE*, XVI:2 (1935) s.v. Namenwesen col. 1643 (Fraenkel) and for names of slaves in general S. Copalle, *De servorum graecorum nominibus capita duo* (Diss. Marburg, 1908) and M. Lambertz, *Die griechischen Sklavennamen* 1–2 (Gymnasial-Programm Wien, 1906/7 and 1907/8).

Νικίας ὁ Νικαιεύς

This doxographer is mentioned several times by Athenaeus; cf. *RE*, Suppl.b.

VII (1940) s.v. Nikias (no. 26 a) cols. 569 f (Philippson) and Christ-Schmid, II p. 864 n. 4.

ταῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων Διαδοχαῖς

This seems to have been a popular kind of literature, treating the heads of the philosophical schools. Works with similar titles are known for, e.g., Antisthenes of Rhodes (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.40, 2.39 etc. and *RE*, I (1894) s.v. Antisthenes (no. 9) cols. 2537 f (Schwartz)), Alexander (mentioned, e.g., in Diog. Laert. 3.4), Sotion (cf. Athenaeus 4.162 E, Diog. Laert. 1.1 and *RE*, IIIA:1 (1927) s.v. Sotion (no. 1) cols. 1235 ff (Stenzel)) and Sosicrates (mentioned, e.g., in Diog. Laert. 6.80). For Antisthenes and Sotion see also Christ-Schmid, II p. 85.

T2A–C πολύτροπος

This adjective meaning “much-turned, much-travelled” is best-known in connection with Odysseus; cf. e.g. *Od.* 1.1, *Od.* 10.330 and Julian 1.12 D. It is therefore of a certain interest that it is here transferred from Odysseus, the “patron saint” of the Cynic school, to the Cynic philosopher Bion. In connection with Odysseus the adjective is often interpreted more or less as an allegory, e.g. by Antisthenes (Porphyrus *Schol. ad Od.* 1.1 = fr. 51 Caizzi): ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πολλοὺς τρόπους λόγων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολύτροποι ἄν εἶεν; cf. Dümmler, pp. 31 ff, F. Buffière, *Les mythes d’Homère et la pensée grecque* (Thèse Paris, 1956) pp. 367 ff, J. Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie: Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes* (Paris, 1958) pp. 108 f and F. Caizzi, ‘Antistene’, *Studi Urbinati*, 38, N.S.B., 1–2 (1964) pp. 74 ff.

The adjective soon acquired a metaphorical sense of “shifty, versatile or wily” (LSJ, s.v. πολύτροπος II), which we find also here. This meaning is encountered in *h. Hom.* 4.439 for Hermes and later e.g. in Thucydides 3.83, Plato *Politicus* 291 B and *Hippias minor* 364 E for Odysseus and Plutarch *Alcibiades* 24.4 for Alcibiades.

For this combination of πολύτροπος and σοφιστής cf. also Dio of Prusa 1.61: ἦν δὲ καὶ πεπαιδευμένος ἀπλῶς, οὐ πολυτρόπως οὐδὲ περιττῶς σοφίσμασιν καὶ πανουργήμασιν ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμόνων.

σοφιστής

Bion is called σοφιστής fairly often in the ancient sources; cf. introd. Chapter I n. 51 with references.

ποικίλος

This adjective is to be found with the metaphorical meaning “subtle, artful or wily” (LSJ, s.v. ποικίλος III 3 c) about persons in Hesiod *Theog.* 511. It has very much the same meaning as πολύτροπος, and this use is classical as we can see from a few references: Aeschylus *Prom.* 310, Euripides *Andr.* 937 and *IA*

526 for Odysseus, Aristophanes *Eq.* 758, Plato *Resp.* 2.365 C, and Polybius 8.16.4.

πλείστας ἀφορμὰς . . . φιλοσοφίας

This sentence can be interpreted in two different ways: 1) Bion's way of life provided critics of philosophy with plenty of material, or 2) Bion's writings contained material which could be used by other critics of philosophy. Notwithstanding that Bion seems to be critical of dogmatic philosophy (cf. e.g. T23), the first alternative seems to be the more probable in this context.

For the phrase ἀφορμὰς δεδοκῶς cf. Demosthenes 18.156: ὁ δὲ τὰς ἀφορμὰς ταύτας καὶ τὰς προφάσεις παρασχὼν οὗτος ἦν and 21.98: ἀφορμὴν ἐστὶν ἐφ' ὧμᾶς αὐτοῦς δεδοκέναι.

καθιππάζεσθαι

This verb with its literal sense "ride down" is found, e.g., in Herodotus 9.14: ἡ δὲ ἵππος προελθοῦσα καθιππάσατο χώραν τὴν Μεγαρίδα. It is first used in a metaphorical sense, as here, in Aeschylus *Eum.* 150, 731, 779, and 809. In all these cases it governs the accusative. The construction with the genitive is apparently late and known only from Diog. Laert. As the genitive tends to decline in Hellenistic Greek (see Radermacher 1925, p. 125), which applies also to compound verbs with κατά (cf. Mayser, II:2 pp. 237 ff, R. Helbing, *Die Kasus-syntax der Verba bei den Septuaginta: Ein Beitrag zur Hebraismenfrage und zur Syntax der Koινή* (Göttingen, 1928) pp. 182 ff and BD, § 181), this may possibly be interpreted as a hyper-atticistic effort to preserve the genitive; for this kind of linguistic phenomena see Schmid 1887–97, V pp. 615 f. Another explanation may be influence from a verb like κατατρέχω, which has very much the same meaning and more frequently governs the genitive, e.g. Diog. Laert. 2.135 (= F32).

It can be noted that the Latin verb *inequito* can also be used in a metaphorical sense; cf. Macrobius *Sat.* 7.15.15: *audet* (sc. *medicina*) *inequitare philosophiae* and for more cases see *TLL*, s.v. *inequito* 1 b.

πότιμος

This is the reading of the MSS. and there is no need for a correction, of which there have been many: φιλότιμος has been proposed by Menagius, πόριμος by Bochartus, πομπικός by Cobet, followed by Hicks and Gigante. Πότιμος on the other hand was kept, correctly, by Kühn, Apelt, and Long. Of all the different conjectures only πομπικός could have a certain plausibility, as it is used to describe e.g. Heraclides Ponticus: ὑπέρογκος ἦν τὸ σῶμα, ὥστ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν μὴ Ποντικὸν ἀλλὰ Πομπικὸν καλεῖσθαι (Diog. Laert. 5.86 = fr. 3 Wehrli VII). This adjective can also be used with a stylistic-rhetorical sense (cf. e.g. Dionysius Hal. *Isaeus* 19 p. 121 U-R, Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 8.3, Philodemus *Rhet.* 2.96 Sudhaus, and Eunapius *VS* p. 500 Boissonade; see also

Geigenmüller, p. 112), which however would suit neither Bion's style nor the context here, which is concerned not with his style but with his personal behaviour.

This metaphorical use of the adjective *πότιμος* in connection with a person, meaning "pleasant, sociable" (LSJ, s.v. *πότιμος* 2 b) can also be found in Theocritus 29.31: *ταῦτα χρή σε νόεντα πέλην ποτιμώτερον* (cf. also A.S.F. Gow's note ad loc.) and in Philostratus *Im.* 1.20.1 p. 323 Kayser: *μὴ ἐπαίνει τὸ ὕδωρ· καὶ γὰρ εἰ πότιμον καὶ γαληνὸν γέγραπται, ποτιμωτέρῳ ἐντεύξει τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ*. Cf. also Plato *Phaedrus* 243 D, which is the first case of a metaphorical use of this adjective, Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi* 8.469 C, Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 13 and Heliodorus 3.10.3. In many cases the original association with water is still vivid.

ἀπολαῦσαι τύφου

Influenced by Plato *Phaedrus* 243 D: *ἐπιθυμῶ ποτίμῳ λόγῳ ἄλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύζειν*, Reiske changed *ἀπολαῦσαι* to *ἀποκλύσαι*, which however is completely unnecessary, as is Causabon's replacement of *ἀπολαῦσαι τύφου* by *ἀποπαῦσαι τύφον*.

The meaning of *ἀπολαύω* may here be "make sport of" (cf. LSJ, s.v. *ἀπολαύω* III), which occurs Theophrastus *Char.* 23.3, Lysias 6.38, Plutarch *Pompeius* 24.8 and *De genio Socratis* 18.587 F. This could then be interpreted to mean that Bion was teaching in a Cynic way, i.e. joking. It is more probable in this context that Bion is depicted as not taking his duties as a philosopher seriously and as making fun of the failings of his listeners instead of curing them.

τύφου

For *τύφος* which is a central Cynic concept see F7 with commentary.

This testimony describes Bion as a versatile sophist, who could change his attitude according to the circumstances. Such behaviour was of course not compatible with the dignity of philosophy and gave rise to many attacks on philosophy by outsiders. Here we may even find an allusion to Bion's own attack on all dogmatic philosophy. Furthermore Bion is criticized for being too pleasant and not taking his philosophical duties seriously. Cf. also Hoogvliet, pp. 10 f for the interpretation.

T3

πολυτελής

We here have a detail from the tradition hostile to Bion; the same is said e.g. about Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2.68–69 and 2.75–76 = frs. 72B and 75–76 Mannebach) and Arcesilaus (Diog. Laert. 4.40). There is also the interesting fact that *πολυτέλεια* was unacceptable to the Cynics, while *εὐτέλεια* was a virtue (cf. F16A with commentary plus references), as *πολυτέλεια* is incompatible with the Cynic *αὐτάρκεια*; cf. here Rich, pp. 24 f.

πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἤμειβεν

This puts Bion in the same class as the old sophists and depicts him in an unfavourable light as one who toured the Greek world, giving lectures for money. This becomes obvious from the context, for his character as πολυτελής is given as the reason for his travelling life. Cf. for both the expression and the idea the description of the sophist given in Plato *Sophista* 224 B: οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ξυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταῦτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα and *Politicus* 289 E: οἱ δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες. For the sophists' way of life in general see Guthrie, pp. 35 ff.

φαντασίαν

This word, which here has the meaning "parade, show or ostentation" (cf. LSJ, s.v. φαντασία 4), does not seem to be used in Attic prose. It is known from Hippocrates *Decent.* 7 p. 236 Littré IX and various Hellenistic authors such as Polybius 15.25.22, 16.21.1 and 31.26.6, Diodorus Siculus 12.83.4, Posidonius ap. Athenaeum 5.212 C (= fr. 253 Edelstein-Kidd = F36 *FGrH* 87) and N.T. *Acta Ap.* 25.23; cf. Radermacher 1925, p. 12.

ἐν γούν 'Ρόδῳ

For Bion's connections with Rhodes cf. also the anecdote in Diog. Laert. 4.49 (= F4).

σχολαστικάς

This post-classical adjective, which is used from Aristotle onwards, seems to have acquired the meaning "learned man, pedant" (LSJ, s.v. σχολαστικός II) from Theophrastus; cf. Wilamowitz, p. 45 and n. 1. The following cases can be noted: Theophrastus ap. Diog. Laert. 5.37, Posidonius: μειράκια σχολαστικά (ap. Athenaeum 5.211 F = fr. 253 Edelstein-Kidd = F36 *FGrH* 87), Epictetus 1.11.39 and 4.1.138, Plutarch *Cicero* 5.2 and Marcus Aurelius 1.16.4.

σχολαστικάς ἐσθῆτας

We must assume that sailors, like working-class people in general, were dressed in a χιτῶν or ἐξωμῖς. Cf. here Dio of Prusa 72.1, where a man wearing only a χιτῶν is identified as a ναύτης. They exchanged this for the philosophical uniform, which consisted of a ἱμάτιον worn without χιτῶν. This ἱμάτιον was usually shabby, which gave it the name τριβων, and worn in a special way in order to take the place of both ἱμάτιον and χιτῶν. For the dress of the philosopher and the importance attached to it see T19 with commentary. For the dress of the Greek man in general see K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* IV, 3. ed. (Freiburg i.B.-Tübingen, 1882) pp. 172 ff and F. Studniczka, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der altgriechischen Tracht', *Abhandlungen des Archäol.-Epigraph. Seminars der Universität Wien*, hrsg. von O. Benndorf und E. Bormann, VI:1 (Vienna, 1886).

τὸ γυμνάσιον

The Greek gymnasium was of very great importance for the intellectual education in Greece and played an essential role in the development of Greek philosophy, some of the most important schools being founded in gymnasia, e.g. the Academy, the Lyceum and the Cynosarges; for its intellectual importance in general see Marrou, p. 257 and J. Delorme, 'Gymnasion: Étude sur les monuments consacrés à l'éducation en Grèce', *Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome* (Paris, 1960) pp. 316 ff.

It should be noticed that Bion obviously used the gymnasium for his teaching and did not confine it to the streets, as is usually said. Even here he seems to follow the practice of the sophists, who delivered public lectures in the gymnasia; see Guthrie, p. 41. However, Socrates and the Cynics also used the gymnasia, e.g. Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.13 = fr. 136A Caizzi) and Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.77). Cf. also Lucian *Peregrinus* 3: διὰ τοῦ γυμνασίου ἀνιῶν ἐπήκουον ἅμα Κυνικοῦ τινοῦς.

περίβλεπτος

This adjective is used in order to indicate in a critical way the result of ostentatious behaviour, or of something negative as here, e.g. Lucian *Rhetorum praeceptor* 11, *Alexander* 12 and *Peregrinus* 18; cf. also Xenophon *Symp.* 8.38 and Galenus *Protrepticus* 8.15 p. 113 Marquardt.

Scholars in general seem to agree that we here have a very negative interpretation of an anecdote about Bion. The underlying truth should be that Bion, thanks to his message and its form, was able to influence even people, who were not usually attracted by philosophy; cf. here Hense 1909, p. LXII, Tarn, p. 328, Oltramare, p. 37 and n. 1 and W.W. Tarn-G.T. Griffith, *Hellenistic Civilization* 3. ed. (London, 1952) p. 327. We have some parallels in anecdotes about Stilpon: λέγεται δ' οὕτως Ἀθήνησιν ἐπιστρέφει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὥστ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων συνθεῖν ἵνα αὐτὸν θεάσαιντο (Diog. Laert. 2.119 = fr. 176 Döring) and Diogenes: θαυμαστὴ δέ τις ἦν περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα πειθῶ, ὥστε πανθ' ὄντιν' ῥαδίως αἰρεῖν τοῖς λόγοις (Diog. Laert. 6.75). Cf. also Lucian *Fugitivi* 17 on the effect of philosophy: οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων ἅπαντες ἀναπηδήσαντες ἐρήμους τὰς τέχνας ἐάσουσιν ὅταν ὁρῶσι . . . ἀργοὺς δὲ καὶ γόητας ἀνθρώπους ἐν ἅπασιν ἀφθόνοις βιοῦντας. On the other hand, the conversion of the masses is a typical trait in the picture of the θεῖος ἀνὴρ and also the philosopher; cf. Bieler, I pp. 122 ff.

However, I am not at all sure that we should not accept the anecdote as it is told by Diog. Laert. There is something contradictory in making converts in the street and then bringing them to a gymnasium, where the listeners were possibly expected to pay. We may remember that the Cynics were very fond of shocking and ostentatious methods in order to gain a hearing, and that their way of dressing was of great help here. Radermacher 1947, pp. 120 f com-

pared this anecdote about Bion with what is told about the Cynic Menedemus, who dressed up like a Fury (Diog. Laert. 6.102; cf. however Suda, s.v. *Φαιός*, 180 and Crönert, pp. 1 f, who believes that this description belongs to a fictitious character in Menippus' work and is followed by Dudley, p. 61; on the other hand the authenticity of the story about Menedemus is accepted by Hirzel 1895, I p. 379 nn. 2 and 4, U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Lesefrüchte 50', *Hermes*, 34 (1899) p. 631 n. and Caizzi, p. 86). Cf. also the anecdotes about Dio of Prusa in Philostratus *VS* 1.7 p. 488 Kayser and Photius *Bibl. cod.* 209 p. 165a41–43 (= Suda, s.v. *Δίων*, 1240), a Cynic in Lucian *Demonax* 19 and Sostratus-Heracles in Philostratus *VS* 2.1 p. 553 Kayser. Lucian *Peregrinus* 15 describes Peregrinus in his Cynic dress and adds *ὄλως μάλα τραγικῶς ἐσκεύαστο*. It seems to be beyond all doubt that the behaviour of the Cynics was often highly theatrical and this is rightly stressed by H.M. Hornsby, 'The Cynicism of Peregrinus Proteus', *Hermathena*, 48 (1933) p. 72.

νεανίσκων

The words for different ages seem to be used in a very unclear way in Greek, and an exact definition of the word *νεανίσκος* is impossible; cf. F60 with commentary.

υἱοθεσίας

This word, which is known as an adoption formula, is not very common (cf. *ThW*, VIII (1969) s.v. *υἱοθεσία* pp. 400 f (v. Martitz)) except on Rhodes, which has a certain interest in this context, as it follows immediately after an anecdote, which is set on Rhodes. Cf. here especially M.S. Smith, 'Greek Adoptive Formulae', *The Classical Quarterly* NS, 17 (1967) pp. 302 ff, where some earlier literature is given. Adoption seems in some cases to have been comparatively informal and prompted by an intention to benefit on the part of the individual adopting (cf. Isaeus 2.10). However, it seems very doubtful if an adoption in a fully legal sense is meant here. For adoption in general see DS, I:1 (1877) s.v. *Adoptio* pp. 75 ff (Baudry), *RE*, I (1894) s.v. *Adoption* cols. 396 ff (Thalheim), L. Beauchet, *Histoire du droit privé de la république Athénienne* II (Paris, 1897) pp. 1 ff, J.H. Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* II (Leipzig, 1905) pp. 508 ff, *RAC*, I (1950) s.v. *Adoption* cols. 99 ff (Wenger-Oepke) and F. Brindisi, *La famiglia attica: Il matrimonio e l'adozione* (Florence, 1961) pp. 31 ff.

εἰς τὸ ἀποχρῆσθαι . . . ἡδονάς

The relationship teacher-student in philosophical groups or communities often seems to have been of a more or less erotic character, as we can see from the well known case of Socrates; cf. here for a survey Guthrie, pp. 390 ff. In ancient biographical literature we find many references to love-relationships between teacher and student, as e.g. Xenocrates – Polemon (Diog. Laert. 4.19),

Arcesilaus — Crantor and Polemon — Crates (Diog. Laert. 4.22). However, the information we find here about Bion seems to be on a lower level, comparable with the malicious information, which Lucian gives us about some of his enemies, e.g. *Alexander* 41: *θηγκόλους . . . τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους καὶ ὠραισιότατους καὶ κάλλει διαφέροντας . . . οὓς ἐγκλεισάμενος ὥσπερ ἀργυρωνήτοις ἐχρῆτο, συγκαθεύδων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἐμπαροινῶν* and *Peregrinus* 9 and 43: *καὶ τὸ μειράκιον τὸ ὠραῖον ὃ ἐπεισε κυνίζειν ὥς ἔχοι τινὰ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλκιβιάδην* and the gossip about Arcesilaus and Theophrastus in Diog. Laert. 4.40–41 and 5.39. For abuse of this kind see Süss, pp. 249 f.

ὥστε φυλάττεσθαι . . . αὐτῶν

This is also a very common idea, that students become ardent supporters and defenders of their teachers, which certainly corresponds to actual fact and which does not need to be interpreted as having a malicious intention. We find an amusing case of support in Lucian *Hermotimus* 9–12.

φίλαντος

Both the word and the treatment of the concept are late and to be found from Aristotle onwards. It is obvious that this concept need not necessarily be interpreted in a negative way. Cf. Aristotle *EN* 9.8.7 p. 1169a11: *ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαντον εἶναι*. Cf. here especially F.-A. Steinmetz, ‘Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios nach einer Analyse von Ciceros “Laelius de amicitia”’, *Palingenesia*, 3 (Wiesbaden, 1967) p. 103, pp. 138 ff and pp. 161 ff. In this context the concept indeed has a negative meaning, which it could have had already in Aristotle’s time: *ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὥς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλάυτους ἀποκαλοῦσι* (*EN* 9.8.1 p. 1168a28–30). The negative sense is the more common; cf. e.g. Epictetus 1.19.11 and Plutarch *De recta ratione audiendi* 6.40 F and *Aratus* 1.4.

πολὺς ἐγκείμενος τῷ

The combination *πολὺς ἐγκειμαι* seems to be fairly familiar and fully classical and can be found in Herodotus 7.158 and Thucydides 4.22.2; its use with the dative, as in this case, also occurs in Demosthenes 18.199: *πολὺς τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι ἐγκεῖται* and Plutarch *Fabius* 9.2: *ἐνέκειτο τῷ δήμῳ πολὺς*. The interpretation of Hoogvliet, p. 13, following Casaubon, that Bion criticizes what follows cannot possibly be correct, as Rossignol realized, p. 6. The meaning of *ἐγκειμαι* here must instead be “insist upon” (cf. LSJ. s.v. *ἐγκειμαι* II).

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων

This proverb seems to have been extremely popular both in Greek and in Latin literature. It is usually said to have originated in the Pythagorean school; cf. Porphyrius *VP* 33, Iamblichus *VP* 167–168, Julian 8.245 A, Timaeus ap. Diog. Laert. 8.10 (= F13b *FGrH* 566) and in *Schol. T in Plat. Phaedr.* 279 C (p. 275 Hermann VI) (cf. also Zenobius *Prov.* 4.79, Photius *Lex.* p. 349 Naber

I and Suda, s.v. κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, 2549–2550), Diog. Laert. 10.11, Cicero *De leg.* 1.12.34, Donatus *Commentum Terenti ad Adelph.* 804 and Hieronymus *Adv. Ruf.* 3.39 (= *PL*, 23 col. 485) and see also Bieler, I p. 126. It later became very popular among the Cynics as we can see from its use in Diog. Laert. 6.37 and 6.72 (cf. also 6.11 and 6.46), Plutarch *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 22.1002 F, Diogenes *Ep.* 10, Crates *Ep.* 26 and *Ep.* 27. Besides these cases it was also used without any school-restrictions, as the following list will show: Plato *Lysis* 207 C, *Phaedrus* 279 C, *Resp.* 4.424 A and 5.449 C and *Leg.* 5.739 C, Euripides *Or.* 735 and *Andr.* 376–377, Xenophon *Mem.* 2.6.23, Aristotle *EN* 8.9.1 p. 1159b31 and *EN* 9.8.2 p. 1168b8–9, Theophrastus in Plutarch *De fraterno amore* 20.490 E (= fr. 20 Wimmer), Menander *Adelphi* fr. 10 (9) Körte, Philo *De Abrahamo* 40.235 and *De vita Mosis* 1.28.156, Dio of Prusa 3.110, Favorinus “Dio of Prusa” 37.7 (= fr. 95 Barigazzi), Lucian *De mercede conductis* 20, Maximus of Tyre 14.6 c (?), Aelius Aristides *or.* 16 p. 392 Dindorf, Alciphron *Ep.* 1.7 and 3.15, Aeneas Rhetor *Ep.* 6, Clemens Alex. *Protrepticus* 12.122.3, Proclus *In Plat. Alcib. pr.* p. 164 Creuzer, *SVF* III frs. 520, 596, 597, 599, and 626, Terence *Adelphi* 804, Cicero *De off.* 1.16.51 and *In Verrem* 2.36.89, Seneca *Ep.* 3.2, *Ep.* 6.3, *Ep.* 48.3, *De benef.* 7.4.1 and 7.12.1, Martial 2.43.1 and 2.43.16, Ps-Seneca *De moribus liber* 145, Symmachus *Ep.* 9.106 (97) and Ambrosius *De viduis* 1.4 (= *PL*, 16 col. 235 C–D). For material in Libanius see E. Salzmänn, *Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Libanios* (Diss. Tübingen, 1910) p. 68 and in the paroemiographic literature E.L.v. Leutsch-F.G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* (Göttingen, 1839–51) I p. 106 and p. 266 and II p. 76 and p. 481. The most complete collection is otherwise to be found in G. Bohnenblust, *Beiträge zum Topos Περὶ φιλίας* (Diss. Bern, 1905) p. 41 and for Latin literature in A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig, 1890) p. 20. Cf. also Dziech, p. 100 n. 140 and for the interpretation Joel 1893–1901, II pp. 1011 ff and Gerhard 1912, p. 398 n. 4.

It is clear that the proverb in this context has been given a negative interpretation as being an expression of Bion’s greed. Hense 1909, p. LXII rightly objected to this and pointed out that we may have a malicious interpretation of a proverb, actually used by Bion, but referring to spiritual things. This is highly probable, as the use of the proverb in the Cynic epistles, in order to defend begging, cannot apply to the case of Bion, as we have no evidence that he followed a mendicant life. For the Cynics’ use of proverbs in general, and for other proverbs used by Bion, see introd. Chapter II:2.

παρ’ ὃ

The preposition here has a more or less causal meaning, giving Bion’s alleged selfishness and greed as reasons for his failure to attract pupils; for this use of

παρά cf. LSJ, s.v. παρά C III 7, KG, I p. 513 and Schwyzer, II p. 497. The phrase *per se* must have been fairly common, as we see the simple *παρό* used from Aristotle onwards.

ἐπιγράφεται

This verb is usually used in a technical sense as a legal term, meaning “enter in a public list, register”, especially with a view to taxes (cf. LSJ, s.v. ἐπιγράφω III). Here it has been transferred to the lists of philosophers, belonging to the same school, which is an easy transition. We also find the verb meaning “enter as one’s patron”, referring not to a legal protector but to a philosophical teacher or pattern in Lucian *Fugitivi* 16: τῶν Διογένη καὶ Ἀντισθένη καὶ Κράττητα ἐπιγραφομένων and *Hermotimus* 14: οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπιγραφόμενοι.

τοσούτων αὐτῷ σχολασάντων

The verb σχολάζω with a personal dative occurs first in Xenophon *Cyr.* 7.5.39 (the text however is uncertain). In a more technical sense, i.e. referring to students with the meaning “study, attend lectures” it seems to be a Hellenistic expression; cf. e.g. *Acad. Phil. Ind. Herc.* p. 89 Mekler: μετὰ δὲ τέτταρα σχολάζειν ἤρξατο Καρνεάδει and p. 106 Mekler: ἐσχολακῶς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι Καλλικλεῖ τῷ Καρνεάδου γνωρίμῳ and Ps-Plutarch *Vitae decem oratorum* 8.844 B: σχολάζων Ἰσοκράτει.

ἀναισχυντίαν

This concept is defined by Aristotle as τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχροῦ πράττειν (*EN* 4.9.7 p. 1128b31–32) and ἡ δ’ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα (sc. τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν) (*Rhet.* 2.6.2 p. 1383b16–18). Theophrastus *Char.* 9 has given the concept a more narrow meaning, as referring mainly to financial matters. For a survey of different meanings of the word see Steinmetz, II pp. 123 ff.

The word could here possibly be taken as an equivalent for the Cynic ἀναίδεια, which was typical of many actions and sayings, especially of Diogenes; cf. Dudley, pp. 29 f. However, it is not probable that we have here a reference to a definite Cynic view on actions and speech but this word more plausibly forms part of the general abuse of Bion. Cf. the criticism of the Cynics in Aelius Aristides *or.* 46 p. 401 Dindorf: τὴν μὲν ἀναισχυντίαν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζοντες and the description of the effect of philosophy on young men in Lucian *Hermotimus* 81: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐς ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἀναισχυντίαν καὶ ἐς τόλμαν καὶ ψεῦδος μακρῷ τινι ἄμεινον εἶχε πέρυσιν ἢ νῦν. Philosophers are often accused of corrupting their young students, as we know e.g. from the cases of Socrates and Arcesilaus, called φθορέα τῶν νέων καὶ κιναιδολόγον καὶ θρασύν (Diog. Laert. 4.40).

Βητίων

This form of the name, which goes back to the *editio princeps* of Frobenius,

has been kept by later editors, although it seems to be extremely rare. The most important MSS., on the other hand, have *βιτ(τ)ίων*. The form *Βιτίων* may very well be correct, as according to Diehl, col. 2409 this name is found on an inscription from Olbia. However I have not been able to locate this inscription. Diehl makes the further assumption that this man may be the friend of Bion, which of course can only remain a guess.

There seems to be a great variety of names created from the root *βιτ-*, as can be seen from F. Bechtel, *Die historischen Personennamen des Griechischen bis zur Kaiserzeit* (Halle, 1917) p. 94 and p. 96; cf. also L. Robert, 'Noms indigènes dans l'Asie-Mineure gréco-romaine' I *Bibliothèque archéologique et historique de l'Institut Français d'archéologie d'Istanbul*, 13 (Paris, 1963) pp. 235 ff and L. Zgusta, 'Kleinasiatische Personennamen', *Československá Akademie věd, Monografie Orientálního Ústavu ČSAV*, 19 (Prague, 1964) p. 125 (§ 173), where other cases of the form *Βιτίων* can be found.

εἰς τῶν συνήθων αὐτῷ

The word *συνήθης* of Bion's pupils occurs also in F15. This use of the word as a noun seems to be somewhat rare; cf. Philodemus *Rhet.* 1.332 Sudhaus. It is also used in other cases of a philosopher's close companions or colleagues; cf. Xenophon *Mem.* 4.8.2: *ἅπανι τοῖς συνήθεσι*, referring to those, who were with Socrates at his death and Diog. Laert. 5.70: *μετὰ τῶν συνήθων* (from Lacon's will).

Μενέδημον

This philosopher, belonging to the Eretrian school, is brought together with Bion also in Diog. Laert. 2.135 (= F32). Menedemus, as well as Bion, was closely associated with Antigonus Gonatas (cf. Tarn, pp. 22 ff) and it is highly probable that the two men met at the court in Pella. For Menedemus in general see also Diog. Laert. 2.125–144, Wilamowitz, pp. 86 ff and *RE*, XV:1 (1931) s.v. Menedemos (no. 9) cols. 788 ff (v. Fritz).

συνδέομαι

This is the reading of the MSS. and should be kept. The conjecture *συνδέδεμαι* by Reiske is unnecessary, as it in no way improves or clarifies the meaning. The verb *συνδέω* is not often used of sexual union. Cf. however Plato *Politicus* 310 B: *οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ὀρθῶς ξυνδοῦνται πρὸς τὴν τῶν παίδων γέννησιν*, where the sense is somewhat similar.

οὐδὲν ἄτοπον . . . πεπονθέναι

For this expression cf. Andocides 4.34: *ὥστ' οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν οὐδ' ἄτοπον πείσεται τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς προγόνοις ἀξιούμενος*. The adjective *ἄτοπος* is used in connection with sexual relationships also in Aristotle *EN* 7.5.7 p. 1149a15: *πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν*.

This answer could be regarded as shockingly outspoken, but can be compared with Bion's own reply to Antigonus Gonatas, where he bluntly admits the truth of all gossip concerning himself, in order to silence the people who were slandering him (F1). It may also very well follow a Cynic tradition, as the old Cynics, especially Diogenes, in this respect often adopted a most shocking attitude, true to their motto *παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα*.

προεφέρετο

This form, although found only in the *editio princeps*, while all MSS. have *προσεφέρετο*, seems more to express the desired meaning "bring forward, utter" (LSJ, s.v. *προφέρω* I 4) and furthermore the verb *προφέρομαι* is common in Diog. Laert.: 2.133, 4.26, 7.19, 7.21, 7.22 and 9.67; cf. Crönert, p. 134.

τοῖς ὁμιλοῦσι

The verb *ὁμιλέω* here probably has a more technical sense, referring to the relationship between teacher and students (LSJ, s.v. *ὁμιλέω* III 1). We find a similar use in Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.15 and 1.2.39. For *ὁμιλέω* as a political and philosophical term cf. Höistad, p. 110 and n. 5.

Θεοδώρειον

For Bion's relations to Theodorus and the Cyrenaic school see introd. Chapter III:3, and for this adjective T19 with commentary.

ἀπολαύσας

The verb must here be used with the meaning "have the benefit of" in an ironic sense, indicating that Bion took this feature from Theodorus (cf. LSJ, s.v. *ἀπολαύω* II). Cf. Hippocrates *VM* 12 p. 596 Littré I, Euripides *IT* 526 and *Phoen.* 1205, Plato *Leg.* 10.915 B and Dio of Prusa 13.12. This construction is usually with genitive but the accusative of neuter words seems also to be possible: Plato *Crito* 54 A: *ἴνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν* and Isocrates 8.81: *δέδοικα μὴ . . . αὐτὸς ἀπολαύσω τι φλαῦρον*.

This accusation of instilling atheism in one's pupils is traditionally made against philosophers, as is well known from the case of Socrates, e.g. as he is portrayed in Aristophanes *Nubes*. We find the same accusation in, e.g., Lucian *Hermotimus* 81.

The criticism made against Bion in this part of his biography, concerning his luxurious life, his sexual relations, his selfishness and his atheism, is of such a traditional character that little value can be attached to it. We have seen that all these points can be paralleled, especially in Lucian's attacks on philosophers and pseudo-religious leaders. See especially the biographies of Peregrinus and Alexander; Theophrastus *Char.* 28 and Lucian *Iuppiter tragoedus* 52 and *Rhetorum praeceptor* 24, where many of these topoi are collected, are also of

great interest. Even *διαβολή* had its rules and topics in antiquity and there is no doubt that they have greatly influenced the biography of Bion. There were even rhetorical rules for such a practice; cf. Aphthonius *Progymn.* pp. 27 ff Rabe and Libanius *Progymn.* 9 pp. 282 ff Foerster VIII. For a general survey see Süss, pp. 245 ff; of general interest is also F.J. Brecht, ‘Motiv- und Typengeschichte des griechischen Spottepigramms’, *Philologus*, Suppl.b. 22:2 (Leipzig, 1930). For the practice of Lucian see M. Caster, *Études sur Alexandre ou le faux prophète de Lucien* (Paris, 1938) pp. 79 ff and Bompaire, pp. 471 ff, and for a Latin example R.G.M. Nisbet, in *M. Tulli Ciceronis In L. Calpurnium Pisonem oratio* (Oxford, 1961) pp. 192 ff.

T4

Βίωνος

This testimony is especially crucial, as the name Bion is not preserved in the MSS., which instead have *βίαντος* or *βίαντι*, while *Βίωνος* is due to a conjecture by Casaubon, which was rejected in the Teubner-edition but accepted in the Loeb- and the recent Budé-edition by R. Klaerr-Y. Vernière (Paris, 1974; see p. 181 for commentary). The conjecture is so obvious that it must be considered as quite certain. There is no Bias brought together with any Antigonus so far as we are aware, but the relations between Bion and Antigonus Gonatas are well known. The confusion in the MSS. is easily explained as the two names are so alike that the same mistake is also made elsewhere. The confusion may have been compounded by the following *Βία*, which can have led to a rapprochement between the two words.

Ἀντίγονος ὁ γέρων

There is another difficulty in this expression, as we must assume that it refers to Antigonus Gonatas, if Bion is meant here. The phrase is sometimes said to mean “the elder or maior” (so LSJ, s.v. *γέρων* II, giving Plutarch *Pelopidas* 2.2 as the only case), but this cannot be true as the only other Antigonus, who could be considered here, is the grandfather of Antigonus Gonatas. Of course a confusion between the two is possible but it seems obvious that, when Plutarch uses the phrase, he means Antigonus Gonatas (cf. Plutarch *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute* 1.9.330 E, *De Iside et Osiride* 24.360 C and *Pelopidas* 2.2). The fact that it does not necessarily mean “maior” is shown by another case, where it is used without any such meaning: *Μέτελλος ὁ γέρων* (*De garrulitate* 9.506 D). The word-order is perhaps of less importance, and a phrase such as *ὁ γέρων Οὐεσπασιανός* (Plutarch *De sollertia animalium* 19.974 A) has very much the same meaning. This being so the assumption of W.W. Tarn, ‘The Battles of Andros and Cos’, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 29 (1909) pp. 267 f that *ὁ γέρων* was a nickname for Antigonus Gonatas, given to him in his old age, seems highly plausible; cf. also Tarn, pp. 251 f and Bickel, p. 295 n. 2, who accepts the proposal of Tarn.

Βία

This is the reading of most MSS., while others have forms of *Βίας*. *Βία* seems to be correct. It gives us a nice pun on the names *Βίων* and *Βία*, which was very popular with the Greeks in general and not least with Bion himself.

Βία . . . καὶ Ἀνάγκη

The two concepts *βία* and *ἀνάγκη* are here personified, which happens also in other cases. Cf. *ML*, I:1 (1884–90) s.v. *Bia* col. 785 (Schultz), and for personification in general F17 with commentary, where references are given. However, the combination of these two personified concepts seems to be very rare. We find the interesting information in Pausanias 2.4.6 that there was on Acrocorinth a sanctuary to these minor deities: *Ἀνάγκης καὶ Βίας ἐστὶν ἱερόν*. Could this fact possibly help us to date this testimony? I am very much aware that the following can only remain a speculation. It is known that Antigonus in person recaptured Corinth about 246 B.C.; cf. here Tarn, pp. 370 ff and introd. Chapter I. He was at this time about 75 years old and could rightly be called *ὁ γέρων*. That he was accompanied by the philosophers, who were attached to his court, is shown by the fact that he appointed the Stoic Persaeus as governor of Corinth (Pausanias 2.8.4 and Plutarch *Aratus* 18.1 = frs. 442–443 *SVF* I). It is therefore a possibility that Bion too was present, and that the king in his reply referred to the actual scene. For Antigonus Gonatas' role in anecdotes and apophthegmata in general see also Bickel, pp. 294 ff.

This anecdote does not convey a very favourable picture of Bion, and it may belong to the hostile tradition. However, it probably has some foundation since Bion obviously did not hesitate to accept support from Antigonus, as we can see from Teles p. 6.3–2 (= F16A), where Bion appears to address Antigonus: *σὺ μὲν εὖπορος γεγόμενος δίδως ἐλευθερίως, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνω εὐθαρσῶς παρὰ σοῦ*; cf. also Diog. Laert. 4.54 (= T3). This has been interpreted in a negative sense by, e.g., Gerhard 1909, p. 163, who calls Bion a “Schlaumeier”. However, it is equally possible that we find the same attitude as in the anecdote about Diogenes: *χρημάτων δεόμενος ἀπαιτεῖν ἔλεγε τοὺς φίλους, οὐκ αἰτεῖν* (Diog. Laert. 6.46).

- T5** For the importance of this testimony for the chronology of Bion's life see introd. Chapter I.

οἱ ἐν Χαλκίδι

This must with certainty refer to Chalcis in Euboea. Rossignol, p. 4 instead proposes Chalcis in Macedonia, which is a highly improbable guess, as this place is very insignificant (cf. *RE*, III (1899) s.v. *Chalkis* (no. 4) col. 2089 (Bürchner)), and one can see no reason for Bion to go there in his old age. The fact that Aristotle died in Chalcis in Euboea (see e.g. Diog. Laert. 5.5–6) cannot be taken as proof that Bion did not die at the same place.

κατέστρεψε

The absolute use of this verb with the meaning “end life, die” (LSJ, s.v. καταστρέφω IV 1) seems to be post-classical: Epicurus *Ep.* 3 p. 61 Usener, Plutarch *Themistocles* 31.5, Arrianus *Anabasis* 7.3.1, Herodian 5.8.10 and Diog. Laert. 2.14.

περίαπτα

The word is fully classical and to be found, e.g., in Plato *Resp.* 4.426 B, Aristotle *EN* 1.8.12 p. 1099a16, Theophrastus *HP* 9.19.2, Diodorus Siculus *Exc. Vat.* 31.4, Plutarch *De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet* 1.920 B and Pollux *Onom.* 4.182; cf. F.G. Welcker, ‘Epoden oder das Besprechen’, *Kleine Schriften* III (Bonn, 1850) pp. 71 ff.

The use of amulets in antiquity seems to have been very extensive, mainly as a protection against illness and not as a cure as in this case, which points to the desperation in the action. For the use of amulets in general see *RE*, I (1894) s.v. Amulett cols. 1984 ff (Riess), *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, I (1927) s.v. Amulett cols. 374 ff (Pfister) and *RAC*, I (1950) s.v. Amulett cols. 397 ff (Echstein-Waszink), where the older literature is given. Among more recent works I only refer to C. Bonner, ‘Studies in Magic Amulets: Chiefly Graeco-Egyptian’, *University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series*, 49 (Ann Arbor-University of Michigan Press, 1950) and A. Delatte-P. Derchain, *Les intailles magiques gréco-égyptiennes* (Paris, 1964).

The point of interest here is that Bion succumbs to a practice, which he elsewhere condemns as superstition (cf. F30 with commentary). It is therefore probable that we here have a part of the tradition, which was hostile to Bion, and that this item is to be regarded as gossip; so Hense 1909, p. LIX. There are similar anecdotes about Pericles: ὁ γοῦν Θεόφραστος . . . ἱστορήκεν ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπούμενῳ τινι τῶν φίλων δείξειε περίαπτον ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρημένον, ὡς σφόδρα κακῶς ἔχων ὁπότε καὶ ταύτην ὑπομένοι τὴν ἀβελτερίαν (Theophrastus in Plutarch *Pericles* 38.2 = fr. 146 Wimmer) and Tullus Hostilius: *tunc adeo fracti simul cum corpore sunt spiritus illi feroces, ut qui nihil ante ratus esset minus regium quam sacris dedere animum, repente omnibus magnis parvisque superstitionibus obnoxius degeret religionibusque etiam populum impleret* (Livy 1.31.6).

μεταγινώσκειν ἐφ’ οἷς

This construction seems to be both late and rare. I have only noted one example in Marcus Aurelius 1.17.7: μηδὲν πλέον πράττειν, ἐφ’ ᾧ ἂν μετέγων. It is a common tendency in later Greek to use prepositions instead of just the case-form with verbs of emotion; cf. Mayser, II:2, p. 284, BD, § 196 and J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* (Diss. Lund, 1955).

ἐπλημμέλησεν εἰς τὸ θεῖον

For this expression, which is classical, cf. Aeschines 3.106: τῶν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς πλημμελημάτων and Maximus of Tyre 21.1 b: τοῖς πλημμελοῦσιν εἰς αὐτόν (sc. τὸν θεόν) and 21.3 e: πλημμελοῖμεν ἄν εἰς τὸ ἀληθές αὐτό.

ἀπορία

Derenne, p. 215 gives the following interpretation of this situation: “étant tombé malade à Chalcis, il inspirait une telle horreur que personne ne voulut le soigner”, which to me seems unnecessarily pessimistic. The reason can equally well, or even more probably, be Bion’s poverty.

τῶν νοσοκομούντων

This verb, which is post-classical, also occurs in Diodorus Siculus 14.71.1 and Iamblichus *VP* 30.184.

ἡκολούθει γε αὐτῷ

This is the reading of the MSS. and should be kept despite Reiske’s conjecture δὲ αὐτός. The proper interpretation of this passage was first given by Mensching, p. 120 (on Favorinus fr. 34), who saw that the subject of ἡκολούθει must be Bion, and that αὐτῷ must refer to Antigonus.

φορείω

Both the litter and the noun are comparatively late in the Greek world. Its use seems in the beginning to have been reserved for weak people and perhaps especially for women. So Dinarchus 1.36 attacks Demosthenes for using a litter: τρυφῶν . . . καὶ ἐπὶ φορείου κατακομιζόμενος. An item about Theophrastus is of special interest in this case: Φαβωρίνος δὲ φησι γηράσαντα αὐτὸν ἐν φορείῳ περιφέρεισθαι (Favorinus ap. Diog. Laert. 5.41 = fr. 92 Barigazzi = fr. 53 Mensching). This custom continues in the Hellenistic period but seems in most cases to be confined to women, or men who are ill or blind: Polybius 30.25.18, Plutarch *Eumenes* 14.3, *Pericles* 27.3, *Pyrrhus* 18.5, *Aratus* 17.4 and 33.4, Seneca *Ep.* 70.10 and Diog. Laert. 10.7; Plutarch *Pelopidas* 30.6 and Seneca *Ep.* 80.8 are exceptions and the litter is here used as a luxury. Diogenes, as can be expected, ridiculed its use: ἰδὼν γυναῖκα ἐν φορείῳ, ‘οὐ κατὰ τὸ θηρίον, ἔφη, ‘ἡ γαλεάγρα’ (Diog. Laert. 6.51). For litters in antiquity in general see DS, III (1904) s.v. Lectica pp. 1002 ff (Girard) and *RE*, XII:1 (1924) s.v. Lectica cols. 1056 ff (Lamer).

Φαβωρίνος ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ

For Favorinus and this work of his see Barigazzi, pp. 207 ff and Mensching, pp. 29 ff.

Mensching’s interpretation, p. 120 (on Favorinus fr. 34), of this sentence that it belongs to the picture of Bion as a parasite does not seem correct to me. I think this item should be taken with the preceding context, to mean that Bion in his

old age and afflicted by illness followed Antigonos in a litter. Therefore I think that the passage *καὶ ὕστερον . . . ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ* should be taken as a whole and as coming from Favorinus, which Barigazzi, p. 227 does; Mensching, p. 120, on the other hand, regards only the last sentence as coming from Favorinus, a view, which can possibly be supported by Diogenes Laertius' method of working, i.e. to put items, which are loosely connected or without any connection at all, at the end of a biography; cf. v. Fritz, pp. 2 ff and Mensching, p. 16.

T6A–B The poem by Diog. Laert. on Bion makes the most of the reported deathbed conversion of the man who was considered to be an atheist. It is impossible that when writing his poem Diog. Laert. had access to any information besides what is given in the biography. Therefore it can be considered as a free development of Bion's reported atheism and conversion, to which Diog. Laert. has added many conventional details of his own. This being so, the poem cannot be considered to have any value as a contribution to our knowledge about Bion, apart from the information that even at this late date Bion could provoke fierce hostility. Therefore I did not consider it worthwhile to comment upon it on any length. The statement, which we find here, that Bion definitely denied the existence of the gods (line 2: *λέγειν ἀκούομεν θεοὺς ὡς οὐδένεισιν ὄντως* and repeated by Hesychius Milesius: *Βίων ὁ Βορυσθενίτης ἔλεγε μὴ εἶναι θεοὺς*) cannot be accepted as a statement of fact without corroboration from the fragments of Bion. The fragments, in which Bion treats religious questions, do not support the view, which Diog. Laert. has expressed (cf. F25–33 with commentary).

The last part of the biography and the poem of Diog. Laert. seem to be in the mind of Montaigne, when he gives the following résumé: “Ils récitent de Bion qu’ infecté des athéismes de Théodorus, il avait été longtemps se moquant des hommes religieux; mais, la mort le surprenant, qu’ il se rendit aux plus extrêmes superstitions, comme si les dieux s’ôtaient et se remettaient selon l’affaire de Bion” (*Essais*, II.12 p. 185 Aux Éditions du Seuil).

2. Literary work, language, and style (T7–18)

T7A–B *ὑπομνήματα*

For the meaning of *ὑπόμνημα* and for the interpretation of this testimony in general see introd. Chapter II:1.

ἀποφθέγματα

The word *ἀπόφθεγμα* is found for the first time in Xenophon *HG* 2.3.56, meaning a witty and pointed saying. The differences between *ἀπόφθεγμα* and the kindred forms *γνώμη* and *χρεία* are far from clear; see introd. Chapter V and n. 21, with references.

ἀποφθέγματα . . . περιέχοντα

Cf. Diog. Laert. 5.39, referring to Theophrastus: *φέρεται δ' αὐτοῦ ἀποφθέγματα ταυτὶ χρειώδη*. According to this very close parallel we should take ἀποφθέγματα χρειώδη together leaving *πραγματεῖαν* alone as the object of περιέχοντα. As *πραγματεῖαν* with no qualifying adjective seems extremely vague, I think that *χρειώδη* goes with it here in spite of the parallel.

χρειώδη

H.-R. Hollerbach, *Zur Bedeutung des Wortes χρεία* (Diss. Cologne, 1964) p. 61 seems to take ἀ.χ. together and translates the adjective here “chrienhaft”, i.e. he sees a connection with *χρεία* in its special sense. The meaning can as well be “useful”, which, although not given in LSJ (cf. LSJ, s.v. *χρειώδης* I, where ἀ.χ. is translated with *χρεία*), is the one given by the translators Apelt, Hicks and Gigante. This must be the meaning of the adjective, e.g. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. dogm.* 11.53 and Lucian *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 13. Perhaps the difference between the two meanings should not be exaggerated, as the form *χρεία* has its name just because of its usefulness; cf. e.g. the definitions in Hermogenes *Progymn.* 3 p. 6 Rabe: *χρεία . . . ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον χρησίμου τινὸς ἔνεκα* and Aphthonius *Progymn.* 3 p. 4 Rabe: *χρειώδης δὲ οὐσα προσαγορεύεται χρεία*.

πραγματεῖαν

The meaning of this noun, even though qualified by an adjective, remains vague; “philosophical argument” seems to give the sense required fairly well (cf. LSJ, s.v. *πραγματεία* III 2).

περιέχοντα

The verb *περιέχω* is used from the Hellenistic period onwards with the sense “contain”, referring to literary works or documents: Menander fr. 602 Körte, Diodorus Siculus 2.1.1, LXX 2. *Macc.* 9.18, 11.16 and 11.22, NT 1 *Peter* 2.6, Josephus *AJ* 12.4 and Herodotus ap. Athenaeum 5.220 D; cf. LSJ, s.v. *περιέχω* I 4 a and Welles, p. 354 with some epigraphical cases and literature.

T8A–B οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα

The phrase οἱ περὶ κτλ. can refer both to a person and his followers and just to the person himself. The first use is the classical one (see KG, I pp. 269 ff and Schwyzler, II pp. 416 f), while the second is said to belong exclusively to Greek grammarians; cf. here especially K. Lehrs, *Quaestiones Epicae* (Königsberg, 1837) p. 28 n., where a rich material from later authors is collected. However, the expression seems to be both earlier and more common. See e.g. Ps-Plato *Axiochus* 368 D, Aristotle *Protrepticus* fr. 52 Rose, Dionysius Hal. *De Thucydide* 51 p. 410 U-R, Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 13.3 (cf. W. Bühler, *Beiträge zur Erklärung der Schrift vom Erhabenen* (Göttingen, 1964) p. 97 and D.A. Russell's note ad loc.), Sextus Empiricus *PH* 3.218, Epictetus 2.19.2, Socrates

Ep. 14 and *Ep.* 15 and Diogenes *Ep.* 39. The assumption that this expression here refers to Bion alone is supported by the fact that this use is very common in Diog. Laert., e.g. 1.12, 1.30, 2.38, 2.62, 2.105, 2.134, 4.40, 4.41 etc. Crönert, p. 144, assumes that Diog. Laert. with this expression refers to the person mentioned and his followers, which does not seem convincing to me.

ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς

For the meaning of the word διατριβή see introd. Chapter II:1 and Appendix 1.

T9A–B *Περὶ δουλείας*

This is the only known work of Bion from which we also have a quotation (cf. F11A–B with commentary). For the textual evidence of this title see Hense 1892, p. 223. The title, as well as the subject, must have been popular in philosophical writings influenced by Cynic and Stoic ideas, as we can see from, e.g., Antisthenes *Περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας* (Diog. Laert. 6.16 = fr. 1 Caizzi) and Dio of Prusa *Περὶ δουλείας καὶ ἐλευθερίας* (*or.* 14 and *or.* 15); cf. also Dziech, pp. 233 ff.

The content of Bion's diatribe *Περὶ δουλείας* has been the object of many guesses and hypotheses. It has been supposed to be the source of Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* (so Hense 1892, pp. 219 ff; cf. also Hense 1909, p. LXXXVIII and M. Petit, in *Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, 28: *Quod omnis probus liber sit* (Paris, 1974) pp. 83 ff) and of Libanius *Περὶ δουλείας* (*or.* 25) (so Helm 1906, pp. 248 f and J. Mesk, 'Libanios *Περὶ δουλείας*', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 76 (1927) p. 205 ff; cf. also Schouler, p. 124 ff, who is more critical on this point), which can never be more than a guess, as we have only one single fragment of a rather general character.

T10 *Περὶ τῆς ὀργῆς*

The fact that both this title and this subject were very common in popular philosophy is clear from Cicero *Ep. ad Quint. frat.* 1.1.13.37: *quare illud non suscipiam ut, quae de iracundia dici solent a doctissimis hominibus, ea tibi nunc exponam, cum et nimis longus esse nolim, et ex multorum scriptis ea facile possis cognoscere*. Authors writing on the subject include, besides Bion, Philodemus, Sotion, Antipater, Plutarch and Seneca; cf. Geffcken 1909, p. 27 and n. 2.

As this title occurs in Philodemus' work *De ira*, Bion has of course been assumed to be one of its sources. Every assumption of this kind must remain very uncertain; cf. F. Bücheler, 'Der Philosoph Nikasikrates', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 43 (1888) pp. 151 ff, Hense 1909, pp. LXXI f and n. 1, H. Ringeltaube, *Quaestiones ad veterum philosophorum de affectibus doctrinam pertinentes* (Diss. Göttingen, 1913) pp. 38 f, R. Philippson, in 'Philodemi de ira liber. Ed. Carolus Wilke. Leipzig 1914', *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, 35 (1915) cols. 645 ff and R. Philippson, 'Philodems Buch über den Zorn: Ein

Beitrag zu seiner Wiederherstellung und Auslegung’, *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 71 (1916) pp. 425 ff.

For the topic in general, namely how to treat anger, see W. Allers, *De Senecae librorum de ira fontibus* (Diss. Göttingen, 1881), M. Pohlenz, ‘Über Plutarchs Schrift *Περὶ ἀοργησίας*’, *Hermes*, 31 (1896) pp. 321 ff, M. Pohlenz, ‘De Posidonii libris *Περὶ παθῶν*’, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, hrsg. v. A. Fleckeisen, Suppl.b. 24 (1898) pp. 535 ff, A. Schlemm, ‘Über die Quellen der Plutarchischen Schrift *Περὶ ἀοργησίας*’, *Hermes*, 38 (1903) pp. 587 ff, Ringeltaube, op. cit., P. Rabbow, *Antike Schriften über Seelenheilung und Seelenleitung I: Die Therapie des Zorns* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1914) and H.G. Ingenkamp, ‘Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele’, *Hypomnemata*, 34 (Göttingen, 1971).

T11 For a detailed interpretation of this testimony see introd. Chapter II:4.

πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοίως διαφορῆσαι

Here we have a textual difficulty, as the most important MSS. have γελοίως, which is kept, e.g., by Long. The other reading γελοίως is, however, accepted by Reiske, Hense and Hicks and seems to me to be the only one possible. There is a parallel for the expression in Diog. Laert. 1.102: πολὺς ὦν ἐν τῷ ἐλ-ληνίζειν: so πολὺς ἐν is here followed by an infinitive with an article, which makes the adverbial form necessary.

διαφορῆσαι

The meaning here may be “tear in pieces” metaphorically (LSJ, s.v. διαφορέω 4). This meaning is very rare but see Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 1.4. Cf. also LXX *Ier.* 37.16 (= 30.16 Lat.): καὶ ἔσονται οἱ διαφοροῦντές σε εἰς διαφορήμα and Hesychius s.v., 1138: διαφοροῦντες σε· παίζοντες σε, which is probably an interpretation of the LXX-passage. Of interest is also how the noun διαφό-ρημα is understood: Suda s.v., 830: διαφόρημα: τὸ παίγνιον and Hesychius s.v., 1434: διαφόρημα: παίγνιον.

τὸ παντὶ εἶδει κεκρᾶσθαι λόγου

For this phrase cf. Diog. Laert. 4.52 (= T19): κατὰ πᾶν εἶδος λόγου σοφιστεύ-οντος, which refers to Theodorus. The expression here is somewhat strange as there is no subject. Therefore we must understand the construction as im-
personal.

τὸν Ἐρατοσθένην

For Eratosthenes’ connections with Bion cf. as well as T12 introd. Chapter I.

πρῶτος

We find the same item in T12–13. The idea as such is highly typical of the Greeks, who always wanted to attribute every invention or change to the in-
fluence of a specific individual, as Bion here is the first to give philosophy a

flowery dress. There was even a literature *Περὶ ἐδρημάτων*, and the Peripatetic philosophers in particular had a great interest for this subject; so Heraclides Ponticus left a work *Περὶ ἐδρημάτων* (Diog. Laert. 5.88 = fr. 22 Wehrli VII). Cf. for this idea E. Wendling, 'Zu Posidonius und Varro', *Hermes*, 28 (1893) pp. 341 ff, Stemplinger, pp. 10 ff, A. Kleingünther, 'Πρῶτος εὐρέτης: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestellung', *Philologus*, Suppl.b. 26:1 (Leipzig, 1933), Curtius, p. 531 and *RAC*, V (1962) s.v. Erfinder II cols. 1191 ff (Thraede) with references.

ἀνθινὰ ἐνέδυσεν

The background of this expression, which has often been discussed, can be found in two different customs, as referring to the dress of the hetaera, or the dress of the satyrs as they appear in the satyr-plays. A rich collection of material for both these interpretations is found in F.T. Welcker, *Theognidis reliquiae* (Frankfort on-the-Main, 1826) pp. LXXXVI ff; cf. also *RE*, VIII:2 (1913) s.v. Hetairai col. 1354 (Schneider). Most scholars favour the first alternative without even discussing the difficulty; so Wachsmuth, p. 75, Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 39 n. 109, H. Reich, *Der Mimus: Ein litterar-entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Versuch* (Berlin, 1903) I:1 p. 355 n. 1, Hense 1909, pp. LXX f, Christ-Schmid, I p. 87 n. 7, Fiske, p. 190 and Gigon, II p. 66 and n. 40. It has a certain probability, as we find the comparison between style and the dress of the hetaera also in other cases (cf. below). Welcker, on the other hand, op. cit. pp. XC f, favours the latter alternative, and we find the same opinion in LSJ, s.v. ἀνθινός II, even though the explanation given there is less probable: "Bion, who delivered his precepts in sarcastic verses, like those used in satyric drama." Maybe it would be wrong to make a definite decision between the two alternatives, and Eratosthenes may very well have had both in mind. This was made easier as the two groups resembled each other in certain aspects: "Gaukler und Gauklerinnen, die niederen Mimen, Miminnen und die Hetären standen im Leben nahe bei einander" (Reich, op. cit. I:1 p. 355 n. 1).

The comparison between literary style and dress seems to be comparatively common, and there are also other cases, where a style is likened to the dress of the hetaera, e.g. Tacitus *Dial. de orat.* 26.2: *adeo melius est orationem vel hirta toga induere quam fucatis et meretriciis vestibus insignire*, Quintilian 10.1.33: *nec versicolore illam, qua Demetrius Phalereus dicebatur uti, vestem* (= fr. 178 Wehrli IV; cf. also Quintilian 8.3.6 and 12.10.47) and Lucian *Bis accusatus* 31: *κοσμουμένην δὲ καὶ τὰς τρίχας ἐνθετίζουσιν εἰς τὸ ἐταιρικὸν καὶ φυκίον ἐντριβομένην* (sc. τὴν ῥητορικὴν) and *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 8. Cf. also A. Gudeman, in *P. Cornelii Taciti Dialogus de oratoribus* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1914) p. 392 and Bramble, pp. 38 ff.

When we see how common this comparison between style and the dress of the hetaera is, the assumption of Highet, p. 32 n. 16 (p. 249) that it was chosen in Bion's case because his mother was a whore, does not seem very probable.

T12 Ἀρκεσίλαον

Arcesilaus, who was the founder of the Middle Academy and one of Eratosthenes' teachers, obviously had personal connections with Bion. They were both disciples of Crates (Diog. Laert. 4.23 = T20) and of Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. 4.29 and 4.52 = T19), and they are brought together by Diocles (T23). In one passage Bion is probably referring to Arcesilaus (F31A–B). For Arcesilaus see Diog. Laert. 4.28–45, *RE*, II (1896) s. v. Arkesilaos (no. 19) cols. 1164 ff (v. Arnim), O. Gigon, 'Zur Geschichte der sogenannten Neuen Akademie', *Museum Helveticum*, 1 (1944) pp. 47 ff and A. Weische, 'Cicero und die Neue Akademie: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Geschichte des antiken Skeptizismus', *Orbis Antiquus*, 18 (Münster, 1961) and for Sceptic philosophy in general introd. Chapter III:5 and n. 53, with references.

Ἀρίστωνα

We here have a reference to the Stoic philosopher Ariston of Chios, who probably was the emulator of Bion (cf. T24). For him see introd. Chapter IV, with references.

ἀνθησάντων

The metaphorical use of this verb meaning "flourish, be popular" of persons is classical: Aristophanes *Eq.* 530: οὕτως ἤνθησεν ἐκεῖνος and Plutarch *Demosthenes* 5.1: τοῦ ῥήτορος . . . ἀνθοῦντος τότε μάλιστα τῇ δόξῃ (cf. LSJ, s.v. ἀνθέω II 3 b).

Ἀπελλῆς

This must be Apelles of Chios, who was the pupil of Arcesilaus (Athenaeus 10.420 D). Hardly anything is known about him but he is mentioned also in Plutarch *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* 22.63 D. Cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Commentariolum grammaticum' II, *Ind. schol. sem. hib. Greifswald* 1880 pp. 8 ff (= *Kleine Schriften* IV (Berlin, 1962) pp. 605 ff) and *RE*, I (1894) s.v. Apelles (no. 9) col. 2688 (v. Arnim).

πολύς ἐστι

The meaning of this expression is not immediately apparent. There is, as far as I have found, only one really good parallel, Aeschines 1.166: πολὺς μὲν γὰρ ὁ Φιλίππος ἔσται, and the meaning must be "to be often mentioned" (cf. LSJ, s.v. πολὺς I 2 c); so this expression is also understood by Sussemihl 1891–92, I p. 126 and v. Arnim, art. cit. col. 2688, although this may seem surprising at first sight.

The use of πολὺς predicatively of one person meaning "great, mighty" is rare: Herodotus 7.14, Euripides *Hipp.* 1 and Aristophanes *Aves* 488 (cf. LSJ, s.v. πολὺς I 2 b).

The judgement of Eratosthenes on the philosophers of his own time could very well be questioned (see Sussemihl 1891–92 I pp. 410 f); cf. in general *RE*,

VI (1909) s.v. Eratosthenes (no. 4) cols. 358 ff (Knaack) and Susemihl 1891–92, I pp. 409 ff.

πρῶτον ἀνθινὰ περιβαλεῖν

Cf. T11 with commentary.

οἷν ἐκ ῥακέων ὁ Βίων

We here have a paraphrase of Homer *Od.* 18.74 H₁: οἷν ἐκ ῥακέων ὁ γέρων (ἐπιγουνίδα φαίνει), where the last word γέρων is replaced by Βίων, which has not upset the metre. The line refers to the occasion when the suitors of Penelope notice the strong leg of Odysseus among the rags. The comparison between Bion and the Cynic “patron saint” Odysseus is cleverly done, even if it is only a guess by Hense 1909, p. CXII that the words were originally used by Bion himself. The purpose of this comparison is of course to stress the real value of Bion’s philosophy in spite of its form. Cf. Wachsmuth, pp. 74 f and J. Teuffer, *De Homero in apophthegmatis usurpato* (Diss. Leipzig, 1890) pp. 35 f.

This Homeric line seems to have enjoyed a certain popularity in literature, influenced by popular philosophy, and is to be found in Favorinus *De exilio* 22 (= fr. 96 Barigazzi), where ἐπιγουνίδα is contrasted with εὐψυχίαν (cf. the commentary of Barigazzi p. 482, who assumes an influence from Bion), in Lucian *Heracles* 8, where Lucian transfers this line to himself and in Maximus of Tyre 7.5 d it is used to illustrate the relation between a soul and a bad body.

T13

κατὰ Θεόφραστον

We here find the same judgement on Bion’s style as in T11–12, but this time it is attributed to Theophrastus instead of Eratosthenes (cf. A. Mayer, in *Theophrasti Περὶ λεξέων libri fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1910) p. 10 n. 2 and p. 34 n. 1). Riese, p. 9 n. 1 objected as Theophrastus, being Bion’s teacher, was too early to know Bion’s writings that well, and above all to be able to say that Bion was the first writer to use this style in a philosophical treatise; we find the same objection in Rohde, p. 248 n. 1 and Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 99 n. 459. There is some weight in this argument, although Theophrastus as source has been accepted by, e.g., Wachsmuth, p. 75, Hirzel 1895, I p. 377 n. 3 and v. Arnim 1899, col. 484. However, even if Theophrastus is not the historical source, I do not think that he is mentioned merely because of some confusion with Eratosthenes. It may instead indicate that this critical judgement on Bion’s style originated in Peripatetic circles; cf. introd. Chapter II:4.

πρῶτου . . . ἀνθινοῖς κοσμήσαντος

Cf. T11 with commentary.

κοσμήσαντος

It is very common that words originally connected with clothing are meta-

phorically applied to descriptions of style, as we have already seen; cf. LSJ, s.v. *κοσμέω* III 2.

T14 *Bioneis sermonibus*

The term *sermo* was used by Lucilius for his poems (cf. frs. 1015, 1016 and 1039 Marx and v. Rooy, p. 54) and by Horace for both his satires and his epistles (cf. Rudd, pp. 154 f and v. Rooy, pp. 60 ff). On the question of whether Horace here intends a comparison between Bion's and his own works see below.

This mention, which shows a good understanding of the character of Bion's work, makes it probable that Horace knew Bion from personal reading; cf. introd. Chapter IV.

sale nigro

A. Kiessling, 'Coniectaneorum spicilegium' I, *Ind. schol. sem. aest. Greifswald* 1883 p. 7 assumed that this refers to a special kind of salt, used for making saltfish. This is possible, although I have not found any cases, where exactly this term is used in such a sense; the same phrase occurs in Horace *Sat.* 2.4.74. For salt in antiquity see DS, IV:2 (1911) s.v. *Sal* pp. 1009 ff (Besnier) and *RE*, IA:2 (1920) cols. 2075 ff (Blümner). However, it is possible that Horace here refers to the occupation of Bion's father as a *ταριχοπώλης* (cf. introd. Chapter I and F1 with commentary); against this view Highet, p. 30 n. 12 (p. 249).

The word *sal* is used metaphorically here, which is very common in Latin (cf. LS, s.v. *sal* II A and Bramble, p. 53). The same use in Greek is both later and more rare; according to Blümner, art. cit. cols. 2091 f it is first found in Plutarch *Comparisonis Aristophanis et Menandri compendium* 4.854 C, possibly as a loan from Latin: αἱ Μενάνδρου κωμωδίαι ἀφθόνων ἀλῶν καὶ ἱλαρῶν μετέχουσιν . . . οἱ δ' Ἀριστοφάνους ἄλλες πικροὶ καὶ τραχεῖς ὄντες; cf. also Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 34.2 with D.A. Russell's note ad loc.

Niger must here have a very strong and mainly negative meaning, which is not usually found in the translations. In other cases, where *niger* is used metaphorically, it indicates the opposite of *candidus* and its meaning is given as "black, bad, wicked, malignant or perfidious" (cf. LS, s.v. *niger* II D). Other cases are to be found in Cicero *Pro Caecina* 10.27, Horace *Sat.* 1.4.85, 91 and 100 and *Sat.* 1.9.73, Martial 10.3.9 and 12.34.7 and Statius *Silvae* 1.3.103: *liventem satiram nigra rubigine turbes*. This being the case, we must expect to find the same meaning here, and the expression comes close to a criticism of Bion's style, which is not surprising as Horace attacks the bitter satire. For this metaphorical use of *niger* see also H. Blümner, 'Die Farbenbezeichnungen bei den römischen Dichtern', *Berliner Studien für classische Philologie und Archäologie*, 13 (Berlin, 1892) pp. 67 f and J. André, 'Étude sur les termes de couleur dans la langue latine', *Études et Commentaires*, 7 (Paris, 1949) pp. 56 f. Bramble, p. 202 n. 3 pointed out the similarity between *Sat.* 1.4.85 and

this line and as a possible translation gave “tasteless wit”.

If this interpretation is correct, it is obvious that Horace cannot refer to his own writings here, as is usually said (see e.g. E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957) p. 6 and Rudd, p. 18), but that he has given a general description of three different kinds of poetry, which more or less coincide with his own works; cf. also Puelma Piwonka, p. 178 n. 1 and v. Rooy, p. 65, who points out that Horace does not designate his satires literally as *Bionei sermones*.

T15

lividis

This colour is closely related to *niger* and usually has a very negative meaning, indicating envy or jealousy (cf. Blümner, op. cit. pp. 155 f and André, op. cit. pp. 171 ff). The meaning, which fits here, would be “spiteful, malicious” (cf. LS, s.v. *lividus* II).

satyra

There is a vast literature on the background for and interpretation of this term. For a general survey see *RE*, IIA:1 (1921) s.v. *Satura* cols. 192 ff (Kroll), Knoche, pp. 8 ff, Witke, pp. 15 ff and v. Rooy, pp. 1 ff and pp. 166 ff for its use in Ps-Acro. All these works include references.

It is worth while noticing that here the Roman satire and the works of Bion are put on the same level, showing that the scholiast had a very vague knowledge of the real character and style of Bion’s treatises.

disputationes

The word is used as a Latin equivalent for the Greek *διάλεξις* or *διάλογος*; cf. St. Augustine *Contra Cresconium* 1.14.17 (= *PL*, 43 col. 456): *quoniam disputatio graece διαλογή vel διάλεξις appellatur*. It is therefore used of philosophical writings of different character; cf. Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* 6: *ex Stoicorum hominum disputationibus*, *Tusc. disp.* 3.34.81, where popular philosophical works are called *scholae* and *disputationes*, and *TLL*, s.v. *disputatio* II B 1, where more instances are given.

stultitiam vulgi

This expresses something which is true both of Bion and of the Cynics in general, as we find a great deal of contempt for *οἱ πολλοί* and their beliefs, which are considered as pure stupidity, from the Cynics’ side (cf. F18 with commentary). The same attitude seems to belong to satirical authors in general; cf. Bramble, p. 5 and n. 1 and pp. 154 f.

carmina Luciliana

The possible influence of Bion on Lucilius has been discussed by Fiske, pp. 178 ff and grossly exaggerated. There are no cases, where it can be stated with certainty that Lucilius is using Bion, and the similarities we find are of a very commonplace character and do not prove a closer relationship; cf. introd. Chapter IV.

Sophistes cognominatus

Bion is called a sophist from time to time in the ancient sources (cf. introd. Chapter I and n. 51). However, it is not probable that he would have called himself a sophist.

in libro, quem edidit

The information that Bion himself published a book, which would have been a collection of his works, is very interesting but this scholion does not inspire such confidence that we can accept it as a statement of fact without further evidence. The same impression can be gathered from Diog. Laert. 4.47 (= T7A), which is also a very late source. For the problem of the transmission of Bion's treatises see introd. Chapter II:1.

mordacissimis

The adjective may possibly have been chosen to indicate Bion's Cynic background (cf. Puelma Piwonka, p. 189), as the Cynics are often associated with the characteristics and habits of dogs; cf. e.g. for Diogenes the anecdotes in Diog. Laert. 6.33, 6.45, 6.55 and 6.61, Demetrius *De eloc.* §§ 260–262 and Horace *Ep.* 1.17.18: *mordacem cynicum*, which refers to Diogenes and see Weber 1887, pp. 108 ff. We find this adjective with a similar metaphorical meaning as here in Ovid *Tristia* 2.563: *non ego mordaci destrinxi carmine quemquam*.

ea, quae apud poetas sunt . . . parceret

The idea that Bion especially attacked the poets and even Homer may to some extent be correct, as the poets often express the opinions of the common people (cf. Dio of Prusa 7.98–99), which are usually criticized by Bion. However, the meaning may here be that Bion treated the poets including Homer with a certain lack of respect, i.e. used them in some sort of parody; cf. introd. Chapter II:2 and F7 with commentary.

laceravit

The metaphorical use of this verb with the meaning “tear to pieces with words” is quite common; cf. Ovid *Ex Ponto* 4.16.1: *invide, quid laceras Nasonis carmina* and LS, s.v. *lacero* II A. This expression can be compared with *πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοίῳ διαφορῆσαι* (T11).

amaris et asperis

The same combination of adjectives can be found, e.g., in Lucretius 2.404: *amara et aspera*.

poeta satyricus

The scholiast has probably been led to this statement by the fact that Bion's and Horace's works have been compared and found very similar, which then has been transferred even to the form. It is highly improbable that Bion used a

poetic form to any great extent, with the exception of parodying a Homeric line from time to time after a Cynic and a general Greek pattern, even though scholars have different opinions on this point; cf. introd. Chapter II:2.

amara

This adjective is obviously used here to paraphrase *niger*, and therefore we can assume that the intention was the same in the two preceding cases. This paraphrase is somewhat surprising as the two words do not convey the same meaning, and *amarus* more than *niger* has the meaning we would expect to find. For *amarus* with this metaphorical meaning “bitter” cf. Ovid *Tristia* 3.1.31: *dictis incessis amaris*. Quintilian 10.1.117: *amari sales* and LS, s.v. *amarus* II B.

The text of this scholion is highly confused. Bion is said once to be a philosopher, once to have been called a sophist; once he is close to Lucilius and called a poet, once he attacks all poets, Homer included. It is obvious that the author has combined different items about Bion without any real knowledge of his life or work. For the value of Ps-Acro see *RE*, VII:2 (1912) s.v. Helenius Acron cols. 2840 ff (Wessner) and v. Rooy, p. 166.

T16

par

The MSS. here have *pater*, which is completely impossible. Hoogvliet, pp. 4 f even made the effort to prove that Bion cannot have been the father of Aristophanes for chronological and historical reasons. Therefore the conjecture *par* by Bücheler is very easy and gives excellent sense; it has obviously been accepted by Hense 1909, p. 102.

Aristophanis

This comparison between Bion and Aristophanes is of very special interest, as it points to the close relationship between the Old Comedy and the Cynic writings, which was noted already in antiquity; cf. introd. Chapter II:3.

dicacitatis

The meaning is “biting wit” (cf. LS, s.v. *dicacitas*) and refers to the use of pointed expressions and puns. Cf. the description in Cicero *De orat.* 2.54.218: *duo genera . . . facetiarum . . . alterum peracutum et breve . . . haec altera dicacitas nominata est*. In Cicero *Orator* 26.87 *dicacitas* is described as *in iaciendo mittendoque ridiculo* (cf. J.E. Sandy’s note ad loc.). Quintilian 6.3.21 gives the following analysis: *dicacitas . . . significat sermonem cum risu aliquos incessantem*. The negative meaning of the term seems to be predominant in the scholia as we can see from e.g. Donatus *ad Terenti Eun. prol.* 6: *dicaces dicuntur qui iocosis salibus maledicunt*. For the meaning of *dicacitas* see Grant, pp. 103 ff.

'nigrum' malum

Porphyrio seems to be the only one of the ancient interpreters of this passage to notice that Horace intended *niger* to have a negative meaning in this context.

facetum

This is a common stylistic term (see *TLL*, s.v. *facetus* 2) and defined as follows by Quintilian 6.3.20: *decoris hanc magis et excultae cuiusdam elegantiae appellationem puto. Facetus* is obviously different from *salsus* and *dicax*. The problem is treated several times by Cicero but not fully consistently. In *Orator* 26.87 *sales* is the generic term, subdivided into *facetiae* and *dicacitas*, and in *De orat.* 2.54.218 *facetiae* is the generic term with *cavillatio* and *dicacitas* as its subdivisions. On the whole it seems that *facetus* is used as the opposite of *dicax* and that it refers to a liberal jest; for a detailed discussion see Grant, pp. 103 ff.

T18 *mirabilis reprehensor*

This points to something very typical both of Bion's nature and of the character of his teaching; cf. also T2A–B, T23 and T25.

diversa carmina . . . varios cibos

This comparison between poetry of different kinds and different sorts of food reminds us of the saying of Bion that it was impossible to please the mob unless you turned into a cake (F18).

convivae

Cf. here the famous expression of Horace *Sat.* 1.1.119: *conviva satur*, which may possibly go back to an idea of Bion (see F68 with commentary).

*3. Relations to other philosophers (T19–24)***T19** *προηρεῖτο*

The reading of the MSS. is *παρητεῖτο*, which is kept by Hicks and Long and regarded positively by Dudley, p. 63 n. 3 (pp. 89 f). This has been emended to *προηρεῖτο* or *προήρητο* by Reiske and Hirzel, which emendation has been accepted by Hense, Apelt and Gigante. The reading *παρητεῖτο* of the MSS., which does not fit the context, can easily be explained as a mistake, thanks to the immediately preceding *παρητησθαι*. It is highly improbable that Diog. Laert. would have started his description of Bion's philosophical development by telling us that he did not accept the Academy.

Cf. the similarity of structure between this passage: *τὴν ἀρχὴν μὲν προηρεῖτο . . . εἰτ' . . . ἔπειτα . . . μετήλθε . . . μεθ' ὃν . . . διήκουσε* and the biography of Arcesilaus in Diog. Laert. 4.29: *ἤκουσε δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς . . . ἔπειτα . . . μεθ' ὃν . . . διήκουσεν . . . ἔπειτα μετήλθεν*.

τὰ Ἀκαδημαϊκά

This adjective seems to be known from the Hellenistic period (cf. *Acad. Phil. Ind. Herc.* p. 68 Mekler) and is later quite common, especially to indicate members of the Academy; see e.g. Plutarch *De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos* 36.1077 C, Athenaeus 11.509 A and Lucian *Piscator* 43. The use of the adjective in neut. pl. to indicate the school with its doctrines is not common; cf. however Diog. Laert. 7.184: *περὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ πληθῶν τῇ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν συστάσει χρησάμενος*.

Κράτητος

That Crates the Academician was the teacher of Bion is stated also in T20–21. For this very much discussed point see introd. Chapter I.

ἐπανειλέτο

This verb is used in post-classical Greek with the meaning “take up a new life or profession” (LSJ, s.v. *ἐπαναίρῃω* II 1 a); cf. Lucian *Bis accusatus* 1 with *τέχνην* and *Apologia* 4 with *λατρείαν*, Menander Rhetor p. 376 Spengel III, Artemidorus *Onir.* 1.17 and Porphyrius *De abst.* 1.27 with *βίον* as its object.

ἀγωγήν

The different meanings of this word “training, way of life, school of philosophy” are all very close and not easy to distinguish clearly (cf. *TLG*, s.v. *ἀγωγή*, LSJ, s.v. *ἀγωγή* II and *ThW*, I (1933) s.v. *ἀγωγή* pp. 128 f (Schmidt)). Here the meaning must be “way of life” as is shown by a close parallel in Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.158: *ἐπίπονον ἀγωγήν βίου δι’ αὐτὴν* (sc. *τὴν δόξαν*) *ἐπαναίρωνται*. An interesting definition of the concept is also given by Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.145: *ἀγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αἵρεσις βίου ἢ τινος πράγματος περὶ ἓνα ἢ πολλοὺς γινομένη, οἷον περὶ Διογένην ἢ τοὺς Λάκωνας*. The transition in meaning from “way of life” to “philosophical school” is easy to understand in that a special way of life often is connected with a certain school of philosophy; cf. Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.150: *ἀγωγήν δὲ ἀγωγῇ, ὅταν τὴν Διογένηος ἀγωγήν ἀντιτιθῶμεν τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἢ τὴν τῶν Λακόνων τῇ τῶν Ἰταλῶν*. It seems that this technical use of the word belongs especially to the Hellenistic period; it is, e.g., very common in Polybius (see A. Mauersberger, *Polybios-Lexikon* s.v. *ἀγωγή*) and occurs for the first time in a letter from Antiochus II to Erythrae (after 261 B.C. (?)); cf. Welles, p. 79 and p. 309.

τρίβωνα καὶ πήραν

These two objects and the *βακτηρία* made the Cynic uniform, which in a later period at least made it very easy to recognize a Cynic philosopher. They are mentioned in innumerable *loca* in the extant literature; a rich material is collected in Dziech, pp. 133 ff. This equipment is obviously connected with the ascetic life of the Cynics, being used especially by poor people and beggars.

Typical was that the garment was worn double. The whole uniform, as well as this special custom, is said in the Cynic tradition to derive from Antisthenes: καὶ πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα καθά φησι Διοκλῆς, καὶ μόνῳ αὐτῷ ἐχρή-
το· βάκτρον τ' ἀνέλαβε καὶ πήραν (Diog. Laert. 6.13 = fr. 136 A Caizzi) but the historical truth of this statement is doubted by Dudley, pp. 6 f. We find the same information about Diogenes: τρίβωνα διπλώσας πρῶτος κατὰ τινας διὰ τὸ ἀνάγκην ἔχειν καὶ ἐνεύδειν αὐτῷ, πήραν τ' ἐκομίσαστο (Diog. Laert. 6.22; cf. 6.76).

The use of the τρίβων without a χιτῶν seems to have a Spartan origin (cf. e.g. Plutarch *Lycurgus* 30.2), and was later taken over by emulators of Sparta and poor people in general. Its special use as the philosopher's garb seems to have started with Socrates; cf. Plato *Symp.* 219 B: ὑπὸ τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλι-
νεῖς τὸν τουτουῖ (sc. Σωκράτους) and *Protagoras* 335 D, Xenophon *Mem.* 1.6.2: ἱμάτιον . . . φαῦλον, which refers to the τρίβων, Ameipsias ap. Diog. Laert. 2.28 (= fr. 9 Kock I) and Maximus of Tyre 1.10 e. The fact that Socrates lacked a χιτῶν is stated in, e.g., Xenophon *Mem.* 1.6.2: ἀχίτων διατελεῖς and Marcus Aurelius 11.28: ὁ Σωκράτης τὸ κῶδιον ὑπεζωσμένος. Therefore it is quite natural that this habit was adopted by the Cynics, who carried the asceticism of Socrates to extremes.

As the τρίβων was originally a kind of ἱμάτιον, it is surprising to find the notice that the Cynics wore an ἐξωμῖς, which was closer to a χιτῶν, as it is usually stressed that the Cynics were without a χιτῶν (cf. e.g. Lucian *Cynicus* 1, Marcus Aurelius 4.30 and Juvenal *Sat.* 13.121–122). Cases where the ἐξωμῖς is given as the dress of the Cynics are, e.g., Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.153, Diogenes *Ep.* 29, Crates *Ep.* 32 and Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 7. What seems to be a contradiction can probably be explained by saying that the τρίβων could be worn in the same way as the ἐξωμῖς, i.e. with one shoulder naked, which is made clear from Epictetus 4.8.34: ἀνείληφε τρίβωνα, γυμνὸν δεικνύει τὸν ὤμον.

For the question of the Cynic dress cf. K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* IV, 3. ed. (Freiburg i.B.-Tübingen, 1882), pp. 175 f, F. Studniczka, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der altgriechischen Tracht', *Abhandlungen des Archäol.-Epigraph. Seminars der Universität Wien*, hrsg. von O. Bendorff und E. Bormann, VI:1 (Vienna, 1886) pp. 76 f, U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'De tribus carminibus latinis commentatio', *Ind. schol. sem. hib. Göttingen* 1893 pp. 16 f (= *Kleine Schriften* II (Berlin, 1941) pp. 263 f), F. Leo, 'Diogenes bei Plautus', *Hermes*, 41 (1906) pp. 441 ff, DS, V (1912–19) s.v. Tribon pp. 414 ff (Brilliant) and *RE*, VIA:2 (1937) s.v. Tribon cols. 2415 ff (Schuppe). As this dress became very typical of the Cynic philosophers, they also attached great importance to it; for this aspect see Geffcken 1909, pp. 56 ff, Oltramare, pp. 40 f and G. Säfllund, 'De Pallio und die stilistische Entwicklung Tertullians', *Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, Ser. in 8°,

VIII (Lund, 1955) p. 31 n. 17 and pp. 49 ff.

The *πήρα* was obviously part of the equipment of a wandering beggar, and as such came to be adopted by the Cynics. It is of a certain interest that the *πήρα* belonged to the Cynic “patron saint” Odysseus, when he was disguised as a beggar (cf. e.g. *Od.* 13.437 and 17.197, 411 and 466) as well as to Irus (*Od.* 18.108). The case of a person carrying a wallet is also known from Telephus, depicted by Euripides, as we can see from the cases, where Aristophanes refers to this fact, e.g. *Nubes* 921–924: *καίτοι πρότερόν γ’ ἐπώχευες, Τήλεφος εἶναι Μυσοῦς φάσκων, ἐκ πηριδίου γνώμας τρώγων Πανδελειτεύους*. The appearance of Telephus with a *σπυρίδιον* on the stage is also said to have converted Crates to the Cynic philosophy (Diog. Laert. 6.87); cf. also Maximus of Tyre 1.10 e. For the *πήρα* see *RE*, XIX:1 (1937) s.v. Pera (no. 2) cols. 563 f (Wotke).

It can be pointed out that the Cynic school was possibly not the first or the only philosophical sect to adopt this equipment, as the same is testified for one branch of the Pythagorean school and maybe at a period prior to the existence of the Cynic school. We here have the description of the Pythagorean Telauges as it is given by Aeschines of Sphettus (frs. 40–48 Dittmar) and of Diodorus of Aspendus (cf. here Diog. Laert. 6.13 and Athenaeus 4.163 E–F). Whether the Cynics in this respect were influenced by the Pythagoreans seems less clear to me than to Dudley, pp. 6 f and W. Burkert, ‘Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon’, *Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft*, 10 (Nuremberg, 1962) pp. 196 f. I do not think that we can exclude the possibility that Antisthenes adopted the *τρίβων* as the philosopher’s garb, following the example of Socrates, and that this was the beginning of the habit. However, Caizzi, p. 122 (on Antisthenes fr. 136) assumes that even Antisthenes was influenced by the Pythagoreans.

καὶ τί γὰρ ἄλλο . . . ἀπάθειαν

Hirzel 1877–83, II p. 60 n. 2 could not find any meaning in the rhetorical question and wanted to change the text to *καὶ πῆραν καὶ τὰλλα ἅπερ μετ.* or *πῆραν καὶ ὅτιπερ ἄλλο μετ.*, which is completely unnecessary, and misses the point. Hirzel 1895, I p. 376 n. 1 himself also abandoned this suggestion and confined his change to *πῆραν καὶ τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ μετεσκεύασεν αὐτὸν πρὸς ἀπάθειαν*. Hense 1909, pp. LXIV f, however, has defended the transmitted text and drawn the attention to a parallel in the Arcesilaus biography in Diog. Laert. 4.40: *πολυτελῆς δὲ ἄγαν ὢν — καὶ τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ἕτερος Ἀρίστιππος*.

μετεσκεύασεν

The verb *μετασκευάζω* is used to indicate a change of dress, equipment or form: Aristophanes *Eccl.* 499, Xenophon *Cyr.* 6.2.8 and Lucian *De saltatione* 59 (cf. LSJ, s.v. *μετασκευάζω* I). After the mention of the Cynic dress it is probable that the use of the verb here indicates that Bion’s conversion to the Cynic

school and its ἀπάθεια was not serious and consisted in merely putting on the Cynic uniform. We find this comparison between a change of garment and a change of philosophical school also in the case of Dionysius of Heraclaea, called ὁ Μεταθέμενος: ὃς ἄντικρυς ἀποδύς τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς χιτῶνα ἀνθινὰ μετημφιάσατο καὶ Μεταθέμενος καλούμενος ἔχαιρε (Athenaeus 7.281 D = fr. 430 *SVF* I); cf. also Lucian *Fugitivi* 3, where Philosophy is complaining about οἱ ξυνήθεις καὶ φίλοι φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦμὸν ὑποδύμενοι and *Peregrinus* 18: τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποδύμενον. For the interpretation see also Hirzel 1895, I p. 376 n. 1, Hense 1909, pp. LXIV f and Geffcken 1909, pp. 56 f.

ἀπάθειαν

Hoogvliet, p. 7 and n. 4 seems to believe that Bion in this respect was a follower of Pyrrho. This is hardly probable, even though the concept ἀπάθεια is central to the philosophy of Pyrrho and the Sceptics; cf. Diog. Laert. 9.108: τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπάθειαν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν πραότητα τέλος εἰπεῖν φασὶ τοὺς σκεπτικούς and M. Pohlenz, 'Das Lebensziel der Skeptiker', *Hermes*, 39 (1904) pp. 15 ff.

The concept is also to be found in the Stoic school; cf. here the general characterization: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆναι εἶναι τὸν σοφόν (Diog. Laert. 7.117 = fr. 448 *SVF* III), A. Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart, 1894) pp. 46 ff and Pohlenz 1964, I pp. 151 ff.

Bion cannot be influenced by the Stoics and it is probable that the concept belongs to the Cynic school from the beginning, although this has been denied by Pohlenz 1964, II p. 77. I do not think that the testimonies to this effect can be explained as due to a later Stoic influence. First of all it is pointed out that the concept did not originate with the Stoics by Anonymus, *In Eth. Nic. comm.* p. 128 Heylbut (*Comm. in Arist. Gr.* XX, 1892) (= fr. 201 *SVF* III): ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν Στοικῶν ἦν ἡ δόξα αὕτη, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ τιθεῖσα. The early testimony concerning the Cynics in Polystratus *Περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως* p. 20 Wilke is also of interest: ἡ τῶν ἀπαθεῖς καὶ κυνικὸς αὐτοὺς προσαγορευσάντων αἵρεσις. Therefore the concept ἀπάθεια, while not of an extremely technical character in the Cynic school, is not altogether missing, and the idea can be said to have its foundation in Socrates, meaning a complete independence and freedom from all passions (for terms with similar meanings used by the Cynics see Oltramare, p. 45). Therefore the following testimonies for the early Cynics may have more value than is usually admitted. Cf. what is told about Antisthenes: παρ' οὗ (sc. Σωκράτους) καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας κατήρξε πρῶτος τοῦ Κυνισμοῦ (Diog. Laert. 6.2 = fr. 128A Caizzi) and οὗτος ἠγήσατο καὶ τῆς Διογένης ἀπαθείας (Diog. Laert. 6.15 = fr. 135A Caizzi) and Diogenes: ταύτας τὰς φωνὰς ὁ τῆς ἀπαθείας προφήτης ἐγὼ ἀποφθέγγομαι ἐναντίας τῷ τετυφωμένῳ βίῳ (Diogenes *Ep.* 21; cf. also Diogenes *Ep.* 12 and Crates *Ep.* 34.4). In Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 8

Diogenes refers to himself as *ιατρὸς τῶν παθῶν* and in Julian 6.192 A the Cynics are described in the following terms: *ἀπάθειαν γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος. τοῦτο δὲ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ θεὸν γενέσθαι*. For *ἀπάθεια* and the Cynics see Joel 1893–1901, II pp. 614 ff, Dziech, p. 236 n. 418 and Rist, p. 56 and n. 1, p. 63 and p. 72, who does not doubt that the concept belongs to the Cynic school; for its place in Greek philosophy in general see *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. by J. Hastings, I (1908) s.v. Apathy pp. 603 f (Kroll), T. Rüther, ‘Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in den beiden ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten und bei Klemens von Alexandrien: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des christlichen Vollkommenheitsbegriffes’, *Freiburger Theologische Studien*, 63 (Freiburg i.B., 1949) and *RAC*, I (1950) s.v. Apatheia cols. 484 ff (Labriolle). Cf. also *RAC*, I (1950) s.v. Affekt cols. 160 ff (Vögtle) and s.v. Ataraxie cols. 844 ff (Wilpert).

τὰ Θεοδώρεια

The use of this adjective indicates that Theodorus’ philosophy was to some extent different from the Cyrenaic school in the form given by Aristippus; cf. Diog. Laert. 2.97 (= fr. 252 Mannebach): *οἱ δὲ Θεοδώριοι κληθέντες τὴν μὲν ὀνομασίαν ἔσπασαν ἀπὸ Θεοδώρου τοῦ προγεγραμμένου καὶ δόγμασιν ἐχρήσαντο τοῖς αὐτοῦ*; cf. also Athenaeus 6.252 C (= fr. 253 Mannebach) and T20 and T23 (= fr. 254A Mannebach). Diog. Laert. here has the adjective in neut. pl. to indicate the school with its doctrines as he previously used the expression *τὰ Ἀκαδημαϊκά*.

διακούσας . . . διήκουσε

The verb *διακούω* in the technical sense of being a hearer or a disciple of a teacher seems to belong to Hellenistic Greek; see Philodemus *Rhet.* 1.96 Sudhaus, Plutarch *Cicero* 4.1, Diog. Laert. 4.29 and 8.86 and LSJ, s.v. *διακούω*.

Θεοδώρου τοῦ ἀθέου

Theodorus is one of the notorious atheists of antiquity and very often has the adjective *ἄθεος* attached to his name; the cases are collected in A.S. Pease, in *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum* I (Cambridge, Mass., 1955) p. 123 (on 1.1.2); cf. also Pease, op. cit. p. 355 (on 1.23.63) for the meaning of *ἄθεος*. A list of the so-called *ἄθεοι* in antiquity is given in W. Fahr, ‘*Θεοὺς νομίζειν*: Zum Problem der Anfänge des Atheismus bei den Griechen’, *Spudasmata*, 26 (Hildesheim, 1969) pp. 180 f. For Theodorus in general see introd. Chapter III: 3, and for his religious attitude also F25–33 with commentary.

κατὰ πᾶν εἶδος λόγου σοφιστεύοντος

Cf. the description of Bion’s style: *διὰ δὴ οὖν τὸ παντὶ εἶδει κεκρᾶσθαι λόγου* (Diog. Laert. 4.52 = T11). The term *σοφιστεύω* cannot be used here mainly to stress the professional side, as is shown by the addition *κατὰ πᾶν εἶδος λόγου*. However, Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 341 n. 1 thinks that this expression indicates that

Theodorus' listeners had to pay. The word has obviously a pejorative meaning and implies that Theodorus in his style and his method of arguing acted as a sophist. The negative meaning is found in, e.g., Aristotle *SE* 1 p. 165a28, Demosthenes 61.48 and Epicurus *De rerum natura* 14.6 (cf. LSJ, s.v. σοφιστεύω I 1). See also the frs. 260–264 Mannebach, which clearly show Theodorus' sophisticated way of reasoning. There is also the possibility that the term is used here with the meaning “give lectures, make rhetorical speeches” (cf. LSJ, s.v. σοφιστεύω I 2), which is common from the Hellenistic period and onwards: Philodemus *Rhet.* 1.223 Sudhaus, Strabo 13.1.66, Plutarch *De Stoicorum repugnantibus* 30.1047 F, *Lucullus* 22.5 and *Caesar* 3.1. Furthermore Theodorus is called σοφιστής by an interlocutor in Diog. Laert. 2.102 (= fr. 261 Mannebach), a term which often applies also to Bion; cf. introd. Chapter I n. 51.

περιπατητικοῦ

This adjective cannot be found for the first time in Hermippus ap. Diog. Laert. 5.2 (= fr. 45 Wehrli Suppl.b. I), as is often alleged but in Colotes in Plutarch *Adversus Colotem* 14.1115 A; cf. R. Westman, ‘Plutarch gegen Kolotes: Seine Schrift “Adversus Colotem” als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle’, *Acta Philologica Fennica*, 7 (Helsingfors, 1955) p. 284. For other cases see LSJ, s.v. περιπατητικός II, and for an explanation of the name *RE*, Suppl.b. VII (1940) s.v. Peripatos cols. 899 ff (Brink).

T20

ἐλλογίμους

This is a completely classical word, known from, e.g., Herodotus and Plato. It is used by Diog. Laert. especially of disciples as here, e.g. 6.85 and 10.25, and is common in an Atticist like Philostratus; cf. Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 160.

Ἀρκεσίλαον

For Arcesilaus and Bion see T12 with commentary.

Θεοδώρειον . . . ἐπικαλούμενον

The statement is somewhat surprising as Bion is never clearly designated as Θεοδώρειος. There are some cases where this adjective is used in connection with him (T3, T19 and T23). From the form in the last case—τῶν Θεοδωρείων τε καὶ Βίωνος—Bion does not seem to be counted as one of the Theodoreans so much as put alongside them. Therefore the reason for the statement in Diog. Laert. must be his hostility towards Bion because of his alleged atheism.

αἵρέσεως

The meaning of the word αἵρεσις here, i.e. “philosophical sect, school” (LSJ, s.v. αἵρεσις B II 2), seems to be post-classical and originate with the Hellenistic period: Polybius 5.93.8, Diodorus Siculus 2.29.6, Dionysius Hal. *Amm.* 7 p. 266 U–R, Polystratus *Περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως* p. 20 Wilke. It has very much the same meaning as ἀγωγή (cf. T19 with commentary) and implies the

choice of both a philosophical doctrine and a certain way of life; cf. the definitions given by Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.16–17 and Diog. Laert. *Prooem.* 19–21, especially § 20: αἵρεσιν μὲν γὰρ λέγομεν τὴν λόγῳ τινὶ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκολουθοῦσαν ἢ δοκοῦσαν ἀκολουθεῖν and *ThW*, I (1933) s.v. αἵρεσις p. 180 (Schlier).

ἐχομένως

For the formation of adverbs from participles see KB, II p. 300 Anm. 2 and Schwyzer, I p. 624. The formation ἐχομένως seems to belong to the Hellenistic period (cf. LSJ, s.v. ἐχομένως), and to be used especially for the order in written works, as here; cf. Apollodorus *Bibl.* 3.1.1: ἐχομένως λέγωμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ Ἀγήνορος and Apollonius Dyscolus 1.101.6 Schneider-Uhlig: ἐχομένως καὶ ὑπὲρ κτητικῶν ρητέον. While the genitive is regular with the verb ἔχομαι, it seems to be very rare after ἐχομένως.

T21

For the text of this testimony, dealing with the pupils of Crates the Academician, and for the identification of the persons mentioned in it, see S. Mekler ad loc. and Crönert, p. 31 nn. 162–163.

The name of Bion is, as must be admitted, due to a supplement by T. Gomperz, ‘Die herkulanische Biographie des Polemon’, in *Philosophische Aufsätze Eduard Zeller zu seinem fünfzigjährigen Doctor-Jubiläum gewidmet* (Leipzig, 1887) p. 149. It is however fully convincing and has been accepted by most scholars, such as S. Mekler ad loc., Crönert, p. 31 and Hense 1909, p. LXVII, and rightly so, as the fact that Bion was a pupil of Crates is attested by two other testimonies (see T19–20 and introd. Chapter I).

Eumenes of Aspendus seems to be completely unknown apart from this single piece of evidence. Of a certain interest is the notice that he left a work *Περὶ κωμωδίας*, as the same is said of his teacher Crates: ἀπέλιπε βιβλία τὰ μὲν φιλοσοφούμενα, τὰ δὲ *Περὶ κωμωδίας*, τὰ δὲ λόγους δημηγορικοὺς καὶ πρεσβευτικούς (Diog. Laert. 4.23). Cf. Sussemihl 1891–92, I p. 122 n. 574^{ab} for more works of this kind and for different identifications; for the topic in general see M. Consbruch, ‘Zu den Traktaten *Περὶ κωμωδίας*’, in *Commentationes in honorem Guilelmi Studemund quinque abhinc lustra summos in philosophia honores adepti* (Strasburg, 1889) pp. 211 ff and G. Kaibel, ‘Die Prolegomena *Περὶ κωμωδίας*’, *Abhandlungen der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.hist. Klasse NF, 2:4 (Berlin, 1898).

Eurypylus of Cos is mentioned also in Athenaeus 11.508 F as one, who had treated the Platonist Euaeon of Lampsacus (cf. Diog. Laert. 3.46). See *RE*, VI (1909) s.v. Eurypylos (no. 15) col. 1351 (Jacoby).

About Crates, for whom the ethnicon is very uncertain, nothing seems to be known.

Arcesilaus of Pitane is the founder of the Middle Academy (see T12 with commentary); the fact that he came from Pitane seems to be a well-established:

Strabo 13.1.67, Diog. Laert. 4.28, Numenius in Eusebius *Praep. ev.* 14.6.14 (= fr. 25.159 Des Places), Solinus 7.8 p. 56.13 Mommsen and *Schol. in Persium ad Sat.* 3.79.

Here it can also be noted that *Acad. Phil. Ind. Herc.* pp. 76f Mekler probably does not refer to Bion; cf. F. Bücheler, 'Acad. Phil. index Herculanensis', *Ind. schol. sem. hib. Greifswald* 1869–70 p. 13, S. Mekler ad loc., Crönert, p. 31 n. 164 and Leo, p. 71. The wrong opinion is to be found in L. Spengel, 'Die Herculanensischen Rollen', *Philologus*, Suppl.b. 2 (1863) p. 541, followed by Susemihl 1890, p. 190 n. 7.

T22

σκωπτόμενος

The word which is here used in a negative sense (cf. LSJ, s.v. σκώπτω 1 a), is completely classical. That σκώπτω implies an ill-natured joke is clear from Aristotle *EN* 4.8.3 p. 1128a7: λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον, *EN* 4.8.9 p. 1128a30: τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λαιδόρημά τί ἐστιν, and *Rhet.* 2.2.12 p. 1379a29: ὀργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσι καὶ σπώπτουσι ὑβρίζουσι γάρ. In the following comparison of tragedy and comedy it is of great interest that the verb σκώπτω can be used about comedy: Aristophanes *Plutus* 557: σκώπτειν πειρᾷ καὶ κωμῳδεῖν, *Pax* 740, *Nubes* 540 and *Ranae* 392 and Aristotle *EN* 7.10.3 p. 1152 a22: ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν (= fr. 67 Kock II). It also belongs to the Socratic-Cynic tradition and can be used about Socrates (Xenophon *Mem.* 1.3.7), Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.7 = fr. 151 Caizzi), Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.26), Crates (Julian 6.201 B) and Menippus (Lucian *Dial. mort.* 1.2); cf. v. Rooy, pp. 102 f.

Ξενοκράτης

For the historical value of this anecdote and Bion's relations with Xenocrates see introd. Chapter I.

τὴν τραγωδίαν . . . τῆς κωμωδίας

Xenocrates had a reputation for not answering back: *quid Xenocratis responsum, quam laudabile! cum maledico sermoni quorundam summo silentio interesset, uno ex his quaerente cur solus ita linguam suam cohiberet: 'quia dixisse me' inquit 'aliquando poenituit, tacuisse nunquam'* (Valerius Maximus 7.2 ext. 6 = fr. 102 Heinze; cf. also Aelianus *VH* 14.9 = fr. 103 Heinze). Therefore the point seems to be that as comedy often parodies and ridicules tragedy, as we know from the famous case of Aristophanes and Euripides, but tragedy never does the same in reverse, so Bion may attack Xenocrates, who however will not answer back in the same way.

Metaphors from the theatre are very common in general (cf. F16A–B with commentary) and perhaps especially among authors who can be regarded as sophists; see e.g. for Aelius Aristides Schmid 1887–97, II pp. 223 f.

T23

τοῦ Κνιδίου Διοκλέους

The name Diocles has been treated in different ways; Wilamowitz, p. 313 n. 23 wanted to correct it to Dicaeocles, which was accepted in e.g. *RE*, V (1905) s.v. Dikaiokles cols. 563 f (v. Arnim). This author is referred to also e.g. by Athenaeus 11.508 F: καὶ Δικαιοκλῆς ὁ Κνίδιος ἐνενηκοστῶ καὶ πρώτῳ Διατριβῶν. On the other hand A. Weische, ‘Cicero und die Neue Akademie: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Geschichte des antiken Skeptizismus’, *Orbis Antiquus*, 18 (Münster, 1961) pp. 21 ff tried to defend the tradition and wanted to identify this Diocles of Cnidus with Diocles of Magnesia, whose history of philosophy is mentioned several times in Diog. Laert.; cf. *RE*, V (1905) s.v. Diokles (no. 50) cols. 798 ff (Martini). It does not seem possible to settle this question definitely.

ταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Διατριβαῖς

The use of ἐπιγράφω with the meaning “entitle” (LSJ, s.v. ἐπιγράφω II 2) seems to be post-classical: *Inscr. Prien.* 37.104, Dionysius Hal. *Dinarchus* 7 p. 306 U–R, Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.65 and Athenaeus 11.496 F. The same applies to the use of the noun ἐπιγραφή with the meaning “title” (LSJ, s.v. ἐπιγραφή 2), which can be found in, e.g., Polybius 3.9.3, Dionysius Hal. *Dinarchus* 6 p. 305 U–R, and Lucian *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 30.

Ἀρκεσίλαον

For Arcesilaus and Bion see T12 with commentary.

τῶν Θεοδωρείων

For this adjective see T20 with commentary.

ἐπεξιόντων

This is an emendation by Wilamowitz, accepted by Des Places, while the MSS. have ἐπεισιόντων, which however does not have the meaning required here: “go out against, attack”. The verb is classical and can be found, e.g., in Thucydides 2.21.2 and 6.97.5 (cf. LSJ, s.v. ἐπέξειμι I 1).

ἀπὸ παντός

This expression is translated by K. Mras ad. loc. “mit allen Mitteln”, which seems to be correct. The use of ἀπό to create adverbial expressions is fully classical (see LSJ, s.v. ἀπό A III 6). However, the form ἀπὸ παντός seems to be very rare; there is one possible case in Dio of Prusa 32.24: οὐδὲ ἀπὸ παντὸς δεῖ τοὺς πεπαιδευμένους φεύγειν, which is so understood by Schmid 1887–97, I p. 107.

ἐξευλαβηθέντα

This verb is fully classical and to be found in e.g. Plato *Laches* 199 E, *Leg.* 10.905 A, and Euripides *Andr.* 644.

ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ μέλαν τὰς σηπίας

For this vivid comparison with the cuttlefish see Eusebius *Praep. ev.* 15.9.13: ὥσπερ αἱ σηπίαι τὸ δυσθήρευτον ἐκ τοῦ σκοτεινοῦ ποριζόμενος and Aelianus *HA* 1.34, where the cuttlefish and its ink are compared with Poseidon veiling Aeneas in a cloud. For the cuttlefish cf. Aristotle *HA* 4.1 p. 524b15–17: τοῦτον δὲ (sc. τὸν θολὸν) πλεῖστον αὐτῶν καὶ μέγιστον ἡ σηπία ἔχει ἀφίησι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα, ὅταν φοβητῇ, μάλιστα δ' ἡ σηπία, Horace *Sat.* 1.4.100: *hic nigrae sucus lolliginis* and *RE*, VIA:2 (1937) s.v. Tintenfische cols. 1393 ff (Steier).

τὴν ἐποχὴν

This is a central concept in the Sceptic philosophy and for its founder Pyrrho. Cf. Diog. Laert. *Prooem.* 16: ἐφεκτικοὶ δὲ ὅσοι ἐπέχουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς ἀκαταλήπτων and the general description of Pyrrho in Diog. Laert. 9.61: ὁθεν γενναιότατα δοκεῖ φιλοσοφῆσαι, τὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας καὶ ἐποχῆς εἶδος εἰσαγαγών. The concept is defined in general by Sextus Empiricus in the following terms *PH* 1.10: 'ἐποχὴ' δέ ἐστι στάσις διανοίας δι' ἣν οὔτε αἶρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν. For the Sceptics see also introd. Chapter III:5 and n. 53, where literature is given, and for ἐποχὴ especially P. Coussin, 'L'origine et l'évolution de l'ἐποχὴ', *Revue des Études Grecques*, 42 (1929) pp. 373 ff.

The fact that Arcesilaus practised ἐποχὴ is well attested in the ancient sources: Diog. Laert. 4.28: πρῶτος ἐπισχὼν τὰς ἀποφάσεις διὰ τὰς ἐναντιότητάς τῶν λόγων. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχείρησε, Cicero *De orat.* 3.18.67: *Arcesilas . . . hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percepi possit. quem ferunt . . . primumque instituisse . . . non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisset disputare*, Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.12.45 and Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.232, where the teaching of Arcesilaus is characterized as follows: καὶ τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχὴν.

There may be a reference to the Theodoreans and Bion also in Plutarch *Adversus Colotem* 26.1121 F: ὁ δὲ Ἀρκεσίλαος τοσοῦτον ἀπέδει τοῦ καινοτομίας τινὰ δόξαν ἀγαπᾶν καὶ ὑποποιεῖσθαι (τι) τῶν παλαιῶν ὥστ' ἐγκαλεῖν τοὺς τότε σοφιστὰς ὅτι προστρίβεται Σωκράτει καὶ Πλάτῳ καὶ Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς δόγματα καὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας οὐδὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλὰ οἷον ἀναγωνὴν καὶ βεβαίωσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἄνδρας ἐνδόξους ποιούμενος; cf. E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (Florence, 1936) I p. 46 and n. 1 and R. Westman, 'Plutarch gegen Kolotes: Seine Schrift "Adversus Colotem" als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle', *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 7 (Helsingfors, 1955) pp. 293 f.

T24 ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰουλίδος

Cf. Stephanus Byz. p. 335 Meineke: Ἰουλὶς, πόλις ἐν Κέῳ τῇ νήσῳ, where Stephanus Byz. quotes Strabo ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰουλίδος— Ἀρίστων ὁ περιπατητικός.

Ἐρασίστρατος ὁ ἱατρός

For this famous and important medical writer of the Hellenistic period see *RE*, VI (1909) s.v. Erasistratos (no. 2) cols. 333 ff (Wellmann).

τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου

For this expression see A. Busse, 'Peripatos und Peripatetiker', *Hermes*, 61 (1926) pp. 338 ff and especially p. 338 n. 1, where more cases are given, and *RE*, Suppl.b. VII (1940) s.v. Peripatos col. 901 (Brink).

Ἀρίστων

Cf. introd. Chapter IV, where I have argued in detail that there is a mistake in Strabo, and that the Stoic Ariston of Chios and not the Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos should be considered as the emulator of Bion.

4. Opinions on Bion's teaching (T25–28)

T25

τοῖς ψέγουσι

In this testimony Philodemus is attacking an unknown opponent, who is of the opinion that it is ridiculous to blame an angry man. Philodemus for his part thinks that exclusive blame, as is to be found in the works of Bion and Chrysippus, is no good and that it is useful to show clearly the consequences of anger. In *RE*, XIX:2 (1938) s.v. Philodemus (no. 5) col. 2470 (Philippson) we find the opinion that the later part of the testimony refers to Bion: "wo er es nützlich nennt zur Heilung einer Leidenschaft, wie Bion die Folgen vor Augen zu stellen." I do not think that this is the correct interpretation, but that Philodemus in the latter part once more, after the notice about Bion and Chrysippus, returns to the first opponent, who does not necessarily criticize Bion or Chrysippus. Cf. also R. Philippson, in 'Philodemi de ira liber. Ed. Carolus Wilke. Leipzig 1914', *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, 35 (1915) cols. 649 f and R. Philippson, 'Philodem's Buch über den Zorn: Ein Beitrag zu seiner Wiederherstellung und Auslegung', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 71 (1916) pp. 437 f. Nevertheless we acquire some interesting information about Bion, viz. that his message was of a mainly negative character and that he obviously liked the attack. This view is confirmed by other evidence (see T18, T23 and F32).

ἡ βαιόν

These words have been understood in very different ways but I have adopted the reading of L. Spengel, 'Die Herculanensischen Rollen', *Philologus*, Suppl.b. 2 (1863) p. 502 and Philippson, art. cit. (1916) p. 437 n. 1, which has a certain probability as the adjective βαιός is found elsewhere in Philodemus: *De ira* p. 95 Wilke and *Rhet.* 1.195 Sudhaus and 1.244 Sudhaus: οὐδὲ βαιόν. Heinze 1890, p. 510, Crönert, p. 32 and C. Wilke ad loc. wanted to read ἡβαιόν, as

being a reference to the Homeric οὐδ' ἡβαιόν (*Il.* 2.380, 2.386, 13.106, 20.361 and *Od.* 3.14), which, according to Crönert, p. 32, could go back to Bion himself. For other suggestions see Crönert, p. 32.

Περὶ τῆς ὀργῆς

For this title see T10 with commentary.

Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν θεραπευτικῷ

Cf. Chrysippus fr. 470 *SVF* III. The fragments from Chrysippus' work *Περὶ παθῶν* are collected in frs. 456–490 *SVF* III. For this work see E. Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme* 2. ed. (Paris, 1951) pp. 245 ff, Pohlenz 1964, I pp. 143 ff and pp. 224 ff, Rist, pp. 22 ff, J.B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Leyden, 1970) pp. 181 ff and A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London, 1974) pp. 175 ff.

καὶ μετρίως ἴστατο

The meaning of ἴσταμαι here is “take up an intellectual attitude” (LSJ, s.v. ἴστημι B I 2). For a similar expression see Philodemus *Rhet.* 1.53 Sudhaus: οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ἴστασθαι νομιστέον οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀποφαινομένους οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην.

T26

This testimony comes from Philodemus' work *De adulatione*, which so far has been neither properly edited nor studied, which makes the interpretation as far as Bion is concerned very uncertain. Cf. Crönert, p. 34 and *RE*, XIX:2 (1930) s.v. Philodemus (no. 5) col. 2470 (Philippson), where an unconvincing attempt has been made to identify the various persons mentioned. The only thing that can be clearly stated is that Philodemus, although accepting someone mentioned in the preceding part, prefers Bion's way of teaching. I do not understand the statement of Philippson, art. cit. (1938) col. 2470 that Philodemus does this “im Gegensatz zu Zenon”, as no Zeno has been mentioned. The other assumption of Philippson that Philodemus approves of Bion's practical description of *κολακεία* has a certain plausibility but cannot be proved. Cf. however the use of ὑπογράφω in Philodemus *De ira* pp. 19–20 Wilke: καὶ τοὺς τρόπους, δι' ὧν ἂν ἤκιστα τοῖς ὀργίλοις πάθουσιν περιπίπτωμεν, ὑπογράφουσι.

T27

Of Polystratus' work *De philosophia*, from which this testimony comes, very little is left and therefore the content is almost unknown. It is obvious that Polystratus in this work attacked some philosophers and it is probable that he here as well as in his other work *Περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως* meant the Cynics; cf. Crönert, pp. 35 f, R. Philippson, ‘Polystratos' Schrift über die grundlose Verachtung der Volksmeinung’, *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 23 (12) (1909) pp. 487 ff and *RE*, XXI:2 (1952) s.v. Polystratos (no. 7) col. 1833 (Mette).

τῷ Βίῳ σπεύδοντες

This is the reading of the papyrus, which has rightly been accepted by Crönert,

p. 36 and n. 188, Philippson, art. cit. (1909) p. 504, Hense 1909, p. 102 and Dudley, pp. 106 f. On the other hand Christ-Schmid, I p. 87 n. 4 would change *Βίῳ* into *βίῳ*, probably because they wanted to connect this with the preceding *τὰ χρησιμώτατα*. However, *τῷ Βίῳ* is to be brought together with the following *σπεύδοντες*, which is an uncommon but not impossible expression. Cf. Chariton 6.1.2 and 6.1.3: *οἱ μὲν Χαιρέα σπεύδοντες . . . οἱ δὲ Διονυσίῳ σπεύδοντες*, Suda, s.v. *Σπουδάσω περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα*, 967: *τίνι σπεύδεις; ἀντὶ τοῦ τίνι σπουδάξεις; οὕτως καὶ Ἄλεξις* (fr. 309 Kock II) and Photius *Lex.* s.v. p. 172 Naber II. This, combined with our general knowledge of the attitude of Polystratus, makes it evident that it is correct to keep the name *τῷ Βίῳ* here.

ὁσφρήσονται

The verb is here used in a metaphorical sense, which however is classical: Aristophanes *Lys.* 619 and Lucian *Timon* 45. We also find the verb *ὁσφραίνομαι* used of dogs, e.g. Xenophon *Cyn.* 4.6, 5.2, 5.5 and 6.2, which explains its use in this context. It is a hint at the Cynic school, which is often described with terms associated with dogs; see T15 with commentary.

The exact interpretation of this testimony is very unclear, and the context does not give much help. The future tense may here be used with very much the same meaning as the present tense, which is classical (see KG, I pp. 172 f and Schwyzer, II p. 293). I would think that the expression refers to people, who followed Bion in respect of his philosophy. This gives the testimony a certain value as we learn that Bion had both followers and importance, as Polystratus made the effort to attack him. Apparently the Epicureans were especially hostile to Bion.

T28

Ἀντίδωρον

For this philosopher, who is mentioned also in, e.g., Diog. Laert. 10.8, and about whom hardly anything is known except that he belonged to the enemies of Epicurus, see Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 95 n. 433, Crönert, pp. 24 ff, who gives more instances from the Herculanean papyri, and *RE*, Suppl.b. III (1918) s.v. Antidoros (no. 7) cols. 120 f (Müller).

νόμων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ διατάξεως

This shows that Bion had no interest in laws and political and administrative matters and did not treat these aspects in his lectures or written treatises. This becomes less surprising when we remember that Bion in his philosophy and teaching was completely devoted to ethical questions. He may also be influenced by the political conditions in the Hellenistic world, which must have removed most of the political interest of people in general and therefore made this topic less important for the philosophers. The first Cynics seem to have had a certain political interest, although of a very unrealistic character; see

Baldry, pp. 101 ff, Rist, pp. 64 ff and J. Ferguson, *Utopias in the Classical World* (London, 1975) pp. 51 ff and pp. 89 ff.

διατάξεως

When *διάταξις* is used on its own by Plutarch, it usually has the meaning “arrangement, disposition” (LSJ, s.v. *διάταξις* I) as, e.g., Plutarch *Numa* 9.1, *Comp. Lyc. c. Num.* 4.8, *Aristides* 24.4, *Lucullus* 42.6 and *Pompeius* 38.1, 46.3, 48.3 and 48.6; cf. also Polybius 30.26.9. However this sense seems somewhat weak in this case and there are other instances, where *διάταξις* is qualified by a genitive, as e.g. Plutarch *Timoleon* 35.3: οὐ νόμων θέσις, οὐ χώρας κατοικισμός, οὐ πολιτείας διάταξις ἐδόκει καλῶς ἔχειν, *Comp. Lyc. c. Num.* 2: καὶ μὴν τῆς τε διατάξεως καὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῶν πολιτευμάτων, *Adversus Colotem* 31.1125 C: καὶ πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ νόμων διάταξιν, 31.1125 D and 31.1125 F. It would perhaps be correct to read *πολιτείας διατάξεως* here. It seems that Colotes had a twofold concept, referring partly to laws, partly to administration; cf. Plutarch *Adversus Colotem* 30.1124 D: οἱ νόμους διατάξαντες καὶ νόμιμα καὶ τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καταστήσαντες and 31.1125 C.

περιστέλλων

This verb with the meaning “dress, wrap up” (LSJ, s.v. *περιστέλλω* I 1 a) is found first in Pindar *Nem.* 11.15 and Empedocles in Plutarch *De esu carniū* 2.998 C (= fr. B 126 *FVS* I) and occurs later in Hellenistic prose: Theophrastus *Char.* 2.10, Aristotle *Probl.* 2.26 p. 868b38, Polybius 21.38.5 and Plutarch *Pyrrho* 11.6.

τὸ σαρκίδιον

The use of the diminutive, here in order to express contempt, is very common, especially in the spoken language; see introd. Chapter II:2.

μέν', ὦ ταλαίπωρ' . . . ἐν δεμνίοις

This is a quotation of Euripides *Or.* 258, which is not chosen at random by Plutarch in his answer to Colotes, as it was originally said by Electra to the mad Orestes. It must have been a popular line both with Plutarch and with other authors, as we find it quoted also Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi* 2.465 C, *Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores* 3.501 C, *An seni sit gerenda res publica* 9.788 F, *De placitis philosophorum* 4.12.901 A, Libanius *Dem. apol. Declam.* 23.69 p. 419 Foerster VI, Galenus *De meth. med.* 1.2 p. 13 Kühn X and Erotianus s.v. *σάφα* p. 79 Nachmanson. *Orestes* belonged to those plays of Euripides, which were most read, even during a later period; see H. Funke, ‘Euripides’, *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum*, 8–9 (1965–66) p. 247 (Nachträge zum Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum (RAC)) and for Plutarch H. Schläpfer, *Plutarch und die klassischen Dichter: Ein Beitrag zum klassischen Bildungsgut Plutarchs* (Diss. Zürich, 1950) pp. 48 ff and especial-

ly p. 49 n. 17, where this line is called a "Bildungszitat".

The correct interpretation of this testimony is given by R. Westman, 'Plutarch gegen Kolotes: Seine Schrift "Adversus Colotem" als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle', *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 7 (Helsingfors, 1955) pp. 80 ff, who points out, and rightly so, that Colotes did not attack Bion or Antidorus in his work, as is assumed by Usener, Index. nom. s.v. 'Ἀντίδωρος and Bion Borysthenites, Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 103 and n. 469^b, Crönert, p. 13 and p. 188 s.v. Bion, R. Philippson, 'Polystratos' Schrift über die grundlose Verachtung der Volksmeinung', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 23 (12) (1909) pp. 502 f and Müller, art. cit. col. 120. At the end of his work Colotes praised law-givers and statesmen at the cost of all philosophers he attacked. Of course Plutarch is critical of this and the mention of Antidorus and Bion forms part of his criticism, meaning that if these two, who had no interest in legal and political questions, had been attacked by Colotes, they could easily have repudiated him as a man, who himself did not take any active part in politics.

Fragmenta

1. *Bion to Antigonus (F1–2)*

F1A–C *Βορυσθενίτης*

The fact that Bion came from Borysthenes, i.e. Olbia, is often pointed out in the ancient sources; cf. introd. Chapter I n. 2.

ἦξεν

The aorist of the verb ἦκω seems to be very late; cf. W. Veitch, *Greek Verbs: Irregular and Defective* (Oxford, 1887) p. 299. However there are other cases in Pausanias 2.11.5, Maximus of Tyre 20.7 c and 20.9 a and Galenus *De meth. med.* 9.4 p. 609 Kühn X.

Ἀντιγόνῳ

For Antigonus Gonatas and his relations with Bion see introd. Chapter I.

τίς πόθεν . . . τοκῆες

Antigonus is here quoting a Homeric line which occurs no less than six times in the *Odyssey* (1.170, 10.325, 14.187, 15.264, 19.105 and 24.297). Thus it is impossible to say exactly which line Antigonus is using. To quote Homer so appositely was very common and popular among educated Greeks, as was the use of a quotation in reply (cf. below). A rich material for this kind of use of Homer is collected in J. Teufer, *De Homero in apophthegmatis usurpato* (Diss. Leipzig, 1890).

The point of interest is that we find the same Homeric line in Lucian *Icaromenippus* 23, addressed by Zeus to Menippus, and in Seneca *Apocolocyntosis* 5.4, addressed by Heracles to Claudius. It cannot be decided with certainty if the anecdote about Bion is the original source in these cases, but it cannot be ruled out. Cf. Teufer, op. cit. p. 13 and O. Weinreich, *Senecas Apocolocyntosis: Die Satire auf Tod/Himmel- und Höllenfahrt des Kaisers Claudius* (Berlin, 1923) pp. 68 ff.

ἐμοῦ ὁ πατήρ . . . ἐξ ἐμᾶντοῦ

Most scholars accept that this actually was written by Bion: Hirzel 1877–83, II p. 60, Hirzel 1895, I p. 368 n. 1, Hense 1909, p. LXXXVII, Geffcken 1911, p. 405, Tarn, p. 235 and n. 46 and Dudley, p. 63 n. 2. Crönert, pp. 29 f, on the other hand, regards the written piece as a forgery and A. Kiessling, ‘Coniectanea spicilegium’ I, *Ind. schol. sem. aest. Greifswald* 1883 p. 7 expresses himself very carefully: “Haec si vera non sunt, at ad veritatem ficta esse concedi debet”. I do not see any reason for not accepting Bion as the author; Dudley, p. 63 n. 2 has noticed in this fragment several characteristics that are typical of Bion.

Another question is whether this piece of literature is to be regarded as a letter. Most scholars have accepted this idea, and Hirzel 1895, I p. 368 n. 1 is the only one to object. He is right to do so. There is nothing to indicate a letter, especially if we compare this with the letters in Diog. Laert., which are very stereotyped. The form makes it clear that we here have a reported dialogue between Bion and Antigonus Gonatas, which develops into a small discourse on Bion's part.

ἐμοῦ

This is the reading of all the MSS. and of Suda (F1B); I cannot see any reason for the change to ἐμοί, proposed by Cobet and accepted e.g. by Long, even though this form would answer the τοι in the quotation. The stress is not so much upon "my" as upon "father".

ἀπελεύθερος

For slavery in general during the Hellenistic period see *RE*, Suppl.b. VI (1935) s.v. Sklaverei cols. 927 ff (Westermann), W.L. Westermann, 'The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity', *The American Philosophical Society*, 40 (Philadelphia, 1955) pp. 28 ff and Schneider, II pp. 167 ff, where the question of manumission is also discussed.

It is very tempting to connect the manumission of Bion's father with a historical event, i.e. the fact that when Zopyrion attacked Olbia the slaves were set free in order to strengthen the defence of the city; cf. introd. Chapter I.

τῷ ἀγκῶνι . . . ταριχέμπορον

The expression and this combination seem to have become quite common and almost of proverbial character. Cf. Plutarch *Quaestiones convivales* 2.1.631D: ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν ταριχοπώλην αὐτόθεν ἐλοιδόρησεν, ὁ δὲ φήσας 'μεμνήμεθά σε τῷ βραχίονι ἀπομυσσόμενον' ἔσκωψεν, *Rhet. ad Herennium* 4.54.67: *ut si salsamentarii filio dicas: 'Quiesce tu, cuius pater cubito se emungere solebat', Suetonius Vita Horatii* 40: *Q. Horatius Flaccus, Venusinus, patre ut ipse tradit libertino et exactionum coactore, ut vero creditum est salsamentario, cum illi quidam in altercatione exprobrasset: 'quotiens ego vidi patrem tuum brachio se emungentem!'*, Macrobius *Sat.* 7.3.6: *est autem loedoria huius modi: oblitusne es quia salsamenta vendebas? scomma autem, quod diximus saepe contumeliam esse celatam, tale est: meminimus quando brachio te emungebas*, Eustathius *ad Il.* 6.211 (p. 637 ed. Rom.): ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ὁ Κυνικὸς Ἀντισθένης (obviously a slip of memory instead of Bion) χρησάμενος πρὸς τὸν ἀνακρίνοντα τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ εἰπὼν, ὥς ἐμοὶ πατήρ μὲν ἦν τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος ἤγουν ταριχέμπορος, Eustathius *ad Il.* 8.457 (p. 723 ed. Rom.): ἐξ ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ κοινῶς ἀπομύσσεσθαι, οὗ χρήσις ἐν τῷ, πατήρ τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν δηλαδὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν τῇ χειρὶ ἀσχολουμένη περὶ ἀλίπαστα and Suda, s.v. Ἀγκῶν, 249 (= F1C). In the first part Bion obviously describes his father

in a joking way. In the later part — *διεδήλουν δὲ τὸν ταριχέμπορον* — H. Lucas, 'Die Herkunft Bions und Horazens', *Philologus*, 58 (10) (1899) pp. 622 ff has tried to find an addition by Diog. Laert. or his source; a similar opinion was expressed already by Hoogvliet, pp. 5 f and F. Fritzsche, in *Lucianus Samosatenensis* II:2 (Rostock, 1870) p. XLII. I am not convinced that this is the correct interpretation but am inclined to think that this phrase is an aside by Bion himself, telling us that his father's vulgar habits also indicated his occupation—fishmonger. The verb *διαδηλόω* is known from Bion's century (*PRev. Laws* 16.17) and other cases, though later, seem to confirm this interpretation: *Sextus Empiricus Adv. math.* 7.87, *Josephus BJ* 6.9.3, *Plutarch Caesar* 6.2 and *Dio Cassius* 40.17.2. That view that Bion's father really was a fishmonger may also find some support from Horace *Ep.* 2.2.60 (= T14), where the expression *sale nigro* may be used in order to indicate this origin; cf. E. Frankel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957) pp. 6 f. Therefore I would think that this connection between wiping one's nose and being a fishmonger, i.e. between a bad habit and a bad occupation, originated with Bion and from him passed into a proverbial expression.

τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος

The use of napkins or handkerchiefs was not generally known in antiquity. Instead the fingers were used, which however was not considered good behaviour in company or in public. Cf. *Theophrastus Char.* 19.4, where *ὁ δυσχερής* is described as *ἐσθίων ἀπομύττεσθαι*, *Xenophon Cyr.* 1.2.16: *αἰσχροὺν μὲν γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστὶ Πέρσαις καὶ τὸ πτύειν καὶ τὸ ἀπομύττεσθαι*, *Xenophon Symp.* 1.15, *Aristophanes Eq.* 910 and *Anth. Pal.* 7.134.

The reason for Bion's father to use his elbow instead of his fingers was that the fingers of a dealer in saltfish were not suitable for wiping his nose.

ταριχέμπορον

This word is known only from Bion ap. *Diog. Laert.*, *Suda* and *Eustathius*, who are obviously quoting Bion. The expressions *ταριχευτής* and *ταριχοπώλης* are more common; the latter is known, apart from *Plutarch*, also from *Alexis* fr. 15.14 *Kock II*, *Nicostratus* fr. 4.5, 4 *Kock II*, *Lucian Vitarum auctio* 11 etc., *Athenaeus* 3.120 A and 8.339 D and *Suda*, s.v. *Δίδυμος*, 872.

A fishmonger had a very low reputation among the Greeks and the Romans, as we can see from references in e.g. *Plato Charmides* 163 B, *Lucian Vitarum auctio* 11, *Menippus* 17 and *Toxaris* 4 and *Juvenal Sat.* 4.32–33. They were also badly treated in comedy; see T.B.L. Webster, *Studies in later Greek Comedy* (Manchester, 1953) pp. 38 f and n. 1, where references are collected. This attitude should be taken together with the general contempt the Greeks felt for all menial occupations; see *Dover*, pp. 40 f.

It has already been indicated in introd. Chapter I and n. 25 that dealing in saltfish must have been very important in Olbia. For a general survey of the

importance of fishing during the Hellenistic period see M.I. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941) II pp. 1177 ff with references. For saltfish, i.e. *τάριχος*, in antiquity see also M. Köhler, 'TAPIXOS ou recherches sur l'histoire et les antiquités des pecheries de la Russie méridionale', *Mémoires de l'Académie Imperiale des sciences de Saint-Petersbourg*, 6^e Sér., Sciences politiques, Histoire et Philologie, 1 (St. Petersburg, 1832) pp. 347 ff, DS, IV:2 (1908–11) s.v. Salsamentum pp. 1022 ff (Bernier) and RE, XI:1 (1921) s.v. Kochkunst cols. 950 ff (Orth).

πρόσωπον

LSJ, s.v. *πρόσωπον* IV 2 gives "legal personality" as the meaning of the word *πρόσωπον* here. If this is correct, we would have a nice pun on the double meaning in *πρόσωπον*, which would be wholly in Bion's style. However, there is the difficulty that the legal use of this word seems to be much later; cf. *ThW*, VI (1959) s.v. *πρόσωπον* p. 771 (Lohse).

However, there is another possibility, which seems more probable to me, viz. to translate the first *πρόσωπον* with "Persönlichkeit, Ansehen", which would give excellent sense here. This meaning of the word is found from the Hellenistic period, e.g. Polybius 5.107.3, 15.25.25 and 32.5.14. Furthermore this interpretation gives us a pun on the double meaning of the word *πρόσωπον*. Cf. K. Praechter, 'Πρόσωπον (Zu Dio Chryst. or. 15,12)', *Philologus*, 63 (17) (1904) pp. 155 f and R. Hirzel, 'Die Person: Begriff und Name derselben im Altertum', *Sitzungsberichte der Königl. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1914, 10. Abhandlung (Munich, 1914) for the different meanings of *πρόσωπον*.

συγγραφὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου

This is a very bitter and ironic expression, indicating that the *συγγραφή* covered the whole face; cf. Hoogvliet, p. 6. The expression as such must refer to branding or tattooing, even though LSJ, s.v. *συγγραφή* gives no parallels for such a use of the noun. It is difficult to decide with certainty which form of punishment Bion means here, as the same terminology is used in both cases in a most confusing way. Branding was probably the more common form but there are also cases of slaves being tattooed; cf. Herodas 5.65–68 with W. Headlam—A.D. Knox's note ad loc., Westermann, op. cit. (1955) p. 19 and p. 53 and E.R. Dodds, 'The Greeks and the Irrational', *Sather Classical Lectures*, 25 (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1951) pp. 163 f for tattooing in general. Here I think it is fairly certain that the expression refers to branding. The use of *συγγραφή* in this connection can then be explained by the fact that brands usually consisted of letters. Therefore branded slaves in Rome were called *litterati*, *notati* or *inscripti*. For the expression cf. Aelianus *VE* 2.9: *τούς γε μὴν ἀλίσκομένους αἰχμαλώτους Σαμίων στίζειν κατὰ τοῦ προσώπου*, Herodas 5.79: *ἐν τῷ μετώπῳ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα ἔχων τοῦτο*, Seneca *De ira* 3.3.6: *inscriptiones fron-*

tis, Pliny *NH* 18.4.21: *inscriptique vultus*, Martial 3.21.2: *famulus . . . fronte notata*, Juvenal *Sat.* 14.24: *inscripta ergastula*, Petronius *Sat.* 103: *frontes notans inscriptione sollerti*, Macrobius *Sat.* 1.11.19: *servus . . . inscripta fronte* and Apuleius *Metam.* 9.12: *frontes litterati*. For more material see Mayor, II p. 293 and W. Headlam-A.D. Knox, in *Herodas: The Mimes and Fragments* (Cambridge, 1922) pp. 264 f (on Herodas 5.79), and for the subject in general *RE*, IIIA:2 (1929) s.v. *στιγματίας* cols. 2520 ff (Hug) and the discussion of the name *Ἐλαφόστικτος* by W. Dittenberger, in *Hermes*, 37 (1902) pp. 298 ff, P. Wolters, in *Hermes*, 38 (1903) pp. 265 ff and O. Crusius, in *Philologus*, 62 (16) (1903) pp. 125 ff.

σύμβολον

The use of this word here is very bitter and ironical, as it usually has a good meaning as a token of good will; cf. Plutarch *Pyrrhus* 20.2: *χρυσίον . . . φιλίας δέ τι καὶ ξενίας . . . σύμβολον*.

μήτηρ

For Bion's mother see T1 with commentary.

ἀπ' οἰκήματος

The meaning of the word *οἶκημα* here—brothel—is quite classical (see LSJ, s.v. *οἶκημα* II 1). For the terminology see DS, III:2 (1904) s.v. *Meretrices* p. 1825 (Navarre) and *RE*, VIII:2 (1913) s.v. *Hetairai* cols. 1339 f (Schneider).

πατατελωνησάμενος

For this verb, which is only to be found here, LSJ, s.v. gives the meaning “cheat the revenue”, which, although commonly accepted (cf. e.g. Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 33 and v. Arnim 1899, col. 483), can hardly be correct. The simple verb *τελωνέω* has the meaning “to be a *τελώνης*, take toll of one” (LSJ, s.v.). As verbs with *παρα-* usually indicate that something is done wrongly, the meaning here must be “to act as a *τελώνης* faithlessly”. There are several verbs of the same type, e.g. *παράγω*, *-βασιλεύω*, *-βλέπω*, *-κόπτω*, *-πράσσω* and *-πρεσβεύω*. Cf. P.A. v.d. Laan, *De ΠΑΡΑ praepositionis vi apud Euripidem in compositione verborum* (Diss. Amsterdam, 1907) pp. 85 ff and Schwyzler, II p. 493. This shows that Bion's father was employed by the customs in Olbia, which was pointed out by K.J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* IV:1 (Berlin-Leipzig, 1925) p. 446 n. 1 and seems to have been understood already by A. Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* I, 2. ed. (Berlin, 1851) p. 454. How this is to be combined with his trade as a fishmonger is not clear, but maybe it was not impossible to follow two occupations, as his position in the customs must have been on a very low level.

The very bad reputation of the *τελώναι* during antiquity is shown by many references: Aristophanes *Eq.* 248, Theophrastus *Char.* 6.5, Philonides fr. 5 Kock I, Apollodorus fr. 13 Kock III, Xenon fr. 1 Kock III, Herodas 6.64,

N.T. *Ev. Matth.* 21.31, Diogenes *Ep.* 36.2, Dio of Prusa 4.98 and 14.14, Lucian *Gallus* 27, *Pseudologista* 30 and *Menippus* 11, *Gnom. Vat.* 344 and Pollux *Onom.* 6.128 and 9.32, where this is given as a dishonest occupation. For the reputation of *τελῶναι* see *ThW*, VIII (1969) s.v. *τελώνης* pp. 98 ff (Michel), and for the occupation in general J. Hasebroek, *Staat und Handel im alten Griechenland: Untersuchungen zur antiken Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1928) pp. 171 ff and *RE*, VA:1 (1934) s.v. *τελῶναι* cols. 418 ff (Schwahn).

πανοίκιος

The meaning "with all the household" is usually expressed in earlier Greek by an adverb like *πανοικίῃ* (Herodotus 8.106.3) or *πανοικησίᾳ* (Thucydides 2.16.1). The adjective *πανοίκιος* belongs to Hellenistic Greek and can be found in, e.g., Diodorus Siculus 5.20.4, Strabo 4.4.2, Dionysius Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.71.3, Philo *In Flaccum* 3.14 and *Legatio ad Gaium* 23.157; cf. Welles, p. 351.

πανοίκιος ἐπράθη μεθ' ἡμῶν

The punishment inflicted on Bion's father and his whole family seems very harsh and oldfashioned, when compared with the conditions in Athens at this time; cf. L. Beauchet, *Histoire du droit privé de la république Athénienne* II (Paris, 1897) pp. 415 ff for cases where a man could be sold in slavery as a punishment, which does not apply to a citizen. However, the conditions in Olbia may have been different and the status of Bion's father as a freedman may have prompted more severe punishment. Moreover the principle of the solidarity of the family was very important in Greek law, and it was applied also to fiscal offences; cf. G. Glotz, *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* (Thèse Paris, 1904), especially pp. 456 ff.

με ἀγοράζει . . . εὐχαριν.

This seems to indicate that the rhetor who bought Bion also used him sexually, which is not in any way improbable. Cf. Herodas *Mime* 5, where a woman has her slave as her lover. More cases of such relationships are given in J.P. Sullivan, *The Satyricon of Petronius: A Literary Study* (London, 1968) p. 121 and n.1.

κατέλιπεν μοι πάντα

There are other cases of a slave inheriting the fortune of his master and lover. Cf. Petronius *Sat.* 76, where Trimalchio remarks about his former owner: *coheredem me Caesari fecit, et accepi patrimonium laticlavium*, Lucian *Timon* 22, where *καταπύγων οἰκέτης ἐκ παιδικῶν τίμιος, ὑπεξυρμημένος ἔτι τὴν γνάθον* is the heir and Lucian *Dial. mort.* 19.4, where the speaker named as his heir *νεώνητόν τινα τῶν μεираκίων τῶν ὠραίων Φρύγα*.

κατακαύσας αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα

Hirzel 1895, I p. 378 calls this action a “Theatercoup”. It indicates a conscious change in Bion’s life and perhaps a transition from rhetoric to philosophy. Cf. Diog. Laert. 3.5, where Plato is said to have burnt his *ποιήματα* after having listened to Socrates, and Diog. Laert. 6.95, where Metrocles burns *τὰς Θεοφράστου ἀκροάσεις* after having joined the Cynic school. Both Plato and Metrocles quote *Il.* 17.392. Cf. O. Gigon, ‘Antike Erzählungen über die Berufung zur Philosophie’, *Museum Helveticum*, 3 (1946) p. 16.

τὰ συγγράμματα

The term *συγγραμμα* indicates a literary work in a more polished form and in prose; it is the opposite both of *ποίημα* and of *ὑπόμνημα*. Cf. Plato *Leg.* 7.810 B: ἃ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας, Isocrates 2.7: πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν μετὰ μέτρου ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων, Dio of Prusa 8.9, 27.6 and 38.10 respectively Galenus *In Hipp. praedict.* 1.8 p. 532 Kühn XVI: μᾶλλον ὑπομνήματι πρέπον ἐστὶν ἢ συγγράμματι. It seems very difficult to find the exact meaning of the term here but “treatises on rhetoric” would fit very well.

συγξύσας

This verb is not very common. We find it with the meaning “shred, grate up” in Hippocrates *Haem.* 3 p. 438 Littré VI: ὅταν ξηρὸν γένηται (sc. φάρμακον), συγξύσας τριῖπον λεῖον. The metaphorical meaning “scrape together” is only to be found here.

ταύτης τοι γενεῆς . . . εἶναι

Bion replies very wittily to Antigonus’ question with a Homeric quotation, *Il.* 6.211 or 20.241. The line is not chosen at random as it in both cases is said by one of the Homeric heroes introducing himself and his ancestry. It is therefore used with a great deal of irony by Bion. Similar instances of one Homeric quotation being answered by another can be found, e.g. Athenaeus 10.438 A—B and Epictetus 3.22.92, in which anecdotes the Cynics Timon and Diogenes play the main role.

Περσαῖος

For the Stoic philosopher see Crönert, pp. 28 ff, Tarn, pp. 231 ff, who describes his relations with Antigonus Gonatas, and *RE*, XIX:1 (1937) s.v. Persaios (no. 1) cols. 926 ff (Deichgräber); the fragments are collected frs. 435—462 *SVF* I. Cf. also F73 with commentary.

Φιλωνίδης

This is a mere name; see Diog. Laert. 7.9 and 7.38 (= fr. 439 and fr. 38 *SVF* I) and *RE*, XX:1 (1941) s.v. Philonides (no. 4) cols. 62 f (Mette).

It can be noted that F1 shows a great autobiographical interest, which we can

also discern in other fragments (cf. F16A). This seems to be typical especially of authors interested in satire as we find the same in, e.g., Lucilius, Horace and Lucian; cf. Geffcken 1909, pp. 55 f and p. 145, Geffcken 1911, p. 405, Fiske, p. 182, Duff, p. 33 and p. 54 and Knoche, p. 18 and p. 29; see also for the case of Bion G. Misch, *Geschichte der Autobiographie* I:1, 3. ed. (Bern, 1949) p. 312.

Bion can hardly be said to have given a flattering picture of himself; indeed it is so dark as to make the reader wonder whether it is really true. It is hardly possible to give a definite answer, because of the lack of sources. It can be assumed that by this extremely outspoken and almost ostentatious answer Bion managed to silence his opponents, which was his main object. The same method was used by Horace *Sat.* 1.6, addressed to Maecenas, where he, openly but in a milder way than Bion, admits his low origin.

To look upon oneself with self-deprecating irony, which sometimes seems to develop into a kind of inverted boasting, obviously has a Cynic background. Already Antisthenes answered questions about his ancestry with much irony: *Ἀντισθένης Ἀντισθένους Ἀθηναῖος ἐλέγετο δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἰθαγενῆς ὅθεν πρὸς τὸν ὀνειδίζοντα εἰπεῖν 'καὶ ἡ μήτηρ τῶν θεῶν Φρυγία ἐστίν'. ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι Θράκης μητρός* (Diog. Laert. 6.1 = fr. 122A Caizzi; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.4 and *Gnom. Vat.* 10 = frs. 145–146 Caizzi). In the same way Crates could be joking about his ugliness: *στεῖχεις δὴ, φίλε κυρτών, / βαίνεις τ' εἰς Ἀἶδαο δόμους κυφὸς διὰ γῆρας* (Diog. Laert. 6.92; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.91–92) and *ἔσκωπτεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὴν χολότητα* (Julian 6.201 B). For this aspect see Geffcken 1909, pp. 55 f and Süß, pp. 257 f. Yet the historical truth of Bion's self-abuse is rendered doubtful by the fact that many details answer the demands of a rhetorical *διαβολή*. Cf. T3 with commentary, where references are also given.

A paraphrase of F1 is given by Montaigne: “J'en embrasserais franchement l'exemple du philosophe Bion. Antigonos le voulait piquer sur le sujet de son origine; il lui coupa broche: Je suit, dit-il, fils d'un serf, boucher, stigmatisé, et d'une putain que mon père épousa par la bassesse de sa fortune. Tous deux furent punis pour quelque méfait. Un orateur m'acheta enfant, me trouvant agréable, et m'a laissé mourant tous ses biens, lesquels ayant transporté en cette ville d'Athènes, me suis adonné à la philosophie. Que les historiens ne s'empêchent à chercher nouvelles de moi; je leur en dirai ce qui en est. La confession généreuse et libre énerve le reproche et désarme l'injure” (*Essais* III. 12 p. 395 Aux Éditions du Seuil).

F2

The suggestion of Hirzel 1895, I p. 368 n. 1 and Hense 1909, p. LXXXVII f that this originally belonged to the same “letter” as the preceding fragment, does not seem to be the only possible explanation, although we have the same Homeric quotation from Antigonos' side in both. On the other hand, F1 is a

complete entity with a Homeric quotation both at the beginning and at the end. F2 can have belonged to the same dialogue as F1, but as well to another, for we may assume that this subject was very important to Bion. Therefore Bion's answer in F2, which has the character of an independent saying, can only later have been connected with Antigonus' introductory question, which was borrowed from F1. Cf. also Geffcken 1911, p. 405, who regards F1 as the original expression, while F2 is more formalized.

δυσβληθέντα ὡς δυσγενῆ

A very common method of attacking people was, as we have seen, to point to their low origin and accuse them of originally having been slaves (cf. F73 with commentary). This belongs to the rhetorical rules for *διαβολή*; cf. Süss, pp. 247 f with some examples.

There are several instances where ancient philosophers are said to have been slaves; this applies, e.g., to Monimus: *οικέτης δέ τινος τραπεζίτου Κορινθίου* (Diog. Laert. 6.82), Menippus: *τὸ ἀνέκαθεν ἦν Φοῖνιξ, δοῦλος* (Diog. Laert. 6.99), Demetrius of Phaleron: *Δημήτριον δὲ τὸν Φαληρέα οἰκότριβα γενέσθαι λέγουσιν ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας τῆς Τιμοθέου καὶ Κόνωνος* (Aelianus *VH* 12.43; cf. Diog. Laert. 5.75 = fr. 2 Wehrli IV), Phaedon: *Φαίδωνι δὲ τὴν τῆς δουλείας ἐπιστὰς δίκην ἐφωράθη* (sc. *Πλάτων*) (Athenaeus 11.507 C) and Boidas: *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ Δίφιλος εἰς Βοΐδαν τὸν φιλόσοφον δλόκληρον συνέταξε ποίημα, δι' οὗ καὶ εἰς δουλείαν ἐρυπαίνετο ὁ φιλόσοφος* (*Schol. ad Aristoph. Nub.* 96 p. 394 Dindorf IV:1; cf. also Gerhard 1909, pp. 213 ff). A list of philosophers who originally were slaves is given in Aulus Gellius *NA* 2.18 and Macrobius *Sat.* 1.11.41–45. The subject must have been of a certain interest as Hermippus of Berytion wrote a work called *Περὶ τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ διαπρεψάντων δούλων* (Suda, s.v. *Ἰστρος*, 706). For slaves as philosophers during the Hellenistic period see also Schneider, II p. 549.

τοξοτῶν

Archers were little used in the Greek army and most of them were foreigners, especially from Scythia; cf. J. Kromayer-G. Veith, 'Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer', *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, IV:3:2 (Munich, 1928) pp. 54 f, *RE*, VIA:2 (1937) s.v. *τοξόται* cols. 1853 ff (Lammert-Hommel) and Schneider, I p. 803. It is clear from many instances in Greek literature that the use of bows was especially connected with Scythia; see e.g. Herodotus 1.73 and 4.10, Pliny *NH* 7.56.201 and M. Ebert, *Südrussland im Altertum* (Bonn-Leipzig, 1921) pp. 90 f. So it may very well be that Bion is here influenced by memories from Olbia, where competitions with bows and arrows were still held during this period (*IPE* I² 195 with commentary) and where these were used as symbols on coins; cf. Minns, pp. 66 ff, p. 465 and plate III with coins from Olbia, where motives from archery are used, A. Schaumberg, *Bogen und Bogenschütze bei den Griechen mit be-*

sonderer Rücksicht auf die Denkmäler bis zum Ausgang der archaischen Stils (Diss. Erlangen, 1910) p. 105 and Ziebell, p. 57.

For τοξόται used in a comparison, as here see Aristotle *EN* 1.2.2 p. 1094a23–24: ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ ἀρίστου) μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος.

F1–2

Bion's main interest in these two fragments is to stress that a man should be judged by what he is himself and not by what his ancestors were. Therefore these fragments are closely connected with Bion's ideas on freedom and slavery (cf. F11A–B with commentary). The problem of the value of high birth was treated by several philosophers, and works with the title *Περὶ εὐγενείας* are attested for Aristotle (e.g. Diog. Laert. 5.22; cf. P.M. Schul, 'Aristote: De la richesse — De la prière — De la noblesse — Du plaisir — De l'éducation: Fragments et témoignages', *Publications de la faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Paris-Sorbonne, Sér. "Textes et Documents"*, 17 (Paris, 1968) pp. 79 ff, where the fragments are collected and given a commentary), the Epicurean Metrodorus (Diog. Laert. 10.24) and the Stoic Diogenes (Athenaeus 4.168 E = fr. 52 *SVF* III); a treatise of Philo also has this title. The idea that high birth does not mean superiority, and that it does not give a noble mind is both old and common as we can see from the sayings collected in Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.29. The concept *εὐγενής* was instead given a moral interpretation. The discussion and the criticism of the old appreciation of nobility goes back to the sophists. Cf. the saying of Lycophron: 'εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν' φησιν 'ἀφανὲς τὸ κάλλος, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ τὸ σεμνόν' (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.29.24 = fr. 4 *FVS* II = Aristotle fr. 91 Rose). We find the same critical attitude in Socrates: *πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ εὐγένειαν οὐδὲν σεμνὸν ἔχειν* (Diog. Laert. 2.31), Plato (see Baldry, p. 73), Euripides and Menander. See further W. Haedicke, *Die Gedanken der Griechen über Familienherkunft und Vererbung* (Diss. Halle-Wittenberg, 1936) with a rich material for the earlier period.

The same opinion is, as may be expected, very common in the Cynic school as we can see from sayings of Antisthenes: *τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς τοὺς καὶ ἐναρέτους* (Diog. Laert. 6.10 = fr. 69 Caizzi; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.4 and *Gnom. Vat.* 10 = frs. 145–146 Caizzi), Diogenes: *εὐγενείας δὲ καὶ δόξας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα διέπαιζε, προκοσμήματα κακίας εἶναι λέγων* (Diog. Laert. 6.72), Demonax: *Δημῶναξ ἀξιούντων τινῶν προτιμᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν προγόνων εὐγένειαν γελοῖον ἔφη ἀλεκτρυόνας μὲν οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων δοκιμάζεσθαι, [εἰ εὐγενεῖς] εἰ γενναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν, τοὺς δ' ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων κρίνεσθαι* (*Gnom. Par.* 1) and the general characterization of the Cynics: *πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονοῦσιν* (Diog. Laert. 6.104). The same applies to the Stoic school, as we can see from Diog. Laert. 7.102 (= fr. 117 *SVF* III), where *εὐγένεια* is numbered among things without value; for the

Cynic attitude cf. Joel 1893—1901, II pp. 349 ff and Dziech, pp. 90 ff.

The idea that high birth has no value of its own later becomes commonplace in literature influenced by popular philosophy as we can see from, e.g. Philo *De nobilitate: De virtutibus* 189: *χρὴ μόνους λέγειν εὐγενεῖς τοὺς σώφρονας καὶ δικαίους, κἂν τύχωσιν ἐξ οἰκοτρίβων ἢ ἀργυρωνήτων γεγονότες*, Dio of Prusa 15.30: *ὁ γὰρ ἵππον θεασάμενος θυμοειδῆ καὶ γαῦρον καὶ πρὸς δρόμον εὖ ἔχοντα, οὐ πυθόμενος εἴτε ἐξ Ἀρκαδίας ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἔτυχεν ὧν εἴτε ἐκ Μηδίας εἴτε Θετταλός, φησὶν εὐγενῆ τὸν ἵππον αὐτὸν κρίνων*, which is a comparison very much in Bion's style, Dio of Prusa 15.31: *ὥστε ὃς ἂν ἡ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καλῶς γεγονώς, τοῦτον προσήκει γενναῖον λέγεσθαι, κἂν μηθεὶς ἐπίσταιται τοὺς γονέας αὐτοῦ μηδὲ τοὺς προγόνους*, Cebes *Tabula* 8.4, Galenus *Protrepticus* 7.11 p. 110 Marquardt, Horace *Sat.* 1.6 and *Sat.* 2.5.8, Seneca *Herc. fur.* 340—341: *qui genus iactat suum / aliena laudat*, *Ep.* 44.2: *bona mens omnibus patet, omnes ad hoc sumus nobiles*, *Ep.* 44.5: *quis est generosus? ad virtutem bene a natura compositus*, and *De beneficiis* 3.28.1 and 3, Juvenal *Sat.* 8.20: *nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus*, Persius *Sat.* 4 and Valerius Maximus 3.4—5.

It is of a certain interest that Antigonus Gonatas expresses very much the same opinion on this question as Bion; cf. introd. Chapter I and n. 64.

Apart from the literature already cited see for this topos also O. Immisch, 'Xenophon über Theognis und das Problem des Adels', in *Commentationes philologae quibus Ottoni Ribbeckio . . . congratulantur discipuli Lipsienses* (Leipzig, 1888) pp. 71 ff, Wendland 1895, pp. 51 ff, Rainfurt, pp. 27 ff, D. Loenen, 'De nobilitate apud Athenienses', *Mnemosyne* NS, 54 (1926) pp. 206 ff, Curtius, pp. 188 f and G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford, 1954) pp. 113 ff and especially n. 1 (p. 272).

2. On philosophy and sciences (F3—10)

- F3 This saying, in a very similar form, is also attributed to Gorgias (*Gnom. Vat.* 166 = *Flor. Mon.* 172), Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2.79 = Arsenius *Violetum* p. 116 Walz = fr. 23 Mannebach), Aristotle (Elias *In Arist. Cat. comm. prol.* p. 21 Busse (*Comm. in Arist. Gr.* XVIII:1, 1900) = Olympiodorus *Anecd. Par.* IV p. 411 Cramer = T67d Düring) and Ariston of Chios (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.4.109 = *Gnom. Par.* 324 = fr. 350 *SVF* I). For more parallels see L. Sternbach's note on *Gnom. Vat.* 166. For this comparison see also *RAC*, III (1962) s.v. Enkyklios Paideia col. 382 (Fuchs) and A. Stückelberger, *Senecas 88. Brief über Wert und Unwert der Freien Künste* (Heidelberg, 1965) p. 61 and n. 38 with more references. It can be noted that we find the suitors of Penelope used in a comparison in Horace *Ep.* 1.2.27—28: *nos numerus sumus et fruges consumere nati, / sponsi Penelopae nebulones*. A. Kiessling, 'Coniectaneorum spicilegium' IV, *Ind. schol. sem. hib. Greifswald* 1887—88 pp. III ff thinks that Horace uses the saying we are treating here, which however is very

uncertain; cf. Heinze 1890, p. 522.

It is very unlikely that this saying originally comes from Gorgias or Aristotle; in the second case the reason for the attribution can be a confusion between the names Aristotle and Aristippus or Ariston; cf. Fuchs, art. cit. col. 382 and O. Gigon, in 'I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition. Göteborg 1957', *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 212 (1958) p. 8. Of the three left there is much to suggest that Aristippus is the original author. He is the oldest and his version has the most details. Bion can very well have taken this saying over from Aristippus, thanks to his connections with the Cyrenaic school. His interest in Aristippus is obvious from Diog. Laert. 2.79 (= F40A); cf. also Teles p. 29.13, where a quotation from Aristippus is given, which may originally have belonged to Bion. Ariston of Chios may also have taken this saying over from Aristippus; cf. Giesecke, p. 23 n. 1, Hense 1909, p. LXXX and n. 1, Mayer, p. 548 n. 131 and Gigon, art. cit. p. 8; O. Mauch, *Der lateinische Begriff disciplina: Eine Wortuntersuchung* (Diss. Basel, 1941), p. 11 n. 3 opposes this view.

It is worth while noticing that the form of the saying in Bion differs in some respects from that found in the others. It is a more obvious comparison with ὥσπερ . . . οὕτω instead of ὁμοίους or εἰκόσιν (cf. Lausberg, § 846:1). Therefore the order is different, so that the Homeric borrowing precedes the point to be clarified.

ἀστείως

This feature of style, *χαριεντισμός*, *ἀστειότης* or *urbanitas*, often belongs to an apophthegma, gnome or chreia. Cf. Aristotle *Rhet.* 3.10.1 p. 1410b ff, where τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦντα are discussed, *Rhet. ad. Alex.* 22 p. 1434a35–38, where one method of achieving ἀστεῖα is γνώμας συμπαραλαμβάνειν, Ps-Anaximenes *Rhet.* 15.2: ἐὰν μὴ βούλῃ γνώμην ἢ ἐνθύμημα συντόμως εἰπεῖν τοῦ ἀστείου ἔνεκεν and Quintilian 6.3.108–109. Other sayings of Bion are also characterized in a similar way by *χαριέντως* (F29 and F73), *χάριεν* (F52), *καλῶς* (F14), *eleganter* (F44) and *facetum illud* (F69). Cf. *RE*, Suppl.b. VI (1935) s.v. Gnome etc. col. 76 (Horna).

ὥσπερ οἱ μνηστῆρες . . . θεραπαίνας

It is almost impossible to find an exact place in the *Odyssey*, which Bion is referring to here, and obviously he is building more on a general impression. Cf. *Od.* 18.321–325, 19.56–95, 20.6–7 and 20.444–446. The description of Aristippus is in this case more detailed, and the names of some of the servants are given.

We have here a Homeric comparison and not an allegorical interpretation. On the other hand, we see here very clearly, how close the two forms are to each other, and how easy the transition from a comparison to an allegorical interpretation; cf. Lausberg, § 556, § 558 and § 895 and J. F. Kindstrand, 'Ho-

mer in der Zweiten Sophistik: Studien zu der Homerlektüre und dem Homerbild bei Dion von Prusa, Maximos von Tyros und Ailios Aristeides', *Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis: Studia Graeca Upsaliensia*, 7 (Uppsala, 1973) pp. 132 f and pp. 179 f for similar expressions in Dio of Prusa and Maximus of Tyre.

Later we find Penelope interpreted as the true philosophy: *τὴν μεθοδικὴν καὶ κανονικὴν φιλοσοφίαν* (Eustathius *ad Od.* 1. 51 (p. 1390 ed. Rom.)). F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Thèse Paris, 1957) pp. 389 ff proposes as a possibility that this allegory could originate from Ariston of Chios, which hardly seems possible, as its type belongs to a much later period; for Ariston's use of Homer in general see Buffière, *op. cit.* pp. 374 f and n. 34.

For Bion's use of Homer in general see introd. Chapter II:2.

θεραπαίνας

This comparison of *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία* with a servant can also be found, e.g., in Philo *De congressu* [*quaerendae*] *eruditionis gratia*, where Sara's servant Hagar is seen as a symbol for the *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία*, e.g. 3.11: *εἰκότως οὖν οὐ βραχέσι χρήσεται προοιμίαις, ἀλλὰ γραμματικῇ, γεωμετρίας, ἀστρονομίας, ῥητορικῇ, μουσικῇ, τῇ ἄλλῃ λογικῇ θεωρίᾳ πάσῃ, ὣν ἐστὶ σύμβολον ἡ Σάρας θεραπαινὶς Ἄγαρ*; cf. Norden 1909, II pp. 673 f, Stückelberger, *op. cit.* pp. 60 ff and M. Alexandre, in *Les Oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, 16: *De congressu eruditionis gratia* (Paris, 1967) pp. 61 ff.

παιδεύμασι

Bion does not use the same expression as the others: *ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα* (Gorgias), *ἐγκυκλίων παιδευμάτων* (Aristippus), *ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμασι* (Aristotle) and *ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα* (Ariston of Cios), but he has kept the same noun as Aristippus. We find the same expression e.g. in Ps-Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 10.7 C: *ἐγκυκλίων παιδευμάτων*; for the terminology see Fuchs, *art. cit.* cols. 370 f.

κατασκελετεύουσι

This is a detail found only in Bion's version of the saying. Therefore it is highly probable that we have here an addition by Bion himself. A vivid expression of this kind is very much in his style, and it is also worth while noticing that the Cynics in general are very fond of comparisons taken from the field of medicine; cf. introd. Chapter II:2.

The idea behind this expression is not new, but it is a common belief that people, who devote themselves exclusively to philosophy or studies, are thought of as being ill or more or less dead. We find this already in Aristophanes *Nubes* 103 and 504. Cf. also Plato *Phaedo* 64 B: *ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφούντες θανατῶσι*, which is given as the popular opinion, Diog. Laert. 7.2, where Zeno, asking the oracle, how he should attain the best life, receives the fol-

lowing answer: ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεόν, εἰ συγχρωτίζοιτο τοῖς νεκροῖς· ὁθεν ζυνέντα τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀναγινώσκειν, Epictetus 4.4.2: τοῖς βιβλίοις προσδέδεμαι ὡς νεκρός and Lucian *De parasito* 50, where a philosopher dead in battle is described as προτεθνηκότα τῆς μάχης.

For the use of the verb κατασκελετεύω in similar connections see Philo *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 10.34: ῥυπῶντες, ὠχροί, κατεσκελετευμένοι, which is a description of οἱ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενοι φιλάρετοι, Diog. Laert. 8.41, where Pythagoras is described as ἰσχνὸν καὶ κατεσκελετευμένον and Lucian *Hermotimus* 2: ὠχρὸν ἀεὶ ὑπὸ φροντίδων καὶ τὸ σῶμα κατεσκληκότα, which refers to a student of philosophy.

F4

ἐν Ῥόδῳ

For a survey of Rhodes during the Hellenistic period see *RE*, Suppl.b. V (1931) s.v. Rhodos cols. 778 ff (Hiller v. Gaertringen) and Schneider, I pp. 387 ff. Rhodes was an intellectual centre with a very important school of rhetoric. The most illustrious period is usually said to have come no earlier than the century after Bion, whose visit to Rhodes is also testified in Diog. Laert. 4.53 (= T3). However, Rhodes must have been already famous for its rhetoric in Bion's time, or this anecdote would be completely without meaning. This lends some support to the old tradition that Aeschines came in exile to Rhodes and there established a school of rhetoric: ἀπάρας εἰς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐνταῦθα σχολὴν καταστησάμενος ἐδίδασκεν (Ps-Plutarch *Vitae decem oratorum* 6.840 D; cf. also Philostratus *VS Prooem.* p. 484 Kayser and the testimonies collected by V. Martin-G. de Budé, in *Eschine: Discours* (Paris, 1962) I pp. 1 ff). See further C. Kunst, 'De Aeschine Rhodi exsulante', *Wiener Studien*, 39 (1917) pp. 167 ff.

τὰ ῥητορικά

Rhetoric was of great importance during the Hellenistic period and was taught even in several philosophical schools. For rhetoric in general during this period and its relationship to philosophy see v. Arnim 1898, pp. 4 ff, Marrou, pp. 292 ff, G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963) pp. 264 ff and Schneider, II pp. 330 ff. Cf. also introd. Chapter II:3.

διασκούντων

LSJ, s.v. διασκέω III gives this as the only case of διασκέω meaning "practise". There are however two cases in Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 9 and *Peregrinus* 17 of διασκέω with the meaning "train" which is comparatively close to the meaning given in this case.

Ἀθηναίων

The use of this noun without the article may be right, as the meaning required is Athenians in general; cf. KG, I pp. 598 f and Schwyzler, II p. 24 for the use of names of nations without the article.

τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα

This expression is usually used to signify philosophical treatises. We find it with this meaning in Cicero *Ep. ad Fam.* 11.27.5, used of the author's own philosophical writings, and in Diog. Laert. 4.23, used of some writings of Crates. Here the meaning does not differ from *φιλοσοφία*, and the expression is formed in analogy with *τὰ ῥητορικά*. The use in Philostratus *VS Prooem.* p. 481 Kayser comes close to this meaning.

πυρὺς . . . πιπράσκω

We notice here the very pointed form that is typical of Bion's style. Even the comparison, with its motif from daily life, is typical of Bion; cf. introd. Chapter II:2. A similar comparison is found in Diog. Laert. 7.105: *τὴν δ' εἶναι ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξη, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἀμείβεσθαι πυρὺς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιόνῳ κριθάς*. The background for the use of this comparison by Bion just on Rhodes may be that Rhodes was very important as one of the great corn markets, in which case Bion hints at the actual situation in his saying; cf. Tarn, p. 221, M.I. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941) I p. 172, L. Carson, 'The Grain Trade of the Hellenistic World', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 85 (1954) pp. 171 ff and Schneider, II pp. 100 f.

This anecdote is founded on the double contrast between Athens and Rhodes, philosophy and rhetoric. As Athens is closely connected with philosophy, so Rhodes is the home of rhetoric, possibly because it was free. Therefore the saying of Bion may be taken as an attack on Athenians practising rhetoric, i.e. those who bring wheat and sell barley. So it becomes obvious that the phrase *ἐν Ρόδῳ* must refer both to the Athenians and to Bion.

The aim of this comparison is to show that philosophy is much more valuable than rhetoric, and it also makes it clear that Bion had no intention of teaching rhetoric. The philosopher's criticism of rhetoric is very common and there are some sayings of, e.g., Diogenes preserved, which show a critical view of rhetoric: *τοὺς ῥήτορας λέγειν μὲν ἐσπουδακέναι τὰ δίκαια, πράττειν δὲ μηδαμῶς* (Diog. Laert. 6.28) and *τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐνδοξολογοῦντας τρισανθρώπους ἀπεκάλει ἀντὶ τοῦ τρισαθλίου* (Diog. Laert. 6.47; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.34). See further Seneca *Ep.* 108.6 with criticism of those who regard philosophy from rhetorical aspects.

F5A–B *Gnom. Par.* gives the originator of this saying as *Δίων*, which probably is a mistake for *Βίων*; there is a similar mistake in *Gnom. Par.* 242; cf. introd. Chapter V:4.

It is very probable that Bion here in his criticism of the *γραμματικοί* uses a thought and an expression that originally belonged to Diogenes: *τούς τε*

γραμματικούς ἐθαύμαζε τὰ μὲν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως κακὰ ἀναζητοῦντας, τὰ δ'ἴδια ἀγνοοῦντας (Diog. Laert. 6.27). Similar expressions can be found in Seneca *Ep.* 88.7: *quaeris, Ulixes ubi erraverit, potius quam efficias, ne nos semper erremus*, Dio of Prusa 4.37, where Diogenes is talking about the pupils of the sophists: *πλανωμένους ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πολὺ κάκιον ἢ τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα φησὶν Ὅμηρος ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ* and St. Augustine *Conj.* 1.13.20: *tenere cogebar Aeneae nescio cuius errores oblitus errorum meorum*. For Cynic criticism of the γραμματικοί see Gerhard 1909, p. 135.

τοὺς γραμματικούς

The word γραμματικός usually refers to the teacher during the period between the γραμματιστής and the σοφιστής or ῥήτωρ; cf. Marrou, pp. 243 ff. Here however Bion must use the word with the meaning “scholar”, which it had from the beginning of the third century; cf. Dio of Prusa 53.1: *τῶν ὕστερον γραμματικῶν κληθέντων, πρότερον δὲ κριτικῶν* and see further K. Lehrs, in *Herodiani scripta tria emendatiora* 2. ed. (Berlin, 1857) pp. 379 ff, *RE*, VII:2 (1912) s.v. Grammatik cols. 1808 ff (Gudeman) and R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford, 1968) pp. 157 f. This transition of meaning is natural, as Homer played a very important role in the teaching of the γραμματικός; see Marrou, pp. 246 ff.

τῆς Ὀδυσσέως πλάνης

The Hellenistic period was a time of very intensive Homeric research. One way of interpreting Homer was to find a historical reality behind the poetic form; cf. F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Thèse Paris, 1957) pp. 228 ff. Some scholars, especially those influenced by the Stoics, also tried to locate the travels of Odysseus to definite places in the Mediterranean, while others remained more critical, e.g. Apollodorus: *ἐπιτιμᾷ δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ Σικελίαν τὴν πλάνην λέγουσι καθ' Ὅμηρον τὴν Ὀδυσσέως* (Strabo 7.3.6), Eratosthenes: *φησὶ τότε ἂν εὐρεῖν τινα, ποῦ Ὀδυσσεὺς πεπλάνηται, ὅταν εὕρῃ τὸν σκυτεῖα τὸν συρράψαντα τὸν τῶν ἀνέμων ἀσκόν* (Strabo 1.2.15) and Aulus Gellius *NA* 14.6.3, where he includes among *mera miracula* the discussion, *utrum ἐν τῇ ἔσω θαλάσῃ Ulixes erraverit κατ' Ἀρίσταρχον ἢ ἐν τῇ ἔξω κατὰ Κράτητα*. Strabo 1 with its discussion is of great general interest for this question; cf. K.J. Neumann, ‘Strabons Gesamtturtheil über die homerische Geographie’, *Hermes*, 21 (1886) pp. 134 ff, G. Aujac, *Strabon et la science de son temps: Les sciences du monde* (Thèse Paris, 1966) pp. 31 ff and G. Aujac-F. Lasserre, in *Strabo: Géographie* I:1 (Paris, 1969) pp. 11 ff. Stückelberger, op. cit. pp. 107 ff, where more material is given is also of interest.

τῆς Ὀδυσσέως πλάνης . . . τὴν ἰδίαν . . . πλανῶνται

The play on the double meaning of the same word is very typical of Bion; cf.

introd. Chapter II:2. We find the same kind of play on the actual and the metaphorical meaning of *πλανάομαι* in a saying of Diogenes in Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.1.23. For a different ‘play’ see Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 9.13 about the *Odyssey*: *κὰν τοῖς μυθώδεσι καὶ ἀπίστοις πλάνος*.

The metaphorical meaning of such words as *πλανάομαι*, *πλάνη* or *πλάνος* is quite common: Plato *Phaedo* 81 A: *πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας*, Cebes *Tabula* 5.3: *πλάνος . . . καὶ ἄγνοια* (cf. also 6.3, 19.5, 23.1 and 25.2) and Maximus of Tyre 20.5 d: *ὕπὸ δὲ τῆς ἀγνοίας πλανώμενον*.

F6

γελοιοτάτους

It is typical of Bion’s way of teaching to ridicule different human occupations and opinions; cf. *γελοιώτερον εἶναι φησὶν* (F27), *ἔλεγε καταγελάστους εἶναι* (F38) and Gerhard 1909, p. 65 and n. 3.

We have here a Socratic and Cynic tradition as we can see from many references. See e.g. Maximus of Tyre 12.10 c: *ὁ Σωκράτης Ἀθηναίων κατεγέλα*; Socrates’ use of irony and jokes is well known. Words like *καταγελάω* and *καταγελάστος* are often associated with different Cynics; cf. e. g. for Diogenes Dio of Prusa 6.13, 6.21 and 10.2, Lucian *Dial. mort.* 11.5 and 29.3, Maximus of Tyre 36.5 c and Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.6.17, for Menippus Lucian *Icaromenippus* 18 and *Dial. mort.* 1.1, 2.3 and 3.1—2, for Demonax Lucian *Demonax* 13 and 26 and for the Cynics in general Lucian *Cynicus* 19 to give just a few instances. See also introd. Chapter II:3.

τοὺς ἀστρονομοῦντας

The depiction of astronomers as ridiculous is very common in Greek literature, especially when influenced by moral philosophy. We find this ridicule already in the anecdote about Thales (Diog. Laert. 1.34 etc.) and in Aristophanes *Nubes* 193—194. Socrates is also made to ridicule the study of the celestial phenomena (e.g. Plato *Theaetetus* 173 E—174 A, Xenophon *Mem.* 1.1.11—15 and 4.7.5 and *Symp.* 6.6—7; cf. Woldinga, II pp. 398 ff). The Cynics followed Socrates in their contempt for astronomical studies as being of no use for a philosophical way of life; so Diogenes: *τοὺς μαθηματικούς ἀποβλέπειν μὲν τρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην, τὰ δ’ ἐν ποσὶ πράγματα παρορᾶν* (Diog. Laert. 6.28), *πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, ‘ποσταῖος’, ἔφη, ‘πάρει ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ’* (Diog. Laert. 6.39; cf. Diogenes *Ep.* 38.1), *ἀστερολογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖν, ὥς ἀχρήστων καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων* (Diog. Laert. 6.73), *φιλοσοφίαν ἅπασαν ἐπαινέσαι καλόν, μάλιστα δὲ ἦν Διογένης ἡσκήσατο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζητεῖν τὰς τῶν ἄστρον ὁδοὺς καὶ περισκοπεῖν τὴν ἡλίου περίοδον ἑτέροις παρήκεν. αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἐποιεῖτο τῶν τρόπων* (Nicolaus *Progygmn.* 3 *Rhet. Gr.* I pp. 272 f Walz) and *Diogenes consultus, quid in caelis agatur, ‘numquam’ inquit ‘ascendi’* (Tertullian *Ad nat.* 2.2). Menippus according to what is told in Lucian *Icaromenippus* 6—8 and *Menippus* 21 and Demonax: *(Δημῶναξ) ἐξεταζόντων τινῶν, εἰ ὁ κόσμος ἔμψυχος, καὶ αὐτὸς εἰ σφαιροειδής*

‘Υμεῖς,’ ἔφη, ‘περὶ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου πολυπραγμονεῖτε, περὶ δὲ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀκοσμίας οὐ φροντίζετε’ (Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.1.11). Cf. also Cebes *Tabula* 13.2, where οἱ ἀστρολόγοι are among those who follow ἡ Ψευδοπαιδεία. For this critical attitude of the Cynics see Norden 1892, pp. 268 ff, who has collected rich material, O. Hense, ‘Zu Lucian and Menippos’, in *Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht* (Vienna, 1902) pp. 189 f and Gerhard 1909, pp. 135 f.

τοὺς παρ ποσὶ

This has quite correctly been excluded by Meineke. It is transferred from the similar Thales-anecdote (Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.1.22), where it belongs, while here, because of the double expression, it gives a superfluous impression.

It can be noted in this connection that the proposal of H. v. Herwerden, ‘Varia ad varios’, *Mnemosyne* NS, 27 (1899) pp. 395 f to read ἀστέρας instead of ἰχθῦς is an unnecessary change, as both comparisons would give the same meaning. On the other hand the use of ἰχθῦς is much clearer and more in accordance with Bion’s style.

τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ἰχθῦς

The word αἰγιαλός is an Ionic and Hellenistic word, first found in Homer; cf. for this phrase *Od.* 22.384–386: ὥστ’ ἰχθύας, οὓς θ’ ἀλιῆες / κοῖλον ἐς αἰγιαλὸν πολιῆς ἔκτοσθε θαλάσσης / δικτύῳ ἐξέρυσαν πολυωπῶ.

τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ἰχθῦς . . . τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ

Bion is here, as often, playing on the double meaning of a word, ἰχθῦς, which in the second case refers to the constellation Pisces. For the zodiac in antiquity see *RE*, XA:1 (1972) s.v. Zodiakos cols. 462 ff (Gundel-Böker).

The contrast expressed here, between close things, which people do not notice and celestial things, which they study is very common. Cf. the Thales-anecdote: ὥς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ’ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν (Plato *Theaetetus* 174 A; cf. Diog. Laert. 1.34 and Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.1.22), the saying of Diogenes in Diog. Laert. 6.28, quoted above, Themistius *or.* 24 p. 307 Downey: τὰ ἐν ποσὶν ἀτιμάσασαι περιπολοῦσι τὸν οὐρανόν (sc. αἱ ψυχαί), Ennius in Cicero *De rep.* 1.18.30: *quod est ante pedes nemo spectat; caeli scrutantur plagas* (= *Scenica* fr. 244 Vahlen = fr. 187 Jocelyn) and Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.39.114: *atque hic vir impediri animi aciem aspectu oculorum arbitratur, et cum alii saepe quod ante pedes esset non viderent, ille in infinitatem omnem peregrinabatur, ut nulla in extremitate consisteret.* For this topos see also Helm 1906, p. 280 n. 2.

Radermacher 1947, pp. 122 f has not seen the real point of this saying of Bion. As we have seen, the criticism of astronomers is a philosophical tradition, and is not incompatible with an ethical outlook.

The assumption of Tarn, p. 237 n. 53, that we here have an attack from Bion’s side on Aratus of Soloi can only remain a clever guess. It is known that

Aratus stayed in Pella with Antigonos Gonatas (see *Schol. in Aratum vet.* p. 14.12–13, p. 15.18–19, p. 19.5–6 and p. 20.3–7 Martin and Lesky, p. 841). On the other hand, we know nothing about the relations between Bion and Aratus. As we have seen, this kind of criticism is a Cynic topos and Bion need not have had a definite person in mind.

F7

παρωδῆσαι

F.W. Householder, ‘*Παρωδία*’, *Classical Philology*, 39 (1944) pp. 1 ff, who has studied *παρωδία* and related words and collected a rich material, found as the meaning in this case, p. 9: “quote verse (in prose, verse or conversation) with metrical alteration of one or more words”. The word “parody” therefore can give wrong associations. It is a witty mode of expression, in this case an attack on a certain person. On the other hand, it cannot be said that Bion here intends to ridicule Homer, although this use of the poet may have such a result. For the meaning of *παρωδέω* see also F.J. Lelièvre, ‘The Basis of Ancient Parody’, *Greece and Rome* NS, 1 (23) (1954) pp. 66 ff and H. Koller, ‘Die Parodie’, *Glotta*, 35 (1956) pp. 17 ff.

ὦ πέπον . . . ἐμπειρότατ’ ἀνδρῶν

Such a use of Homer, a combination of pastiche and cento, is very common, especially among philosophers belonging to the Cynic school, like Diogenes, Crates, Menippus, Timon and also Lucian; cf. introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 66. In this case the first line is obviously built on the model of *Il.* 3.182: ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρεΐδῃ, μοιρηγενές, ὀλβιόδαιμον. We see that Bion follows the structure of the line very closely, although he has changed all the words. The Homeric vocative ὦ μάκαρ is replaced by ὦ πέπον, which is also a Homeric expression (cf. *Il.* 6.55 etc. and *Od.* 13.154). The vocative Ἀτρεΐδῃ is replaced by Ἀρχύτα, which however does not change the metre. The two following adjectives are created by Bion after the Homeric model and are only found here. The formation of the adjective ψαλληγενές is uncommon, as Bion here for the first part uses a verb, ψάλλω, while in compounds of this kind this element is usually a noun. Therefore Hoogvliet, p. 12 assumes a noun ψάλλος, which does not exist and Reiske makes the conjecture ψαλμηγενές, which is not necessary, as we cannot expect to find a correct linguistic foundation for Bion’s new creations in a parody. This makes the meaning of the adjective rather unclear. In analogy with other adjectives of the same type, one would expect the meaning “sprung from harp-playing” (so LSJ, s.v.). Wachsmuth, p. 202 however translates the word with “homo ad psallendum natus”. Ὀλβιότῳφε is a happier creation and the meaning would be “happy in his own conceit” (so LSJ, s.v.). We have here as a parallel ὀλβιογᾶστωρ (Amphis fr. 10 Kock II). A feature of special interest here is the use of τῳφος which is an important Cynic concept (cf. below). In the second line the element P₂ has a pattern in Homer in πάντων ἐκπαγλότατ’ ἀνδρῶν (*Il.* 1.146, 18.170 and 20.389). We see that Bion has merely replaced

the adjective. For the first part of the line P₁ no definite Homeric pattern has been found.

Ἀρχύτα

The problem is, which Archytas Bion means here. Hoogvliet, p. 12, Mullach, p. 428 (on fr. 47) and Orelli, p. 625 (on fr. 46) are of the opinion that Bion here attacks Archytas of Mytilene. We find the same opinion in Wachsmuth, p. 77, who, however, oddly enough, pp. 201 f argues for Archytas of Tarentum. The former is a rather obscure person, mentioned in Diog. Laert. 8.82 in a list of homonyms and in Athenaeus 13.600 F; cf. *RE*, II (1896) s.v. Archytas (no. 4) col. 602 (v. Jan). Therefore there would be very little point in Bion attacking him. So the person in question must be Archytas of Tarentum; cf. *FVS*, I pp. 421–439, where the testimonies and fragments are collected, Diog. Laert. 8.79–83 and *RE*, II (1896) s.v. Archytas (no. 3) cols. 600 ff (Wellmann-v. Jan). He was obviously a well known and respected character with a great interest in both mathematics and music — *Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντῖνος μάλιστα τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἐπιμεληθεὶς μουσικῆς* (Ptolemaeus *Harm.* 1.13) — and therefore more likely to be the target of Bion's attack.

ὀλβιοτῦφε

Τῦφος is a very common term in Cynic writings and one of the things which the Cynics very strongly opposed; cf. also T2A–B. It seems to have a twofold meaning for the Cynics, referring partly to vanity, conceit and partly to illusion. A definition is given in Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.5: οἷσις τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὡς ὄντων. Cf. also the sayings of the Cynic Monimus: τὸ γὰρ ὑποληφθὲν τῦφον εἶναι πᾶν ἔφη (Diog. Laert. 6.33 = Menander fr. 215.7 Körte) and τῦφος τὰ πάντα (Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.5). For other instances where *τῦφος* is attacked by the Cynics see Diog. Laert. 6.7, 6.85 and 6.86 and Diogenes *Ep.* 21 and *Ep.* 31.1. For *τῦφος*, its meaning and use, see Weber 1887, p. 241 n. 1 and p. 249, Norden 1892, pp. 311 f, Dziech, pp. 208 ff and Dudley, p. 44 n. 3 (p. 56).

τῆς ὑπάτης ἔριδος

Archytas carried out important research into the relations between different tones: τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀκόλουθον διασώζειν, οὐκ ἐν ταῖς συμφωνίαις μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς τῶν τετραχόρδων διαιρέσεσιν ὡς οἰκείου τῇ φύσει τῶν ἐμμελῶν ὄντος τοῦ συμμέτρου τῶν ὑπεροχῶν (Ptolemaeus *Harm.* 1.13). Therefore it is plausible that Bion by this rather obscure expression has tried to give it a double meaning which is quite in his style. The two possible meanings would be “the quarrel about the highest string” and “the highest quarrel”, which implies an ironic hint at a, from Bion's point of view, completely useless discussion; cf. also Wachsmuth, pp. 201 f.

F8

This cannot be considered as a proper fragment according to the definition I have given above; cf. introd. Chapter V:3. However I have placed it here because of the close connection with the other fragments in this group.

μουσικήν

We have already seen from the preceding fragment with its ridicule of Archytas that Bion is critical of music as part of education. Obviously this is a Cynic tradition. Cf. the general characterization of the Cynics in Diog. Laert. 6.104: *περιαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*. There are also some sayings preserved, in which Diogenes criticizes music: *ἐθαύμαζε . . . τοὺς μουσικοὺς τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ λύρᾳ χόρδας ἀρμόττεσθαι, ἀνάρμοστα δ' ἔχειν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἥθη* (Diog. Laert. 6.27), *ιδὼν ἄφρονα ψαλτήριον ἀρμοζόμενον, 'οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ', ἔφη, 'τοὺς μὲν φθόγγους τῷ ξύλῳ προσαρμόττων, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν εἰς τὸν βίον μὴ ἀρμόττων;*' (Diog. Laert. 6.65) and *μουσικῆς τε καὶ γεωμετρικῆς καὶ ἀστερολογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖν, ὡς ἀχρήστων καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων* (Diog. Laert. 6.73). An attack on music may be found also in Cercidas fr. 6 Powell, although the text is extremely uncertain; for the interpretation see Dudley, pp. 81 f. Cf. also Seneca *Ep.* 88.9: *ad musicum transeo: doces me, quomodo inter se acutae ac graves consonent, quomodo nervorum disparem redditum sonum fiat concordia; fac potius, quomodo animus secum consonet nec consilia mea discrepent*. See Gerhard 1909, pp. 134 f and for the Greek attitude towards music in general E. Koller, *Musik und musische Paideia: Über die Musikaporetik in der aristotelischen Politik* (Diss. Basel, 1956) and A.J. Neubecker, 'Die Bewertung der Musik bei Stoikern und Epikureern: Eine Analyse von Philodems Schrift *De musica*', *Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Institut für griechisch-römische Altertumskunde, Arbeitsgruppe für hellenistisch-römische Philosophie*, 5 (Berlin, 1956).

γεωμετρίαν

Even this field of science was regarded as being of no use. Socrates opposed a study of geometry which went beyond what was practically useful: *τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν* (Xenophon *Mem.* 4.7.2–3). Diogenes and the Cynics in general rejected geometry among other sciences as useless (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.73 and 6.104). Cf. also Seneca *Ep.* 88.10: *metiri me geometres docet latifundia potius quam doceat, quomodo metiar, quantum homini satis sit*.

διέπαιζεν

Here Bion is following a Socratic and Cynic tradition, when he uses a form of joke or ridicule even for a serious message. The same verb is used, e.g., about the activity of Socrates (Epictetus 2.18.22) and of Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.72). Cf. further introd. Chapter II:3.

F9A–B ἡπόρει

This verb can be used in a more technical way with the meaning “start a question, raise a difficulty” (LSJ, s.v. ἀπορέω I 2) from the time of Socrates and Plato (see e.g. Plato *Protagoras* 324 D and Xenophon *Symp.* 4.1) and is quite common in Aristotle.

Judging by the terminology, ἀνάμνησις and ἀλογία, Bion seems in this fragment to be attacking various aspects of Platonic philosophy by pointing out inconsistencies; his objections are answered by the scholiast in ἡ ῥητέον κτλ. Ἀνάμνησις is a central Platonic concept, which is obviously not accepted by Bion. Because of its theoretical character it must have been completely meaningless for Bion’s ethical and practical interests; cf. Soro, pp. 71 f.

We find the same criticism of ἀνάμνησις also in Straton (frs. 125–127 Wehrli V), who opposes this concept as a proof of immortality. Plato was attacked from different quarters for his life, philosophy or style. The Cynics were very active here and ridiculed in particular the doctrine of ideas. See e.g. the sayings of Antisthenes (fr. 50A–C Caizzi), Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.40 and 6.53) and Stilpon (Diog. Laert. 2.119 = fr. 199 Döring). For Antisthenes’ criticism of Plato see Dümmler, pp. 13 ff and F. Dümmler, *Akademika* (Giessen, 1889) pp. 188 ff, and for the ancient criticism in general R. Fenk, *Adversarii Platonis quomodo de indole ac moribus eius iudicaverint* (Diss. Jena, 1913), J. Geffcken, ‘AntiPlatonika’, *Hermes*, 64 (1929) pp. 87 ff and also E. Neef, *Lukians Verhältnis zu den Philosophenschulen und seine μίμησις literarischer Vorbilder* (Diss. Greifswald, 1940) pp. 18 ff.

F10 ἐκλαβών

The use of this verb meaning “contract to do work” (LSJ, s.v. ἐκλαμβάνω IV 1) with an infinitive seems to be post-classical; cf. Plutarch *Pelopidas* 25.5: Ἀνδροκύδης ὁ Κυζικηνὸς ἐκλαβὼν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως πίνακα γράψαι μάχης ἐτέρας and Aelianus *VH* 14.15. It is the correlative of ἐκδίδωμι with the meaning “give out on contract” (LSJ, s.v. ἐκδίδωμι 3), which use and meaning are classical as we can see from, e.g., Demosthenes 18.122: ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντ’ ἐκδεδωκὼς κατὰ συγγραφὴν, Plato *Parmenides* 127 A and Theophrastus *Char.* 16.6 and 22.8.

ἀλινδούμενον

The use of this verb for animals is post-classical (cf. LSJ, s.v. ἀλινδέομαι II 1) and occurs, e.g., in Nicander *Theriaca* 156 and 204.

ὁ Παύσω

For this painter, about whom little is known, see *RE*, XVIII:2 (1949) s.v. Pauson cols. 2425 f (Lippold). The anecdote which Plutarch tells here can also be found in Lucian *Dem. enc.* 23–24 and in Aelianus *VH* 14.15, where it is told about Socrates.

ἀναστραφῶσι

The verb ἀναστρέφω meaning “invert order of words or statements” (LSJ, s.v. ἀναστρέφω I 2) occurs also Demetrius *De eloc.* § 11, § 184 and § 185 and Hermogenes *Id.* 1.11 pp. 282–283 Rabe.

The interpretation of this saying of Bion is far from clear but a comparison with the Pauson-anecdote in Aelianus’ form ought to be of some help: λόγους τις διεφοίτα λέγων τοὺς Σωκράτους λόγους εἰκέναι τοῖς Παύσωνος γράμμασι. The conclusion is: καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ σαφῶς διαλέγεσθαι. εἰ γοῦν τις αὐτοὺς στρέψειεν, ὀρθότατα ἔχειν οὐκ ἐβούλετο δὲ ἄρα ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τούτοις, πρὸς οὓς διελέγετο, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἰνιγματώδεις αὐτοὺς παρείχετο καὶ πλαγίους. Obviously Socrates intended his sayings to be right from whatever side you looked at them. Bion is probably saying that it is possible to look at a thing from both sides and that both views can be right, which seems to be a rather sceptical attitude; for the connections between the Cynics and the Sceptics see introd. Chapter III:5.

F3–10 The fragments which have just been treated, clearly show that Bion does not accept any of the parts of the traditional teaching-system (ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία) as necessary for a perfect, philosophical way of life. We have seen him deprecating rhetoric, philology, astronomy, music and geometry as being completely useless. To this can be added the statement of Demetrius Lacon, who accuses Bion of τὴν τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντων ἀγνωσίαν (F26A). As far as we can judge from these fragments Bion does not even value these fields of knowledge as a preparation for philosophy, and here he differs from most of the philosophical schools: the Academy, the Peripatos and the Stoa. We find this critical attitude in the Cynics, the Epicureans and the Sceptics; see further Fuchs, art. cit. cols. 379 ff, Marrou, p. 226 and Stückelberger, op. cit. which is of great general interest and gives many references.

Here Bion surely follows the Cynics and we have already seen many agreements between his ideas and those of other Cynics. Their main criticism is that the liberal arts do not contribute in any way to a moral improvement. Cf. the sayings of Antisthenes: τὴν τ’ ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων (Diog. Laert. 6.11 = fr. 70 Caizzi) and Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.27–28 and 6.73). Menippus is reported to have written Πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μαθηματικοὺς καὶ γραμματικούς (Diog. Laert. 6.101). Of interest is also the general characterization of the Cynics in Diog. Laert. 6.103–104: παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα. γράμματα γοῦν μὴ μανθάνειν ἔφασκεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης (= fr. 66 Caizzi) τοὺς σώφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφωιντο τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. περιαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

There could also be a Cyrenaic influence on the thought of Bion. As we have seen, Aristippus was rather critical too (Diog. Laert. 2.79–80 = fr. 23 Manne-

bach), and according to Aristotle *Metaph.* 2.2.4 p. 996a29—b1 (= fr. 151 Mannebach) he criticized mathematics as having no ethical value. The Cyrenaics are also said to ἄχρηστα ἡγεῖσθαι τό τε φυσικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ διαλεκτικόν (Diog. Laert. 2.92 = fr. 146 Mannebach).

For similar negative statements concerning the liberal arts see Cebes *Tabula* 13, where οἱ τῆς Ψευδοπαιδείας . . . ἐρασταί are οἱ μὲν ποιηταί, . . . οἱ δὲ ῥήτορες, οἱ δὲ διαλεκτικοί, οἱ δὲ μουσικοί, οἱ δὲ ἀριθμητικοί, οἱ δὲ γεωμέτραι, οἱ δὲ ἀστρολόγοι, οἱ δὲ κριτικοί, οἱ δὲ ἡδονικοί, οἱ δὲ περιπατητικοί καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τούτοις εἰσὶ παραπλήσιοι (cf. R. Joly, 'Le tableau de Cébès et la philosophie religieuse', *Collection Latomus*, 61 (Brussels-Berchem, 1963) pp. 31 f, p. 34 and pp. 75 ff), Lucian *Convivium* 34: ὥς οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἦν ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι τὰ μαθήματα, εἰ μὴ τις καὶ τὸν βίον ῥυθμίζοι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον and Seneca *Ep.* 88.20: 'nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia?' *Ad alia multa multum, ad virtutem nihil . . . liberales artes non perducunt animum ad virtutem, sed expediunt.*

3. On ethical concepts (F11—24)

F11A—B This fragment has a special interest, as it is the only one to come from a work the title of which we know — *Περὶ δουλείας* (cf. T9A—B). There is no reason to reject Bion as its originator, although there is some confusion in the MSS., some of which give the name Δίων instead. Cf. O. Hense's note ad loc., Hense 1892, p. 223 and Hense 1909, p. LXXXVIII.

πολλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν

Meineke and Hense 1909, p. LXXXVIII and p. CII and n. 1 wanted to exclude these words as being an addition by Stobaeus or his immediate source, and divergent from Bion's very short and pointed style. However, this seems to be far from certain. This, or a similar, phrase is very common and can almost be regarded as a Cynic technical expression; cf. Diogenes ap. Diog. Laert. 6.66: τοὺς μὲν οἰκέτας ἔφη τοῖς δεσπόταις, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις δουλεύειν, Xenophon *Apol.* 16: δουλεύοντα ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαις, Musonius fr. III p. 10.12—13 Hense: μὴ δουλεύειν ἐπιθυμίαις and Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* 33: *cui tandem hic libero imperat, qui non potest cupiditatibus suis imperare.* There are very similar expressions with ἡδοναί instead of ἐπιθυμίαι: Socrates in Xenophon *Mem.* 1.5.5: ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων (bis), Aristotle *EN* 10.1.2 p. 1172a33: δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς and in Plutarch *Pelopidas* 3.1 (= fr. 56 Rose): δουλεύοντες . . . ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, Dio of Prusa 4.115: δεδουλωμένοι δὲ ἡδοναῖς and Seneca *De vita beata* 4.4: *vides autem, quam malam et noxiosam servitutem serviturus sit quem voluptates doloresque, incertissima dominia impotentissimaque, alternis possidebunt.* Not only is the expression quite natural, but also the underlying idea is fully Cynic and in accordance with Bion's thought, which attacks all passions which enslave people, and instead strives

for ἀπάθεια (cf. T19 with commentary). Therefore I see no reason to regard this phrase as not coming from Bion. Cf. Joel 1893–1901, II p. 605 and pp. 615 f and Dziech, pp. 191 ff and pp. 233 ff with a rich material.

Both the antithetical form of this saying, contrasting liberty with slavery, and the idea that real freedom does not depend on whether you are free or slave but on your own character, are typically Cynic. This moral interpretation of the concepts freedom and slavery should be compared with the attitude to εὐγένεια, which is also given a new and moral meaning (see F1–2 with commentary). Actual slavery is without importance for freedom on the moral level, and therefore I doubt if Bion's purpose is to comfort slaves, as Hense 1892, p. 224 believes, especially as the Cynics in general were indifferent to slavery, which “was not to be abolished, but to be disregarded” (Baldry, p. 112). Therefore it is also quite clear that Bion is talking not about legal slavery but about slavery from a moral point of view, and that his saying refers to ὁ σοφός and his opposite.

Slavery seems to have been opposed first by the sophists and men like Alcidas (Aristotle *Rhet.* 1.13.2 p. 1373b18 with the commentary of the scholiast) and Antiphon (fr. 44 b 2 *FVS* II). To give the whole complex of freedom/slavery a moral interpretation, and to make freedom dependent of virtue is often regarded as typically Stoic; cf. G. Kaibel, ‘Inscriften aus Pisidien’, *Hermes*, 23 (1888) p. 543 n. 3. However, there can be no doubt that the origin is to be found in the Cynic school. Cf. the sayings of Diogenes: τοὺς μὲν οἰκέτας ἔφη τοῖς δεσπόταις, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις δουλεύειν (Diog. Laert. 6.66) and: διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν (sc. Διογένης) ὅτι ‘ἐξ οὗ μ’ Ἀντισθένης ἡλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα (Epictetus 3.24.67 = fr. 118 Caizzi). The different anecdotes about the selling of Diogenes into slavery also clearly illustrate this thesis; see e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.29 and 6.74 and Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 123–124 and for the interpretation Helm 1906, pp. 227 ff, v. Fritz, pp. 22 ff and Höistad, pp. 118 ff and pp. 176 ff.

The idea also belongs to the Stoic school as we can see from the sayings of Zeno: ἐλευθέρους τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον (Diog. Laert. 7.33 = fr. 222 *SVF* I) and Chrysippus: μόνον τ’ ἐλεύθερον (sc. εἶναι τὸν σοφόν) τοὺς δὲ φαύλους δούλους· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν στέρησιν αὐτοπραγίας (Diog. Laert. 7.121 = fr. 355 *SVF* III). Cf. also Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* V: ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος, καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος and *Paradox. Stoic.* 35: *servi igitur omnes improbi, servi!*

This whole idea that freedom or slavery are dependent on virtue or vice became very popular in writings of authors influenced by Cynic and Stoic ideas. To give just a few references: Dio of Prusa *or.* 14 (cf. § 17: ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοὺς μὲν φρονίμους ἐλευθέρους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν ὡς ἐθέλουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους δούλους τε εἶναι καὶ ἄ μὴ ἐξεστὶν αὐτοῖς, ταῦτα ποιεῖν) and *or.*

15, Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit*, Epictetus 4.1, Seneca *Ep.* 47.17 and Persius *Sat.* 5. See further Höistad, especially pp. 201 ff and M. Petit, in *Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, 28: *Quod omnis probus liber sit* (Paris, 1974) pp. 44 ff, where a survey of this idea is given.

F12A—B This saying also occurs in *Mel. Aug.* 9.9 and in *Cod. Neapol. Maximi* c. 2 (ἐκ τῶν Φαβωρίνου), and is ascribed to Solon in Antonius Melissa *Loci communes* I Sermo 8 (= *PG*, 136 col. 797 C), which is an obvious mistake; cf. introd. Chapter V:4. There is no reason to doubt the attribution of this saying to Bion.

τὴν φρόνησιν

This concept is central for the Cynic school, as being the supreme virtue, with a practical and ethical meaning. We find this in Antisthenes, who left a work with the title *Ἡρακλῆς ἢ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢ ἰσχύος* (Diog. Laert. 6.18 = fr. 1 Caizzi) and the saying: *τειχὸς ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν μήτε γὰρ καταρρεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι* (Diog. Laert. 6.13 = fr. 88 Caizzi); cf. also Aristotle *EE* 8.1.7 p. 1246b34: *τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως*, which Joel 1893–1901, I p. 353 n. 2 assumes to be a reference to the Cynics; cf. further Weber 1887, p. 147 and Dziech, pp. 217 f.

The fact that *φρόνησις* was of great importance for the Cyrenaic school according to a saying of Theodorus is also of interest: *ἀγαθὰ δὲ φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἐναντίας ἐξεις, μέσα δὲ ἡδονὴν καὶ πόνον . . . οὐ γὰρ ἀποβαλεῖν τὴν φρόνησιν ἔνεκα τῆς τῶν ἀφρόνων ὠφελείας* (Diog. Laert. 2.98 = fr. 175 Mannebach). Cf. also for the Cyrenaics in general: *τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν δὲ αἰρετὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς περιγινόμενα* (Diog. Laert. 2.91 = fr. 223 Mannebach).

For the meaning and importance of *φρόνησις* cf. also Aristotle *EN* 1.13.20 p. 1103a4–6 and *EN* 10.8.3 p. 1178a16–19 and the anonymous saying preserved in Antonius Melissa *Loci communes* I Sermo 8 (= *PG*, 136 col. 797 B): *φρόνησις τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀρχή*.

τὴν ὄρασιν

The use of this noun here is somewhat surprising as we would expect *ὄψις*. It must signify “power of sight” and LSJ, s.v. *ὄρασις* I 1 only gives one example (*SIG*³ 1141) where *ὄρασις* has this meaning, which usually belongs to *ὄψις* (cf. LSJ, s.v. *ὄψις* II 1). The reason for this use may very well be found in Bion's rhetorical interests and his effort to give a perfectly balanced sentence, with the correspondence between *τὴν φρόνησιν* and *τὴν ὄρασιν*.

The belief that sight is the most important and reliable of the senses is very common in Greek and is expressed in many ways. Cf. Herodotus 1.8: *ὥτα γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποισι ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν* (to which passage Lucian refers in *De saltatione* 78 and *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 29) and Aristotle *Metaph.* 1.1.1 p. 980a24–27: *οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μη-*

θὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἰρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων αἴτιον δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν τι ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς.

F13

παντοπώλιον

This noun, which is rare, is also to be found in, e.g., Plato *Resp.* 8.557 D, Aeneas Tacticus 30.1 and Pollux *Onom.* 7.16.

This comparison from everyday life is very typical of Bion's style; cf. introd. Chapter II:2. The feature of interest here is the expression in Plato *Phaedo* 69 A–B: φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως. For the interpretation of this difficult sentence see J.V. Luce, 'A Discussion of *Phaedo* 69a6–c2', *The Classical Quarterly*, 38 (1944) pp. 60 ff, R.S. Bluck, in *Plato's Phaedo* (London, 1955) pp. 4 ff and H. Reynen, 'Phaidoninterpretationen', *Hermes*, 96 (1968) pp. 46 ff. Plato compares φρόνησις with money which allows of the purchase of all other virtues. In the same way Bion seeks to stress that φρόνησις, as the most important virtue, can also yield all other virtues.

τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην

For this virtue in the Cynic school see the saying of Diogenes: τὴν παιδείαν εἵπε τοῖς μὲν νέοις σωφροσύνην (Diog. Laert. 6.68) and Crates in his hymn to Euteleia: χαῖρε θεὰ δέσποινα, σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγάπημα / Εὐτελία, κλεινῆς ἔγγογε Σωφροσύνης / σὴν ἀρετὴν τιμῶσιν, ὅσοι τὰ δίκαι' ἀσκοῦσιν (Julian 6.198 D = fr. 12 Diels) and for a general survey Dziech, pp. 221 ff and H. North, 'Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature', *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, 35 (Cornell, 1966) pp. 132 ff. For σωφροσύνη in general see, apart from North, op. cit., E. Weitlich, *Quae fuerit vocis σωφροσύνη vis ac natura apud antiquiores scriptores Graecos usque ad Platonem* (Diss. Göttingen, 1920; a summary is published in *Jahrbuch der philosophischen Fakultät der Georg August-Universität zu Göttingen*, 1922 I: Historisch-philologische Abteilung pp. 38 ff), A. Kollmann, 'Sophrosyne', *Wiener Studien*, 59 (1941) pp. 12 ff and G.J. de Vries, 'Σωφροσύνη en grec classique', *Mnemosyne* 3. ser., 11 (1943) pp. 81 ff.

†στρατουρίαν

This is the reading of the MS., which does not make sense. Sternbach's emendation of στρατουρίαν to στρατουργίαν is not to be recommended, as the word is known only from one MS. of Hermogenes *Progymn.* 10 p. 23.2–3 Rabe, where however the editors instead have στρατολογία. The meaning of στρατουργίαν would be "raising, levying of an army" (cf. LSJ, s.v. στρατολογία). The formation of the word as such is possible and metaphors from the military sphere are popular with the Cynics; see Weber 1887, pp. 138 f and Gerhard

1909, pp. 191 f. Even the concept *σωφροσύνη* can be used in military contexts as we can see from Thucydides 1.84.3 and Xenophon *Cyr.* 5.4.44 (?); cf. North, *op. cit.* p. 132.

However this emendation is still far from satisfactory, partly because the word *στρατουργίαν* is singular and partly because it does not fit very well in the sentence. After *παντοπώλιον* one would expect Bion to continue with another metaphor from the commercial sphere. Therefore Giesecke, p. 67 n. 1 proposed *ἐργαστήριον* instead, which has a certain probability, as it continues with a metaphor of the same kind. We find the two concepts combined e.g. Lucian *Pseudologista* 9: *οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ τῶν καπηλείων*. For a metaphorical use of *ἐργαστήριον* see Antiphanes: *τὸ γῆρας ὥσπερ ἐργαστήριον* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.50b.48 = fr. 240 b Kock II), Xenophon *HG* 3.4.17, Polybius 10.20.7, Libanius *or.* 55. 34 and Aelius Aristides *or.* 14 p. 326 Dindorf; cf. also Cicero *De leg.* 1.13.36: *philosophorum qui quasi officinas instruxerunt sapientiae*. If the emendation *ἐργαστήριον* is accepted, it keeps up the superiority of *φρόνησις*, which was stated by Bion in F12A–B and also makes *σωφροσύνη* a more active virtue. For the attitude of the Greeks to the different virtues see O. Kunsenmüller, *Die Herkunft der Platonischen Kardinaltugenden* (Diss. Munich, 1935).

F14

τῆς τραπέζης

The word may here be used with a double meaning, which would be quite in Bion's style, referring both to the eating-table, including what is upon it, and to the money-changer's counter; both meanings are common (see LSJ, s.v. *τράπεζα*). The latter sense is used from Plato *Apol.* 17 C and found e.g. Theophrastus *Char.* 5.7 and 23.3. For the terminology see R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques* (Leyden, 1968) pp. 37 ff. The term is used with a double meaning also in, e.g., Plutarch *De vitando aere alieno* 2.828 A; cf. D.A. Russell, 'Remarks on Plutarch's *De vitando aere alieno*', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 93 (1973) p. 164. Both meanings make excellent sense in Bion's case, as he advocates a very simple life as far as food and drink is concerned (see F17 with commentary) and treats bankers with great contempt (see F41 with commentary).

τὰς ἡδονάς

This is a typical Cynic paradox. '*Ἡδοναί*' here does not refer to pleasures in any vulgar sense, the old term being retained but given a new, spiritual meaning. Cf. the saying of Antisthenes: *ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνοὺς διωκτέον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.29.65 = fr. 113 Caizzi) and introd. Chapter III:2.

ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν

For a similar appreciation of *τὸ φρονεῖν* see Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi*

4.466 F: ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν ἅμα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ποιεῖ καὶ ἄριστον καὶ ἥδιστον.

F15

Πύρρωνος

For Pyrrho, the founder of the Sceptic school, see Diog. Laert. 9.61–108 and *RE*, XXIV:1 (1963) s.v. Pyrrhon (no. 1) cols. 89 ff (v. Fritz). For the Sceptics in general and their relations to the Cynic school see introd. Chapter III:5 and n. 53 and n. 55 with references.

προκοπῆς

This word, meaning “moral progress”, which does not form part of the quotation here, is used in two fragments of Bion (F19–20).

Plutarch uses this saying in an essay where he attacks the Stoics, who assume that there are only wise men and fools and no real progress, ὅφ’ ἡς αἰνιγμα γέγονεν ἡ λεγομένη προκοπή (2.76 A). However, the Stoics acknowledge “eine Entwicklung zum Besseren” (Pohlenz 1964, I p. 154). For the Stoic attitude to προκοπή see fr. 234 *SVF* I, frs. 530–543 *SVF* III, Epictetus 1.4 and Seneca *Ep.* 75.8–14; cf. also A. Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart, 1894) pp. 144 ff, O. Luschkat, ‘Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts in der alten Stoa’, *Philologus*, 102 (1958) pp. 178 ff and I.G. Kidd, in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. by A.A. Long (London, 1971) pp. 164 f.

Obviously the Cynics here have a more positive view and admit moral progress more openly; cf. the statement of Posidonius: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ Ἠθικοῦ λόγου τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην (Diog. Laert. 7.91 = fr. 29 Edelstein-Kidd) and the saying of Antisthenes: διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετὴν (Diog. Laert. 6.10 = fr. 69 Caizzi). The same applies to the two other philosophical schools, which are of special importance for Bion, i.e. the Cyrenaics: προκοπὴν τε ἀπολείπουσι καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις (Diog. Laert. 2.93 = fr. 246 Mannebach) and the Peripatos: τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μετὰ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπὴν (Diog. Laert. 7.127).

τοὺς συνήθεις

For the use of this word indicating Bion’s closer pupils see T3 with commentary.

ὦ ξέν’ . . . δοῖεν

We here have a Homeric cento, composed of *Od.* 6.187 and *Od.* 24.402. This use of Homer is especially popular among the Cynics; cf. F7 with commentary and introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 66. We can note that in Homer these lines are addressed in friendly way to Odysseus, with whom the patient Cynic is compared. This comparison is quite natural as Odysseus can be regarded almost as a Cynic “patron saint”; cf. further Höistad, pp. 94 ff, W.B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a traditional Hero* (Oxford,

1954) and F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Thèse Paris, 1956) pp. 365 ff.

In *Od.* 6.187 the Homeric text has $\xi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$; $\omega\acute{\iota}\xi\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is not found in any MSS. or indeed in Homer at all. It does not fit the metre and could therefore be considered as not being part of the quotation. However, it is possible to read $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$ with synaloephe, which is unusual in epic except in a few words like $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ and a following word beginning with a vowel; there is a similar case, e.g. *Od.* 4.352 $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$; cf. W.J.W. Koster, *Traité de métrique grecque suivi d'un précis de métrique latine* 2. ed. (Leyden, 1953) pp. 49 f and D. Korzeniewski, *Griechische Metrik* (Darmstadt, 1968) pp. 25 f. Some Plutarch-MSS. have $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\acute{\iota}$ instead of $\phi\omega\tau\acute{\iota}$, which cannot be found in any Homeric MSS. but is easy to explain as a slip of memory, as we meet the phrase $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\acute{\iota}\epsilon\omicron\iota\kappa\alpha\varsigma$ in *Od.* 8.166, 18.128 and 24.253. In the quotation of *Od.* 24.402 $\nu\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\iota$ is a special reading here; the vulgate has $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omicron\iota$.

It must often have happened that philosophers, and especially those belonging to the Cynic school, were ridiculed and insulted by the masses. Therefore it was an attribute of a true philosopher to be able to withstand such treatment. We here have a tradition which goes back to Socrates: $\acute{\iota}\delta\iota\omicron\nu\ \Sigma\omega\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \dots\ \tau\omega\acute{\nu}\ \lambda\omicron\iota\delta\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\tau\omega\acute{\nu}\ \alpha\nu\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ (Epictetus 2.12.14; cf. also Diog. Laert. 2.21 and Seneca *De constantia sapientis* 18.5). Cf. further the sayings of Antisthenes: $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\tau\acute{o}\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \alpha\kappa\omicron\upsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\rho\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ \eta\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \lambda\acute{\iota}\theta\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \beta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$ (Diog. Laert. 6.7 = fr. 85 Caizzi; cf. also frs. 20 and 150 Caizzi and Seneca *De constantia sapientis* 18.5), Diogenes: $\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\omicron\acute{\nu}\tau\alpha,\ \acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\ \sigma\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\epsilon\lambda\omega\varsigma\iota\nu$, $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\prime\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\omega},\ \acute{\epsilon}\phi\eta,\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\epsilon\lambda\omega\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}$ (Diog. Laert. 6.54) and $\eta\nu\ \mu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\gamma\omicron\acute{\iota}\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \eta\ \sigma\tau\rho\epsilon\beta\lambda\omicron\acute{\iota},\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\acute{\nu}\ \omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \alpha\nu\iota\alpha\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \eta\gamma\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta$ (Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 9) and Crates: $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\rho\nu\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\tau\eta\delta\epsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\iota\delta\acute{\omicron}\rho\epsilon\iota,\ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\mu\nu\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omega\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \beta\lambda\alpha\sigma\phi\eta\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ (Diog. Laert. 6.90). Epictetus' comments on the Cynic philosopher in general are also of interest: $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu\ \kappa\omicron\mu\psi\omicron\nu\ \tau\omega\ \Kappa\upsilon\nu\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\ \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\pi\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\alpha\iota\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \omega\varsigma\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \delta\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu\ \phi\iota\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \omega\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu,\ \omega\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\acute{\omicron}\nu$ (3.22.54; cf. also Epictetus 3.12.10 and *Ench.* 20 and 22). The whole idea should be considered in the context of the Cynic striving toward $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ (cf. T19 and F11A–B with commentary). For a general survey see Bieler, I pp. 56 ff, Höistad, pp. 195 ff and v. Geytenbeek, pp. 134 ff.

F16A–B The extension of this fragment seems to be quite clear. The first sentence belongs so closely to the following that it must be said to form part of the quotation. The first $\phi\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\ \beta\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ is later taken up by $\phi\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}$ twice. Moreover the use of the first person singular seems to be typical of Bion rather than of Teles. The beginning of something new is indicated by $\delta\iota\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}$, which can be found with the same function also in Teles p. 39.7. Cf. however Hoogvliet, p. 20, who thinks that the words of Teles start with $\mu\acute{\eta}\ \omicron\upsilon\nu\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\acute{\lambda}\omicron\upsilon$.

It can be noted that Teles seems to quote this passage of Bion twice more without mentioning his name p. 16.4—7: ὥσπερ <δ> ἀγαθὸς ὑποκριτῆς εὖ καὶ τὸν πρόλογον εὖ καὶ τὰ μέσα εὖ καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ εὖ καὶ τὰ πρῶτα τοῦ βίου εὖ καὶ τὰ μέσα εὖ καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν and p. 52.2—5: ἡ τύχη ὥσπερ ποιήτρια τις οὕσα παντοδαπὰ ποιεῖ πρόσωπα, ναυαγοῦ, πτωχοῦ, φυγάδος, ἐνδόξου, ἀδόξου. δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα πᾶν ὃ τι ἂν αὕτη περιθῇ καλῶς ἀγωνίζεσθαι. ναυαγὸς γέγονας, εὖ τὸν ναυαγὸν πένης ἐκ εὐπόρου, εὖ τὸν πένητα.

ὥσπερ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑποκριτὴν

This comparison between life and a play, man and an actor, seems to have been extremely popular in slightly different forms. The main point in Bion's form of the comparison is to stress that you have to play every role which is given to you equally well. We find similar forms used, e.g., by the Stoic Ariston of Chios: εἶναι γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸν σοφὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ, ὃς ἂν τε Θερσίτου ἂν τε Ἀγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἐκάτερον ὑποκρινεῖται προσηκόντως (Diog. Laert. 7.160 = fr. 351 SVF I), Epictetus: ἡ οὐχ ὀρᾷς, ὅτι οὐκ εὐφρονότερον οὐδὲ ἥδιον ὁ Πῶλος τὸν τύραννον Οἰδίποδα ὑπεκρίνετο ἢ τὸν ἐπὶ Κολωνῷ ἀλήτην καὶ πτωχόν (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.33.28 = fr. A 11 Schenkl) and Maximus of Tyre: τί δήποτε οἱ ἐν Διονύσου τὰ δράματα ὑποκρινόμενοι, νῦν μὲν τὰς τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἰέντες φωνάς, νῦν δὲ τὰς τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ αὖθις Τηλεφόν τινα ὑποδύμενοι ἢ Παλαμήδην ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ, τι περ ἂν τὸ δράμα ἐθέλῃ, οὐδὲν πλημμελὲς οὐδὲ ἔξω τρόπου νομίζονται ποιεῖν, ἄλλοτε ἄλλοι φαινόμενοι οἱ αὐτοί (1.1 a) to give just a few examples. This topos has been treated in detail by different scholars and a rich material will be found in Helm 1906, pp. 44 ff, Hense 1909, pp. CVII ff, Curtius, pp. 148 ff and especially M. Kokolakis, *The Dramatic Simile of Life* (Athens, 1960). For the meaning of the term ὑποκριτής see A. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* 2. ed. (Oxford, 1968) pp. 126 f.

ἡ τύχη

It is a very common idea that τύχη is regarded as the giver both of life and of possessions. For the second aspect see F37—38 with commentary. The idea which we find in this fragment that man has to act a role assigned to him by God or Fortune is also expressed by Demades: βασιλεῦ, τῆς τύχης σοι περιθείσης πρόσωπον Ἀγαμέμνονος αὐτὸς οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ πράττων ἔργα Θερσίτου (Diodorus Siculus 16.87.2), Alexis: ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βίων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἡ τύχη / ἡμῶν μεγάλοις προσένειμε τοὺς δ' ἐλάττωσιν (Athenaeus 6.237 B = fr. 116 Kock II), Lucian: ἐδόκει . . . χορηγεῖν δὲ καὶ διατάττειν ἕκαστα ἡ τύχη (*Menippus* 16) and ἔνεστι . . . καὶ τῶν τῆς τύχης ἀγαθῶν καταφρονεῖν ὀρώντα ὥσπερ ἐν σκηνῇ καὶ πολυπροσώπῳ δράματι τὸν μὲν ἐξ οἰκέτου δεσπότην προίοντα, τὸν δ' ἀντὶ πλουσίου πένητα κτλ. (*Nigrinus* 20) and Maximus of Tyre: δράμα . . . διδασκόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ ποιητῇ τῷ θεῷ and τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων,

ὦν δραματουργεῖ ὁ θεός (1.1 b). For more material see Kokolakis, op. cit. p. 27 and p. 59.

Τύχη is here personified as was very common during the Hellenistic period; for a general survey see *RE*, VIIA:2 (1948) s.v. Tyche cols. 1643 ff (Herzog-Hauser) and Dover, pp. 138 ff and for personifications in general see F17 with commentary, where literature is given.

It is of a certain interest that the concept τύχη was attacked by Diogenes: Διογένης ἔφη νομίζειν ὅρᾱν τὴν τύχην ἐφορμῶσαν αὐτῷ καὶ λέγουσαν· Τοῦτον δ' οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητῆρα (Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.8.21), Διογένης δὲ ὁ κύων ἀγροίκως καὶ τέλεον οὐ πολιτικῶς ἡῦχει κατὰ τῆς τύχης, (ὥς) πολλὰ μὲν βέλη ἐφείσης αὐτῷ ὡς σκοπῷ, τυχεῖν δὲ μὴ δυναμένης (Favorinus "Dio of Prusa" 64.18 = fr. 94 Barigazzi), ἔφασκε δ' ἀντιτιθέναι τύχῃ μὲν θάρσος, νόμῳ δὲ φύσιν, πάθει δὲ λόγον (Diog. Laert. 6.38) and *videtur* (sc. *Diogenes*) *mihi dixisse*: 'Age tuum negotium, fortuna; nihil apud Diogenem iam tui est' (Seneca *De tranquillitate animi* 8.7). It was possible for Diogenes to reach this secure and superior attitude thanks to his philosophy which made his life free and independent. Therefore Tyche could offer no threat. This is clearly stated in the following saying: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη, 'εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο, τὸ γοῦν πρὸς πᾶσαν τύχην παρεσκευάσθαι (Diog. Laert. 6.63; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.93 for the attitude of Crates).

It is interesting to see that there are no traces of such a critical attitude in the fragments of Bion. Tyche seems to be a negative concept, being used to stress the insecurity of the human situation. However it is accepted and this attitude may be taken as an acceptance of actual circumstances, where people believe in Tyche and cannot be expected to reach such a level of freedom as to become independent of Tyche. For the belief in Tyche during the Hellenistic period see M.P. Nilsson, 'Geschichte der griechischen Religion' II, 2. ed. *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, V:2:2 (Munich, 1961) pp. 200 ff and Schneider, II pp. 830 ff, where more material and references are given.

ποιήτρια

This word seems to be mainly post-classical and can be found e.g. *Suppl. Epigr.* 2.263, Strabo 17.1.33, Dio of Prusa 33.45, Plutarch *Quaestiones Graecae* 40.300 F, Lucian *Muscae encomium* 11 and Athenaeus 13.600 F. It can also be noted that Alexis wrote a play with the title *Ποιήτρια* (Pollux *Onom.* 9.153 = fr. 184 Kock II). Cf. Schmid 1887–97, I p. 371 and v. Müller, pp. 53 f.

πρωτολόγου . . . δευτερολόγου

These words are to be found only in Bion instead of the more ordinary expressions *πρωταγωνιστής* and *δευτεραγωνιστής*, which, however, are not very common either; cf. for the terminology Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit. pp. 132 ff. It should be noticed that the first *δευτερολόγου* is due to a convincing conjecture

by Meineke, while the MSS. have *υστερολόγου*, which was defended by H. Schenkl, 'Πρωταγωνιστῆς τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμωδίας', *Hermes*, 42 (1907) p. 335, who quoted Eustathius *Opusc.* 269.30: *τοὺς υστερολόγους καὶ ταπεινούς*.

ὅτε μὲν βασιλέως, ὅτε δὲ ἀλήτου

It may be tempting to regard this as a hint at Antigonus Gonatas and Bion himself as a wandering philosopher. Cf. Dio of Prusa 1.9, where he refers to himself as *ἄνδρες ἀλλῆται καὶ αὐτουργοὶ τῆς σοφίας* and 13.11: *οἱ μὲν ἀλήτην, οἱ δὲ πτωχὸν ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ φιλόσοφον* and Lucian *Cynicus* 1, where the life of the Cynic is described as *τὸν ἀλήτην καὶ ἀπάνθρωπον βίον καὶ θηριώδη*. However we may equally well have the contrast between king and beggar, which is very common in stage metaphors. Cf. e.g. Epictetus in Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.33.28 (= fr. A 11 Schenkl): *ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾷς, ὅτι οὐκ εὐφρονότερον οὐδὲ ἥδιον ὁ Πῶλος τὸν τύραννον Οἰδίποδα ὑπεκρίνετο ἢ τὸν ἐπὶ Κολωνῷ ἀλήτην καὶ πτωχόν*. A very common contrast of this kind is that between Agamemnon or another hero and Telephus. Cf. Maximus of Tyre 1.1 a: *τί δήποτε οἱ ἐν Διονύσου τὰ δράματα ὑποκρινόμενοι, νῦν μὲν τὰς τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἰέντες φωνάς, νῦν δὲ τὰς τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ αὐθις Τηλέφον τινα ὑποδύμενοι ἢ Παλαμήδην* and 1.10 c: *ἀκροῶνται δὲ οἱ θεώμενοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ Τηλέφου ἢ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος*. Telephus himself can be taken as an example of a man who had to play the role both of a king and of a beggar. This story was well known from Euripides' use of the legend; cf. E.W. Handley-J. Rea, 'The Telephus of Euripides', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*, Suppl. 5 (London, 1957) and F. Jouan, *Euripide et les légendes des chants cypriens: Des origines de la guerre de Troie à l'Iliade* (Paris, 1966). pp. 222 ff. It can also be noted that Telephus became a kind of model for Cynic philosophy. So Diogenes adopted his dress: *Τηλέφον τε τὸν Ἡρακλέους, ἠνίκα εἰς Ἄργος παρεγένετο, πολὺ χειρόνι σχήματι τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐμφανισθῆναι 'πτῶχ' ἀμφίβληστρα σώματος λαβόντα βράκη ἀλκτῆρια ψυχοῦς' . . . καὶ Τηλέφος μὲν, ἵνα ὑγείας τύχῃ, τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τοῦ βίου ἐναπεκρύψατο* (Diogenes *Ep.* 34.2–3) and *ἀμπισχόμενον . . . τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῆς Σινώπης ἀγωνιστήν, κατὰ τὸν Τηλέφον ἐκεῖνον, βακτηρίᾳ καὶ θυλάκῳ* (Maximus of Tyre 1.10 e). Crates was converted to philosophy after having seen Telephus on the stage: *τοῦτόν φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν ταῖς Διαδοχαῖς θεασάμενον ἐν τινι τραγωδίᾳ Τηλέφον σπυρίδιον ἔχοντα καὶ τᾶλλα λυπρὸν ᾄξει ἐπὶ τὴν κυνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν* (Diog. Laert. 6.87). Cf. also Synesius *De providentia* 13 (= *PG*, 66 col. 1241 C) and Horace *Ep.* 2.3.95 ff and 103 ff and Kokolakis, *op. cit.* p. 20 n. 4 and p. 49 n. 1.

μὴ οὖν βούλου . . . ποιήσεις

A similar idea is expressed by Epictetus 4.2.10: *διάφορα δ' οὕτως πρόσωπα οὐ μίγνυται· οὐ δύνασαι καὶ Θερσίτην ὑποκρίνασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα. ἂν Θερσίτης εἶναι θέλῃς, κυρτόν σε εἶναι δεῖ, φαλακρόν. ἂν Ἀγαμέμνων, μέγαν καὶ καλὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους φιλοῦντα*; cf. also the following saying of Ariston of

Chios: ὃς ἂν τε Θεοσίτου ἂν τε Ἀγαμέμνωνος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἐκάτερον ὑποκρινεῖται προσηκόντως (Diog. Laert. 7.160 = fr. 351 SVF I). Ariston may here very well be influenced by Bion, as Dudley believes, p. 100, while Kokolakis, op. cit. p. 24 is more sceptical. For this problem in general see introd. Chapter IV.

σὺ μὲν ἄρχεις . . . ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρχομαι

Hense 1909, p. LXXIX assumed that Bion is here addressing Antigonus Gonatas, which is highly probable; we find the same opinion in Hirzel 1895, I p. 368 n. 1 and Tarn, p. 236. Cf. also the previous opposition between βασιλέως and ἀλήτου.

ἐνὸς τουτουῖ παιδαγωγὸς γενόμενος

To whom does Bion refer here with the expression ἐνὸς τουτουῖ? Similar expressions in Musonius fr. VIII p. 39.16–18 Hense: ἐξαρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἄρχειν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ γυναικός τε καὶ παίδων ἢ καὶ νῆ Δία αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον and in Teles p. 24.4–5: σὺ πολλῶν [ἢ ὀλίγων] καὶ ἡβώντων βασιλεύεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ὀλίγων καὶ ἀνήβων παιδαγωγὸς γενόμενος, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον ἐμαντοῦ suggest that Bion here refers to himself and this is the easiest explanation. In this case, however, τουτουῖ is a problem, as this pronoun is not used of the speaker; cf. KG, I p. 643. On the other hand, it can hardly be taken as referring to Antigonus, as it conveys a certain flavour of contempt; its use here can possibly be due to the fact that ὅδε in later Greek becomes much rarer than οὗτος, and that the two pronouns are confused; see Radermacher 1925, p. 74 and BD, § 64:2 and § 289.

τουτουῖ

For the use of the deictic iota see introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 29. The reason for its use here may be euphonic as the following word starts with a consonant; cf. Dionysius Hal. *De comp. verb.* 6 pp. 29 f U-R. Crönert, p. 43 takes the deictic iota as proof that this passage is an addition by Teles.

παιδαγωγός

From Teles' use of this noun p. 24.5 about himself it has been assumed that he was a teacher in an elementary school, e.g. by Wilamowitz, p. 306 and Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 43 n. 125. This explanation is far from certain and almost improbable in Bion's case. Therefore I think this expression should not be taken literally but be explained against the Cynic background and the educational theories of the Cynics, who regard the philosopher as a παιδαγωγός — ἄρχων. Cf. Epictetus 3.22.17, where the Cynic philosopher is referred to as ὁ παιδευτῆς ὁ κοινός, ὁ παιδαγωγός, Seneca *Ep.* 89.13, where the wise man is called *humani paedagogus generis* and Höistad, pp. 176 ff.

δίδως ἐλευθερίως . . . λαμβάνω εὐθαρσῶς

This phrase expresses various ideas which are of great importance to Bion.

First of all you should use your riches in a proper way; cf. e.g. F38: *πλούτον, δὲν . . . ἀνελευθερία φυλάττει* with commentary. Furthermore Bion finds it possible to accept financial support without losing his freedom and independence. This attitude should not necessarily be interpreted in a negative sense as an expression of an hedonistic attitude; cf. T4 with commentary.

ὕποπίπτων

The meaning here is “cringe to, fawn on” and the verb is often used of flatterers or suppliants. Both the use and the meaning are fully classical (cf. LSJ, s.v. *ὕποπίπτω* I 2).

ἀγεννίζων

This verb, which is a *hapax legomenon*, indicates a person who acts like an ἀγεννής; cf. v. Müller, p. 57. Such words as *γενναῖος* and *ἀγεννής* are common in Cynic writings but are of course given a moral interpretation and do not refer to actual ancestry. Cf. F1–2 and F53 with commentary.

Here the verb *ἀγεννίζω* refers to financial matters so that it is interesting to find that Aristotle *Virt. Vit.* p. 1251b16 combines this vice with *ἀνελευθερία*. The adverb *ἀγεννῶς* occurs in Teles p. 15.6 and p. 57.2, in the first passage in a financial context.

μεμψιμοιρῶν

This word meaning “grumble, complain of”, is post-classical and used by such authors as Polybius 18.8.3 and 18.48.7, Diodorus Siculus 17.78.1, Philo *De vita Mosis* 1.33.181, Plutarch *De tuenda sanitate praecepta* 9.127 A and Lucian *De sacrificiis* 1; cf. v. Müller, p. 60. For the idea behind this concept the definition of *μεμψιμοιρία* in Theophrastus *Char.* 17.1: *ἔστιν ἡ μεμψιμοιρία ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδομένων* is of great interest, as it is wholly applicable to the use of the verb in Bion. Moral philosophy is wont to attack *μεμψιμοιρία*, a vice often combined with avarice. Cf. especially Horace *Sat.* 1.1, Heinze 1889, pp. 15 ff, H. Herter, ‘Zum ersten Satire des Horaz’, *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 94 (1951) pp. 1 ff with extremely rich material, E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957) pp. 90 ff and Rudd, pp. 1 ff.

σὺ μὲν . . . μεμψιμοιρῶν

This whole sentence could be compared with Horace *Carm.* 2.18.12–14: *nec potentem amicum / largiora flagito, / satis beatus unicus Sabinis* and *Carm.* 3.16.37–38: *importuna tamen pauperies abest, / nec si plura velim tu dare deneges*. There is an interesting similarity between Bion and Horace in their relations to their protectors, Antigonos Gonatas and Maecenas respectively. They both retain their independence, but Bion’s attitude seems to be somewhat colder and there are no traces of affection or gratitude. He accepts support as a matter of course. Here we have a typically Cynic attitude. For a Cynic with *παρρησία* (cf. F53 with commentary) and *ἐλευθερία* as ideals, it must have

been extremely important to remain independent of the rulers of the world. This attitude was strengthened by the great self-confidence of the Cynics and their freedom from fear. Cf. e.g. the sayings of Antisthenes: ὅστις δὲ ἐτέρους δέδοικε, δοῦλος ὢν λέληθεν ἑαυτόν (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.8.14 = fr. 119 Caizzi) and Diogenes: δούλου γὰρ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι (Diog. Laert. 6.75) and Hense 1892, pp. 233 f.

τὰ πολυτελῆ . . . τοῖς δὲ . . . εὐτελέσι

This contrast is common in writings influenced by Cynic ideas; cf. e.g. Antisthenes in Xenophon *Symp.* 4.41–42 (= fr. 117 Caizzi), Xenophon *Hieron* 1.20: μᾶλλον ἡδονταὶ οἱ ταῖς πολυτελεστέραις παρασκευαῖς τρεφόμενοι τῶν τὰ εὐτελέστερα παρατιθεμένων, Teles pp. 12–13, Philo *De somniis* 1.20.124, Musonius fr. XVIII A p. 94.9–11 Hense: ὡς χρὴ καθάπερ τὴν εὐτελῆ τῆς πολυτελοῦς τροφὴν προτιμᾶν καὶ τὴν εὐπόριστον τῆς δυσπορίστου and Lucian *Cynicus* 2 and 8: τὰ ξενικὰ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἀεὶ προτιμῶντες καὶ τὰ πολυτελῆ τῶν εὐτελῶν καὶ τὰ δυσπόριστα τῶν εὐπορίστων.

As we have already seen from these very few examples the two concepts are used especially about food and drink, but also about way of life in general. The Cynics advocate a very simple life according to the demands of nature, and admit only the simplest and cheapest forms of food and drink in order to maintain their αὐτάρκεια. Therefore the concept πολυτέλεια is severely condemned as well as τρυφή (cf. F17 with commentary). See further Diog. Laert. 6.53 and 6.57, Woldinga, II p. 333 and Gigon, II p. 44.

The concept εὐτελής – εὐτέλεια, on the other hand, has a good meaning, referring to the simple, Cynic way of life. This tradition goes back to Socrates, of whom it is said: οὕτω γὰρ εὐτελής ἦν (Xenophon *Mem.* 1.3.5; cf. Diog. Laert. 2.27). Cf. also the saying of Antisthenes: πολὺ δικαιοτέρους γε εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦς εὐτέλειαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυχρηματίαν σκοποῦντας (Xenophon *Symp.* 4.42 = fr. 117 Caizzi), the description of Diogenes: ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸν εὐτελῆ βίον (Diog. Laert. 6.21) and Crates' hymn to Εὐτελία, κλεινῆς ἔργονε Σωφροσύνης (Julian 6.199 A = fr. 12 Diels). For the question of the Cynic food see F17 with commentary, and for this subject see further Joel 1893–1901, II pp. 451 ff and p. 502, Wendland 1895, pp. 8 ff, Gerhard 1909, p. 72 and pp. 110 ff, Dziech, pp. 126 ff, v. Geytenbeek, pp. 96 ff and Vischer, especially pp. 27 ff.

οὐ γὰρ . . . ἀτυφίας

We here have a case where a preceding οὐ negates the whole, i.e. a μέν-clause and a δέ-clause containing οὐ. Cf. KG, II p. 205 and LSJ, s.v. οὐ C 3. A typical example will be found in Demosthenes 18.13. Therefore there is no need to understand the last part of the sentence as a question as W. Capelle does in *Epiktet, Teles und Musonius: Wege zu glücklichem Leben* (Zürich, 1948) p. 219.

σωφροσύνης

For this virtue according to the Cynics and Bion see F13 with commentary.

ἀτυφίας

This noun is mainly post-classical and can be found also in, e.g., Menander fr. 253 Körte, Philo *De virtutibus* 3.17, 33.178 and 36.195, *De vita contemplativa* 4.39, *De congressu [quaerendae] eruditionis gratia* 24.138 and *De vita Mosis* 2.20.96, Plutarch *Quomodo suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 11.82 B and Julian 7.214 B–C: οἱ τὴν ἀτυφίαν ἀσπασάμενοι πρῶτοι τὴν εὐτέλειαν ἤσκουν διὰ πάντων. The underlying idea is typically Cynic; cf. e.g. the following saying of Antisthenes: πάλιν Ἀντισθένης μὲν τὴν ἀτυφίαν (τοῦ μὲν ὅλου βίου τέλος εἶναι ἔταξε) (Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 2.21.130.7 = fr. 97A Caizzi). For the Cynic struggle against τῦφος see F7 with commentary.

F17 εἰ λάβοι . . . φωνὴν τὰ πράγματα

The personification of abstract concepts in this form, which originally belonged to poetry (see e.g. Aeschylus *Agam.* 37 with E. Fraenkel's note ad loc., Sophocles *El.* 548 and Euripides *IT* 52, *Hipp.* I fr. 439 Nauck and *Hipp.* 418 and 1074) became common in prose from the time of Plato. Cf. e.g. Plato *Protagoras* 361 A: καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι “Ἀτοποι γ’ ἐστὲ”, Antisthenes ap. Diog. Laert. 6.9 (=fr. 189 Caizzi): ‘εἰπέ μοι’, φησὶν, ‘εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι ὁ χαλκός, ἐπὶ τίνι ἂν <οῖει> σεμνυνθῆναι’, Demosthenes *Ol.* 1.2: ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρὸς . . . μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφιεῖς, Eratosthenes ap. Athenaeum 10.418 A: τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐλάλουν, οἷα ἂν καὶ τὰ ἀγγεῖα φωνὴν λαβόντα, ὅποσον ἕκαστος χωρεῖ, Epictetus 3.1.23: μὴ δὲ λέγε τῷ ἐξαιρέτῳ ‘σὺ οὖν τί εἶ;’ εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐρεῖ σοι φωνὴν ποθεν λαβόν, Plutarch *De Stoicorum repugnantibus* 31.1048 F: ὥστ’, εἰ λάβοι φωνὴν (sc. ὁ βίος) εἰπεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους κτλ., Maximus of Tyre 5.4 f: τί γὰρ εἰ καὶ τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος φωνὴν λαβόντα . . . εὐχαιτο and 11.3 a: εἰ οὖν ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς ἡ τέχνη φωνῇ φωνὴν λαβοῦσα, Lucian *De luctu* 13: πρὸς ᾧς ὁ νεκρὸς αὐτὸς ἀποκρίναιτ’ ἂν, εἰ λάβοι φωνὴν and *Pseudologista* 26: ἦν λέγει ταῦτα ἡ γλῶττα, ἰδίαν αὐτὴ φωνὴν λαβοῦσα, Galenus *Anim. pass.* 1.5 p. 69 Marquart: ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἐκεῖνοις μόνοις διελέχθη τὰ πράγματα λαβόντα φωνήν, Babrius 71.5–6: ἡ θάλασσα . . . γυναικεῖν λαβοῦσα φωνήν, Philo *De opificio mundi* 26.79: μόνον οὐκ ἄντικρυς βοώσης τῆς φύσεως and *De Cherubim* 11.35: αἱ δὲ καίτοι φωνητηρίων ὀργάνων ἀμοιροῦσαι τὴν δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ῥήξουσιν φωνὴν ἐναργεστέραν οὖσαν τῆς διὰ γλώττης, Lucretius 3.931–932: *denique si vocem rerum natura repente / mittat* and Cicero *De fin.* 4.15.41: *atque ipsa hominis institutio si loqueretur hoc diceret*. We note that most of these cases are formed after a special pattern and that the expression φωνὴν λαβεῖν seems to be the regular phrase. Cf. further A. Nauck, ‘Kritische Bemerkungen VIII’, *Mélanges Gréco-Romains tirés du Bulletin de l’Académie Imperiale des sciences de St.-Petersbourg*, 4 (St. Petersburg, 1880) p. 663 n. 61, Norden 1892, pp. 344 f and Hense 1909, p. 6.

τὰ πράγματα . . . ἡ πενία

Personifications of abstract concepts are common in Greek literature, especially in philosophy of a more popular kind, such as the Cynic, as it must be considered as a very effective way of attracting listeners. A few typical examples will suffice. Cf. Crantor in Sextus Empiricus *Adv. dogm.* 5.53–58, where ὁ πλοῦτος, ἡ ἡδονή, ἡ ὑγεία and ἡ ἀνδρεία appear as acting and talking, and Cleanthes in Galenus *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 5.6 p. 476 Kühn V, where we have a dialogue between λογισμός and θυμός (= fr. 570 SVF I). This form of expression is later very common in Cebes *Tabula* and in Lucian. For personification in general see *ML*, III:2 (1902–09) s.v. Personifikationen abstrakter Begriffe cols. 2068 ff (Deubner) with a very rich material, *RE*, XIX:1 (1937) s.v. Personifikationen cols. 1042 ff (Stössl), Lausberg, §§ 826 ff, and for its use especially in popular philosophy Weber 1887, pp. 161 ff and Hirzel 1895, I pp. 372 f.

A special aspect of this kind of personification is that two abstract concepts can be used in a dispute with each other, which is an old tradition in Greek literature. This may originally have been the case in Bion, although it is impossible to say anything with certainty from the present fragmentary state. Cf. further O. Hense, 'Die Synkrisis', *Prorektoratsrede Freiburg i. B.* 1893, M.C. Waites, 'The Allegorical Debate in Greek Literature', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 23 (1912) pp. 1 ff, Rainfurt, pp. 10 f, L. Radermacher, in 'Aristophanes' Frösche', *Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 198:4 (Vienna, 1921) pp. 20 ff, F. Focke, 'Synkrisis', *Hermes*, 58 (1923) pp. 327 ff, Puelma Piwonka, pp. 184 f and v. Rooy, p. 36.

[πρῶτον ἡ πενία, ἄνθρωπε, τί μοι μάχη;] . . . <ἄνθρωπε>

The whole of the first phrase has rightly been deleted by Hense. Weber 1887, pp. 162 f tries, without conviction, to defend it and Wilamowitz, p. 296 n. 8 wants to delete only [πρῶτον ἡ πενία], which was done already by Cobet. Hense 1909, p. 6 suggests that ἄνθρωπε should be transferred to the beginning of the speech of πενία, but he does not print this in his text. However, this is a highly plausible change, as the the whole first phrase can be explained as a marginal note, in order to show that the speech of Poverty does not begin until later, which has slipped into the text.

ὥσπερ οἰκέτης . . . ἐφ' ἱερὸν καθίσας

It is a very old custom for slaves to flee to the house-altar in order to escape punishment. We find this already in Homer *Od.* 22.379: ἐξέσθην δ' ἄρα τῷ γε Διὸς μεγάλου ποτὶ βωμόν. For the expression used by Bion cf. also Thucydides 1.126.10: καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμόν ἰκέται and Lysias 13.24: καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμόν. For supplication in general see J. Gould, 'Hiketeia', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 93 (1973) pp. 74 ff.

τὴν ἀποφορὰν . . . φέρω

The noun ἀποφορά refers to the money which the slave, who was let out to hire, had to pay to his master. Cf. especially Xenophon *De vect.* 4.14. The term can be found in, e.g., Andocides 1.38, Ps-Xenophon *Ath. pol.* 1.11, Menander *Epitr.* 380, Theophrastus *Char.* 30.15 and Diog. Laert. 7.169. For the phrase used by Bion cf. also Aeschines 1.97: δὴ ὁβολοὺς ἀποφορὰν ἔφερε τῆς ἡμέρας and Menander fr. 364 Körte: εἴτ' ἀμφορεαφόρος τις ἀποφορὰν φέρων, where we have the same play on sounds as in Bion. For this use of slaves see further A. Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* I, 2. ed. (Berlin, 1851) pp. 101 ff, B. Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthum* (Halle, 1869) p. 195 and J. Hasebroek, *Staat und Handel im alten Griechenland: Untersuchungen zur antiken Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1928) pp. 79 f.

εὐτάκτως

This adverb with the meaning "regularly" about payments can only be found in some later papyri; cf. LSJ, s.v. εὐτακτος II and F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden* I (Berlin, 1925) col. 623 s.v. εὐτακτος.

ἡ πενία

Poverty is here given an opportunity not only to defend itself but also to praise itself and develop the ideal life of the Cynics. This positive view of poverty is typical especially of the Cynics, although it can be found in many other passages in Greek literature. For a survey see G.W. Meyer, *Laudes Inopiae* (Diss. Göttingen, 1915), J. Hemelrijk, *Πενία en Πλοῦτος* (Diss. Utrecht, 1925) and J.J. v. Manen, *Πενία en Πλοῦτος: In de periode na Alexander* (Diss. Utrecht, 1931), especially pp. 30 f, pp. 56 ff and pp. 110 ff for the Cynic attitude to πενία and πλοῦτος. For the personification of πενία see *ML*, III: 2 (1902–09) s.v. Penia col. 1921 (Höfer) and *RE*, XIX:1 (1937) s.v. Penia cols. 495 ff (Voigt).

ἄνθρωπε

This vocative, which has a contemptuous sense, especially when addressed to slaves, is very common e.g. in Plato and the discourses of Epictetus; cf. Geffcken 1909, p. 13 and n. 1 and Dziech, p. 125 n. 187.

σωφροσύνης . . . δικαιοσύνης . . . ἀνδρείας

It can be noticed that φρόνησις is not mentioned here. For σωφροσύνη see F13 with commentary. As regards the status of the other two virtues in the Cynic school it is of a certain interest that Antisthenes wrote *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικός* and *Περὶ ἀνδρείας* (Diog. Laert. 6.16 = fr. 1 Caizzi). There is also other evidence that the Cynics had a very high opinion of δικαιοσύνη; cf. the following sayings of Antisthenes: τὸν δίκαιον περὶ πλείονος ποιῆσθαι τοῦ συγγενοῦς (Diog. Laert. 6.12 = fr. 74 Caizzi) and τοὺς βουλομένους ἀθανάτους εἶναι ἔφη δεῖν εὖσεβῶς καὶ δικαίως ζῆν (Diog. Laert. 6.5 = fr.

75 Caizzi) and the material collected in Dziech, p. 218 n. 384. For the cardinal virtues and their relations to each other see O. Kunsemüller, *Die Herkunft der platonischen Kardinaltugenden* (Diss. Munich, 1935).

ἢ οὐ μεστὰι μὲν αἱ ὁδοὶ λαχάνων

It is very tempting to find here a hint of Aratus *Phaenomena* 2: μεστὰι δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγνυαί, which is a very famous line, frequently quoted; see E. Maas, in *Arati Phaenomena* (Berlin, 1893) ad loc. If this is the case, Bion here has a paraphrase but has given it a surprising and ridiculous ending by substituting λαχάνων for Διός. Hense 1909, p. C, however, believes that Bion is here imitating Xenophon *Mem.* 2.2.4: ἐπεὶ τούτου γε τῶν ἀπολυσόντων μεστὰι μὲν αἱ ὁδοί, μεστὰ δὲ τὰ οἰκήματα.

λαχάνων

The Cynics advocated a very simple life with simple food. Consequently λάχανα play an important role and we find innumerable references to the Cynic habit of eating vegetables, which also provides the theme of several anecdotes (e.g. Diog. Laert. 2.68, 2.102 and 6.58). Thus a few references will suffice. See Teles p. 41.4, where μάζη καὶ λαχανίοις are regarded as sufficient food, Teles p. 44.7–8: τῷ ὄντι μέγα καὶ ἀξιόλογον καὶ πήρας καὶ θερμῶν καὶ λαχάνων καὶ ὕδατος (τὸ) μηδενὸς φροντίζειν and the general characterization of the Cynics in Diog. Laert. 6.104: ἔνιοι γοῦν καὶ βοτάναις καὶ παντάπασιν ὕδατι χρῶνται ψυχρῷ. For the food of the Cynics see Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 318 and n. 6, Wendland 1895, pp. 8 ff, Gerhard 1909, p. 58, Dziech, pp. 128 ff, v. Geytenbeek, pp. 96 ff and Vischer, pp. 75 ff. J. Haussleiter, 'Der Vegetarismus in der Antike', *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 24 (Berlin, 1935) pp. 167 ff pointed out that it is not a consistent vegetarianism on the part of the Cynics, as we can see from, e.g., Diog. Laert. 6.73.

πλήρεις δὲ αἱ κρῆναι ὕδατος

The belief that the water of nature should be the drink is common among Cynics. Cf. besides the examples given above Philo *De praemiis et poenis* 17.99: τροφή μὲν οὖν ἄρτος καὶ ναματιαῖον ὕδωρ, ὃ πανταχοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀνακέχεται, Diogenes *Ep.* 37.4–5: πόμα δὲ ὕδωρ ναματιαῖον, Crates *Ep.* 14: ἐθίζεσθε ἐσθίειν μάζαν καὶ πίνειν ὕδωρ, Dio of Prusa 6.12 on Diogenes: ἡδίων δ' ἔπινε τοῦ ρέοντος ὕδατος ἢ ἄλλοι τὸν Θάσιον οἶνον and Maximus of Tyre 36.5 e discussing the Cynic way of life: κρῆναι γῆς ἔγγονοι, παντὸς Λεσβίου καὶ Χίου πόματος δασιλέστεραι. Cf. also the literature given in the preceding note.

οὐκ εὐνάς σοι τοσαύτας παρέχω ὁπόση γῆ

This idea is very common in writings influenced by the Cynics. Cf. e.g. Anacharsis *Ep.* 5.3: κοίτη δὲ πᾶσα γῆ, Dio of Prusa 4.13: ἐστίαν δὲ ἐνόμιζε (sc. Διογένης) τὴν γῆν ἅπασαν, Epictetus 1.24.7: τὸ δὲ ἐπ' ἀστρώτῳ πέδῳ καθεύδειν λέγει (sc. Διογένης) ὅτι μαλακωτάτη κοίτη ἐστίν, Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 9:

χαμαὶ καθεύδοντα, which belongs to the picture of the Cynic, and *Cynicus* 15: εἶη δέ μοι γῆν μὲν ἅπασαν εὐνὴν αὐτάρκη ἔχειν and Seneca *De consolatione ad Helviam* 10.7: *terra cubile erat*. Cf. further Wendland 1895, pp. 20 ff and Reuters, p. 89.

γράδια

Diminutives are common in the spoken language, and also in popular philosophical discourses; cf. introd. Chapter II:2.

φυστήν

This may have been a light pastry. It is also mentioned in Aristophanes *Vespa* 610, where the scholia give the following explanation: *φυστή μαῖζα ἢ ἐξ ἀλφίτων καὶ οἴνου* (p. 476 Dindorf IV:2). Athenaeus 3.114 F gives the following description: *παρ' Ἀθηναίοις μὲν φύστην τὴν μὴ ἄγαν τετριμμένην*, which indicates that it is a simple dish. Cf. K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* IV, 3. ed. (Freiburg i.B.-Tübingen, 1882) p. 218 n. 3.

τερετίζοντα

This verb, which is onomatopoetic, is here used as a sign of happiness and satisfaction. A number of anecdotes about Diogenes indicate that humming in company was not conventional behaviour but a way of showing independence and superiority: *σπουδαιολογουμένων ποτὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς προσήει, ἐπέβαλε τερετίζειν* (Diog. Laert. 6.27) and *περιπεσὼν δ' αὖ τισι συμπτώμασιν ἔλεγε 'εὐ γε, ὦ τύχη, ὅτι μου ἀρρένως προσέστηκας.'* ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς καὶ τερετίζων ἀνεχώρει (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.44.71). Other instances show that it was regarded as ill-mannered: Theophrastus *Char.* 19.10 and *Char.* 27.15, Dio of Prusa 32.69 and 33.9 and Lucian *De mercede conductis* 33.

ἢ οὐκ ὄψον . . . παρασκευάζω σοι τὴν πεῖναν

The idea expressed here, and further developed in the following sentences, that hunger is the best sauce is very common in writings influenced by Cynic ideas. Cf. Xenophon *Mem.* 1.3.5: *ὥστε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου ὄψον αὐτῷ εἶναι*, *Cyr.* 1.5.12: *λιμῶ δὲ ὅσαπερ ὄψω διαχρῆσθε* and *Cyr.* 4.5.4, Epicurus ap. Diog. Laert. 10.131: *καὶ μαῖζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν*, ἐπειδὴ ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται, Diogenes *Ep.* 32.1: *ὄψον δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κήπων φέροντος οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν μαγειρείων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν γυμνασίων*, Anacharsis *Ep.* 5.4: *πᾶν ὄψον πεῖνα* (see also Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.32.90), Epictetus in Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.1.141 (= fr. C17 Schenkl): *μέτρον ἔστω σοι παντὸς σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ ἢ πρώτη τῆς ὀρέξεως ἔμπλησις; ὄψον δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴ αὐτὴ ἢ ὄρεξις; καὶ οὔτε πλείονα τῶν δεόντων προσοίση οὔτε ὀψοποιῶν δεηθήσῃ, ποτῶ τε τῶ παραπεσόντι ἀρκηθήσῃ*, Dio of Prusa 6.12: *ὁ δὲ (sc. Διογένης) λιμῶ μὲν ἐχρήτο καὶ δίψει πρὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐκάστοτε, καὶ ἐνόμιζε τοῦτο ἰκανώτατον καὶ δριμύτατον τῶν ὄψων*, Maximus of Tyre 34.6 a: *εἰ δίψα μὲν σώματι παρασκευάζει ἡδονὴν ποτοῦ, καὶ λιμὸς σώματι παρασκευάζει ἡδονὴν βρωτοῦ*, Varro 160:

patella esurienti posita provocat Neapolitanas piscinas, Cicero *De fin.* 2.28.90: *negat enim tenuissimo victu, id est contemptissimis escis et potionibus, minorem voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis ad epulandum*, Horace *Sat.* 2.2.14–16: *cum labor extuderit fastidia, siccus, inanis / sperne cibum vilem; nisi Hymettia mella Falerno / ne biberis diluta* and Seneca *Ep.* 78.22: *magis iuvat bibere sitientem; gratior est esurienti cibus. Quidquid ex abstinentia contigit, avidius excipitur*, *Ep.* 119.3 and *Ep.* 123.2. Cf. Heinze 1889, p. 25 and K. Praechter, ‘Der fünfte Anacharsisbrief’, *Hermes*, 56 (1921) p. 425.

ἀδάπανον καὶ ἀτρύφερον

Note the paronomasia which is very popular in Cynic writings; cf. introd. Chapter II:2. Ἀδάπανος is not used by Attic prose-writers but is found in the drama, e.g. Euripides *Or.* 1176 and Aristophanes *Pax* 594: it becomes more common in Hellenistic Greek: Diodorus Siculus 1.80.5, Ps-Plutarch *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 189 F and Dio of Prusa 4.93 and 62.4. Cf. Welles, p. 309.

Ἀτρύφερος is a post-classical word, found also e.g. in Cebes *Tabula* 20.2: *στολὴν ἀτρύφερον καὶ ἀπλῆν*.

ἢ οὐχ ὁ πεινῶν ἥδιστα ἐσθίει . . . τὸ μὴ παρὸν ποτὸν ἀναμένει

This seems to reproduce a saying of Socrates: οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἥδιστα ἐσθίων ἥκιστα ὄψου δεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἥδιστα πίνων ἥκιστα τοῦ μὴ παρόντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ποτοῦ (Xenophon *Mem.* 1.6.5; cf. also Diog. Laert. 2.27). See also Joel 1893–1901, II p. 664.

πλακοῦντα

The Greeks had many different kinds of cakes; for a survey see H. Blümner, *Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Künste bei Griechen und Römern* I (Leipzig, 1875) pp. 84 ff and *RE*, XI:2 (1922) s.v. Kuchen cols. 2088 ff (Orth). As cakes must have been considered a luxury it is surprising that they appear so often in anecdotes about the Cynics; cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.55 and 6.56. Gerhard 1912, pp. 400 ff and v. Fritz, pp. 42 ff are of the opinion that this is an expression of a hedonistic Cynicism. The foundation for this assumption seems somewhat weak and I would assume that stories of this kind are rather an expression of an attitude hostile to philosophers. It frequently happens that Lucian in order to give a negative picture of philosophers describes them as too fond of food and drink. Cf. e.g. *Convivium* 16, where an angry Cynic calms down at the sight of a *πλακοῦς εὐμεγέθης*.

Χῖον

The island of Chios was a well known producer of wine in antiquity, as we can see from, e.g., Strabo 14.1.35 and Aelianus *VH* 12.31. For wine in antiquity in general see K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* IV, 3. ed. (Freiburg i.B.-Tübingen, 1882) pp. 229 ff, *DS*, V (1912–19) s.v. Vinum pp.

912 ff (Jardé) and C. Seltman, *Wine in the Ancient World* (London, 1957).

For the expression used by Bion, which indicates that for a thirsty man water is better than wine, see Maximus of Tyre 36.5 e: κρῆναι . . . παντὸς Λεσβίου καὶ Χίου πώματος δαψιλέστεραι and F18 with commentary.

τρυφήν

Like πολυτέλεια (they occur combined e.g. Xenophon *Mem.* 1.6.10 and Dio of Prusa 33.27) this word has a very negative meaning, indicating the opposite of the ideal Cynic life, i.e. a life of pleasure. The struggle against τρυφή probably belongs to the Socratic tradition. Cf. e.g. the sayings of Antisthenes: πρὸς τὸν ἐπαινοῦντα τρυφήν, ‘ἐχθρῶν παῖδες’, ἔφη, ‘τρυφήσειαν’ (Diog. Laert. 6.8 = fr. 179 Caizzi), Diogenes: Διογένης ἔλεγε καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτὸν τρυφήσαι περιειργάσθαι γὰρ καὶ τῷ οἰκιδίῳ, καὶ τῷ σκιμποδίῳ, καὶ ταῖς βλαύταις δέ, αἵσπερ οὖν ἐχρήτο Σωκράτης ἔστιν ὅτε (Aelianus *VH* 4.11; cf. also Dio of Prusa 6.15) and Crates, who thought that all evil came διὰ τρυφήν καὶ πολυτέλειαν (Plutarch *De tuenda sanitate* 7.125 F). Cf. Dziech, p. 138 n. 220, Reuters, p. 92 and Joel 1893–1901, II p. 507 n. 1 (p. 512): τρυφᾶς – “das furchtbarste Wort in der Sprache des Kynikers”.

Many references concerning the ideal Cynic life have already been quoted; for the Cynic ideals of asceticism see also W. Capelle, ‘Altgriechische Askese’, *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 25 (13) (1910) pp. 690 ff, especially pp. 697 ff and P.R. Arbesmann, ‘Das Fasten bei den Griechen und Römern’, *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 21:1 (Giessen, 1929) pp. 110 ff.

τὸν μὲν χειμῶνα τὰ βαλανεῖα, θέρους δὲ τὰ ἱερά

The text προῖκα, τὸν μὲν χειμῶνα is due to a conjecture and replaces πρῶτον μὲν χειμῶνα of the MSS. A somewhat surprising feature here is the accusative χειμῶνα followed by the genitive θέρους and we have two genitives in some of the parallels (cf. below). There is, however, a close parallel in Herodotus 3.117: τὸν μὲν χειμῶνα . . . τοῦ δὲ θέρους; cf. KG, I pp. 446 f and Schwyzer, II p. 70. The absence of the article in the second case is paralleled in Xenophon *Oec.* 9.4: χειμῶνος μὲν . . . τοῦ δὲ θέρους.

This trait comes from the Diogenes-legend: οἰκίας δὲ τὰς καλλίστας καὶ ὑγιεινοτάτας ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένας, τὰ τε ἱερά καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια (Dio of Prusa 6.14), ἀλλὰ οἴκοις μὲν ἐχρήτο ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διέτριβεν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς (Dio of Prusa 4.13), ὅτε καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασκε, δεικνὺς τὴν τοῦ Διὸς στοὰν καὶ τὸ Πομπεῖον, αὐτῷ κατεσκευακέναι ἐνδραιῶσθαι (Diog. Laert. 6.22), βασιλεία δ’ ἦν αὐτῷ τὰ τε ἱερά καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἄλση (Maximus of Tyre 36.5 d) and Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 9. Cf. also Teles p. 41.10–11: καὶ κάθευδε τὸ μὲν θέρος ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, τὸν δὲ χειμῶνα ἐν τοῖς βαλανείοις and Plutarch *An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat* 3.499 A: καταγελᾶ σου Μητροκλῆς, ὃς χειμῶνος ἐν τοῖς προβάτοις (πριβάτοις

Usener) καθεύδων καὶ θέρους ἐν τοῖς προπυλαίοις τῶν ἱερῶν. The mention of the seasons sometimes refers to Diogenes' visits to Athens and Corinth, e.g. Dio of Prusa 6.1 and Maximus of Tyre 36.5 c. Cf. K. Praechter, 'Zur Frage der Composition der sechsten Rede des Dion Chrysostomos', *Hermes*, 37 (1902) pp. 283 ff.

τὰ βαλανεῖα

It was probably a habit of the poor to visit the public baths in winter in order to warm themselves; cf. Alciphron *Ep.* 1.23 (3.40) and Aristophanes *Plutus* 952–953. The public baths were visited by all kinds of people, although some avoided them out of snobbery; see Plutarch *Phocion* 4.2: Φωκίωνα γὰρ οὔτε γελάσαντα τις οὔτε κλαύσαντα ῥαδίως Ἀθηναίων εἶδεν, οὐδ' ἐν βαλανείῳ δημοσιεύοντι λουσάμενον. Cf. for the use of baths R. Ginouvès, 'Balaneutikè: Recherches sur le bain dans l'antiquité grecque', *Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, 200 (Paris, 1962) pp. 216 ff.

οἰκητήριον

For the use of diminutives see introd. Chapter II:2.

ὁ Παρθενών

Diogenes is here referring to Athena's temple in Athens. Wilamowitz, p. 296 n. 8 takes this as a proof that the temple was open to the public. Cf. also A.D. Nock, 'Notes on Ruler-Cult I–IV', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 48 (1928) p. 26 n. 23 a (= *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (Oxford, 1972) I p. 140 n. 23 a), who thinks that this story that Diogenes used the Parthenon as his summer residence may perhaps be intended to contrast with its use as a winter residence by Demetrius Poliorcetes in the year 304/3 B.C.

εὔπνους

Cf. Aristotle *Oec.* 1.6.7 p. 1345a31: οἰκίαν . . . εὔπνουν μὲν τοῦ θερούς and Dio of Prusa 6.3, where Diogenes is said to stay in Corinth because of τὸ θέρος εὔπνουν.

πολυτελής

The use of this adjective here may be somewhat surprising as πολυτέλεια is rejected by the Cynics; (cf. F16A with commentary). Here however the use is ironical and the word does not refer to private luxury.

εἰ ταῦτα λέγοι . . . ἀντειπεῖν

Cf. Lucretius 3.931–932 and 950: *si vocem rerum natura repente / mittat . . . quid respondemus* and Horace *Sat.* 1.2.69 and 72: *diceret haec animus . . . quid responderet?*

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ . . . γενέσθαι

For this phrase cf. Plato *Resp.* 1.336 D: καί μοι δοκῶ . . . ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι.

The two preceding fragments, which are unusually long, come from a diatribe of Teles entitled *Περὶ αὐταρκείας*, and although it can never be wholly certain that we here have the exact text of Bion, it must be fairly close. Cf. further introd. Chapter IV.

The term *αὐτάρκεια* does not occur in the fragments of Bion but they are a good illustration of what the Cynics mean by this central concept. In order to reach *αὐτάρκεια*, according to Bion, it is necessary to play the role which has been assigned to you without complaint. *Αὐτάρκεια* for him means satisfaction with what you have, even if it is very little, as man needs very little. So we have not only a defence but almost an eulogy of poverty. For the concept *αὐτάρκεια* see introd. Chapter III:2 and n. 21 with references.

F18 τοῖς πολλοῖς

Οἱ πολλοί as the opposite of *ὁ σοφός* is a very common expression in philosophical writings, and the Cynics look upon the crowd with a great deal of contempt. Cf. also T15, where Bion condemns *stultitiam vulgi*, and see further Joel 1893–1901, II p. 1098 and Dziech, p. 172 n. 288.

πλακοῦντα

For cakes see F17 with commentary.

Θάσιον

This is a very famous wine, regarded by the Cynics as a luxury, when water is enough. Cf. the saying of Antisthenes: *ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν τῷδε τῷ Θασίῳ οἶνῳ ἐν-τυχῶν οὐ διψῶν πίνω αὐτόν* (Xenophon *Symp.* 4.41 = fr. 117 Caizzi) and the description of Diogenes in Dio of Prusa 6.12: *ἥδιον δὲ ἔπινε τοῦ ῥέοντος ὕδατος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι τὸν Θάσιον οἶνον*. Cf. also F17 with commentary, where literature on wine in antiquity in general is given.

Bion has here chosen two very typical examples of things which are not necessary for a person who leads a philosophical life, but are deeply craved by the common people. On the weakness for cakes cf. e.g. Horace *Sat.* 2.8.24: *ridiculus totas semel absorbere placentas*.

The expression is so striking as to make an impression on the listeners. For similar cases see T18, where different kinds of poetry are compared with different kinds of food and F58, where an effeminate boy is compared with *ἀπαλὸν τυρόν*.

F19 This and the following fragment are very similar and one may well be a variation of the other; cf. Hense 1909, pp. XCVII f.

ἄνοια

This, as being the opposite of *φρόνησις*, is of course condemned by the Cynics. Cf. the saying of Diogenes: *παρὰ ἄνοιαν κακοδαιμονοῦσι* (Diog. Laert. 6.71; cf. Höistad, pp. 43 f) and the picture of Diogenes given by Dio of Prusa 8.5:

τὸν φρόνιμον ἄνδρα . . . ὅπου πλεῖστοί εἰσιν ἄφρονες, ἐκεῖ μάλιστα ἐπιδημεῖν ἐξελέγχοντα καὶ κολάζοντα τὴν ἄνοιαν αὐτῶν, 9.1: ἐπισκοπῶν . . . τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὴν ἄνοιαν αὐτῶν and 10.14: πλείω κακὰ πεπόνθασιν ἀνθρώποι ὑπὸ ἀργυρίου ἢ ὑπὸ πενίας, ἄλλως τε ἀνόητοι ὄντες.

προκοπῆς:

For the attitude of different philosophical schools to the idea of moral progress see F15 with commentary.

ἐμπόδιον

For the use of this word as a noun with the genitive cf. Thucydides 1.139.4, Epictetus *Ench.* 9: νόσος σώματός ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ and Anacharsis *Ep.* 2: ἐμπόδια ὀρθῆς κρίσεως. For the whole expression there is a close parallel in Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 34 (= *PG*, 91 col. 893 D): μέγα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ κενοδοξία πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐμπόδιον.

F20 This saying is also ascribed to Heraclitus (*Gnom. Par.* 209 = *Flor. Mon.* 199 = Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 34 (= *PG*, 91 col. 897 A) = fr. B 131 *FVS* I). The saying also occurs anonymously in *Gnom. Vat.* 306, Ioannes Dam. *Sacra parall.* (= *PG*, 96 col. 216 D) and Isidorus Pelusiotes *Ep.* 4.6 (= *PG*, 78 col. 1053 C). For other similar sayings see M. Marcovich, in *Heraclitus: Greek Text with a short Commentary* (Merida, Venezuela, 1967) pp. 573 ff. The assumption of Marcovich, op. cit. p. 575 that the saying is Stoic in origin does not seem wholly convincing. It can as well be Cynic, and the attribution to Bion speaks for such an origin.

τὴν οἴησιν

The meaning of οἴησις can be “false notion, opinion” or “self-conceit” (LSJ, s.v. οἴησις I and II). However, I do not think that the two meanings can always be clearly distinguished. The term has here the same meaning as δόξα, κενοδοξία, τυφός or ὑπόληψις, which are all attacked by the Cynics as being the opinion of people in general and not philosophically founded. Οἴησις can be found with this negative meaning, e.g. Ps-Aristotle *Rhet. ad Alex.* 14 p. 1431a40, in the saying of Zeno: ἔλεγε δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι τῆς οἰήσεως ἀλλοτριώτερον πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν (Diog. Laert. 7.23 = fr. 71 *SVF* I), Epictetus 2.11.6–8, 2.17.1: τί πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος; ἀποβαλεῖν οἴησιν and 2.17.39 and Marcus Aurelius 4.12. Cf. A. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa: Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 1890) pp. 3 f.

ἐγκοπήν

This word, which in the sense “hindrance” (LSJ, s.v. ἐγκοπή II) seems to be post-classical, can also be found in, e.g., Philodemus *Περὶ θεῶν* 3.6.9: ἐγκοπή ἀειδιότητος. It is here chosen by Bion for the rhetorical effect in connection with προκοπή; cf. introd. Chapter II:2.

F21 τοῦ ὄφεως

We find a comparison with a snake also in Epictetus 1.25.24: ὡς ὁ ὄφεις ἐὰν συσπᾷ τὴν κεφαλὴν, λέγω ‘ἐκεῖνο αὐτοῦ τύπτε ὃ φυλάσσει’ and Clemens Alex. *Paedagogus* 3.6.35.1: εἰκέναι γοῦν μοι δοκεῖ ὁ πλοῦτος ἐρπετῶ, οὐ εἰ μὴ τις ἐπίσταιτο λαβέσθαι ἀβλαβῶς, πόρρωθεν ἀκινδύνως ἄκρας οὐράς ἀνακρημνὰς τὸ θηρίον, περιπλέζεται τῇ χειρὶ καὶ δήζεται; there is some doubt as to whether this really goes back to Musonius, as Hense 1909, p. 9 assumes; cf. v. Geytenbeek, p. 20.

τὴν ὑπόληψιν . . . ὑπολάβης

The sense of these words was originally neutral, and ὑπόληψις had the meaning “mental conception” in general; cf. Aristotle *De anima* 3.3 p. 427b24: εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τὰναντία τούτων. However, the development to a negative meaning is easy enough, being “mere opinion, fancy”; cf. Aristotle *EN* 6.3.1 p. 1139b17: ὑπολήψει καὶ δόξη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι. The Cynic Monimus, who held Sceptic ideas, is reported to have said: ὅτι πᾶν ὑπόληψις (Marcus Aurelius 2.15; cf. A.S.L. Farquharson’s note ad loc.) and τὸ γὰρ ὑποληφθὲν τῷφον εἶναι πᾶν ἔφη (Menander ap. Diog. Laert. 6.83 = fr. 215.7 Körte; cf. also Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.5). Other cases of ὑπόληψις with a negative meaning can be found e.g. Marcus Aurelius 4.3, 4.7, 8.40, 12.22 and 12.25. Cf. A. Bonhöffer, ‘Epiktet und das Neue Testament’, *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 10 (Giessen, 1911) pp. 262 f.

καὶ ἐὰν μὲν οὕτως ὑπολάβης . . . οὐκ ὀδυνήσῃ

Cf. Epictetus *Ench.* 30: τότε δὲ ἔση βεβλαμμένος, ὅταν ὑπολάβης βλάπτεσθαι.

ὡς ἑτέρως

This is a common expression in prose, meaning “in the other way” (LSJ, s.v. ἕτερος V 2); cf. e.g. Plato *Sophista* 266 A and Demosthenes 18.85.

ἀνιάσῃ . . . δόξης

Cf. F22 with commentary. The idea that sufferings are caused by false opinions is very common in literature influenced by popular philosophy: Epictetus *Ench.* 5: ταρασσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα· οἷον ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν δεινόν, (ἐπεὶ καὶ Σωκράτει ἂν ἐφαίνετο), ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τοῦ θανάτου, διότι δεινόν, ἐκεῖνο τὸ δεινόν ἐστι, Dio of Prusa 16.4: οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτὸ δεινόν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἡμετέρας γίγνεται τοιοῦτον, Plutarch *De exilio* 5.600 E–F: ὧν δὲ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ἔχει κακόν, ἀλλὰ ὅλον καὶ πᾶν τὸ λυποῦν ἐκ κενῆς δόξης ἀναπέπλασται, Marcus Aurelius 4.3.4: ὅτι τὰ πράγματα οὐχ ἄπτεται τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ ἔξω ἔστηκεν ἀτρεμοῦντα, αἱ δὲ ὀχλήσεις ἐκ μόνης τῆς ἐνδον ὑπολήψεως, Horace *Sat.* 1.2.76–77: tuo vitio rerumne labores, / nil referre putas and Seneca *Ep.* 78.13: levis est dolor, si nihil illi opinio adiecerit . . . omnia ex opinione

suspensa sunt, Ep. 94.17: *inter insaniam publicam et hanc, quae medicis traditur, nihil interest nisi quod haec morbo laborat, illa opinionibus falsis* and *De tranquillitate animi* 12.5: *non industria inquietos, sed insancae falsae rerum imagines agitant*.

τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης

The concept δόξα is very common in Cynic thought and in Cynic writings and usually has a negative meaning as “opinion” or “self-conceit”. Therefore δόξα can be used as a synonym for κενοδοξία, οἷσις, τῦφος or ὑπόληψις. For the possibility of a positive interpretation of this concept in the Cynic school see F43A–B with commentary.

F22

τὴν δόξαν ἀνιῶν μητέρα εἶναι

This fragment must be among those most often discussed by different scholars. The text can hardly be accepted, as it is given by the MSS., even though Gerhard 1909, p. 91, like Menagius and Long, tries to find some meaning in it. Obviously the fault must lie in the word ἐτῶν, and different emendations have been proposed: ἀνιῶν by Reiske, followed by Apelt and Gigante, ἀτῶν by Casaubon, ἀρετῶν by Hirzel 1895, I p. 377 n. 2 and H. Richards, ‘Varia’, *The Classical Review*, 16 (1902) p. 395, followed by Hicks, and θεῶν by Crönert, p. 32 n. 168. Cf. also Hense 1909, pp. LXXXIV f. The interpretation of the fragment depends on how we understand the word δόξαν. Almost everyone seems to have given it the meaning of “glory”; there is however another possibility: “opinion”, i.e. the same as κενοδοξία, οἷσις, τῦφος or ὑπόληψις (cf. F20–21 with commentary). This meaning is well known in Cynic writings as we have seen. If we accept this meaning, and I am convinced that we should, Reiske’s emendation ἀνιῶν gives excellent sense. This reading is supported by another Bion-fragment (F21), which, curiously enough, has been overlooked in this connection: ἀνιάση . . . ὑπὸ τῶν ιδίων τρόπων καὶ τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης and the meaning here is the same as in the preceding fragment.

μητέρα

For this rhetorical figure, *fictio personae*, see Lausberg, § 829. This use of μήτηρ or mater is very common and given as an example of this figure in Quintilian 9.3.89: *crudelitatis mater est avaritia*. For other cases see Aeschylus *Septem* 224: *πειθαρχία γὰρ τῆς εὐπραξίας μήτηρ*, Sophocles *Phil.* 1360: *ἡ γνώμη κακῶν μήτηρ*, Xenophon *Oec.* 5.17: *γεωργίαν τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μητέρα* and Aristotle *Protrepticus* fr. 51 Rose: *μήτηρ γὰρ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἡ φιλοσοφία*.

F23

A very similar saying is ascribed to Bias: *Βίας ἔλεγεν ἀτυχῇ εἶναι τὸν ἀτυχίαν μὴ φέροντα* (Diog. Laert. 1.86 = *Gnom. Vat.* 153 = *Flor. Mon.* 168 = Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 18 (=PG, 91 col. 836 A) = *Gnom. Bas.* 98 = *Gnom. cod. Pal.* 122 f. 163^v n. 78^a = Arsenius *Violetum* p. 149 Walz). *Gnom. Vat.* alone here has the reading εὐτυχίαν, which is considered by L.

Sternbach ad. loc. to be correct. We may remember here the similarity between the two names *Βίας* and *Βίων*; cf. introd. Chapter V:4. For other similar sayings see Marcus Aurelius 4.49.2: *ὅτι οὐχὶ τοῦτο ἀτύχημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φέρειν αὐτὸ γενναίως ἐτύχημα* and Seneca *Ep.* 85.28: *quaeris quid sit malum? Cedere iis quae mala vocantur* and *Ep.* 96.1: *non feram me, quo die aliquid ferre non potero*. For the form of the expression see Geffcken 1909, pp. 127 f.

F24 *μᾶλλον*

Hense 1909, p. XCIX assumes that this saying is not complete; the use of *μᾶλλον* without a second part could point to this. However, the use of the comparative in this way is quite common; cf. KG, II pp. 305 ff and Schwyzler, II pp. 184 f. It may also be noted that the comparative is often used instead of the superlative in later Greek; see BD, § 60 and § 244 and Radermacher 1925, pp. 67 ff.

ἐνήμερεῖν

For this verb in the sense of “to be successful” (LSJ, s.v. *ἐνήμερέω* 2) see Aeschines 2.63, Theophrastus *Char.* 21.11, Machon ap. Athenaeum 13.577 D and Epictetus 4.1.22.

Bion here wants to stress the complete indifference of the Cynic to success, and how the struggle for this only brings suffering.

4. On religion and mythology (F25–33)

F25 *Κράτητος*

Who is this Crates? The name Crates appears in several passages of the Stilpon-biography of Diog. Laert.: 2.114, 2.117 (*bis*), 2.118 and 2.119. When he is mentioned the second time in 2.117, he is introduced as *Κράτητος . . . τοῦ κυνικοῦ*. This could be interpreted as meaning that another Crates had been mentioned in the two previous instances; cf. Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 285 n. 1, who wants to identify the Crates named in 2.114 with a Peripatetic philosopher, who is mentioned in Diog. Laert. 4.23, but who says nothing about the first Crates in 2.117; the same opinion can be found in *RE*, VIA:2 (1929) s.v. Stilpon col. 2526 (Praechter). On the other hand Stilpon is, as we have seen, also connected with the Cynic Crates. Besides Diog. Laert. 2.117–119 see Diog. Laert. 10.1, Seneca *Ep.* 10.1 and Derenne, p. 204, who thinks that the Cynic Crates is meant here in 2.117. For the problem see also Döring, p. 146.

Στίλπωνα

For Stilpon in general see Diog. Laert. 2.113–120 and Praechter, art. cit. cols. 2525 ff. The fragments are collected in Döring, pp. 46 ff (frs. 147–210). Stilpon seems to have been rather close to the Cynic school, at least so far as his religious attitude is concerned, as we can see from the anecdotes in Plutarch

Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus 12.83 C and Athenaeus 10.422 D (= frs. 159–160 Döring), where Stilpon appears as a sceptical and unconventional mind.

ταῖς προσκυνήσεσι

The noun *προσκύνησις* in religious context refers to the habit of prostrating oneself before and/or kissing the cult-object. For a detailed interpretation of the meaning of *προσκύνησις* see H. Bolkestein, 'Theophrastus' Charakter der Deisidaimonia als religionsgeschichtliche Urkunde', *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 21:2 (Giessen, 1929) pp. 21 ff.

This religious practice was in many cases critically regarded almost as a form of superstition. Cf. Theophrastus *Char.* 16.5, where the superstitious man is described as ἐπὶ γόνατα πεσὼν καὶ προσκυνήσας, Plutarch *De superstitione* 3.166 A: ῥίψεις ἐπὶ πρόσωπον, αἰσχρὰς προκαθίσεις, ἀλλοκότους προσκυνήσεις, Polybius 15.29.9: καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐλιπάρει γονυπετοῦσα καὶ μαγγεύουσα πρὸς τὰς θεάς and 32.15.7: προσκυνοῦντα καὶ λιπαροῦντα τὰς τραπεζὰς καὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς ἐξάλλως. The Cynics' ridicule of this habit is in no way surprising, and made clear from some anecdotes about Diogenes, who makes fun of γυναιῖκα ἀσχημονέστερον τοῖς θεοῖς προσπίπτουσιν (Diog. Laert. 6.37) and τῷ Ἀσκληπίῳ ἀνέθηκε πλήκτην, ὃς τοὺς ἐπὶ στόμα πίπτοντας ἐπιτρέχων συνέτριβεν (Diog. Laert. 6.38).

εὐχαῖς

For the Greek attitude to prayers see F29 with commentary.

οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ . . . πρέσβυ

This is a hexameter, and it is typical of Bion as well as of the Cynics in general to use a poetic quotation in an answer in this way. As it is a hexameter we would expect to find this line or a prototype in Homer. However, this is not possible (*pace* Casaubon). Moreover, it is not likely that Bion created this line as we find parts of it quoted by other authors: Philodemus *De pietate* 30.6–8 p. 150 Gomperz (P₁) and Athenaeus 1.4 B (h₁); cf. J. Schweighäuser, *Animadversiones in Athenaei Deipnosophistas* I (Strasburg, 1801) pp. 51 f. In the last case the line is used by a certain Charmus. However, I think that neither Bion nor Charmus should be considered as the originator but that the line may come from some Cyclic epos; cf. Döring, p. 147.

Stilpon and Bion refuse to discuss religious questions in public. It seems to have been a Cynic tradition not to encourage questions of this kind, and there are several anecdotes, where a Cynic philosopher gives a witty and usually repudiating answer when asked about the existence of the gods or about things after death. Cf. for Diogenes: *extant testimonia tam ignoratae quam dubitatae inter philosophos divinitatis. Diogenes consultus, quid in caelis agatur, 'numquam', inquit, 'ascendi'. Item an dei essent, 'nescio', inquit, 'nisi, ut sint expedi-*

re' (Tertullian *Ad nat.* 2.2) and for Demonax: ἐρομένου δέ τινος, 'ὅποῖα νομίσεις τὰ ἐν Αἰδου;' 'περίμεινον κάκειθ' ἐν σοὶ ἐπιστελῶ' (Lucian *Demonax* 43; cf. also *Demonax* 32).

This negative attitude to discussion of religious matters in public is in no way confined to the Cynics. Cf. the sayings of Euclides: Εὐκλείδης ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, ὅποῖοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τίνι χαίρουσι, 'τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ οἶδα', εἶπε, 'τοὺς μέντοι φιλοπράγμονας ὅτι μισοῦσι, ἀσφαλῶς οἶδα' (*Gnom. Vat.* 277 = fr. 11 Döring), Sextus *Sent.* 360: ἐπὶ πλήθους λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ μὴ ἐπιτήδευε, Porphyrius *Ad Marcellam* p. 284.17–18 Nauck: καὶ σιγᾶσθω ὁ περὶ αὐτοῦ (sc. θεοῦ) λόγος ἐπὶ πλήθους and Cato *Disticha* 2.2: *an di sint caelumque regant, ne quaerere doceri: / cum sis mortalis, quae sunt mortalia cura.*

Different explanations can be found for this attitude as far as the Cynics are concerned. One reason may be that religion was not important enough for the Cynics to be included in a serious philosophical discussion, concerned mainly with ethical problems. Cf. the statement of Helm 1924, col. 7 that for the Cynics "Gottheit und Natur sind Nebensachen". Derenne, p. 204, on the other hand, thinks that the reason for this silence lay in the danger of being too outspoken in Athens, which theory does not seem very convincing to me, when it is a question of the Cynics. It is more probable that they declined to discuss it, because they thought that people in general could not really understand the question or because they considered the subject too serious for a discussion in public. This seems to apply to Diogenes and Crates according to Julian 7.214 A: τοιοῦτ' ὁ δὲ τῷ ἄνδρ' ἐν τῷδε γενομένῳ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀκροατήρια συνεκροτεῖται οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ δι' εἰκόνων καὶ μύθων τοῖς φίλοις συνεγγέσθην. Furthermore it can be noted that the Cynics were very careful when discussing religious problems in general; cf. R. Asmus, 'Der Kyniker Sallustius bei Damascius', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 25 (13) (1910) p. 506: "die kynische Zurückhaltung der Theologie gegenüber".

A point of interest in this connection is that this contempt for the uninitiated crowd seems to be a literary commonplace, especially in literature influenced by popular philosophy; cf. Plato *Symp.* 218 B, Horace *Carm.* 3.1.1: *odi profanum vulgus et arceo* and Bramble, p. 5 and p. 154 f.

The result would be that Bion reserved discussion of religious matters for his intimate pupils, a view which in some way is supported by Diog. Laert. 4.54 (= T3): πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀθεώτερον προεφέρετο τοῖς ὁμιλοῦσι. On the other hand this single statement does not at all imply that Bion denied the existence of the gods, as it was interpreted by P. Decharme, *La critique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs des origines au temps de Plutarque* (Paris, 1904) p. 175; cf. also Hense 1909, p. LXXV.

F26A—B For the text of these fragments, which remains uncertain on several points, see Crönert, pp. 31 f and p. 178.

τὴν τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντων ἀγνωσίαν

Wachsmuth, p. 74 takes this as referring to an attack from Bion's side on natural philosophers. Although this does not immediately follow from this fragment, where nothing is said about Bion's opinions of natural sciences, except that he was without knowledge in that field, it is plausible enough; cf. F3—10 with commentary.

ἐπιχείρημα

Cf. Aristotle *Top.* 8.11 p. 162a16: ἐπιχείρημα δὲ συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικός, Hermogenes *Inv.* 3.5 pp. 140—148 Rabe and W. Kroll, 'Das Epicheirema', *Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 216:2 (Vienna-Leipzig, 1936).

ἐν τοῖς λόγοις θεωρητοῖς

The phrase as such is traditional, but it is also used as the Epicurean description of the gods as mentally conceived and opposed to what is sensationally perceived (ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς), as we can see from the following saying: 'Ἐπίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντα θεωρητοὺς διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως (*Aetius Plac.* 1.7.34 = *Dox. Gr.* p. 306.13—16 = fr. 355.11—13 Usener). Cf. also Philodemus *Περὶ θεῶν* 3.11.2 and Cicero *De nat. deor.* 1.19.49: *docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur* and see further R. Philippson, 'Zur epikureischen Götterlehre', *Hermes*, 51 (1916) pp. 568 ff, C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford, 1928) pp. 591 ff, S.A. Pease, in *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum* I (Cambridge, Mass., 1955) pp. 314 f and D. Lemke, 'Die Theologie Epikurs: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion', *Zetemata*, 57 (Munich, 1973) p. 35 n. 78 and pp. 67 ff.

From the text, where Bion is quoted, it is obvious that his dialectical proof refers to the gods, and that he wants to show the absurdity of the belief that the gods are anthropomorphic. It is not probable that his criticism is directed exclusively against the Epicureans, but it has a more general bearing and he wants to criticize this general belief that the gods have a human shape. We find this criticism already in Xenophanes (see frs. B 14—16 *FVS* I) and in Heraclitus (see fr. B 5 *FVS* I). The Cynics were critical, especially of the cult of statues with a human form; see for Antisthenes Clemens Alex. *Protrepticus* 6.71.1 etc. = fr. 40A—D Caizzi and for Diogenes *Theosoph. Graec.* 70. For criticism of the idea that gods have a human form cf. for Ariston of Chios: *cuius discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in errore sententia est, qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat neque in dis sensum esse dicat dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit* (Cicero *De nat. deor.* 1.14.37 = fr. 378 *SVF* I) and Socrati-

cus Xenophon formam dei veri negat videri posse et ideo quaeri non oportere, Ariston Stoicus comprehendendi omnino non posse (Minucius Felix 19.13). Cf. also the Stoic idea of God: *μη εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον* (Diog. Laert. 7.147 = fr. 1021 SVF II).

F27 γελοιότερον

It is typical of Bion's way of teaching to use ridicule, following a Cynic tradition; see F6 with commentary.

ιατροῦ . . . νόσον . . . φαρμακεύοντος

To take comparisons and pictures from the field of medicine is very popular both with Bion and with the Cynics in general; see introd. Chapter II:2.

We find exactly the same comparison in Philo *De providentia* 2.7: *si medicus urere vel secare pro patre vel matre aegro tantibus filium sanum aggredetur, nonne aut furere, aut exitiale quid moliri evidenter censeretur? Quantum ergo absurdus erit, id quod neque de hominibus dici potest, id de Diis credere?* It is possible that Philo is here quoting Bion; cf. P. Wendland, *Philos Schrift über die Vorsehung: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nacharistotelischen Philosophie* (Berlin, 1892) pp. 49 f.

The thought that the gods punish the children for the sins of the fathers is very old (cf. e.g. Homer *Il.* 4.160–162) but the protests against this idea also started very early as was pointed out by M.P. Nilsson, 'Geschichte der griechischen Religion' II, 3. ed., *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, V:2:1 (Munich, 1967) pp. 688 f. We find this already in Solon (see fr. 1.31–32 Diehl) and Theognis (see 205–206 and 731–742; but cf. also Gerhard 1909, pp. 262 f). For Bion and the Cynics in general the thought must have been totally absurd. We have already found the same attitude in Philo and criticism also occurs in Cicero *De nat. deor.* 3.38.90: *quem vos praeclare defenditis, cum dicitis eam vim deorum esse ut etiam si quis morte poenas sceleris effugerit expetantur eae poenae a liberis, a nepotibus, a posteris*, which may go back to Carneades and in Plutarch *De sera numinis vindicta* 12.556 E–557 E; cf. A.S. Pease, in *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum* II (Cambridge, Mass., 1958) pp. 1214 f. Bion is here ridiculing a certain religious belief, and it is impossible to pass comment on his opinion of the relations between gods and fate, or fate and responsibility. On the other hand, it is possible that we here find a hint at the Stoics, to whom this idea of punishment from the side of the gods belongs; cf. e.g. Philo *De providentia* 2.7 and Cicero *De nat. deor.* 3.38.90. For this problem in general see also Wendland, op. cit. pp. 49 f and Helm 1906, p. 128.

F28

Behind this saying of Bion is the famous myth of the Danaides, who as a punishment in the underworld for having murdered their husbands carried water in sieves to fill a pithos with holes in it. Cf. *ML*, I:1 (1884–86) s.v. Danaiden cols. 949 ff (Bernhard), *RE*, IV (1901) s.v. Danaiden cols. 2087 ff

(Waser) and A.B. Cook, *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* III (Cambridge, 1940) pp. 355. Bion here ridicules both the myth and the common belief in punishment in Hades, a rejection typical of the Cynics; cf. Helm 1906, pp. 195 f.

His saying probably has a wider meaning however. It was a common belief that people, who were not initiated in the mysteries, had to carry water with a sieve to a leaky jar in the underworld: *ὥς τῶν ἐν ᾿Αΐδου . . . οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν, οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ* (Plato *Gorgias* 493 B) and: *οἱ μὲν δὴ ἄλλοι φέρουσιν ὕδωρ, τῇ δὲ γραῖ κατεᾶχθαι τὴν ὑδρίαν εἰκάσεις· ὅσον δὲ ἐν τῷ ὀστράκῳ λοιπὸν ἦν τοῦ ὕδατος, ἐκχέουσά ἐστιν αὐθις ἐς τὸν πίθον. ἐτεκμαιρόμεθα δ' εἶναι καὶ τούτους τῶν τὰ δρώμενα Ἐλευσῖνι ἐν οὐδενὶ θεμένων λόγῳ* (Pausanias 10.31.11); cf. A. Dieterich, *Nekyia: Beiträge zur Erklärung der neuentdeckten Petrusapokalypse* (Leipzig, 1893) p. 69 n. 3 and Cook, op. cit. pp. 397 ff. I would think that this is the most important thing for Bion, to ridicule the mysteries and the importance attached to them. We find the same critical attitude in sayings of Antisthenes: *μνούμενός ποτε τὰ Ὀρφικά, τοῦ ἱερέως εἰπόντος ὅτι οἱ ταῦτα μνούμενοι πολλῶν ἐν ᾧδου ἀγαθῶν μετίσχουσι, 'τί οὖν', ἔφη, 'οὐκ ἀποθνήσκεις;*' (Diog. Laert. 6.4 = fr. 162 Caizzi), Diogenes: *ἀξιούντων Ἀθηναίων μνηθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ λεγόντων ὥς ἐν ᾧδου προεδρίας οἱ μεμνημένοι τυγχάνουσιν, 'γελοῖον', ἔφη, 'εἰ Ἀγασίλαος μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διάξουσιν, εὐτελεῖς δέ τινες μεμνημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσσονται* (Diog. Laert. 6.39; cf. Plutarch *Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat* 4.21 F and Julian 7.238 B–C) and Demonax: *οὔτε ἐμνήθη μόνος ἀπάντων ταῖς Ἐλευσινίαις . . . πρὸς δὲ θάτερον, τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ταύτην ἔφη ἔχειν αἰτίαν τοῦ μὴ κοινωνῆσαι σφίσι τῆς τελετῆς, ὅτι, ἂν τε φαῦλα ἢ τὰ μυστήρια, οὐ σιωπήσεται πρὸς τοὺς μηδέπω μεμνημένους, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέψει αὐτοὺς τῶν ὀργίων, ἂν τε καλὰ, πᾶσιν αὐτὰ ἐξαγορεύσει ὑπὸ φιланθρωπίας* (Lucian *Demonax* 11; cf. also *Demonax* 34). It can be noted that the mysteries were also ridiculed by the notorious atheist Diagoras (*Schol. ad Aristoph. Av.* 1073 pp. 236 f Dindorf IV:3 = fr. II:1 Jacoby). Cf. further Decharme, op. cit. pp. 134 f and pp. 218 f and Helm 1906, pp. 71 f.

Heinze 1889, p. 30 assumed that this ridicule implies a criticism of the Stoics. Notwithstanding that Zeno seems to accept the idea of punishment in the underworld (cf. Lactantius *Inst. div.* 7.7.20 = fr. 147 *SVF* I), it is equally possible that Bion's attack is directed against the belief of people in general.

F29

τὰ εἶδωλα . . . αἱ σκιαί

These expressions refer to the heathen gods; Cf. Plutarch *De fraterno amore* 3.479 C–D: *σκιαί γὰρ εἰσιν ὄντως αἱ πολλαὶ φιλίαι καὶ μιμήματα καὶ εἶδωλα τῆς πρώτης ἐκείνης* (sc. *φιλαδελφίας*), where the two terms are used to indicate a copy of much less value than the original.

αἱ χῳλαι . . . Διὸς θυγατέρες

This is a paraphrase of Homer *Il.* 9.502–503. The description of Thersites' ugliness can be found in *Il.* 2.216–219. It seems to have an almost proverbial character; cf. Aristotle *Eudemus* fr. 45 Rose: ψυχὴν γὰρ εἶχε καὶ ὁ Θερσίτης αἰσχιστος ὢν and Maximus of Tyre 1.5 c: αἰσχύων δὲ τοῦ Θερσίτου and see further *RE*, VA:2 (1934) s.v. Thersites cols. 2464 f (Gebhard).

χαριέντως

This character of style belongs to an apophthegma, gnome or chreia; cf. F3 with commentary.

ἐνδίκως

This is a poetic word known from tragedy: Aeschylus *Choeph.* 462 and *Prom.* 63, Sophocles *Ajax* 1342, *OT* 135 and *Phil.* 372 and 524 and Euripides *Andr.* 920 etc. and from Plato: *Philebus* 12 D and *Leg.* 12.954 A.

αἰτήσαιντο

The MSS. have αἰτήσωνται, which seems to be impossible. Cobet's emendation, accepted by Stählin-Treu, is αἰτήσονται, which is rather surprising, as Cobet usually denies the possibility of the construction with ἄν and the future indicative; cf. A.C. Moorhouse, 'AN with the Future', *The Classical Quarterly*, 40 (1946) p. 1. This construction seems to be possible in Attic prose and may be a colloquialism; see KG, I p. 209, Schwyzler, II pp. 351 f and especially Moorhouse, art. cit. pp. 1 ff. However, I have not been able to find a good parallel in a similar clause. Therefore I have accepted the emendation of Dindorf: αἰτήσαιντο, which was accepted by Hense 1909, p. LXXVI and which is the form we would expect here. Cf. Plato *Philebus* 12 D: πῶς ἄν . . . οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτο ἐνδίκως.

τὴν εὐτεκνίαν

This word is also mostly poetic and found in, e.g., Euripides *Ion* 470, *Supp.* 66 and fr. 773 Nauck and Aristotle *EN* 1.8.16 p. 1099b3 and *Rhet.* 1.5.4 p. 1360b20. The same expression is also used in some magic prayers; see C. Ausfeld, 'De Graecorum precatationibus quaestiones', *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, begr. v. A. Fleckeisen, Suppl.b. 28 (1903) pp. 542 f. The meaning of the word is here "the blessing of having many and/or good children".

For the uselessness of praying just for children see Ps-Plato *Alcibiades* 2.142 B–C: εὐρήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εὐξαμένους τινὰς ἤδη γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένων εἰς συμφοράς τε καὶ λύπας τὰς μεγίστας καταστάντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν διὰ τέλους ὄντων τῶν τέκνων ὅλον τὸν βίον λυπούμενοι διήγαγον τοὺς δὲ χρηστῶν μὲν γενομένων, συμφοραῖς δὲ χρησαμένων ὥστε στερηθῆναι, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλάττονας δυστυχίας καθεστηκότας ἢ περ ἐκείνους καὶ βουλομένους ἄν ἀγένητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι and Diogenes ap. Diog. Laert. 6.63: θυόντων τινῶν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ υἱὸν γενέσθαι, ἔφη, 'περὶ δὲ

τοῦ ποδαπὸς ἐκβῆ ὃν θύετε'; cf. also Joel 1893–1903, II pp. 776 f.

ἦν οὐδ' αὐτῷ παρασχεῖν ἰσχυσεν

It is not immediately clear, whether Bion has given a special hint here. There are many stories about Zeus' sorrows and disappointments because of his many children. Helm 1906, p. 92 proposes that Bion is here thinking of the *Αἵται*, and that the quotation of *Il.* 9.502–503 originally followed in Bion's text; cf. also Hense 1909, p. LXXVI. This is quite possible but there may also be other explanations, as a comparison with Maximus of Tyre shows. In *or.* 5 Maximus discusses the question *Εἰ δεῖ εὐχέσθαι*, which is answered in the negative. A passage of special interest here is 5.5 c, which stresses Zeus' incapacity to help Sarpedon, made clear in *Il.* 16.433–434: *τίνι θεῶν εὐχεται ὁ Ζεὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ παιδός*; It is therefore of great interest that the same lines are quoted in Clemens Alex. *Protrepticus* 4.55.3, just before the quotation from Bion, with the same intention of exposing the weakness of the heathen gods.

So Bion ridicules and rejects prayer to the gods as being of no use at all. Prayer was obviously a subject for much discussion in different philosophical schools, and there are several works concerning prayer reported for various authors in antiquity. Aristotile wrote a work *Περὶ εὐχῆς* (Diog. Laert. 5.22; cf. fr. 49 Rose and P.-M. Schul, 'Aristote: De la richesse — De la prière — De la noblesse — Du plaisir — De l'éducation: Fragments et temoignages', *Publication de la faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Paris-Sorbonne, Sér. "Textes et Documents"*, 17 (Paris, 1968) pp. 45 ff), Favorinus *Περὶ εὐχῆς* (fr. 8 Barigazzi) and Maximus of Tyre *Εἰ δεῖ εὐχέσθαι* (*or.* 5). There are also other works treating the same topic: Ps-Plato *Alcibiades* 2, Lucian *Navigium*, Juvenal *Sat.* 10 and Persius *Sat.* 2. Here I intend to concentrate upon the attitude of those schools, which are of special interest in Bion's case. Socrates condemns materialistic prayer and his way of praying is described as follows: *εὐχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας, ὅποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἐστι* (Xenophon *Mem.* 1.3.2); cf. Gigon, I pp. 96 ff. The Cynics are very critical of prayer, as men do not know their own good so that the prayer proves useless. See the following saying of Diogenes: *ἐνεκάλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῆς εὐχῆς, αἰτεῖσθαι λέγων αὐτοὺς ἀγαθὰ τὰ αὐτοῖς δοκοῦντα καὶ οὐ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν* (Diog. Laert. 6.42, where the emendation of *τύχης* to *εὐχῆς* seems convincing to me; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.28, Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.6.35 and Lucian *Demonax* 27). For Stilpon's attitude see Diog. Laert. 2.117 (= fr. 177 Döring). The opinion of the Cyrenaic school is also relevant in this context. Obviously Aristippus is critical: *ὁ αὐτὸς* (sc. 'Αρίστιππος) *καθόλου τὸ εὐχέσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν τι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔφη γελοῖον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ἄρρωστος αἰτῇ τι βρωτὸν ἢ ποτόν, τότε διδόναι ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇσιν συμφέρειν* (*Gnom. Vat.* 32 = fr. 227 Mannebach) and the same applies

to the Cyrenaic school in general: ἐνταῦθα γενόμενος ὑπεμνήσθην τῶν περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν εὐχεσθαι πρὸς τινων ἑτεροδόξων, τοῦτέστιν τῶν ἀμφὶ τὴν Προδίκου αἵρεσιν παρεισαγομένων δογμάτων. ἵνα οὖν μηδὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ αὐτῶν τῇ ἀθέῳ σοφίᾳ ὡς ξένη ὀγκύλλωνται αἰρέσει, μαθέτωσαν προειληφθαι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Κυρηναϊκῶν λεγομένων φιλοσόφων (Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 7.7.41.1–2 = fr. 228 Mannebach). Consequently we may here have an influence from the Cyrenaic school on the thought of Bion. For the Greek attitude to prayer in general see Helm 1906, pp. 91 ff and pp. 121 f, H. Schmidt, 'Veteres philosophi quomodo iudicaverint de precibus', *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 4:1 (Giessen, 1907), H. Braune, *Περὶ εὐχῆς: Veterum de precibus sententiae* (Diss. Marburg, 1935) and *RAC*, VIII (1972) s.v. Gebet I cols. 1134 ff (v. Severus).

- F30** Of this fragment only part of the last sentence can with full certainty be said to derive from Bion. However, the first part is closely linked with the second and has some traits strongly suggesting that this part too originally derives from Bion. Cf. Hense 1909, pp. LIX f and W. Abernethy, *De Plutarchi qui fertur de superstitione libello* (Diss. Königsberg, 1911) pp. 32 ff for a detailed commentary on this fragment, which includes a list of traits possessed by the superstitious man.

σακκίον

For the use of diminutives see introd. Chapter II:2.

σακκίον . . . κυλινδούμενος

Bion may here possibly be influenced by Menander, as we can see from a quotation preserved in Porphyrius *De abstin.* 4.15 p. 253 Nauck (= fr. 754.4–5 Körte), adduced by Hense 1909, p. LX: ἔλαβον σακίον, εἴτ' εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν / ἐκάθισαν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ κόπρου. Cf. also Abernethy, op. cit. pp. 81 ff.

σακκίον . . . ῥάκεσι ῥυπαροῖς

The wearing of sackcloth is a sign of sorrow and submission, typical especially of Semitic peoples. Cf. Eusebius *Hist. eccl.* 2.10.8: ἡ πληθὺς (sc. τῶν Ἰουδαίων) δ' αὐτίκα σὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ἐπὶ σάκκον καθεσθεῖσα τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ τὸν θεὸν ἱκέτεον ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέως, οἰμωγῆς τε πάντ' ἦν ἀνάπλεα καὶ θρήνων and *Apocal. Petri* 30: γυναῖκες καὶ ἄνδρες ῥάκη ῥυπαρὰ ἐνδεδυμένοι ἐκυλίοντο.

γυμνός

The idea behind this practice is that clothes can be an obstacle to religious and magic rites. Cf. Pliny *NH* 26.60.93: *negat Apollo pestem posse crescere, cui nuda virgo restinguat*. To present oneself without clothes was also a sign of submission as we can see from, e.g., Plutarch *Comp. Cim. c. Luc.* 3.4: Τηγράνης δ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν γυμνὸν καὶ ἄνοπλον φέρων ὑπέρριψε Πομπηῖῳ. Cf. J. Heck-

enbach, 'De nuditate sacra sacrisque vinculis', *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 9:3 (Giessen, 1911), especially pp. 35 ff.

ἐν πηλῷ κυλινδούμενος

The phrase may go back to Homer *Il.* 22.414: πάντας δὲ λιτάνευε κυλινδούμενος κατὰ κόπρον. Cf. also Teles p. 34.3: κυλινδούμενος κατὰ κόπρον, where the word κόπρος is preserved, Lucian *De luctu* 12: οἱ μὲν γὰρ χαμαὶ κυλινδοῦνται and Plutarch *De superstitione* 3.166 A, where πηλώσεις and καταβορβορώσεις are considered blameworthy. The background of this strange practice is the idea that people in the underworld are punished by living in dirt and squalor (cf. Plato *Phaedo* 69 C and *Resp.* 2.363 D). By undergoing this form of punishment on earth the superstitious man hopes to be liberated from them; cf. Dieterich, op. cit. pp. 72 ff.

ἐξαγορεύει . . . πλημμελείας

The superstitious man confesses his sins and hopes that he will not have to suffer punishment for them after death. Cf. Vergil *Aen.* 6.567–569: *castigat* (sc. *Rhadamanthus*) *auditque dolos subigitque fateri, / quae quis apud superos, furto laetatus inani, / distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem.*

ὥς τάδε φαγόντος ἢ πiónτος

Different religious movements in Greece, such as the Orphics and the Pythagoreans, had strict rules on what to eat and drink (cf. e.g. Plato *Leg.* 6.782 C–D and Alexis ap. Athenaeum 4.161 B = fr. 220–221 Kock II). The superstitious man is of course very afraid of offending against any of these regulations. Cf. the material collected in T. Wächter, 'Reinheitsvorschriften im griechischen Kult', *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 9:1 (Giessen, 1910) pp. 70 ff.

βαδίσαντος ὁδόν

Theophrastus *Char.* 16.3 may be of some help for the understanding of this aspect: καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐὰν ὑπερδράμῃ γαλῆ, μὴ πρότερον πορευθῆναι, ἕως διεξέλθῃ τις ἢ λίθους τρεῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς ὁδοῦ διαβάλλῃ, i.e. you should not continue on a road, which a weasel had crossed, until the bad omen had been removed.

τὸ δαιμόνιον

This expression indicates in an impersonal fashion the power of the gods, i.e. the supernatural which intervenes in human life. The meaning need not be negative but easily can become so.

δαισινδαιμονία

Cf. the definition of this concept given in Theophrastus *Char.* 16.1: ἀμέλει ἢ δαισινδαιμονία δόξειεν (ἂν) εἶναι δειλία πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον and for the interpretation see Bolkestein, op. cit. pp. 3 ff, P.J. Koets, *Δαισινδαιμονία: A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Religious Terminology in Greek* (Diss. Utrecht, 1929),

Ussher, pp. 135 f and Steinmetz, II pp. 180 ff.

περιθειόμενος

This is Hercher's obvious correction of the *περιθυόμενος* of the MSS. Cf. Hesychius s.v. *περιθειῶσαι περικαθᾶραι*, κυρίως θείω, 1707 and Photius *Lex.* s.v. *περιθειῶσαι περικαθᾶραι* p. 80 Naber II. The use of *θείον* to fumigate and purify is well known and found already in Homer *Od.* 22.481–482: οἷσε θείον γρηϋ, κακῶν ἄκος, οἷσε δὲ μοι πῦρ / ὄφρα θειώσω μέγαρον (cf. also *Od.* 22.492–494). It is also used in the underworld in order to purify the souls of the dead according to Lucian *Vera historia* 2.29: αὐτίκα ἡμᾶς ὁσμή τε δεινὴ διεδέχετο οἶον ἀσφάλτου καὶ θείου καὶ πίττης ἅμα καιομένων. Cf. Dieterich, op. cit. p. 200.

περιματτόμενος

This word, meaning “purify by magic”, is not common. For the idea behind this practice see Demosthenes 18.259: καὶ καθαίρων τοὺς τελουμένους κάπομάττων τῷ πηλῷ καὶ τοῖς πιτύροις, Plutarch *De superstitione* 3.166 A: τὴν περιμάκτριαν κάλει γραῦν and A. Dieterich, ‘Über eine Scene der aristophanischen Wolken’, *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 48 (1893) pp. 275 ff.

For the combination of *περιθειόμενος* . . . *περιματτόμενος* cf. Menander *Phasma* 54–55: περιμαζάτωσαν σ' αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν κύκλῳ / καὶ περιθεωσάτωσαν. As the two verbs are extremely rare, it is improbable that they would occur together both in Menander and in Bion by accident. Therefore we may confidently assume that Bion is quoting Menander.

αἱ δὲ γράες

It is a very common idea that women, and especially old women, are more prone than men to different superstitious practices. Cf. e.g. Menander *Phasma* 54, Plutarch *De superstitione* 3.166 A and *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 27.1105 B, Strabo 7.3.4, Polybius 12.24.5 and Horace *Sat.* 1.8 to give just a few instances; for this aspect see Bolkestein, op. cit. pp. 62 f and pp. 68 f and Ussher, p. 153.

καθάπερ παττάλῳ . . . περιάπτουσι φέρουσαι καὶ περιαρτῶσι

It was a common practice to wear different things, which were supposed to have an apotropaic function. This practice is ridiculed by Lucillius *Anth. Pal.* 11.257: Ἐρμογένῃ τὸν ἱατρὸν ἰδὼν Διοφάντος ἐν ὕπνοις / οὐκέτ' ἀνηγέρθη καὶ περίαμμα φέρων. The point of interest is that Bion is said to have succumbed to this superstition on his death-bed (Diog. Laert. 4.54 = T5). For the use of amulets in antiquity in general see T5 with commentary, where references are given.

περιθειόμενος . . . περιματτόμενος . . . περιάπτουσι . . . περιαρτῶσι

Note the paronomasia, with four words all starting with *περι-*. This is a

retorical device typical both of Bion and of the Cynics in general; cf. introd. Chapter II:2.

The compounds with *περι-* are probably not chosen at random in these cases but may suggest the drawing of a magic circle round oneself; so Ussher, p. 156. Compounds of this type are very common in religious and magic contexts. Cf. Polybius 4.21.9: *καθαρμὸν ἐποιήσαντο καὶ σφάγια περιήνεγκαν τῆς τε πόλεως κύπλω καὶ τῆς χώρας πάσης*, Plutarch *Quaestiones Romanae* 68.280 C, when talking about the Lupercalia: *περιμάττουσι σκυλακίοις τοῦς ἀγνισμοῦ δεομένους, περισκυλακισμόν τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος τοῦ καθαρμοῦ καλοῦντες*, Lucian *Menippus* 7 on purification: *ἐκάθηρέν τέ με καὶ ἀπέμαξε καὶ περιήγησεν δαδὶ καὶ σκίλλῃ . . . εἰτά με ὄλον καταμαγεύσας καὶ περιελθὼν*, Theophrastus *Char.* 16.2, 13 and 14 and Diog. Laert. 6.42. For this idea of a magic circle see *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, V (1932 – 33) s.v. Kreis cols. 462 ff (Straberger-Schusser).

The question of sources for Plutarch's *De superstitione* poses a special problem in connection with this fragment. The question has been treated in detail by Abernethy, op. cit. pp. 81 ff, who postulated a work of Bion on this subject, inspired by Theophrastus and Menander, which was the source for Plutarch's treatise. This begs the question. All popular philosophers attacked superstition, and we are in no way entitled to assume that Plutarch followed just one source, i.e. the postulated work of Bion. Cf. however H. Erbse, 'Plutarchs Schrift *ΠΕΡΙ ΔΕΙΣΙΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ*', *Hermes*, 80 (1952) pp. 299 f, who accepts Abernethy's assumption. A critical view on this point can be found in Christ-Schmid, I p. 513 n. 1 and H. Hommel, 'Der allgegenwärtige Himmels Gott: Eine religions- und formengeschichtliche Studie', *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 23 (1925) p. 194.

F31A–B *θαυμαστόν*

This kind of expression belongs to a Socratic and Cynic tradition, as an expression for Socrates' ironic way of teaching. Cf. for Socrates Xenophon *Mem.* 2.3.2, 4.2.6 and 4.4.5, Dio of Prusa 13.22 and Diog. Laert. 2.30, and for Diogenes Teles p. 41.13, Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 157 and Dio of Prusa 6.34. See also Gerhard 1909, p. 21 and n. 4.

ὁ μῦς

For the Greeks and the Romans the discovery of something mouse-eaten, especially metals and clothing, was portentous, a belief which was ridiculed by people with a more sceptical outlook. Cf. e.g. Theophrastus *Char.* 16.6: *καὶ ἐὰν μῦς θύλακον ἀλφίτων διαφάγῃ, πρὸς τὸν ἐξηγητὴν ἐλθὼν ἐρωτᾷν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν*, Plutarch *Marcellus* 28.2, Cicero *De divinatione* 1.44.99 and 2.27.59 and Pliny *NH* 8.82.221. The saying of Cato preserved in St. Augustine *De doct. christ.* 2.77 is closer to Bion's derisive picture: *unde illud eleganter dic-*

tum est Catonis, qui cum esset consultus a quodam qui sibi a soricibus erosas caligas diceret, respondit non esse illud monstrum, sed vere monstrum habendum fuisse, si sorices a caligis roderentur. This description is too similar to Bion's to be an accident, and it is highly probable that Cato is here quoting Bion, as we know that he was influenced by Greek popular philosophy; cf. Oltramare, pp. 81 ff and Rossignol, p. 19, who wants to substitute the name *Bionis* for *Catonis*. There is also the possibility that this was originally a quotation from a comedy ἀν μῦς διορύξη βωμὸν ὄντα πῆλινον / κᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἔχων διατράγη θύλακον (Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 7.4.24 = Com. adesp. fr. 341 Kock III); cf. Hense 1909, p. LXI. For the whole question of the mouse and its place in superstitious belief and practice see A.S. Pease, in 'M. Tulli Ciceronis De divinatione' 1:2, *University of Illinois, Studies in Language and Literature*, 6:3 (1920) p. 276 with more material and references, Bolkestein, op. cit. pp. 39 f and Ussher, p. 134.

τὸν θύλακον

This word, of which the ordinary nominative-form in Attic is θύλακος, θύλαξ being rare and in most cases late, is fully classical. The sack was used for many different purposes in antiquity, especially to carry meal (cf. Herodotus 3.46 and Aristophanes *Plutus* 763). For a general survey of this use see DS, IV:2 (1908–11) s.v. Saccus pp. 932 f (Lafaye) and *RE*, IA:2 (1920) cols. 1622 f (Hug). Cf. also F42 with commentary for the use of βαλλάντιον.

διέτρωγεν

The verb τρώγω here seems to be used properly according to the classical rules, i.e. meaning "gnaw, nibble" of animals (cf. LSJ, s.v. τρώγω I). In later Greek it was used with a wider meaning also about men, which however was more or less vulgar. Cf. J. Haussleiter, "Ἐσθίω τρώγω", *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik*, IX (Leipzig, 1896) pp. 300 ff and BD, § 101 s.v. ἐσθίω.

Ἀρκεσίλαος

For Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, see T12 with commentary. As Bion and Arcesilaus obviously had close personal relations, it is highly probable that Bion is here referring to Arcesilaus the philosopher and not to the completely unknown comedy-writer, who is known only from the list of homonyms in Diog. Laert. 4.45. The last identification was proposed by A. Gercke, 'Ariston', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 5 (1892) p. 209 and n. 2 and accepted by J. Demiańczuk, in 'Supplementum comicum', *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności, Wydział Filologiczny* Ser. III, 6 (Cracow, 1913) p. 214, Arcesilaus fr. 1. For a similar identification see introd. Chapter I n. 39.

Ἀρκεσίλαος παίζων ἐνεχίρει

Crönert, p. 43 n. 196 has interpreted this expression as meaning that Arcesi-

laus made fun of an expression of Bion; this is not very convincing, as it does not leave much of joke for Bion. It is more plausible that Bion here uses an original joke of Arcesilaus; see also Hense 1909, p. LIII n. 2.

Ἐγχειρέω with a participle seems to be a very rare construction, while the infinitive is normal. Maybe it would therefore be correct to change *παίζων* to *παίζειν*. For a somewhat similar expression see Xenophon *Symp.* 1.14: *γελοῖόν τι εὐθύς ἐπεχειρεί λέγειν*.

From F30—31 it is perfectly clear that Bion mercilessly attacked every form of superstition, regarding it as a vice (see F34 with commentary), which is in no way surprising in view of his educational background in the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools. Cf. e.g. for Diogenes the anecdotes in Diog. Laert. 6.37 (*βουλόμενος αὐτῆς περιελεῖν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν*), 6.42, 6.48: *λεγόντος δ' αὐτῷ τινος ἰσχυρῶς δεισιδαίμονος 'μὴ πληγὴ τὴν κεφαλὴν σου διαρρήξω', 'ἐγὼ δέ γε', εἶπε, 'πατρῶν ἐξ ἀριστερῶν τρέμειν σε ποιήσω' and Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 7.4.25.1: *εὖ γοῦν καὶ Διογένης πρὸς τὸν θαυμάζοντα, ὅτι εὗρεν τὸν ὄφιν [ἐν] τῷ ὑπέρῳ περιειλημένον, 'μὴ θαύμαζε,' ἔφη 'ἦν γὰρ παραδοξότερον ἐκεῖνο, εἰ τὸ ὕπερον περὶ ὀρθῷ τῷ ὄφει κατειλημένον ἐθεάσω' and for the Cyrenaics the statement in Diog. Laert. 2.91: *τὸν σοφὸν μήτε φθονήσῃν μήτε ἐρασθήσεσθαι ἢ δεισιδαιμονήσῃν γίνεσθαι γὰρ ταῦτα παρὰ κενὴν δοξαν* (= fr. 241 Mannebach). However, this critical attitude is not confined to special schools but can be found in many Greek, and especially satirical, writers. For superstition in antiquity in general see, besides the literature given above, M.P. Nilsson, 'Geschichte der griechischen Religion' II, 2. ed. *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, V:2:2 (Munich, 1961) pp. 218 ff for the Hellenistic period, W. Kroll, 'Antiker Aberglaube', *Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge*, hrsg. v. R. Virchow NF, Ser. 12, 278 (Hamburg, 1897), H. Schweizer, *Aberglaube und Zauberei bei Theokrit* (Diss. Basel, 1937) und J. Gunning, *De Nieuwe Attische Comedie als bron voor de kennis der Grieksche Religie* (Diss. Utrecht, 1940) pp. 89 ff.**

F32

This is not a fragment in the proper sense according to the definition given above; cf. introd. Chapter V:3. However, I have placed it here because of the close connection with the other fragments in this group.

κατατρέχοντος

The metaphorical use of this verb with the genitive, meaning "run down, inveigh against" (LSJ, s.v. *κατατρέχω* II) seems to be mainly Hellenistic: Philodemus *Vit.* p. 42 Jensen, Dio Cassius 61.10.2, Athenaeus 1.10 E and 5.220 C and Diog. Laert. 7.187: *εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ κατατρέχουσι τοῦ Χρυσίππου ὡς πολλὰ αἰσχυρῶς καὶ ἀρρήτως ἀναγεγραφότος*.

τῶν μαντέων

For divination during the Hellenistic period in general see Nilsson, op. cit. II

pp. 229 ff. Criticism of divination is a trait common to several philosophical schools. Xenophanes did not regard it as of any use: *Colophonius Xenophanes unus, qui deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulit* (Cicero *De divinatione* 1.3.5). It is particularly interesting in this context that the Cynics adopted a critical attitude, as we can see from sayings of Diogenes: *ὅτε δὲ πάλιν ὄνειροκρίτας καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας τούτοις . . . οὐδὲν ματαιότερον νομίζειν ἀνθρώπου* (Diog. Laert. 6.24; cf. also Diogenes *Ep.* 38, Dio of Prusa 10.17–28 and Diog. Laert. 6.43), Demonax: *καὶ μάντιν δέ ποτε ἰδὼν δημοσίᾳ ἐπὶ μισθῷ μαντευόμενον, ‘οὐχ ὁρῶ’, ἔφη, ‘ἐφ’ ὅτῳ τὸν μισθὸν ἀπαιτεῖς’ εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀλλάξαι τι δυνάμενος τῶν ἐπικεκλωσμένων, ὀλίγον αἰτεῖς ὁπόσον ἂν αἰτῆς, εἰ δὲ ὡς δέδοκται τῷ θεῷ πάντα ἔσται, τί σου δύναται ἡ μαντικὴ’* (Lucian *Demonax* 37) and Oenomaus, who wrote a special treatise against divination according to Julian 7.209 B: *ἐν . . . τῷ κατὰ τῶν χρηστηρίων . . . τοιούτου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε ἀνηρῆσθαι μὲν ἅπασαν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλάβειαν*. All the extant fragments of Oenomaus are also directed against divination; cf. the fragments in *FPG* II pp. 361–385, P. Vallette, *De Oenomaio Cynico* (Thèse Paris, 1908) and Dudley, pp. 162 ff. Of the other schools which are of importance for Bion we have no evidence on the Cyrenaics, but there is no reason to suppose that they accepted divination. Theophrastus must have been rather critical of the superstitious sides of this practice, as we can gather from his *Char.* 16. For the attitude of Greek philosophers in general to divination see A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire de la divination dans l’antiquité* I (Paris, 1879) pp. 29 ff, F. Jaeger, *De oraculis quid veteres philosophi iudicaverint* (Diss. Rostock, 1910), A.S. Pease, in ‘M. Tulli Ciceronis De divinatione’ 1:1, *University of Illinois, Studies in Language and Literature*, 6:2 (1920) pp. 53 ff, F. Pfeffer, ‘Studien zur Mantik in der Philosophie der Antike’, *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie*, 64 (Meisenheim am Glan, 1976) and especially for the Cynics Helm 1906, pp. 123 ff.

νεκρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπισφάττειν

Here Menedemus is expressing a general truth about Bion’s character and way of teaching, that he loved attack for its own sake and that he could not refrain from it, even when it was completely unnecessary; cf. introd. Chapter I.

The expression as such seems to be a proverb, which has already been noted by Casaubon and Menagius. There are no real good parallels but cf. Sophocles *Ant.* 1030: *τίς ἀλκὴ τὸν θανόντ’ ἐπικτανεῖν* and *Phil.* 946: *κοῦκ οἶδ’ ἐναίρων νεκρὸν ἢ καπνοῦ σκιάν*, the German equivalents “Die Todten noch einmal tödten” and “Einen Todten erdrosseln” (given in K.F.W. Wander, *Deutsches Sprichwörter-Lexicon* IV (Leipzig, 1876) p. 1258 nos. 101 and 103), the English proverb “To flog a dead horse” and an Italian phrase “Cessate d’uccidere i morti” (G. Ungaretti, ‘Non gridate più’, in *Vita d’un uomo: Tutte le poesie*, a cura di Leone Piccioni 3. ed. (Verona, 1970) p. 236). Crönert, p. 33 n. 172

thinks that Menedemus is here parodying an expression of Bion, but this can only remain a guess.

ἐπισφάττειν

The meaning must be “kill over again” (LSJ, s.v. *ἐπισφάζω* II 2), which can only be found here. Nor is the metaphorical use of this verb in general common but see Lucian *Juppiter tragoedus* 43: *ἡμᾶς ἐπισφάττεις, ὦ Μῶμε, οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ νῦν ἐπιτιμῶν*.

Μενέδημος

For Menedemus see T3 with commentary.

F33

de saxo . . . Capitolium

By *saxum* Seneca obviously means the Tarpeian rock, which was used for executions (see *RE*, IVA:2 (1932) s.v. *Tarpeium saxum* col. 2330 (Taubenschlag)) and *Capitolium* is something typically Roman. Therefore these two things cannot have been mentioned in Bion’s original text and it is interesting to see that Seneca has replaced Greek by Roman things, a tendency which we find already in the philosophical writings of Cicero and at many other places in Seneca; cf. A. Dyroff, ‘Caesars Anticato und Ciceros Cato’, *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 63 (1908) pp. 592 f and Oltramare, pp. 292 f.

de saxo deiecturus est

Temple robbery was considered a very serious crime and was punishable by death, as we can see from, e.g., Xenophon *HG* 1.7.22: *κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον κρίνατε, ὅς ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱεροσύλοις καὶ προδόταις, κριθέντα ἐν δικαστηρίῳ, ἂν καταγνωσθῇ, μὴ ταφῆναι ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ, τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια εἶναι* and see further L. Beauchet, *Histoire du droit privé de la république Athénienne* III (Paris, 1897) p. 41 and J.H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* II (Leipzig, 1908) pp. 442 f. Schneider, II pp. 533 f has pointed out that this harsh punishment was still exacted during the Hellenistic period. The method of execution referred to here is by throwing from a rock into a chasm (cf. Herodotus 7.133, Aristophanes *Eq.* 1362, Plato *Gorgias* 516 E and Xenophon *HG* 1.7.20). Although this method was not used in Bion’s time and only the corpses were thrown into the chasm (*βάρανθρον*), Bion may here very well refer to the old, well-known method. Cf. for this problem *RE*, Suppl.b. VII (1940) s.v. *Todesstrafe* cols. 1608 f (Latte) and R.J. Bonner-G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* II (Chicago, 1938) pp. 278 f.

In this fragment Bion tries in a very sophistic way to prove that either all are temple-robbers or none. His way of reasoning in some ways resembles the method of Diogenes: *συνελογίζετο δὲ καὶ οὕτως· τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ πάντα· φίλοι δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φίλων· πάντ’ ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν σοφῶν* (Diog.

Laert. 6.37 and 6.72). We also find cases where temple robbery is clearly defended, among the Cynics by Diogenes: *μηδέν τε ἄτοπον εἶναι ἐξ ἱεροῦ τι λαβεῖν* (Diog. Laert. 6.73) and among the Cyrenaics by Theodorus: *εἶναί τε πατρίδα τὸν κόσμον κλέψειν τε καὶ μοιχεύσειν καὶ ἱεροσυλήσειν* (sc. τὸν σοφὸν) *ἐν καιρῷ* (Diog. Laert. 2.99 = fr. 230 Mannebach). The discussion reaches back to the Sophistic as we can see from *Δισσοὶ λόγοι* 3.7. p. 410.24–25 *FVS II*: *ἤδη ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐπιорκεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλέν.*

This whole attitude is a somewhat shocking paradox, as people in general may be assumed to have had a deep respect for temples. The Cynic may have attacked the idea that the gods were actually living in the temples, i.e. the usual anthropomorphic idea of the gods, as well as all official aspects of religion. Cf. also the anecdote in Diog. Laert. 6.45, where Diogenes defends a man who had stolen from a temple: *θεασάμενός ποτε τοὺς ἱερομνήμονας τῶν ταμιῶν τινα φιάλην ὑψηρημένον ἀπάγοντας ἔφη, ‘οἱ μεγάλοι κλέπται τὸν μικρὸν ἀπάγουσι’* and Brown, p. 32 for the interpretation.

- F25–33** The extant fragments on religious questions clearly show that Bion had nothing positive to say on the subject, and that he obviously did not include religious topics in his general teaching. On the other hand it is not possible to assume from these fragments that Bion was an atheist, which is the opinion of e.g. Decharme, op. cit. 175 and A.B. Drachmann, *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity* (London, 1922) p. 109. There is nothing in the preserved fragments to prove such a view. Yet Bion is highly critical of all the conventional forms and beliefs of popular religion. He does not accept prayers, the mysteries, the idea of punishment after death, or divination, he does not find fault with temple robbery and he challenges the idea that the gods are anthropomorphic and every form of superstition. Many of these points can be found in early critics of conventional religion, such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus and the sophists, and we have seen that most of them have parallels in the teaching of other Cynic philosophers. Bion too shares some ideas with the Cyrenaic school, and the question is whether this school has had a decisive influence on his attitude to religious questions. This was assumed by e.g. Gerhard 1909, pp. 79 ff. There is one fact to support such a view. We found no traces of a positive attitude to religion in general. Such an attitude is not completely absent in the Cynic school, although the testimonies are rare and in many cases late, being found in such authors as Dio of Prusa, Epictetus, Maximus of Tyre, Julian and Diog. Laert. Particular stress is laid on monotheistic belief and the divine mission of the philosopher, and religion is regarded as exclusively spiritual. Therefore it is possible that Bion in this respect was influenced by Theodorus, although it cannot be stated with full certainty. For the religious attitude of the Cynics see Helm 1924, cols. 12 f; the actual positive aspects are indicated by, e.g., Höistad, p. 166 and pp. 190 f, R. Joly, ‘Le Tableau de Cébès et la philosophie religieuse’, *Collection*

Latomus, 61 (Brussels-Berchem, 1963) pp. 70 ff and D. Babut, 'La religion des philosophes grecs: De Thalès aux stoiciens', *Littératures anciennes*, 4 (Paris, 1974) pp. 139 ff.

5. *On avarice and wealth* (F34—46)

F34

The extent of this fragment seems to be quite clear, as *διὸ καὶ εἰ*, which follows the fragment as it is given here, is used by Teles to mark a transition to something new on p. 6.8 too.

καὶ εἴ τις βούλεται . . . ζητείτω

For this sentence cf. Epicurus in Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.17.23 (= fr. 135 Usener): *εἰ βούλει πλούσιόν τινα ποιῆσαι, μὴ χρημάτων προστίθει, τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφαίρει* and Seneca *Ep.* 21.7.

ἐνδείας καὶ σπάνεως

This is a common combination in Teles and occurs on p. 35.10—11, p. 36.6, p. 39.8 and p. 42.6.

τὸν ὕδρωπικόν

The use of comparisons from the medical field are very popular with the Cynics; cf. introd. Chapter II:2. We find the basic idea behind this saying that avarice can be compared with a disease in Antisthenes (Xenophon *Symp.* 4.37 = fr. 117 Caizzi). The comparison between a miser and a man suffering from dropsy seems to have enjoyed a certain popularity. Bion may here be using a saying, which originally belonged to Diogenes: *Διογένης ὁμοίου τοὺς φιλαργύρους τοῖς ὕδρωπικοῖς ἐκείνους μὲν γὰρ πλήρεις ὄντας ὕγρου ἐπιθυμεῖν ποτοῦ τοὺς τε φιλαργύρους πλήρεις ὄντας ἀργυρίου ἐπιθυμεῖν πλείονος, ἀμφοτέρους δὲ πρὸς κακοῦ. ἐπιτείνεσθαι γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πάθη, ὅσω τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα πορίζεται* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.10.45). A similar comparison is also used by Aristippus (Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 3.524 A—B = fr. 71A Mannebach), which is of a certain interest in Bion's case. Later we find the man with dropsy used in comparisons in Polybius 13.2.2 (cf. R. v. Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* I (Stuttgart, 1890) pp. 333 f), Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 3.4, Maximus of Tyre 1.5 g, Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.31c.84, *Gnom. Vat.* 434, ascribed to Plato, *Excerpt. Par.* 86, Lucilius fr. 764 Marx, Horace *Carm.* 2.2.13 and *Ep.* 2.2.146, Ovid *Fasti* 1.215—216 and Seneca *De consolatione ad Helviam* 11.3. For this comparison cf. Heinze 1889, pp. 26 f, Seidel, pp. 48 ff, Fiske, p. 200 and Dziech, p. 203 n. 346.

κρήνας δὲ καὶ ποταμούς αὐτῷ παρασκευάζοι

An expression of the same exaggerated kind can be found in, e.g., Lucian *Dipsades* 4: *οὐδ' ἂν σβέσειάς ποτε τὸ δίψος, οὐδ' ἦν τὸν Νεῖλον αὐτὸν ἢ τὸν Ἰστρον ὅλον ἐκπιεῖν παράσχης.*

πίνων διαρραγείη

The use of the verb *διαρρήγνυμι* with a participle in hyperbolic expressions of this kind seems to belong to everyday language, as we can see from, e.g. Aristophanes *Ranae* 254–255: ἐλαύνων εἰ διαρραγήσομαι, Demosthenes 18.21: οὐδ' ἂν σὺ διαρραγῆς ψευδόμενος, Teles p. 27.5: εἰ κωπηλατοῦντα διαρρήγνυσθαι δέοι, Dio of Prusa 31.110: οὐδὲ ἂν διαρραγῶσι κεκραγότες and 40.11, Lucian *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 10: καὶ διαρραγῶσι ἐπαινοῦντες and 20: ἔστ' ἂν διαρραγῇ ἐσθίων, *Charon* 21 and *De mercede conductis* 35 and Aelius Aristides *or.* 38 pp. 729–730 Dindorf: καὶ διαρραγῇ τὰ Πυθία ἐξορχούμενος. For the use of this verb in connection with food and similar elements see Xenophon *Cyr.* 8.2.21 and Epictetus 3.26.5. Cf. v. Müller, p. 58 and Weber 1895, p. 14.

ἱκανωθεῖη

The use of this verb meaning “to be satisfied, content” (LSJ, s.v. *ἱκανόω* II) seems to be post-classical. Cf. Teles p. 42.4 and Dionysius Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.74.5. Otherwise the verb is found particularly in the LXX, N.T. and Byzantine literature. Cf. v. Müller, p. 59.

δοξοκόπος

This adjective, meaning “thirsting for notoriety” seems, with its noun *δοξοκοπία* and the verb *δοξοκοπέω*, to be a late word and used especially in literature influenced by Cynic and Stoic thoughts, e.g. Philo *De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini* 5.32, Musonius fr. VII p. 29. 8–9 Hense: πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πράγματα ἔχειν ὑπὲρ δόξης τὸ πραγματεύεσθαι ὅπως μὴ δοξοκόπος ᾖ and Dio of Prusa 32.24, 34.31, 66.3, 66.7, 66.11 and 66.15. Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 11.18: διὰ δειλίαν ἢ δοξοκοπίαν and Lucian *Peregrinus* 2: ὡς τῆς δοξοκοπίας and 12. This kind of word formation with *-κόπος* and *-κοπέω* belongs to a more vulgar language; cf. Schmid 1887–97, I pp. 157 f and v. Müller, p. 56.

Δόξα in the meaning of “popular estimation, reputation” was regarded with great contempt by the Cynics as we can see from many sayings; cf. further F43 with commentary.

δαισιδαίμων

It may be somewhat surprising at first to find this concept in this context, and we see the same combination in Teles pp. 41.15–42.1: ὅταν δὲ ποιήσας ἀλαζόνα πολυτελεῖ δαισιδαίμονα δοξοκόπον ἅπληστον χρήματα πολλὰ διδῶς, οὐδὲ περνεῖς. The reason for this combination is that superstition came to be counted among the main vices together with *φιληδονία*, *φιλοπλουτία* and *φιλοδοξία*. Cf. Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi* 2.465 D: λῦπαι δὲ καὶ ταραχαὶ καὶ κακοθυμίαι διὰ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ δαισιδαιμονίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ κενῶν δοξῶν and *De sera numinis vindicta* 11.556 B: ἀλλ' ὅπου φιλοπλουτία καὶ φιληδονία περιμανῆς καὶ φθόνος ἄκρατος ἐνοικίζεται μετὰ δυσμενείας ἢ κακοηθείας, ἐν-

ταῦθα καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαν σκοπῶν ἀνευρήσεις ὑποκαθημένην καὶ μαλακίαν πρὸς πόνον καὶ δειλίαν πρὸς θάνατον καὶ μετάπτωσιν ὀξεῖαν ὀρμῶν καὶ χαυνότητα πρὸς δόξαν ὑπὸ ἀλαζονείας, Horace *Sat.* 2.3.77–80: *quisquis / ambitione mala aut argenti pallet amore, / quisquis luxuria tristive superstitione / aut alio mentis morbo calet* and Seneca *Ep.* 47.17: *alius libidini servit, alius avaritiae, alius ambitioni, omnes timori* and *Ep.* 123.16, where *voluptas*, *gloria*, *paupertas*, *mors* and *superstitio* are given as reasons for unhappiness. Cf. for this aspect Norden 1892, pp. 340 f, C.W. Mendell, ‘Satire as Popular Philosophy’, *Classical Philology*, 15 (1920) pp. 147 f and P.J. Koets, *Δεισιδαιμονία: A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Religious Terminology in Greek* (Diss. Utrecht, 1929) p. 43.

For Bion’s attitude to superstition in general see F30–31 with commentary.

F35A–C This saying is also attributed to other philosophers: Bias (*Schol. in Aphthonium Rhet. Gr.* II pp. 17 f Walz), Democritus (*Gnom. Vat.* 265 = *Appendix Gnom.* 47), Diogenes (*Diog. Laert.* 6.50 = *Arsenius Violetum* p. 208 Walz) and Demetrius (*Flor. Mon.* 188). For more parallels without names, and similar sayings with names see Menagius on *Diog. Laert.* 6.50, L. Sternbach on *Gnom. Vat.* 265, O. Hense on *Stob. Flor.* 3.10.37, O. Stählin-U. Treu on *Clemens Alex. Paedagogus* 2.3.39.3, A. Nauck, ‘Kritische Bemerkungen’ VIII, *Mélanges Gréco-Romains tirés du Bulletin de l’Académie Imperiale des sciences de St.-Petersbourg*, 4 (St. Petersburg, 1880) pp. 728 f, Gerhard 1909, p. 61 n. 3 and especially H. Herter, ‘Zum ersten Satire des Horaz’, *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 94 (1951) p. 19. No definite decision on the origin of this saying is possible. However, the only attribution to Bias can easily be due to the similarity between the two names Bias and Bion; cf. introd. Chapter V:4. The attribution to Demetrius is somewhat uncertain, as has been noted by O. Hense on *Stobaeus Flor.* 3.10.37.

τὴν φιλαργυρίαν

This is one of the Greek words for avarice; other terms with very much the same meaning are *αἰσχροκέρδεια*, *πλεονεξία*, *φιλοκέρδεια*, *φιλοπλουτία*, *φιλοχρηματία* and sometimes *ἀνελευθερία*. Avarice is generally severely condemned, and there is a very rich material, as we can see from, e.g., the sayings collected in *Stobaeus Flor.* 3.10. To give just a few examples from non-philosophical literature cf. *Diphilus in Stobaeus Flor.* 3.10.5 (= fr. 94 Kock II): *εἰ μὴ τὸ λαβεῖν ἦν, οὐδὲ εἰς πονηρὸς ἦν / φιλαργυρία τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ὅταν ἀφείς σκοπεῖν / τὰ δίκαια τοῦ κέρδους διὰ παντὸς δεῦλος ᾗς* and *Ps-Longinus De sublimitate* 44.6: *φιλαργυρία μὲν νόσημα μικροποιόν*. For this aspect, and for the distinction between the different terms, see Gerhard 1909, pp. 60 ff and Dziech, pp. 203 ff. Of interest for the attitude to avarice in general are also Herter, art. cit. and G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford, 1954) p. 282.

μητρόπολιν

The metaphorical use of the word *μητρόπολις* is quite common. In addition to the instances given above and in the literature which is quoted there, the following cases can be noted: Hippocrates *Carn.* 4 p. 588 Littré VIII, Diodorus Siculus 1.2.2, Philolaus in Plutarch *Quaestiones convivales* 8.2.1.718 E (= fr. 44 A 7a *FVS* I), Chrysippus ap. Athenaeum 3.104 B (Append. II:28:6 *SVF* III), Pontianus ap. Athenaeum 10.443 C–D and Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 7.6.33.4.

F36 *μικρολόγον*

This type of character is mentioned in F37 as well. Notwithstanding that this adjective originally had a wider meaning, it was soon connected with money matters and became merely a synonym for “greedy”. We can see this in Theophrastus’ definition of *μικρολογία*: ἔστι δὲ ἡ μικρολογία φειδωλία τοῦ διαφόρου ὑπὲρ τὸν καιρόν, ὃ δὲ μικρολόγος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἐν τῷ μηνί ἡμιωβόλιον ἀπαιτεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν (*Char.* 10.1) and in Ps-Aristotle *MM* 1.24.1 p. 1192a10, where *μικρολόγος* is regarded as one aspect of ἀνελευθεριότης. This connection between *μικρολογία* and avarice is made clear by many other passages: Demosthenes 59.36, Isocrates 12.8, Hyperides fr. 225: *μικρολόγον . . . τὸν εἰς ἀργύριον ἀνελεύθερον*, Aristotle *Protrepticus* fr. 56 Rose: οἱ μὲν οὐ χρῶνται τῷ πλούτῳ διὰ μικρολογίαν, Menander fr. 97 Körte, Polybius 32.13.16, Dio of Prusa 4.134, Plutarch *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 30.822 A, *Cato maior* 5.1 and *Pelopidas* 3.1, Lucian *Nigrinus* 22, *Juppiter tragoedus* 15, *Saturnalia* 14, *Navigium* 28, and *Dial. mort.* 10.8, Herodian 2.3.9 and Athenaeus 1.3 D.

οὐχ οὗτος . . . ἡ οὐσία τοῦτον

For this expression and idea cf. Seneca *Ep.* 119.12: *sic divitias habent, quomodo habere dicimus febrem, cum illa nos habeat. E contrario dicere solemus: febris illum tenet. Eodem modo dicendum est: divitiae illum tenet* and *De vita beata* 22.5: *ad postremum divitiae meae sunt, tu divitiarum es*; cf. also Hense 1909, p. CI n. 1.

Here Bion wants to stress the importance of absolute freedom and independence from things which do not really belong to you, an idea which is very important both for the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. There is a famous expression of this idea in Aristippus’ answer regarding his relations to Lais: ἔχω, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχομαι (Diog. Laert. 2.85 etc. = fr. 57 Mannebach).

F37 *ἰδίῳν . . . ἀλλοτρίῳν*

The contrast between these two adjectives is wholly in accordance with tradition, e.g. Epictetus 2.13.8, 2.16.28, 3.22.38, 3.24.4, 4.1.81 and 4.5.7. Cf. A. Bonhöffer, ‘Epiktet und das Neue Testament’, *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 10 (Giessen, 1911) p. 36. For Bion’s use of ἀλλότριος see also F54 with commentary.

ὥς δ' ἐξ ἀλλοτριῶν μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι

This expression is very short, almost to the point of obscurity, instead of ἐκ τῶν δ' ὑπαρχόντων ὥς ἀλλοτριῶν μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι.

The idea expressed in this and the preceding fragment that the rich man is blamed, not because of his riches, but on the ground that he makes no use of his wealth, is both old and extremely common. It is often expressed by the contrast between κτήματα and χρήματα, which is popular especially in Cynic writings; cf. Gerhard 1909, pp. 113 ff. The idea as such can be found in Plato *Euthydemus* 280 D: δεῖν ἄρα, ἔφην, ὥς ἔοικε μὴ μόνον κεκτηῖσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ἢ οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται, Isocrates 1.28: πειρῶ τὸν πλοῦτον χρήματα καὶ κτήματα κατασκευάζειν· ἔστι δὲ χρήματα μὲν τοῖς ἀπολαύειν ἐπισταμένοις, κτήματα δὲ τοῖς κτᾶσθαι δυναμένοις, Aristotle in Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 8.527 A (= *Protrepticus* fr. 57 Rose): σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἀκούεις, φήσομεν, Ἀριστοτέλους λέγοντος ὅτι οἱ μὲν οὐ χρῶνται, οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται, καθάπερ οὐδετέρου προσήκοντος; ἀλλ' ἐκείνους μὲν οὐκ ὠφελεῖ τὸ οἰκεῖον οὐδὲ κοσμεῖ, τούτους δὲ καὶ βλάπτει καὶ καταισχύνει and Menander fr. 509 Körte: οὐπώποτ' ἐξήλωσα πλουτοῦντα σφόδρα / ἄνθρωπον, ἀπολαύοντα μηδὲν ὦν ἔχει. As the idea is so common it is impossible to say anything certain about a possible source for Bion. Heinze 1889, p. 19 n. 1 thinks that Plato is the source, while P. Wendland, *Anaximenes von Lampsakos: Studien zur ältesten Geschichte der Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1905) p. 94 seems to believe in an Aristotelian origin. Hense 1909, pp. XLVIII f remains hesitant on this point. It is interesting that Gerhard 1909, p. 60 and n. 3 here finds an expression of a Cynicism, influenced by Cyrenaic ideas. For this problem see introd. Chapter III:5.

For parallels in later authors see e.g. Teles p. 38.3—4: ἐπιθυμοῦντες μὲν πολλῶν χρᾶσθαι δὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι (cf. also p. 37.6—9). Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 5.525 B: οἱ δὲ φιλάργυροι κτῶνται μὲν ὥς πολυτελεῖς, χρῶνται δὲ ὥς ἀνελεύθεροι and ἀλλ' ὥσπερ βαρεῖα καὶ πικρὰ δέσποινα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ἀναγκάζει (sc. ἡ φιλαργυρία), χρῆσθαι δὲ κωλύει and 6.525 F: ἀφαιροῦνται γὰρ ἄλλων οἷς αὐτοὶ χρῆσθαι μὴ δύνανται μηδὲ πεφύκασιν, Publilius Syrus 273: *in nullum avarus bonus est, in se pessimus*, Cato *Disticha* 4.16: *utere quaesitis opibus, fuge nomen avari / quid tibi divitiae, si semper pauper abundes* and Horace *Sat.* 2.3.109—110: *qui nummos aurumque recondit nescius uti / compositis* and *Sat.* 2.3.166—167: *quid enim differt, barathrone / dones quidquid habes an numquam utare paratis*. For this topic in general see Heinze 1889, pp. 18 ff, Seidel, pp. 56 f and Rudd, p. 183.

F38A—C This saying, which also occurs in *Corp. Par.* 535 Elter, is attributed to Dio of Prusa (Arsenius *Violetum* p. 195 Walz = *Gnom. Bas.* 176). Yet it does not occur in Dio's speeches and a confusion between the two names Βίων and Δίων is easy enough; cf. introd. Chapter V:4.

καταγελάστους

The use of ridicule is typical both of Bion and of the Cynics in general; cf. F6 with commentary.

τύχη

For the personification of *τύχη* cf. F17 with commentary, where references are also given. The following fragment also describes *τύχη* as the giver of wealth. Thanks to this expression Bion can show that the possession of wealth is completely accidental and in no way due to the qualities of the owner. The whole idea that property is merely a gift of Tyche or a loan in general is extremely common (cf. *RE*, VIIA:2 (1948) s.v. Tyche col. 1669 (Herzog-Hauser) and Dover, pp. 174 f) and only a few cases can be given. For the first aspect, Tyche as the giver of property, see the saying of the Cynic Monimus: τὸν πλοῦτον εἶπε τύχης ἔμετον εἶναι (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.31c.89; cf. *Gnom. Vat.* 216 and Arsenius *Violetum* p. 209 Walz), Apollodorus fr. 16 Kock III: οὐκ οἶδα ὅτω πέποιθας ἀργυρίῳ πάτερ; / ὁ καιρὸς ὁ τυχῶν τοῖς μὲν οὐ κεκτημένοις / ἔδωκε, τῶν κεκτημένων δ' ἀφείλετο, Cebes *Tabula* 7.2: καὶ παρ' ὧν μὲν ἀρπάζει (sc. ἡ τύχη) τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἑτέροις δίδωσι· παρὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖται παραχρῆμα ἃ δέδωκε καὶ ἄλλοις δίδωσιν εἰκῇ καὶ ἀβεβαίως and 31.5: ὅτι τοιαύτην φύσιν ἔχει ἡ τύχη, ὥστε ἃ δέδωκεν ἀφελέσθαι καὶ ταχέως πάλιν δοῦναι πολλαπλάσια, αὐτῆς δὲ ἀφελέσθαι ἃ δέδωκεν, οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ προυπαρχόντα, Ps-Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 8.5 D: πλοῦτος δὲ τίμιον μὲν, ἀλλὰ τύχης κτῆμα, Dio of Prusa 65.13: φασὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν τύχην) διδόναι μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰγαθὰ, ῥαδίως δὲ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, Galenus *Protrepticus* 6.11 p. 110 Marquardt: τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ πάθοιεν ἰδίον μὲν οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν κεκτημένοι, ἀεὶ δ' ἐπ' ἄλλοτρίοις καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἐπαιρόμενοι, *Anth. Pal.* 9.74, where a field is saying εἰμὶ δ' ὅλως οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τύχης, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.7.20: omnibus praemiis donisque fortunae and *Paradox. Stoic.* 9, where Bias is said to have called property *ludibria fortunae*, Seneca *Ep.* 72.7: nihil dat fortuna mancipio, *De consolatione ad Marciam* 10.3: quidquid a fortuna datum est, tamquam exempto auctore possideas, *De vita beata* 21.2: divitias quidem ubi tutius fortuna deponet quam ibi, unde sine querella reddentis receptura est? and *De tranquillitate animi* 8.3, where people without wealth are referred to as quos numquam fortuna respexit and Phaedrus 4.12.5: Pluto, qui Fortunae est filius.

ἀνελευθερία

The adjective ἀνελεύθερος, which indicates the opposite of ἐλεύθερος, came to be used of meanness in money matters, and is often combined with other adjectives meaning “avaricious”: Plato *Resp.* 5.469 D: ἀνελεύθερον καὶ φιλοχρήματον, Demosthenes 59.36: ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ μικρολόγοι, Aristophanes *Plutus* 591: ἀνελεύθερος . . . καὶ φιλοκερδής and Menander *Mon.* 36: ἀνελεύθεροι

γάρ εἰσιν οἱ φιλάργυροι. The philosophical analysis of ἀνελευθερία, meaning “avarice, meanness” started with Aristotle; cf. e.g. *EN* 2.7.4 p. 1107b10: περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἑλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία, *EN* 4.1.3 p. 1119b28–31, *EE* 2.3.10 p. 1221a34: ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν (sc. δαπάνην) ἐλλείπων and *EE* 3.4.1 p. 1231b28. The concept is also treated in one of Theophrastus’ *Characters*, where we find the following definition: ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερία ἐστὶ ἀπουσία τις [ἀπὸ] φιλοτιμίας δαπάνην ἐχούσης (*Char.* 22.1). For this concept see Gerhard 1909, pp. 60 f, Steinmetz, II pp. 249 ff and Dover, p. 115.

χρηστότης

This noun has the general meaning of “kindness, goodness” (see LSJ, s.v. *χρηστότης* and *ThW*, IX (1973) s.v. *χρηστότης* pp. 478 ff (Weiss)). Nevertheless it also seems to be used with a more special sense of “generosity”, which is probably the case here. A definition which refers more to this active aspect is given in Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.7.25 (p. 147.5–7): χρηστότητα δὲ ἔξιν ἐκουσίως εὐποιητικὴν ἀνθρώπων, αὐτῶν ἐκείνων χάριν, μεταξὺ πονηρίας οὐδαν καὶ ἀνωνύμου. Cf. also Plutarch *Comp. Dem. c. Cic.* 3.3: πολλὴν μὲν ἐπίδειξιν ὑπεροψίας χρημάτων ἐποιήσατο, πολλὴν δὲ φιланθρωπίας καὶ χρηστότητος, which is especially interesting as *χρηστότης* is the opposite of avarice as in Bion’s fragment, and Lucian *Timon* 8: χρηστότης ἐπέτριψεν αὐτὸν καὶ φιλανθρωπία καὶ ὁ πρὸς τοὺς δεομένους ἅπαντας οἶκτος and see further H. Bolkestein, *Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum: Ein Beitrag zum Problem “Moral und Gesellschaft”* (Utrecht, 1939) pp. 135 f.

The meaning of the whole phrase *χρηστότης ἀφαιρεῖται* must be that a person with a good character rids himself of his wealth in order to support others. This could be taken as an example of the Cynic *φιλανθρωπία*, which is a very important concept. However, few instances are known of the Cynics giving material help to their fellowmen, but this is not surprising as many of them had probably disposed of their property. Cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.87–88, where Crates is said to have given his property to the people. For the Cynic *φιλανθρωπία* in general see Bernays, pp. 101 f, Weber 1887, p. 217, Joel 1893–1901, II pp. 967 and p. 1014, Gerhard 1909, p. 32 n. 4 and Dziech, p. 202 n. 342.

There is no trace of compassion with suffering humanity in Bion’s saying. Such an attitude is very rare in antiquity but see Ἐπικούρου προσφώνησις 67 Wotke: ἄν δέ που καὶ τύχη χρημάτων πολλῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ῥαδίως ἄν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίον εὐνοίαν διαμετρῆσαι, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 4.20.46: *misericiordiam* (sc. *utilem*) *ad opem ferendam et calamitates hominum indignorum sublevandas* and Horace *Sat.* 2.2.103: *cur eget indignus quisquam te divite?* Cf. also Ps-Aristotle *Rhet. ad Alex.* 26 p. 1435b32–33: διδότην γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος καὶ εὐδαιμόνων τῷ πένητι καὶ ἐνδεῖ and Menander *Mon.* 478: μέμνησο πλουτῶν τοῦς

πένητας ὠφελεῖν but the value of these two sayings is very doubtful according to Bolkestein, *op. cit.* p. 94 n. 2. It seems to have been an almost unknown idea in Greece that the rich were in any way morally obliged to help the poor; for a survey of the problem see Bolkestein, *op. cit.* pp. 149 f.

F39A—D The text as it is preserved in *Gnom. Vat.* is probably closest to Bion's original. It is highly plausible that *τύχη* belongs to the original, as it occurs with the same meaning also in the preceding fragment. O. Hense on Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.51.56 assumes that Bion actually said *ἡ τύχη οὐ δεδώρηκεν ἀλλὰ δεδάνεικεν*.

ὁ Περιπατητικός

Both Favorinus and *Gnom. Vat.* know that Bion studied with Theophrastus and that he could with some right be called a Peripatetic. Cf. introd. Chapter III:4 and T19 with commentary.

ἡ τύχη

For *τύχη* as the giver of wealth see F38 with commentary.

The idea expressed in this fragment that property as well as life is only on loan, and that the person enjoying it cannot be regarded as its real owner, is extremely common, whether *τύχη* is mentioned or not. A few examples will suffice: Euripides *Phoen.* 555–557 and *Supp.* 534–535, Epictetus 1.1.31–32, 2.16.28 and *Ench.* 11, Ps-Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 28.116 A–B, Lucian *Nigrinus* 26, Marcus Aurelius 12.27, Lucilius fr. 550 Marx, Lucretius 3.971, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.39.93, Horace *Sat.* 2.2.126–135 and *Ep.* 2.2.172–177 and Seneca *Ep.* 88.12, *De consolatione ad Marciam* 9.4 and *De tranquillitate animi* 11.2. For this idea see also Heinze 1889, p. 28 n. 1, Wendland 1895, pp. 59 ff, Rainfurt, pp. 25 f, Seidel, pp. 40 f and Dover, pp. 174 f.

F40A—B Ἀρίστιππος

This anecdote about Aristippus can also be found in Suda, s.v. Ἀρίστιππος, 3909: λέγεται δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτῷ φέροντος ἀργύριον καὶ ἀχθομένου τῷ βάρει, 'τὸ βαροῦν ἀπόβαλε' ἔφη, Horace *Sat.* 2.3.99–102: *quid simile isti / Graecus Aristippus? qui servos proicere aurum / in media iussit Libya, quia tardius irent / propter onus segnes* and Ausonius 3.1.13: *spargit Aristippus mediis in Syrtibus aurum*. Even though no comment is made on the source in these cases, it is highly plausible that the anecdote originally comes from Bion, who had a great interest for Aristippus, thanks to his connections with the Cyrenaic school; cf. F3 with commentary. Hirzel 1895, II p. 13 n. 3 is sceptical of this assumption. It can be noted that the version of Horace has more details and is more pointed. So Aristippus has not got one *θεράπων* but *servi*, he is not *ἐν ὁδῷ* but *in media . . . Libya*, and he brings with him not *ἀργύριον* but *aurum*. Cf. Heinze 1889, pp. 25 f, Helm 1906, p. 286 and Fiske, p. 161.

τοῦ δὲ θεράποντος . . . βαστάζοντος ἀργύριον

Money was usually carried by slaves and divergency from this usage was not considered as good behaviour. Cf. Theophrastus *Char.* 18.3, where ὁ ἄπιστος is described as φέρων αὐτὸς τὸ ἀργύριον. For this habit see also Theophrastus *Char.* 23.8, where ὁ ἀλαζών is said to τῷ παιδί μάχεσθαι ὅτι τὸ χρυσίον οὐκ ἔχων αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ, Athenaeus 12.533 B: καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς περιήγετο (sc. Κίμων) μὲν αἰεὶ νεανίσκους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἔχοντας κέρματα τούτοις τε διδόναι προσέταπεν, ὅποτε τις προσέλθοι αὐτῷ δεόμενος and Plautus *Pseudolus* 170: *i, puere, prae; ne quisquam pertundat cruminam cautios.*

βαστάζοντος . . . βάσταζε

This verb is originally poetic and is not used in Attic prose. It occurs in prose from the Hellenistic period (cf. LSJ, s.v. βαστάζω), and can be found with the same meaning as here in, e.g., Polybius 2.24.16: τῶν δυναμένων ὄπλα βαστάζειν (for more cases see A. Mauersberger, *Polybios-Lex.* s.v. βαστάζω) and in Epictetus 2.8.7 and 2.9.22. Cf. A.D. Papanikolaou, 'Chariton-Studien: Untersuchungen zur Sprache und Chronologie der griechischen Romane', *Hypomnemata*, 37 (Göttingen, 1973) pp. 26 f.

ἐν ὁδῷ

Aristippus continued the habit of the old sophists and travelled extensively. He also held some cosmopolitan ideas: 'ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι', ἔφη, 'ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμὲν τὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι (Xenophon *Mem.* 2.1.13 = fr. 84 Mannebach); cf. Gigon, II pp. 35 ff.

This anecdote seeks to illustrate the philosopher's independence of external circumstances in general and especially of wealth. Therefore he must be able to stand a loss. There are many anecdotes about different philosophers to illustrate this point; cf. Gerhard 1909, pp. 98 ff. For Aristippus' philosophical attitude see also the anecdote in Diog. Laert. 2.77: πλέων ποτὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ σκάφος ἔγνω πειρατικόν, λαβὼν τὸ χρυσίον ἡρίθμει· ἔπειτα εἰς θάλατταν ὡς μὴ θέλων παρακατέβαλε καὶ δῆθεν ἀνώμωξεν. οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐπειπεῖν φασιν αὐτὸν ὡς ἄμεινον ταῦτα δι' Ἀρίστιππον ἢ διὰ ταῦτα Ἀρίστιππον ἀπολέσθαι (= fr. 69A Mannebach) and his famous saying ἔχω, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχομαι (Diog. Laert. 2.75 etc. = fr. 57 Mannebach) may also be remembered in this connection.

F41

οἱ τραπεζίται

This term, originally meaning money-changer, is used from the fifth century B.C. For the terminology see R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques* (Leyden, 1968) pp. 39 ff. It seems that the τραπεζίται did not always enjoy the best reputation as shown by, e.g., Demosthenes 37.52: μισοῦσι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς δανείζοντας, Antiphanes fr. 159.11 Kock II, Cebes *Tabula* 31.3: μηδὲ γίνεσθαι ὁμοίους τοῖς κακοῖς τραπεζίταις and Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 11, where this occupation is referred to as having a bad reputation. Cf. also

Epictetus 3.3.3 and Dio of Prusa 34.31. For bankers in antiquity in general see K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* IV, 3. ed. (Freiburg i. B.-Tübingen, 1882) pp. 452 ff, DS, V (1912–19) s.v. Trapezitai pp. 407 ff (Lécrivain) and *RE*, VIA:2 (1937) s.v. Trapeza cols. 2194 ff (Ziebarth). Cf. also F14 where Bion may be using the word *τράπεζα* with the meaning “bank”.

We find the *τραπεζῖται* used in a somewhat similar comparison in Ps-Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 28.116 A, where people’s relations to their belongings are compared with the relations between money-changers and the money they have received from others: οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τραπεζῖται, καθάπερ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν πολλάκις, ἀπαιτούμενοι τὰ θέματα δυσχεραίνουνσιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀποδόσει, ἅνπερ εὖ γνωμονῶσι.

Bion’s comparison of the miser with the money-changer serves two purposes and illustrates two common ideas: acquisition of more money does not free you from avarice, and the money which you possess does not really belong to you. Both these ideas are expressed also in other fragments of Bion; see F44 respectively F38–39 with commentary.

F42A–B βαλλάντιον

The spelling with *λλ* is better attested than with *λ* and can be found, e.g., in Ps-Simonides 157.3 Diehl and Philodemus *Rhet.* 1. 354 Sudhaus; for the spelling see M. Schanz, in *Platonis opera quae feruntur omnia* VII: *Euthydemus, Protagoras* (Leipzig, 1880) p. VII. This word meaning “bag, purse” is an ordinary Attic word and occurs in, e.g., Aristophanes *Aves* 157 and *Eq.* 707 and 1197, Plato *Symp.* 190 E, Xenophon *Symp.* 4.2 and Theophrastus *Char.* 17.5. Thanks to this everyday character it can also be found in texts influenced by popular philosophy (cf. Reuters, p. 94): Anacharsis *Ep.* 6, Ps-Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 8.5 D, Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 7.526 D, Lucian *Dial. mort.* 11.4, where those who could not properly inherit the Cynic doctrine are described as *διερρηγκότες ὑπὸ τρυφῆς, καθάπερ τὰ σαπρὰ τῶν βαλλαντίων* and Alciphron *Ep.* 3.55.2. It was a common practice in ancient times to carry money in bags; see further DS, III:2 (1900–04) s.v. Marsupium pp. 1623 f (Lafaye) and *RE*, XIV:2 (1930) s.v. Marsupium cols. 1981 ff (Hug) and F31 with commentary.

ἔχει

All the MSS. have *ἔχουσιν*, which is rather surprising but did not worry the editors. The subject is *τὰ φαῦλα τῶν βαλλαντίων* and after *ἦ* and *ἐστίν* we should expect *ἔχει*, which is necessary, if we are to keep *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*. Cf. Helm 1906, p. 204 n. 2, who has *ἔχει* but does not comment upon this.

Notwithstanding that Stobaeus gives this quotation from Bion under the title *Ἐπαινος πλούτου*, it is clear that Bion here adopts a negative and critical attitude to the popular standpoint, in so far as he compares the rich man with a

purse, which lacks intrinsic value.

The belief that a man is worth what he owns, seems to be very ancient and is often given as the opinion of people in general or the avaricious. Cf. the saying of Aristodemus: χρήματ' ἀνὴρ (Alcaeus fr. 101 Diehl = fr. Z 37 Lobel-Page and Pindar *Isthm.* 2.17), which became proverbial; see E.L. v. Leutsch-F.G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* (Göttingen, 1839–51) I p. 173 and p. 377 and II p. 129, p. 226 and p. 725 and A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und die sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig, 1890) p. 157. The same idea is also expressed in Theognis 929–930 and 1117–1118.

This idea is often critically referred to in literature influenced by popular philosophy as we can see from the following references: Ps-Plato *Eryxias* 396 C: σκοπεῖν, ὁπόθεν πλούσιοι ἔσονται, ὥς ἂν μὲν τι ἔχῃς, ἀξίός του εἶ, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὐδενός, Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 7.526 C: καὶ τοσούτου νόμιζε σεαυτὸν ἀξίον, ὅσον ἂν ἔχῃς, Lucilius fr. 1120 Marx: *tantum habeas, tantum ipse sies tantique habearis*, Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* 44: *animus hominis dives, non arca appellari solet*, Horace *Sat.* 1.1.62: 'nil satis est' inquit, 'quia tanti quantum habeas sis', Seneca *Ep.* 87.18: *fiscus tanti est, quantum habet; immo in accessionem eius venit, quod habet. Quis pleno sacculo ullum pretium ponit nisi quod pecuniae in eo conditae numerus effecit? Idem evenit magnorum dominis patrimoniorum: accessiones illorum et appendices sunt*, which is very close to Bion's saying, and *Ep.* 115.14: *ubique tanti quisque, quantum habuit, fuit*, Petronius *Sat.* 77.6: *assem habeas, assem valeas*, Juvenal *Sat.* 3.143–144: *quantum quisque sua nummorum servat in arca, / tantum habet et fidei* and Apuleius *Apol.* 23: *tanti re vera estis quantum habetis*. Cf. also Heinze 1889, pp. 19 f, A. Gercke, 'Die Komposition der ersten Satire des Horaz', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 48 (1893) pp. 50 f, Weber 1895, p. 3, Seidel, pp. 55 f, Gerhard 1909, p. 87 and n. 5 and pp. 136 f and Fiske, p. 193, pp. 226 f and pp. 236 f and n. 47 (p. 352).

F43A–B This saying is also attributed to Bias (Apostolius V. 90 b = E.L. v. Leutsch-F.G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* II (Göttingen, 1851) p. 358), which has not so far been noticed in connection with Bion. The similarity between the two names Bias and Bion may have caused the confusion; cf. introd. Chapter V:4. A saying which is very similar is ascribed to Cato: τῶν ἀρχόντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις ἢ τὴν δόξαν αὐξάνεσθαι (Ps-Plutarch *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 199 D; cf. also Plutarch *Cato maior* 10.4) and found in Isocrates 1.37: ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελειῶν ἀπαλλάττου μὴ πλουσιώτερος, ἀλλ' ἐνδοξότερος; cf. P. Wendland, *Anaximenes von Lampsakos: Studien zur ältesten Geschichte der Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1905) p. 100 and Hense 1909, p. LXXXIV.

τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα . . . μὴ πλουσιώτερον

It must have been very common for men in power to try to increase their own wealth during their period of office. Therefore the idea expressed by Bion became a topos in eulogies of governors; cf. L. Robert, *Hellenica IV: Épigrammes du Bas-Empire* (Paris, 1948) pp. 13 f and pp. 107 f and Schouler, p. 81 n. 3.

ἐνδοξότερον

This is a very surprising idea at first sight, as the Cynics are known to regard δόξα meaning “reputation, glory” as completely worthless. This is clear from sayings of Antisthenes: τὴν τ’ ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθόν (Diog. Laert. 6.11 = fr. 95 Caizzi), Diogenes: τοὺς στεφάνους δόξης ἐξανθήματα (Diog. Laert. 6.41) and εὐγενείας δὲ καὶ δόξας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα διέπαιζε, προκοσμήματα κακίας εἶναι λέγων (Diog. Laert. 6.72), Crates: ἔχειν δὲ πατρίδα ἀδοξίαν καὶ πενίαν (Diog. Laert. 6.93) and Teles p. 11.8–9: καὶ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἀδοξίαν ἴσως ἔχοντα. The attitude of the Cynics in general is characterized as follows: δόξης . . . καταφρονοῦσιν (Diog. Laert. 6.104). Cf. further on this question Zeller, II:1⁴ pp. 305 f and n. 6, Norden 1892, p. 340 n. 1, Joel 1893–1901, II p. 860, W. Capelle, *De Cynicorum epistulis* (Diss. Göttingen, 1896) p. 42, Oltramare, p. 266, which quotes examples from Seneca, and Dziech, pp. 86 ff.

However there are sayings which give another impression. Cf. the anecdote about Antisthenes: *hoc Antisthenes dixisse traditur. Is enim cum vidisset adolescentem luxuriosum acroamatibus deditum, ait: ‘miserum te, adolescens, qui numquam audisti summum acroama, id est laudem tuam’* (Porphyrio Schol. in *Hor. Sat.* 2.2.94 = fr. 191 Caizzi), Diogenes’ question to the oracle in Delphi: τί ποιήσας ἐνδοξότατος ἔσται (Diog. Laert. 6.21) and the saying of Crates: Κράτης οὐ τῷ πλούτῳ εἶπεν ἑαυτὸν ἠὲ δοξηκέναι μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ τῇ πενίᾳ (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.33.27). A seeming contradiction can be explained by the Cynics’ fondness for paradox, and by their habit of giving old concepts a new interpretation. Their δόξα is not the δόξα of people in general. On the contrary their δόξα consists in what is generally considered as ἀδοξία. Consequently they can use the concepts δόξα and ἐνδοξος with a positive meaning after giving them a new interpretation. Cf. the following anecdote about Diogenes: καὶ σχεδὸν εἰς τὸν τοῦ Διογέους λόγον περιελήλυθέν σοι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὃς ἐρομένου τινός ὅπως ἂν τις ἐνδοξος γένοιτο, ‘εἰ δόξης’, ἔφη, ‘καταφρονήσεις’ (Lucian *Pro imaginibus* 17; cf. also Dio of Prusa 9.13, Diogenes *Ep.* 7, Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 11 and Theon *Progymn.* 5 p. 97 Spengel II) and see further Gerhard 1909, pp. 87 ff.

F44

eleganter

This stylistic feature belongs to the apophthegma, gnome or chreia; cf. F3 with commentary.

calvis

Baldness was a popular target for different jokes on the part of comedy-writers and Cynics; cf. Gerhard 1909, pp. 154 f and Bramble, p. 111 and n. 3. See also F69 with commentary.

Wealth does not rid a man of the desire to possess more, and even a rich man strongly resents a loss, as Bion shows through this comparison. The idea is common; cf. F41, Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 2.523 E: φιλαργυρίαν δ' οὐ σβέννυσιν ἀργύριον οὐδὲ χρυσίον, οὐδὲ πλεονεξία παύεται κτωμένη τὸ πλεόν, Publilius Syrus 55: *avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro*, Lucilius fr. 558 Marx: *denique uti stulto nil sit satis, omnia cum sint*, Cicero *Paradox. Stoic.* 6: *numquam . . . pecunias . . . in bonis rebus aut expetendis esse duxi, quippe cum viderem rebus his circumfluentes ea tamen desiderare maxime quibus abundarent. Neque enim umquam expletur nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis, neque solum ea qui habent libidine augendi cruciantur sed etiam amittendi metu*, Horace *Ep.* 1.2.56: *semper avarus eget* and Seneca *Ep.* 2.6: *non qui parum habet, sed qui plus cupit, pauper est*.

A reference to F44 is made by Montaigne: “Car, comme disait Bion, autant se fâche le chevelu comme le chauve qu'on lui arrache le poil” (*Essais* I.14 p. 42 Aux Éditions du Seuil).

F45

τὸν τὰ χωρία κατεδηδοκότα

This metaphorical use of κατεσθίω is very common and can be assumed to belong mainly to the spoken language. We find this use already in Homer *Od.* 2.237–238: κατέδουσι . . . οἶκον, 11.116, 13.396 and 428, 15.32, 17.378 and 19.159 and 534, Aristophanes *Eq.* 258: τὰ κοινὰ . . . κατεσθίεις and *Vespae* 1116, Antiphanes fr. 239 Kock II, Anaxippus fr. 1.32 Kock III, Demosthenes 38.27, Aeschines 1.42 and Athenaeus 8.354 B. We find the same metaphorical use of comedere in Latin: Horace *Ep.* 1.15.40: *si qui comedunt bona*, Seneca *Ep.* 122.14: *multi bona comedunt* and Quintilian 6.3.74: *quod patrimonium comedisset*.

τὸν μὲν Ἀμφιάραον

For this mythical hero who was well known to the Greeks see *ML*, I (1884–90) s.v. Amphiaraos cols. 293 ff and especially col. 298 (Wolff). The use of one of the traditional heroes in a disrespectful comparison of this kind is typical of the Cynics. It may be noted that a work with the title *Περὶ Ἀμφιάρου* is testified for Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.18 = fr. 1 Caizzi).

F46

τὸν πλοῦτον νεῦρα πραγμάτων

This saying is of proverbial character and we find this or similar forms, especially with πολέμου substituted for πραγμάτων, in e.g. Aeschines 3.166, where it is attributed to Demosthenes, Crantor in Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 11.53,

Plutarch *Cleomenes* 27.1, Appianus *BC* 4.12.99, *Schol. vet. ad Pind. Ol.* 1.4, Eustathius *ad Il.* 2.637 (p. 309 ed. Rom.), Georgius Pisida *Heracl.* 1.163–164 (= *PG*, 92 cols. 1311–1312 A), Nicetas Choniata *Historia* p. 82.22–23 Bekker, Suda, s.v. *Νεῦρα μάχης*, 266, Theodorus Metochita p. 515 Müller, Cicero *Phil.* 5.25 and *Pro lege Manilia* 7.17 and Florus 3.13.6. Cf. A. Meineke, ‘Vermischtes’, *Philologus*, 3 (1848) pp. 320 f, A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig, 1890) p. 242 and Hense 1909, pp. LXXXII f. For Bion’s use of proverbs in general see introd. Chapter II:2.

The problem here is whether we can believe Bion to have said this. The saying with its praise of wealth may seem somewhat surprising so that it has been attributed to the assumed interlocutor by several scholars, e.g. Hense 1892, p. 236 n. 1, Weber 1895, p. 19 and n. 2 and Hense 1909, p. LXXXII and n. 1. Hense 1892 compared this sentence with Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 11.53, where Crantor lets Plutus say: *ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεῦρα τῶν πράξεων γίνομαι*. This does not, in my opinion, exclude the possibility of the saying being used by Bion. Bion is not an enemy of wealth as such, and he approves of its rightful use. The expression *νεῦρα πραγμάτων* here is very general and we do not know the context. So I do not regard it as impossible that Bion used the expression about a use of wealth which is acceptable to him, i.e. in order to do good (cf. F38A–C), although this expression is unusually strong.

F34–46 In the preceding fragments we have learnt Bion’s attitude to avarice and wealth. His standpoint is, as can be expected, critical in many respects. Avarice is severely condemned as the source of all evil. The same is not entirely true of his view on wealth. He stresses the uncertainty which always accompanies wealth and points out that it does not confer any special value on the owner. Furthermore he criticizes people who do not use their wealth aright. But wealth used in a sensible way is not completely without value according to Bion’s point of view, and his attitude can be well described with the words used of Phoenix by Gerhard, 1909, pp. 201 f: “Der Missbrauch des Reichtums zu Luxus und Üppigkeit wie auch sein Nichtgebrauch werden getadelt und demgegenüber empfohlen sein rechter Gebrauch”.

Avarice and wealth were very common topics for discussion in the moral philosophy of different schools. While the question was old, it was of course fully valid during the Hellenistic period. The importance of the subject is shown by all the material, which can be found in the ancient literature and it is obvious that the problem was often treated. So there is a work *Περὶ πλούτου* testified for Aristotle (Diog. Laert. 5.22; cf. P.-M. Schul, ‘Aristote: De la richesse — De la prière — De la noblesse — Du plaisir — De l’éducation: Fragments et témoignages’, *Publications de la faculté des lettres et sciences humaines*

*de Paris-Sorbonne, Ser. "Textes et Documents", 17 (Paris, 1968), where the fragments are given and this work discussed). The analysis in Aristotle EN 4.1–3 pp. 1119b21–1122a17 is also of great interest. Works with the title *Περὶ πλούτου* were further written by Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. 5.47) and by Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.80). Some of Theophrastus' *Characters* are also very enlightening (see e.g. *Char.* 10, 22 and 30). The topic was treated by several later authors, such as Plutarch in *De cupiditate divitiarum* and the lost work *Περὶ πλούτου*, and Dio of Prusa in *Περὶ πλούτου* (or. 79). For a survey of writings on this subject by authors influenced by a Cynic and Stoic tradition see Seidel, p. 46. Most of the ideas expressed by Bion seem to be of a very common-place character, as we have already seen from all the parallels given above. His attitude may be regarded more as general philosophical than as belonging to a particular school. Avarice is of course generally condemned but the different schools differ to some extent in their attitude to wealth. The questions of interest in this case concern Cynic and Cyrenaic influence on the thought of Bion, and a possible development in the Cynic school. These problems have been discussed in introd. Chapter III.*

Many references for this aspect have already been quoted; general surveys with rich collections of material will be found in Seidel, pp. 45 ff, Gerhard 1909, pp. 57 ff and pp. 112 ff and Dziech, pp. 73 ff.

6. On envy (F47–48)

F47A–F The idea expressed in this saying seems to have been extremely popular in slightly different forms. The saying, which is quoted as by Bion also *Mei. Aug.* XXXVI.14 and *Corp. Par.* 534 Elter, is also ascribed in the same form to Anacharsis (*Flor. Ottobon. Gr.* 192 f. 212^r), Antagoras (*cod. Pal. Gr.* 297 f 117^v no. 44), Democritus (*Gnom. Vat.* 266 = *Flor. Mon.* 189 = *Flor. Leid.* 178 = *cod. Vat. Gr.* 742 f. 66^r = *Laurent. Plut.* LXXXVI nr. 8 f. 315^r), Diagoras (Georgides Monachus *Gnom.* 26 (=PG, 117 col. 1084 B) = *Flor. Pal.-Vat.* 63 = *Flor. Bar.* 191 = *Flor. Ottobon. Gr.* 192), Dio (*Gnom. Bas.* 252), Publilius Syrus (Macrobius *Sat.* 2.2.8) and to an anonymous author — *τὶς σοφός* (*Anecd. Gr.* III p. 468 Boissonade). With regard to Dio, we remember that a confusion between the two names *Βίων* and *Δίων* is very easy; cf. introd. Chapter V:4. For examples of similar sayings see L. Sternbach's notes on *Gnom. Vat.* 19, 158, 266 and 334 and E. Milobenski, 'Der Neid in der griechischen Philosophie', *Klassisch-Philologische Studien*, hersg. v. H. Herter und W. Schmid, 29 (Wiesbaden, 1964) p. 92.

κεκυφότα

The verb *κύπτω* is here used to indicate sorrow or depression; cf. Aristophanes fr. 395 Kock I: *ὥς ἐς τὴν γῆν κύψασα κάτω καὶ ξυννενοφυνῖα βαδίζει*, Amphis

fr. 30.6 Kock II, Euphron fr. 1.27 Kock III and Theophrastus *Char.* 24.8. *Gnom. Vat.* is the only text to have *συγκεχυμένον*.

F48 βάσκανον

LSJ, s.v. βάσκανος II translates this adjective as “slanderos, malicious”. Notwithstanding that the word can be used as a term of general abuse, it seems to be especially connected with envy, and in many cases “envious” seems to be the correct meaning. Cf. Demosthenes 18.132, Menander *Perikeiromene* 279 Körte, Com. adesp. fr. 359 Kock III, where an envious man is addressed *ἄνθρωπε βασκανώτατε*, Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi* 11.471 A: *καὶ πολὺ τὸ δύσζηλον ἢ φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ τὸ βάσκανον οὐ χαίρει τοσοῦτον τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅσον ἀνιᾶται τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς* and *Script. Physiog.* I p. 406.3—4 Foerster: *ὁπόσοι δὲ ἐν ῥίνι φθέγγονται, ψευδεῖς, κακοήθεις, βάσκανοι, πῆμασιν ἄλλων χαίροντες*. This view is confirmed, e.g., by the use of the noun *βασκανία* in Dio of Prusa 45.5: *φθόνου καὶ βασκανίας* and Plutarch *De recta ratione audiendi* 5.39 D: *φθόνος τοῖνον μετὰ βασκανίας καὶ δυσμενείας οὐδενὶ μὲν ἔργῳ παρῶν ἀγαθόν* and the adjective *βασκαντικός*, which occurs in combination with *φθονητικός* e.g. Plutarch *Quaestiones convivales* 5.7.5.682 D and Philodemus *Vit.* pp. 42 f Jensen.

According to the ancient view there seems to have been a difference between *φθονερός* and *βάσκανος*. Cf. *Schol. ad Plat. Alcib.* 2.147 C pp. 284 f Hermann VI: *φθονερός ὁ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὐπραγοῦσιν ἀχθόμενος καθ’ ἑαυτόν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ φθονος φθονερός. διαφέρει δὲ βασκάνου· ὁ γὰρ βάσκανος ὑπὸ φθόνου καὶ συκοφαντεῖ καὶ κακηγορεῖ, ἀπὸ τοῦ βαβάκτου ἴσως. ἔστι δὲ βαβάκτης ὁ κράκτης καὶ μανιώδης.*

ἐσκυθρωπακότα

This verb, meaning “to be of a sad countenance” (LSJ, s.v. *σκυθρωπάω* 1), is fully classical. For the meaning cf. Aelianus *VH* 14.22: *καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς σκυθρωποῖς καὶ ἀνηκέστοις ἕκαστος αὐτῶν συνωφρυνόμενος ἦν δῆλος, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθος ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου τῷ πλησίον διαδεικνύς* and *Script. Physiog.* I p. 40.6—7 Foerster: *οἱ ἀνιῶμενοι σκυθρωπότεροί εἰσιν καὶ οἱ εὐφραινόμενοι ἱλαροί*. It is of interest that this description is applied especially to avaricious people; cf. Aristophanes *Plutus* 756, where the rich are described with the phrase *ὀφρῦς συνῆγον ἐσκυθρῶπαζον θ’ ἄμα*, and Dio of Prusa 4.91, where *ὁ φιλοχρήματος δαίμων* is described as *σκυθρωπός τε καὶ συννεφής ἰδεῖν*. Juvenal *Sat.* 14.110 describes the *avarus* as *triste habitu vultuque*.

There is a somewhat similar expression in Libanius *Περὶ δουλείας* (or. 25) 20: *σῶμα δὲ ἀναλίσκει* (sc. ὁ φθόνος) *καὶ ποιεῖ τῶν πενθούντων σκυθρωπότερον, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτῷ προσέπεσε τι κακόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τῷ πέλας ἤκε τι ἀγαθόν*. There is some doubt as to whether Libanius is here quoting Bion and still more so whether a discourse of Bion is the source for Libanius’ speech, as J. Mesk

assumes in ‘Libanios *Περὶ δουλείας*’, *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 76 (1927) p. 208, as the idea expressed is extremely common; cf. also F11A–B with commentary.

F47–48 Envy is such a general problem that it was discussed in all the philosophical schools, which had an interest in ethics. See here especially Milobenski, *op. cit.*, who followed this subject through all Greek philosophy and collected very rich material. The subject must have been very common in popular philosophy such as Cynicism; cf. F.J. Brecht, ‘Motiv- und Typengeschichte des griechischen Spottepigramms’, *Philologus*, Suppl.b. 22:2 (Leipzig, 1930) p. 84: “Der Neid ist ein Thema des Kynismos und der kynisierenden Chrie” and for the Cynic attitude in general Dziech, pp. 195 f, Reuters, pp. 86 f and Milobenski, *op. cit.* pp. 116 ff. The critical attitude of the Cynics emerges from a few references; cf. e.g. the sayings of Antisthenes: ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰοῦ τὸν σίδηρον, οὕτως ἔλεγε τοὺς φθονεροὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ἥθους κατεσθίεσθαι (Diog. Laert. 6.5 = fr. 82 Caizzi), Diogenes: κακοὶ κακῶν ἐπιτήδαιοι ὄντες, καὶ ἀλλήλοις φθονοῦντες (Diogenes *Ep.* 28.1) and Crates: *Crates ille Diogenis sectator . . . similiter adversum iracundiam et invidiam atque avaritiam atque libidinem ceteraque animi humani monstra et flagitia philosophus iste Hercules fuit* (Apuleius *Flor.* 22). The same condemnation of envy is also attested for the Cyrenaic school by a saying of Theodorus: τὸν σοφὸν μήτε φθονήσῃν μήτε ἐρασθήσεσθαι ἢ δεισιδαιμονήσῃν γίνεσθαι γὰρ ταῦτα παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν (Diog. Laert. 2.91 = fr. 241 Mannebach). The same attitude can, not surprisingly, be found in Theophrastus, and some sayings ascribed to him are very similar to Bion’s as far as the content is concerned: τοὺς μοχθηροὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ οὕτως ἤδεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίῳις ἀγαθοῖς ὥς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.38.30; cf. *Gnom. Vat.* 334) and οἱ δὲ φθονοῦντες πρὸς τοῖς ἑαυτῶν κακοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθοῖς λυπούμενοι διατελοῦσιν (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.38.43). Cf. also Milobenski, *op. cit.* pp. 92 f.

7. On friendship and outspokenness (F49–53)

F49

ὁποῖοι

This is the reading of the MSS. and should be retained, against the reading *ὁμοιοι*, originally proposed by Hense, and adopted by Fiske, p. 195. The transmitted reading was successfully defended by, e.g. v. Arnim, Körte, Praechter, Sitzler, and Wendland in their reviews of Hense’s first edition of Teles’ fragments (see introd. Chapter V:1 n. 4 for references), W. Capelle, *De Cynicorum epistulis* (Diss. Göttingen, 1896) p. 20 n. 3 and Gerhard 1909, p. 42 and n. 4, and finally accepted also by Hense himself 1892 p. 236 n. 1 and 1909 p. XCII.

συντηρεῖν

This compound seems to belong to the Hellenistic period and to be used from Aristotle *De plantis* 1.1 p. 816a8 onwards. Later we find this verb in, e.g., Polybius 4.6.10 and it is common in LXX, N.T. and papyri; cf. LSJ, s.v. *συντηρέω* and Welles, p. 367.

Notwithstanding that the text of this fragment is certain the same cannot be said about the interpretation. Bion seems to be saying that we should hold fast to our friends, as they are, lest we give the impression of having associated with bad men or declined the company of good. The central point is then to remain faithful to one's friends. The idea as such is old, being expressed by e.g. Solon ap. Diog. Laert. 1.60: *φίλους μὴ ταχὺ κτῶ· οὕς δ' ἂν κτήσῃ μὴ ἀποδοκίμαζε* and Isocrates 1.24: *βραδέως μὲν φίλος γίγνου, γενόμενος δὲ πειρῶ διαμένειν*. Nevertheless the saying is somewhat strange coming from a philosopher, for whom the aspect of *δοκεῖν* should be without importance. Therefore Bion must be talking about friendship between people in general and not among philosophers. This also emerges from the fact that the philosopher would not countenance friendship with bad men. The question, whether it was possible to break up a friendship, was also discussed in treatises on friendship. It was answered in the affirmative by Aristotle *EN* 9.3.3 p. 1165b13–23. It is of interest that the opposite answer is given by Scipio in Cicero *Laelius De amicitia* 16.60: *quin etiam si minus felices in deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat*, which is supposed to go back to Theophrastus, Bion's teacher. For this problem see F.–A. Steinmetz, 'Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios: Nach einer Analyse von Cicero "Laelius De Amicitia"', *Palingenesia*, 3 (Wiesbaden, 1967) pp. 134 ff.

F50

It is not clear whether this fragment should be understood as a literal quotation or a paraphrase by Plutarch. The very full form of expression may point to Plutarch: *εὐφορον – εὐκαρπον, σκάπτων – πράγματα ἔχων* and *ὠφέλιμος – πάμφορος*. Nevertheless, the hiatus in *εἴη ἐπαινῶν* casts doubts on the attribution of the actual wording to Plutarch as he would probably have avoided a hiatus of this type.

εὐφορον . . . καὶ εὐκαρπον

Note the paronomasia which is very popular in Cynic rhetoric; cf. introd. Chapter II:2.

Εὐκαρπος is mainly poetic (cf. LSJ, s.v. *εὐκαρπος* I and Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 299) and can be found in, e.g., Pindar *Pyth.* 1.30 and *Nem.* 1.14, where it refers to land.

πάμφορος

This adjective is not often used of persons; cf. Xenophon *Mem.* 2.4.7: *τοῦ δὲ*

παμφορωτάτου κτήματος, ὃ καλεῖται φίλος. Here the use can be explained as a result of the comparison with an ἀγρός.

This saying does not show Bion as a very strict Cynic; praise of a person would hardly be possible for him, even if he could make this person better, as for him παρρησία is more important. Bion seems to be a more practical man, and praise does not necessarily imply flattery. Praise is usually treated very restrictively in treatises on friendship but this aspect is not altogether missing; cf. Plutarch *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* 36.73 C: προθύμως ἐπαινεῖν τὸ πρῶτον and Cicero *Laelius De amicitia* 24.89, where Terence *Andria* 68 is quoted: *obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit* and where Cicero adds: *in obsequio autem . . . comitas adsit, assentatio vitiorum adiutrix procul amoveatur*. Cf. for this aspect G. Bohnenblust, *Beiträge zum Topos Περὶ φιλίας* (Diss. Bern, 1905) pp. 34 f.

Notwithstanding that Bion is unusually liberal towards praise, Hense 1909, p. XCIII and Gerhard 1909, p. 43 are unfairly critical. To speak of “aristippeischer Unverfrorenheit” and “laxe Moral” because of this saying as Heinze 1890, p. 514 n. 1 does, lacks justification.

F51

τοῖς κολακεύουσι

The κόλαξ is a very common character in Greek literature, especially in comedy. Flattery is often treated by authors with philosophical interests and the attitude is always negative. One of Theophrastus' *Characters* treats κολακεία and gives the following definition: τὴν δὲ κολακειάν ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις ὁμιλίαν αἰσχροὴν εἶναι, συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι (*Char.* 2.1). The subject is treated by Plutarch in the treatise *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* and there is one speech of Maximus of Tyre entitled *Τίσιν χωριστέον τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου* (*or.* 14). Flattery and flatterers are harshly criticized by Cynic philosophers, who place truth and candour above everything, as we can see from sayings of, e.g., Antisthenes: κρεῖττον ἔλεγε . . . εἰς κόρακας ἢ εἰς κόλακας ἐμπεσεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεκρούς, οἱ δὲ ζῶντας ἐσθίουσιν (*Diog. Laert.* 6.4 = *Stobaeus Flor.* 3.14.17 = fr. 84 Caizzi), Diogenes: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί τῶν θηρίων κάκιστα δάκνει, ἔφη, ‘τῶν μὲν ἀγρίων συκοφάντης, τῶν δὲ ἡμέρων κόλαξ’ (*Diog. Laert.* 6.51) and ἐπὶ τῆς κολακειᾶς ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μνήματος αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ ὄνομα τῆς φιλίας ἐπιγέγραπται (*Stobaeus Flor.* 3.14.14) and Crates: Κράτης πρὸς νέον πλούσιον πολλοὺς κόλακας ἐπισυρόμενον ‘νεανίσκε’ εἶπεν ‘ἐλεῶ σου τὴν ἐρημίαν’ (*Stobaeus Flor.* 3.14.20). Cf. for this subject O. Ribbeck, ‘Kolax: Eine ethologische Studie’, *Abhandlungen der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Classe, 9:1 (Leipzig, 1883) pp. 1 ff, Bohnenblust, *op. cit.* p. 31, Gerhard 1909, pp. 32 ff and Steinmetz, *op. cit.* pp. 153 ff.

ἀπεΐκαζε . . . ἀμφορεῦσιν

This use of similes is very typical of Bion's kind of rhetoric, as is the use of a

common word from everyday language, e.g., ἀμφορεύς; cf. introd. Chapter II:2. For similar comparisons see the following saying of Diogenes: τοὺς εὐειδεῖς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους ὁμοίους ἔφη εἶναι ἀλαβάστροις ἔχουσιν ὄξος (Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 44 (= PG, 91 col. 928 B)), Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 15, where a young man is compared with τὰ καινὰ τῶν ἀγγείων and Horace *Ep.* 1.2.69–70, where a young man is compared with a jar: *quo semel imbuta recens servabit odorem / testa diu*. Cf. Hense 1892, pp. 228 ff.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὥτων ῥαδίως μεταφερομένοις

This comparison is used because of the double meaning of the word οὖς. Bion is very fond of word-plays of this kind; cf. introd. Chapter II:2. A very similar comparison can be found in Demophilus *Sim.* 3: οἱ ἐλαφροὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθάπερ τὰ κενὰ τῶν ἀγγείων εὐβάστακτοι τοῖς ὠταρίοις εἰσιν. For the expression cf. also Plutarch *Quaestiones convivales* 7.5.3.705 E: ὥσπερ εἰ τῶν κεραμίων μέγα φρονοίη τὸ (μὴ ἀπὸ) τῆς γαστρὸς αἰρόμενον ἢ τοῦ πνυθμένος, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὥτων ῥαδίως μεταφερόμενον and *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 5.802 D: τὸν μὲν οὖν λύκον οὗ φασι τῶν ὥτων κρατεῖν, δῆμον δὲ καὶ πόλιν ἐκ τῶν ὥτων ἄγειν δεῖ μάλιστα.

F52A–B χάριεν

This feature of style is characteristic of an apophthegma, gnome or chreia; cf. F3 with commentary.

τὸν Θεόγνιν

This poet enjoyed great popularity among later authors, especially if they were influenced by philosophy. Cf. introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 62.

πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ . . . δέδεται

Bion here quotes Theognis 177–178. These lines seem to have enjoyed a certain popularity, being quoted, *in toto* or in part, by Aristotle *EE* 3.1.29 p. 1230a13, Lucian *De mercede conductis* 5, referring to οἱ ἀγεννέστατοι τῶν ποιητῶν, Artemidorus *Onir.* 1.32, Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.47.8 (= *Corp. Hermet.* 10.24 a p. 204 Scott = p. 125 Nock-Festugière II) and Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.32.34. Cf. also A. Peretti, ‘Theognide nella tradizione gnomologica’, *Studi classici e orientali*, 4 (Pisa, 1953) pp. 38 ff for the tradition and text of these two lines.

καταδολεσχεῖς

This verb is post-classical and can be found in e.g. LXX *La.* 3.20, Plutarch *De garrulitate* 2.503 B and Julian *Ep.* 32 Bidez-Cumont. Cf. also F74 with commentary for ἀδολέσχης.

The meaning of this fragment seems to be perfectly clear to me. Bion criticizes the poet Theognis, as he cannot accept the idea that poverty prevents anybody

from being outspoken. So he directly addresses the poet and shows from his own work and life that his opinion is wrong. Both these things, to criticize a poet (see W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1924) pp. 64 ff) and to address him directly (see Schmid 1887–97, III p. 319) are quite common and natural among philosophical authors, as the poet is generally thought to express the ideas of the common people. I therefore see no reason to assume that Bion here refutes a Cynic, who cannot use his *παρρησία* completely (so Gerhard 1909, p. 43) or an opponent who quotes Theognis (so Hense 1909, p. LXXXII and p. LXXXVI). The form of address — σὺ πένης ὦν — can very well apply to Theognis.

F53

τὴν †δυσσέβειαν

This fragment has been interpreted in widely different ways, because the reading of all the MSS. *δυσσέβειαν* is very unsatisfactory, although accepted by Casaubon, Rossignol, p. 26 and Gerhard 1909, p. 43. Our knowledge of Bion's religious attitude makes it very difficult to accept the reading of the MSS. and furthermore the word *δυσσέβεια* is highly poetic and known mainly from tragedy: Aeschylus *Choeph.* 704 and *Eum.* 533 and Sophocles *Ant.* 301 and 924, *Trach.* 1246 and *El.* 1383 (cf. Schmid 1887–97, II p. 195). Thus it is less probable that this word was used by Bion. Different emendations have been proposed: *δυσγένειαν* by Menagius, followed by W. Capelle, *De Cynicorum epistulis* (Diss. Göttingen, 1896) pp. 42 f, Hense 1909, pp. LXXXV f, Apelt, Hicks, Gigante and Long, *εὐσέβειαν* by F.T. Welcker, in *Theognidis reliquiae* (Frankfort on-the-Main, 1826) p. XCII, followed by Wachmuth, p. 70 n. 3 and *δυσχέρειαν* by A. Gercke, 'Ariston', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 5 (1892) p. 213 n. 5.

Among these different emendations *δυσγένειαν* is the only one to have some probability, thanks to a close parallel in Ps-Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 2.1 B–C: *καλὸς οὖν παρρησίας θησαυρὸς εὐγένεια*, which is followed by the same quotation of Euripides *Hipp.* 424–425 as in Bion's saying. This emendation was rejected by O. Immisch, 'Xenophon über Theognis und das Problem des Adels', *Commentationes philologiae quibus Ottoni Ribbeckio . . . congratulatur discipuli Lipsienses* (Leipzig, 1888) p. 82 n. 1 and the saying would be very surprising in this form, if we can trust Bion to have said it. We know that he did not consider high birth to be of any value (see F1–2 with commentary). Hense's suggestion 1909, p. LXXXV, that Bion quoted this in order to refute it does not seem very convincing, and I do not believe this saying should be ascribed to an assumed interlocutor. However, a combination of nobility and candour occurs in many passages: Aristotle *EN* 4.3.28 p. 1124b29; where *ὁ μεγαλόψυχος* is described as *παρρησιαστής*, Josephus *BJ* 2.299: *εἶπερ γενναῖοί εἰσιν καὶ παρρησιασταί*, Dio of Prusa 32.11, where *ἄνδρα . . . παρρησιαζόμενον* is counted among *γενναίων καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν* and Lucian *Calumiae non*

temere credendum 23: ὁ δὲ ἦν μὲν ἔχῃ τι γενναῖον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ παρρησιαστικόν. Cf. for this combination E. Peterson, 'Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von παρρησία', in *Rheinhold-Seeberg-Festschrift* I (Leipzig, 1929) pp. 286 f. Therefore the idea as such is possible, on condition that the word *δυσγένεια* is interpreted with a moral sense so that lowborn is vicious and highborn is virtuous. This is common in Cynic writings; cf. e.g. the sayings of Antisthenes: τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς τοὺς καὶ ἐναρέτους (Diog. Laert. 6.10 = fr. 69 Caizzi) and Diogenes, who regards οἱ καταφρονούντες . . . πλούτου, δόξης, ἡδονῆς, ζωῆς as εὐγενέστατοι (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.29a.19), and see further F1–2 with commentary. Still I do not find this interpretation fully satisfactory, and I have not found any cases of the negative word *δυσγένεια* being interpreted in a moral sense.

Another interpretation is possible, if we examine the meaning of the text. I think that the context in Euripides can give a clue here. What makes a man a slave? The answer is: ὅταν ξυνειδῇ μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς κακά (Hipp. 425). Obviously a man is enslaved by his bad conscience. This belief that a bad conscience is a poor basis for outspokenness would make very good sense in the fragment of Bion. There are numerous parallels for this combination of the two concepts conscience and outspokenness. Cf. the saying of Diogenes: τίς γὰρ ἂν ἦττον φοβοῖτό τι ἢ θαρσοίη μάλιστα, ἢ ὅστις αὐτῷ μηδὲν συνειδείη κακόν (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.24.14), Menander fr. 522 Körte: ὁ συνιστορῶν αὐτῷ τι, κἄν ἢ θρασύτατος, / ἢ σύνεσις αὐτὸν δειλότατον εἶναι ποιεῖ, Epictetus 3.22.94: τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τούτοις καὶ τυράννοις οἱ δορυφόροι καὶ τὰ ὄπλα παρεῖχε τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τισὶν καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας καὶ αὐτοῖς οὐσίς τε κακοῖς, τῷ δὲ Κυνικῷ ἀντὶ τῶν ὄπλων καὶ τῶν δορυφόρων τὸ συνειδὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην παραδίδωσι, Josephus *AJ* 2.52: τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνειδότος καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν παρρησίαν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, Lucian *Hermotimus* 51: ἡ δὲ (sc. ἀλήθεια) ἄτε μηδὲν κίβδηλον ἑαυτῇ συνειδυῖα μετὰ παρρησίας διαλέγεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, Pausanias 7.10.9: ὁ μὲν δὲ ὑπὸ συνειδότος ἐπαρρησιάζετο ἀγαθοῦ, Horace *Ep.* 1.1.60–61: *hic murus aureus esto, / nil conscire sibi, nulla pallascere culpa* and Seneca *Ep.* 24.12: *et quamvis conscientia tibi tua fiduciam faciat*. The idea may be found already in Isocrates 1.16: μηδέποτε μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας ἔλπιζε λήσειν καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους λάθῃς, σεαυτῷ συνειδήσεις. All these passages indicate that there is a connection between conscience and παρρησία; cf. also Peterson, art. cit. pp. 289 f. For the very much discussed problem of conscience in antiquity in general see *ThW*, VII (1964) s.v. *σύννοια/συνείδησις* pp. 897 ff (Maurer) with a rich bibliography, to which I only add some later works: P.W. Schönlein, 'Zur Entstehung eines Gewissensbegriffes bei Griechen und Römern', *Rheinisches Museum* NF, 112 (1969) pp. 289 ff, A. Cancrini, 'Syneidesis: Il tema semantico della "conscientia" nella Grecia antica', *Lessico intellettuale Europeo*, 6 (Rome, 1970) and D.E. Marietta, 'Conscience in Greek Stoicism', *Numen*, 17 (1970) pp. 176 ff.

For the Cynics and the concept conscience see also Oltramare, p. 163 and G. Rudberg, 'Zum Diogenes-Typus', *Symbolae Osloenses*, 15–16 (1936) p. 4.

If this interpretation of the fragment is accepted there is still the problem of the text. A word like *δυσσυνειδησίαν*, which would fit and have a certain similarity with *δυσσέβειαν* of the MSS. is unfortunately very late and known only from *Hom. Clem.* 3.14 p. 643 Dindorf. I would therefore read *συνείδησιν*, which is known from Democritus fr. B 297 *FVS* II and later from Menander *Mon.* 107 and two sayings ascribed to Bias and Periander (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.24.11–12) but probably from the Hellenistic period; cf. here Cancrini, op. cit. p. 135. The concept *συνείδησις* usually implies a bad conscience.

σύνοικον

The metaphorical use of this word about things and concepts is rare but found both in tragedy and in Attic prose; cf. Aeschylus *Agam.* 1641–1642: *ὁ δυσφιλῆς σκότῳ / λιμὸς ξύνοικος*, Sophocles *OC* 1134, Plato *Philebus* 63 D, Xenophon *Symp.* 8.24 and Maximus of Tyre 7.1 b and 24.4 d.

τῇ παρρησίᾳ

This is a very important and common concept in the Cynic school and mentioned in innumerable places in writings, dealing with the Cynics or influenced by their ideas. It has a moral and not a political meaning and is often closely connected with *ἐλευθερία*. It was even supposed to be the reason for the name of the Cynic school: *διὰ τὸ παρρησιαστικὸν καὶ ἐλεγκτικόν* (Olympiodorus *Proleg. et in Categ. comm.* p. 3.29 Busse (= *Comm. in Arist. Gr.* XII:1, 1902) and Joannes Philoponus *In Arist. Categ. comm.* p. 2.9–10 Busse (= *Comm. in Arist. Gr.* XIII:1, 1898) and came to be regarded as a characteristic of the Cynic school as we can see from Lucian *Demonax* 50: *κατὰ τινα πάτριον τοῖς Κυνικοῖς παρρησίαν θρασυνομένῳ*. Cf. the following saying of Diogenes: *ἐρωτηθεὶς τί κάλλιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἔφη, 'παρρησία'* (Diog. Laert. 6.69) and the anecdote about him (*τί δέ, Διογένης οὐκ εἶχε παρρησίαν*) in Plutarch *De exilio* 16.606 C (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.43), Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 8, where the Cynic describes himself as *τὸ δὲ ὄλον ἀληθείας καὶ παρρησίας προφήτης*, *Dial. mort.* 11.3–4, where the Cynic virtues are said to be: *σοφία, αὐτάρκεια, ἀλήθεια, παρρησία, ἐλευθερία* and *Demonax* 3, where this Cynic philosopher is described as *ὄλον δὲ παραδοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ παρρησίᾳ*. The fact that this freedom of speech could be misused and was greatly detested by the enemies of the Cynics is clear from, e.g., Aelius Aristides *or.* 46 p. 401 Dindorf: *τὴν μὲν ἀναισχυντίαν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζοντες, τὸ δ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι παρρησιάζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ λαμβάνειν φιλανθρωπεύεσθαι*. For this concept see further Bernays, pp. 100 f, Gerhard 1909, pp. 34 f, Dziech, pp. 168 f, Peterson, art. cit. pp. 283 ff, Dudley, p. 28, *ThW*, V (1954) s.v. *παρρησία / παρρησιάζομαι* pp. 869 ff (Schlier) and G. Scarpata, *Parrhesia: Storia del termine e delle sue traduzioni in latino* (Brescia, 1964).

δουλοῖ γὰρ ἄνδρα . . . ἡ

We have here a quotation of Euripides *Hipp.* 424. Euripides was particularly popular among authors interested in philosophy and is quoted by Bion in F81; cf. introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 60. This and the following line seem to have enjoyed a certain popularity as they are quoted several times: Ps-Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 2.1 C, Plutarch *Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat* 9.28 C, Aelius Aristides *or.* 53 p. 628 Dindorf and Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.30.11 with O. Hense's note ad. loc.

Θρασύπλαγχνος is obviously the correct form; θρασύστομος in the MSS. B and P of Diog. Laert. is regarded as a "slip of memory" by W.S. Barrett in his note ad. loc.

F49—53 These tiny fragments do not give us a very clear picture of Bion's ideas on friendship. We only get some short hints and no consistent analysis. He seems to stress the importance of loyalty to one's friends. He rejects flatterers but does not condemn praise altogether. The importance of being outspoken is stressed, and it is pointed out that this is not cut down by poverty but only by a bad moral background.

The topic seems to have been very popular in ancient philosophy, and several treatises *Περὶ φιλίας* are reported. Among extant works the following may be mentioned: Plutarch *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*, *De amicorum multitudine* and *De fraterno amore*, Maximus of Tyre *or.* 14 and Cicero *Laelius De amicitia*; cf. further F. Scheuerpflug, *Quaestiones Laelianae* (Diss. Jena, 1914) pp. 20 ff. When we come to the philosophical schools which may have influenced Bion, we see that the subject was much discussed in a positive way in the Academy. For Plato's attitude see W. Ziebis, *Der Begriff der Φιλία bei Plato* (Diss. Breslau, 1927). Xenocrates wrote a treatise *Περὶ φιλίας* (Diog. Laert. 4.12). Yet it is impossible to say whether Bion was in any way influenced by the Academy. The Cynics did not attach any great value to friendship as they stressed the supreme importance of freedom and independence. There is little material left but some sayings are significant, e.g. Antisthenes: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη, 'τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁμιλεῖν' (Diog. Laert. 6.6 = fr. 177 Caizzi) and οἱ σπουδαῖοι φίλοι (Diog. Laert. 6.12 = fr. 79 Caizzi), which seems to imply that friendship can only exist between wise men. We get the same impression from the general characterization of the Cynics: τὸν σοφὸν . . . φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ (Diog. Laert. 6.105). Even Stilpon, who was very close to the Cynics, stressed the independence of the wise man and the uselessness of friends (Seneca *Ep.* 9.1—3 = fr. 195 Döring). The same critical standpoint can be found in Bion's teacher from the Cyrenaic school, Theodorus: ἀνῆρει δὲ καὶ φιλίαν . . . τοὺς δὲ σοφοὺς αὐτάρκεις ὑπάρχοντας μὴ δεῖσθαι φίλων (Diog. Laert. 2.98 = fr. 238 Mannebach). Cf. also the opinion of Hegesias and his followers: μήτε δὲ χάριν τι εἶναι μήτε φιλίαν μήτε

εὐεργεσίαν (Diog. Laert. 2.93 = fr. 236 Mannebach). A more positive attitude to friendship can be found in the Peripatetic school, where the subject was treated by Aristotle in *EN* 8–9 (see further J. Steinberger, *Begriff und Wesen der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Cicero* (Diss. Erlangen, 1955)) and by Theophrastus in his now lost work *Περὶ φιλίας* (Diog. Laert. 5.45). Cf. G. Heylbut, *De Theophrasti libris Περὶ φιλίας* (Diss. Bonn, 1876) who tries to reconstruct this work. It is very difficult to say to what extent Bion was influenced by the different schools because of the fragmentary state of the material. He does not seem to have adopted the extreme standpoint of the Cynic and the Cyrenaic schools and there is a slight possibility that he was more influenced by Theophrastus, who also had a more practical outlook (cf. F49 with commentary). For this subject in general see besides the literature already given F. Dirlmeier, *ΦΙΛΟΣ und ΦΙΛΙΑ im vorhellenistischen Griechentum* (Diss. Munich, 1931), E. Klein, *Studien zum Problem der griechischen und römischen Freundschaft* (Diss. Freiburg, 1957), W. Brinckmann, *Der Begriff der Freundschaft in Senecas Briefen* (Diss. Cologne, 1963), *RAC*, VIII (1972) s.v. Freundschaft cols. 418 ff (Treu) and J.-C. Fraisse, *Philia: La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique* (Paris, 1974).

8. On beauty and love (F54–61)

F54

τὸ κάλλος

It is a very common idea in philosophical writings that beauty has no intrinsic value, as it does not contribute to moral improvement. We find this critical attitude to an appreciation of beauty already in a saying attributed to Thales: *μὴ τὴν ὄψιν καλλωπίζεσθαι* (Diog. Laert. 1.37) and it is very common in authors influenced by moral philosophy; see the sayings of Antisthenes: *πρὸς τὸ παρασχηματίζον αὐτὸ τῷ πλάστῃ μειράκιον, 'εἰπέ μοι', φησὶν, 'εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι ὁ χαλκός, ἐπὶ τίνι ἂν <οἶε> σεμνυνθῆναι;* τοῦ δ'εἰπόντος, 'ἐπὶ κάλλει', 'οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ οὖν', ἔφη, 'τὰ ὅμοια γεγηθὼς ἀψύχῳ;' (Diog. Laert. 6.9 = fr. 189 Caizzi; cf. also Diog. Laert. 2.33, *Gnom. Vat.* 49 and Joel 1893–1901, II p. 321) and Diogenes: *ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς τί κακὸν ἐν βίῳ ἔφη 'γυνὴ καλὴ τῷ εἶδει'* (*Gnom. Vat.* 189), Theophrastus' definition of beauty as *σιωπῶσαν ἀπάτην* (Diog. Laert. 5.19), Galenus *Protrepticus* 8.17 p. 114 Marquardt: *πρὸς τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ φαίῃ τις εἶναι χρησίμον ἀνασκήτου νέου κάλλος*, Iamblichus *Protrepticus* 8 p. 47 Pistelli: *ισχύς τε γὰρ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος γέλως ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια, κάλλος τε παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὁρᾶν ἀκριβὲς δοκεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτον*, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.10.30: *pulcritudinem . . . contemnere* and Seneca *Ep.* 124.22: *quid excolis formam? Cum omnia feceris, a mutis animalibus decore vinceris*. Cf. Rainfurt, pp. 33 f and Dziech, pp. 105 ff.

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν

These two words should not be used together, if we give ἀλλότριος its special, philosophical meaning, of indicating something, which is of no real good and also no real possession of the owner. The idea may go back to Antisthenes: τὰγαθὰ καλὰ, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά· τὰ πονηρὰ νόμιζε πάντα ξενικά (Diog. Laert. 6.12 = fr. 73 Caizzi). Diogenes' comment on Antisthenes is also of interest: ἐδίδασκέν με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμὰ. κτῆσις οὐκ ἐμὴ· συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φήμη, συνήθεις τόποι, διατριβή, πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι ἀλλότρια· σὸν οὖν τί; χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ταύτην ἔδειξέν μοι ὅτι ἀκώλυτον ἔχω ἀνανάγκαστον (Epictetus 3.24.68—69); cf. further Zeller, II:1⁴ pp. 303 f. We find the same idea in Plato *Symp.* 205 E: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐαυτῶν, οἶμαι, ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον καλεῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον and in the Stoic school: κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀστεῖφ ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν τῷ δὲ φανλῶ οὐδὲν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν (Plutarch *De Stoicorum repubnantiis* 12.1038 B = fr. 674 *SVF* III).

There could of course be another and simpler explanation of this phrase, in that beauty is regarded as being of more value and enjoyment to others than the owner. We find the phrase ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν used with this meaning in, e.g., Plato *Resp.* 1.343 C and Aristotle *EN* 5.1.17 p. 1130a3. For the meaning of ἀλλότριος see also F37 with commentary.

F55

τυραννίδα

This metaphorical use of τυραννίς does not seem to be very common; cf. however Plato *Leg.* 9.863 E: τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ φόβου καὶ . . . ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τυραννίδα. Socrates' definition of beauty as ὀλιγοχρόνιον τυραννίδα is most interesting (Diog. Laert. 5.19).

φεῦ

The exclamatory φεῦ with genitive is used mostly in the drama and may be regarded as a poetic expression; cf. KG, I p. 388 and Schwyzer, II p. 134. However it also occurs in prose: Xenophon *Cyr.* 3.1.39, Dio of Prusa 37.42, Lucian *Timon* 45 and Alciphron *Ep.* 3.48.2; for its occurrence in Philostratus see Schmid 1887—97, IV p. 335.

τυραννίδος τριχὶ καταλυομένης

Behind this expression is the very common Greek idea that a boy is most beautiful before he has grown a beard. Cf. Homer *Il.* 24.347—348 and *Od.* 10.278—279, Plato *Protagoras* 309 A—B, Xenophon *Symp.* 4.23, Lucian *Alexander* 6 and *Amores* 10 and Seneca *Ep.* 95.24. Cf. further for this idea RE, XI:1 (1921) s.v. Knabenliebe col. 904 (Kroll), H. Licht, *Sittengeschichte Griechenlands* II (Dresden-Zürich, 1926) pp. 122 ff, G. Devereux, 'Greek Pseudo-Homosexuality and the "Greek Miracle"', *Symbolae Osloenses*, 42 (1968) p. 76 and P.G. Maxwell-Stuart, 'Strato and the Musa Puerilis', *Hermes*, 100 (1972) p. 226.

Equally common is the idea expressed here by Bion that his beauty and even love is ruined, when the boy grows a beard; cf. especially the saying of Dionysius: ὁ αὐτὸς νεωτέρου τινὸς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὥρᾳ σεμνυνομένου ἀνοήτων ἔφη τοιαύτην ὑπεροχὴν θαυμάζειν, ἥτις ὑπὸ τριχὸς καταλύεται (*Gnom. Vat.* 262) and Straton *Anth. Pal.* 12.195: οὕτω τὴν ὥραν ἐκ τριχὸς ὀλλυμένην. There is also Plutarch *Amatorius* 24.770 B: οἶσθα τοὺς παιδικοὺς ἔρωτας ὥς εἰς ἀβεβαιότητα πολλὰ ψέγουσι καὶ σκώπτουσι λέγοντες ὥσπερ ὦν αὐτῶν τριχὶ διαιρεῖσθαι τὴν φιλίαν; cf. Hense 1909 p. LXXI and Mayer, p. 576, who think that this may go back to Bion, while Giesecke, p. 66 n. 1 remains sceptical of this assumption. The same idea is expressed in more general terms by Aristotle *EN* 8.4.1 p. 1157a8: ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίστε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει.

The meaning of this fragment is made clear by the quotation from Plutarch. Bion points to the unstable value of beauty, which is ruined when the boy grows a beard.

F56

φορτικώτερον

This is typical of the style both of Bion and of the Cynics in general; cf. introd. Chapter II:4.

τὰς . . . τρίχας

The word is here, as well as in the preceding fragment used of the beard, which seems to be a rare usage; cf. however Aeschylus *Persae* 1056: καὶ μοι γενείου πέρθε λευκῆρη τρίχα and Straton *Anth. Pal.* 12.195.

Ἀρμοδίους . . . καὶ Ἀριστογείτονας

For these famous tyrant-slayers see *RE*, II (1896) s.v. Aristogeiton (no. 1) cols. 930 f (Miller). With typical Cynic disrespect Bion is here comparing the two heroes of Athens with hairs, but the comparison is very witty: as the two heroes killed the tyrant, so the beard puts an end to the tyranny of love.

Here the plural-forms of the names depend on the plural *τρίχας*; it may be noted, however, that plural forms of proper names are not common in Attic prose except in Plato. It is considered by Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 23.3–4 as a method of reaching ὕψος; cf. KG, I p. 15, Schwyzer, II p. 45, Schmid, 1887–97, IV p. 47 and Dürre, p. 16.

ὥς . . . ἀπαλλαττομένους . . . τοὺς ἐραστάς

An accusative absolute with a definite noun is regular only with ὥς; cf. KG, II pp. 95 f, Schwyzer, II pp. 402 f and J. Carrière, 'L'accusatif absolu avec ὥς: Nuances et origine', *Revue de Philologie* 3^e sér., 47 (1973) pp. 212 ff.

ἄμα καλῆς τυραννίδος

The text here is difficult and has provoked several emendations, none of which is very convincing. However, if we understand ἄμα as it is explained by C. Hubert ad loc.: ἄμα: scil. ἄμα θριξὶ περὶ τὸ γένειον φουμέναις, the reading of the

MSS. *καλῆς τυραννίδος* makes perfectly good sense, especially in comparison with the text of the preceding fragment: *τυραννίδα ἔχει τὸ κάλλος*. Therefore there is no need for an emendation, although it must be admitted that the text to be understood is unusually long. There may be a sort of a parallel in a similar context in Lucian *Alexander* 6: *ἤδη δὲ πώγωνος ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος πιμπλάμενος καὶ τοῦ Τυανέως ἐκείνου ἀποθανόντος ἐν ἀπορίᾳ καθεστώς, ἀπηνθηκνίας ἅμα τῆς ὥρας, ἀφ' ἧς τρέφεσθαι ἐδύνατο*, where *ἅμα* probably refers back to the first part of the sentence *ἤδη . . . πιμπλάμενος*.

F57

συνεχές

It is often pointed out in connection with *ἀποφθέγματα* of popular philosophers that they use the same ideas and expressions; this reflects an actual fact, as they treated a limited number of subjects and repeated the same discourses at different places and on different occasions. This is a feature of Socrates, as we can see from Ps-Plato *Clitopho* 407 E: *ταῦτ' οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ὅταν ἀκούω σοῦ θαμὰ λέγοντος*, Xenophon *Mem.* 4.4.6: *καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης . . . ἔφη . . . οὐ μόνον αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν* and Diog. Laert. 2.25: *πολλάκις . . . ἔλεγε* and *συνεχές . . . ἀνεφθέγγετο*. The same trait is found in the picture of Antisthenes: *ἔλεγέ τε συνεχές* (Diog. Laert. 6.3 = fr. 108A Caizzi) and Diogenes: *συνεχές τε ἔλεγεν* (Diog. Laert. 6.24; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.38 and 6.69). See also Weber 1887, p. 209.

ἀλλοτρίας ἀποδρέπεσθαι

The metaphorical use of this verb in the medium seems to be mostly poetical; cf. Pindar fr. 122.8 Snell: *μαλθακᾶς ὥρας ἀπὸ καρπὸν δρέπεσθαι*, *Anth. Pal.* 6.303 and Plutarch *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 8.79 D. The verb usually governs the accusative but it is hardly possible to understand *ἀλλοτρίας* here as plural. However, there is one case of *ἀποδρέπομαι* with the genitive in Alciphron *Ep.* 3.51.2, which must also be the case here. The simple verb *δρέπομαι* can also govern the genitive; cf. Pindar fr. 123.1 Snell, Lucian *Vera historia* 1.8, Philostratus *Heroicus* p. 131.23 Kayser and *Im.* p. 364.8 Kayser and Schmid 1887–97, IV p. 54 and p. 287.

καὶ γὰρ εἰς σῶμα βλάπτεσθαι καὶ εἰς ψυχήν

For a parallel expression in a similar context see Philo *De specialibus legibus* 3.7.37, who when discussing *τὸ παιδεραστεῖν*, remarks: *τοῖς πάσχουσιν, οἱ νόσον θήλειαν νοσεῖν ἐθιζόμενοι τάς τε ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα διαρρέουσι*; cf. R. Schütze, *Juvenalis ethicus* (Diss. Greifswald, 1905) p. 32 and Hense 1909, p. XCI n. 1 and for Philo's attitude in general I. Heinemann, *Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung: Kulturvergleichende Untersuchungen zu Philons Darstellung der jüdischen Gesetze* (Breslau, 1932) pp. 283 f.

The meaning of this fragment is far from clear. Yet it must refer to homosexual relationships, as shown by the context and the parallel in Philo. Bion seems

therefore to be saying that it is better to play the passive role than the active, a somewhat surprising idea, as the passive partner is usually looked upon with contempt and the quotation from Philo refers to the passive. Perhaps this may be understood in the sense that it is better to give in as a young boy than as an adult indulge in different relationships with boys, which must inflict damage on both body and soul. Bion could seem to adopt the attitude that pederasty is acceptable, when the love concerns the soul more than the body and when the aim is to reach virtue; cf. Plato *Symp.* 185 B: οὕτω πάντως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα χαρίζεσθαι and Xenophon *Symp.* 8 with much material and for this pedagogical background Marrou, pp. 61 ff. For the idea that a good ἐραστής can be of great use for the boy cf. also Plutarch *Amatorius* 15.757 F—758 A and Mayer, p. 584.

However none of these explanations seems fully satisfactory and I think that this saying may illustrate a different idea, viz. that it is worse to do ill than to suffer ill. The belief that the former ruins both body and soul can be found also in Xenophon *Mem.* 1.5.3: οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατής τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις βλαβερὸς, ἑαυτῷ δ' ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακοῦργος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακοургότερος, εἴ γε κακοургότατόν ἐστι μὴ μόνον τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθείρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. This idea is old and expressed by e.g. Democritus: ὁ ἀδικέων τοῦ ἀδικεομένου κακοδαιμονέστερος (fr. B 45 *FVS* II) but seems to have been developed especially by Socrates and the Socratic schools and is clearly expressed in e.g. Plato *Apol.* 30 C and *Gorgias* 479 E: κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος and Aristotle *EN* 5.11.7 p. 1138a28—b1: ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν . . . ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν . . . τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἦττον φαῦλον. For this idea cf. A. Dihle, 'Die Goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgäretik', *Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 7 (Göttingen, 1962) pp. 61 ff.

F58

ὀνειδιζόμενος ἐπί

The use of a preposition with this verb seems to be late; cf. also Diog. Laert. 6.6. The use of a preposition instead of a dative in connection with verbs of emotion became more common during the Hellenistic period; see Mayser, II:2 pp. 284 f, BD, § 196 and J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodorus von Sizilien: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* (Diss. Lund, 1955) p. 71.

ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ θηρᾶσαι μεῖράκιον

This trait seems to belong to the hostile description of a sophist. Cf. Plato *Sophista* 231 D: ὁ σοφιστής . . . τὸ πρῶτον ἠϋρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής (cf. also Ps-Plato *Def.* 415 C), Xenophon *Cyn.* 13.9: οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφισταὶ πλουσίους καὶ νέους θηρῶνται, Posidonius ap. Athenaeum 5.211 F (= fr. 253 Edelstein-Kidd): πρὸς τὸ σοφιστεύειν ὄρμησε μεῖράκια σχολαστικὰ

θηρεύων and Diog. Laert. 9.64: ὄθεν καὶ Ναυσιφάνην ἤδη νεανίσκον ὄντα θηραθῆναι.

ἀπαλὸν τυρόν

For a similarly vivid comparison between man and food see T18 with commentary and Gerhard 1909, p. 112.

ἀπαλὸν τυρόν ἀγκίστρῳ ἐπισπᾶσθαι

This expression and comparison seems to have enjoyed a certain popularity, and we find a similar use in Epictetus 3.6.9: τῶν νέων τοὺς μαλακοὺς οὐκ ἔστι προτρέψαι ῥάδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τυρόν ἀγκίστρῳ λαβεῖν οἱ δ' εὐφρεῖς, κἂν ἀποτρέψῃς, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔχονται τοῦ λόγου (cf. Musonius fr. XLVI p. 129 Hense) and Cosmas Hierosolymnitanus *Comm. in S. Gregorii Nazianzeni Carmina* 66 (PG, 38 cols. 524–525): ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπαλὸς τυρὸς τοῦ καλὰθου τὸν τύπον ἀναδέχεται, οὕτω δὴ τῶν διδασκάλων τοὺς τρόπους καὶ τὴν ἔξιν, καθ' ἣν, εἴτε νωθροὶ, εἴτε διεγχευμένοι τύχοιεν οἱ μαθητευόμενοι ἀνατυποῦνται; cf. also J.R. Asmus, 'Gregorius von Nazianz und sein Verhältnis zum Kynismus: Eine patristisch-philosophische Studie', *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 67 (1894) p. 322 n. 2. This also suggests a way of understanding this saying of Bion. Obviously he does not consider an effeminate and weak boy as fit for his teaching and philosophy. Cf. Lucian *Cynicus* 19 and Seneca *Ep.* 112, where a dissipated youth is considered as being incapable of receiving instruction, and see Weber 1887, p. 183. To attack effeminate boys is very common in popular philosophical writings, where they are described as ἀπαλοὶ or μαλακοί. This emerges from various anecdotes about Diogenes: Diog. Laert. 6.46, 6.47, 6.54, 6.59, 6.62, 6.65 and 6.66.

Even if this is the main point of the saying, I do not think that it is complete without erotic implications, which is indicated by the expression θηρᾶσαι μειράκιον. Cf. Antisthenes fr. 192 Caizzi: φασὶ δὲ καὶ Ἀντισθένη μειρακίου τινὸς ἐρᾶν καὶ τινὰς βουλομένους θηρεύειν αὐτό.

F59

διέβαλλε

To abuse can be taken as something typical both of Bion and of the Cynics in general; cf. introd. Chapter II:3.

τὸν Σωκράτην

It may seem surprising that Socrates can be criticized. However the Cynics did not spare anyone. So we find that Socrates' way of life was criticized by Diogenes: Διογένης ἔλεγε καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτὸν τρυφῆσαι (Aelianus *VH* 4.11). Socrates' positive view of pederasty was often criticized by later authors, e.g. Maximus of Tyre 18.5.

τὸν Σωκράτην . . . οὐδὲν ἐποίει παράδοξον

Bion here refers to the description given by Alcibiades of his relationship to

Socrates in Plato *Symp.* 216 C—219 D. Alcibiades played an important role in different literary works of the Socratic schools, as we can see from writings of Plato, Antisthenes and Aeschines of Sphettus. For a survey of writings with Alcibiades as a main character see H. Dittmar, 'Aeschines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker', *Philologische Untersuchungen*, 21 (Berlin, 1912) pp. 65 ff and B. Ehlers, 'Ein vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines', *Zetemata*, 41 (Munich, 1966) pp. 10 ff.

This fragment is of a quite special interest, as it has been taken by various scholars as the only passage, where Bion is not negative in his attitude to pederasty. J. Geffcken, 'Leonidas von Tarent', *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, hrsg. v. A. Fleckeisen, Suppl. b. 23 (1897) p. 72, Gerhard 1909, p. 145 and Hense 1909, p. LXXVI and pp. XCI f tried to explain this contradiction by saying that Bion is here under the influence of his teacher Theodorus, whose opinion was: *φανερῶς δὲ τοῖς ἐρωμένοις ἄνευ πάσης ὑποράσεως χρῆσθαι τὸν σοφόν* (Diog. Laert. 2.99 = fr. 271 A Mannebach). On the other hand, the Cynic attitude to pederasty may not be wholly negative as is usually stated (cf. below).

Perhaps this saying could be understood in a somewhat different way. I do not think that we should take it as an approval of pederasty. It is more of a shocking paradox. We could imagine that this would be the answer to a question about Socrates' behaviour, which Bion gave in order to surprise his audience. In a way it also contains his doctrine about the necessity of adaptation to circumstances; cf. Geffcken 1911, p. 406 n. 11.

F60

νέος . . . νεανίσκος

Νέος usually means a young man under 30 (cf. Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.35), while *νεανίσκος* often signifies an even younger person and is used as a synonym for *μειράκιον*. Here the words are obviously used the other way round, which is somewhat surprising, but the terms for different ages do not seem to have been consistently employed. This fact becomes very clear from the many examples collected from classical authors in A.A. Bryant, 'Boyhood and Youth in the Days of Aristophanes', *Harvard Studies of Classical Philology*, 18 (1907) pp. 73 ff, where it is shown that several different terms can be used for the same individual in the same literary work. There is a similar case in Ps-Plato *Amatores* 132 A—C, where the *ἐρώμενοι* are referred to as *νέοι* and later *μειράκια* and where one *ἐραστής* is addressed *ὦ νεανία*.

The division of life into different ages, usually seven, is treated by several ancient authors: Hippocrates *De Hebdomad.* 5 p. 636 Littré VIII, Aristophanes Byz. pp. 87 ff Nauck and Pollux *Onom.* 2.4—21. Cf. also F. Boll, 'Die Lebensalter: Ein Beitrag zur antiken Ethologie und zur Geschichte der Zahlen', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 31 (1913) pp. 89 ff.

Both the beauty (cf. *RE*, I (1894) s.v. Alcibiades (no. 2) col. 1518 (Toepffer)) and the erotic activity of Alcibiades are well known. Cf. Satyrus ap. Athenaeum 12.534 C: ἐθανμάζετο οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, Eupolis ap. Athenaeum 12.535 A (= fr. 158 Kock I): Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξίτω. τί ληρεῖς; / οὐκ οἶκαδ' ἐλθὼν τὴν σεαυτοῦ γυμνάσεις δάμαρτα and Pherecrates ap. Athenaeum 12.535 B (= fr. 155 Kock I): οὐκ ὦν ἀνὴρ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὥς δοκεῖν / ἀνὴρ ἀπασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν ἐστι νῦν.

This seems to be a conventional type of abuse, and a similar story is told about Verres: *vir inter mulieres, impura inter viros muliercula* (Cicero *In Verrem* 2.2.78.192) and Caesar: *Curio pater quadam eum oratione omnium mulierum virum et omnium virorum mulierem appellat* (Suetonius *De vita Caesarum* 1.52).

F61A–B This saying is very well known and ascribed to a number of different philosophers, as is indicated by Diog. Laert. 4.48: ἀναφέρεται γὰρ καὶ εἰς τοῦτον: Pitacrus (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.22a.17), Bias (Aulus Gellius *NA* 5.11.7), Socrates (Diog. Laert. 2.33; cf. also Xenophon *Mem.* 1.1.8 and 2.8.5), Aristippus (Antonius Melissa *Loci communes* II Sermo 34 (= *PG*, 136 col. 1292 A); cf. Mannebach, p. 72), Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.3 = *Gnom. Vat.* 2 = fr. 180 Caizzi) and Theocritus (*Cod. Vat. Gr.* 742 f. 66^v). The saying is also ascribed to Solon (Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 39 (= *PG*, 91 col. 912 B) = *Mel. Aug.* LVI.2) which is obviously a mistake; cf. introd. Chapter V:4. It is hardly possible to say where the saying originally came from. Of course we may here have a confusion between the names Bias and Bion, and it is highly improbable that this saying could be attributed to Bias; cf. *RE*, III (1899) s.v. Bias (no. 10) col. 389 (Crusius). Barigazzi, p. 543 pointed out that the expression was older than Bion, which was noted already by Rossignol, p. 29, and drew the attention to a quotation from Anaxandrides: ἀλλ' ἔλαβεν αἰσχράν' οὐ βιωτόν ἐστ' ἔτι / οὐδ' εἴσοδος τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν / ἀλλ' ἔλαβεν ὥραιάν τις· οὐδὲν γίνεται / μᾶλλον τι τοῦ γήμαντος ἢ τῶν γειτόνων (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.22a.28 = fr. 52 Kock II); for the text see also O. Hense, 'Zu den Bruchstücken der griechischen Komiker', *Wiener Studien*, 42 (1920–21) pp. 97 f. We find the same idea expressed also by Theophrastus: *difficile custoditur, quod plures amant. Molestum est possidere, quod nemo habere dignetur* (Hieronymus *Ad Jovinianum* 1.47 (= *PL*, 23 col. 277 C)). As we know that Bion was influenced both by the comedy and by Theophrastus, one of these may very well be his source.

ἐὰν μὲν . . . κοινήν

For the highly rhetorical structure of this sentence, especially *ποινήν* . . . *κοινήν*, see Hense 1909, p. C and introd. Chapter II:2. The word *καλήν* is not found in all sayings but some have *ὥραϊαν*: *Cod. Par. Gr.* 1168 nr. 14 (=

F61B) and Anaxandrides fr. 52 Kock II.

ποινήν

The word *ποινή* is not common in prose; its use here comes very close to a personification, which occurs in e.g., Aeschylus *Choeph.* 936 and *Eum.* 323 and Euripides *IT* 200. For Poiné see *ML*, III:2 (1902-09) s.v. Poiné cols. 2602 ff (Ilberg) and *RE*, XXI:1 (1951) s.v. Poiné cols. 1211 ff (Kruse).

According to this fragment we must assume that Bion is critical of marriage, although it is not possible to say anything more definite about his opinion on the subject. The question of marriage, especially for the wise man, seems to have been very much discussed in philosophical schools. In the case of the Cynics, Antisthenes seems to have accepted marriage because of the procreation of children: *γαμήσειν* (sc. *τὸν σοφὸν*) *τε τεκνοποιίας χάριν* (Diog. Laert. 6.11 = fr. 115 Caizzi). Diogenes, on the other hand, adopted a more negative standpoint: *ἐπὶ τὸν μέλλοντα γαμεῖν καὶ μὴ γαμεῖν* (Diog. Laert. 6.29; cf. Giesecke, p. 68 n. 1 and v. Fritz, pp. 14 f for the text) and *ἐρωτηθεὶς ποίῳ καιρῷ δεῖ γαμεῖν*, ἔφη, *‘τοὺς μὲν νέους μηδέπω, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους μηδέποτε’* (Diog. Laert. 6.54). Cf. also the saying ascribed to the Cynic philosopher in Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 9: *γαμοῦ δὲ ἀμελήσεις καὶ παίδων*. It is of interest in Bion's case that the problem was much discussed in the Peripatetic school and writings on the subject are attested both for Theophrastus (Hieronymus *Ad Jovinianum* 1.47 (= *PL*, 23 col. 276 B) = Seneca fr. XIII. 47 Haase) and Demetrius of Phaleron (Diog. Laert. 5.81 = fr. 86 Wehrli IV). Theophrastus seems to have taken up a negative view on the question, if the wise man should marry: *non est ergo uxor ducenda sapienti* (col. 276 C). For the attitude to marriage in general in antiquity see F. Bock, ‘Aristoteles Theophrastus Seneca De matrimonio’, *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie*, 19 (Leipzig, 1899) pp. 1 ff, K. Praechter, *Hierokles der Stoiker* (Leipzig, 1901) pp. 66 ff and pp. 121 ff, Bickel, F. Buddenhagen, *Περὶ γάμου: Antiquiorum poetarum philosophorum graecorum De matrimonio sententiae e quibus mediae novaeque comoediae iudicia locique communes illustrarentur* I (Diss. Basel, 1919), v. Geytenbeek, pp. 62 ff and K. Gaiser, ‘Für und wider die Ehe: Antike Stimmen zu einer offenen Frage’, *Dialog mit der Antike*, 1 (Munich, 1974).

F54—61 In the preceding fragments we learnt Bion's ideas on beauty, love, especially in its homosexual form, and marriage. Here he proves on the whole to be a true Cynic. He points out that beauty has no real value and that it easily disappears. Bion's view of homosexual love is not quite clear, but there are no fragments where he definitely accepts it. Against this theoretical standpoint there are some anecdotes, which give another picture (see especially T3 with commentary) but these are probably traces of a hostile tradition; cf. introd. Chap-

ter I. Gerhard 1909, p. 145 regards Bion as one of the “*unechte, entartete Ky-niker*”, which does not seem to be a correct judgement.

The Cynic attitude to sex was very natural. They did not demand a life of chastity but thought that sexual desires should be satisfied in the simplest possible way, which is expressed in a number of, sometimes rather crude, sayings and anecdotes; cf. for Antisthenes Xenophon *Symp.* 4.38 (= fr. 117 Caizzi) and for Diogenes Dio of Prusa 6.17, Lucian *Cynicus* 10 and Diog. Laert. 6.46 and 6.69. Concerning the Cynic attitude in general to pederasty it is usually said to be negative; cf. e.g. Gerhard 1909, pp. 140 ff, Woldinga, II pp. 329 f and n. 1 and v. Geytenbeek, pp. 71 ff. However this does not seem to be fully certain. See e.g. for Antisthenes Diog. Laert. 6.11–12 (= fr. 115 and fr. 79 Caizzi), which probably refers to homosexual affairs. It is also of interest that homosexual love was accepted by the early Stoa as we can see from the following statement of Zeno: *καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἶδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐαν, ὥς φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ* (Diog. Laert. 7.129 = fr. 248 SVF I), which opinion is found in a work highly influenced by Cynic ideas and therefore may be taken as Cynic. Cf. on this point Rist, pp. 56 ff. For the Greek attitude to pederasty in general see *RE*, XI:1 (1921) s.v. Knabenliebe cols. 897 ff (Kroll), H. Licht, *Sittengeschichte Griechenlands* II (Dresden-Zürich, 1926) pp. 115 ff, K.J. Dover, ‘Eros and Nomos’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*, 11 (1964) pp. 31 ff and Dover, pp. 213 ff.

9. On old age (F62–65)

F62A–B This saying is also ascribed to Solon in Antonius Melissa *Loci communes* II Sermo 17 (= *PG*, 136 col. 1056 C) and Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 41 (= *PG*, 91 col. 917 D). This attribution to Solon is clearly due to a mistake (cf. introd. Chapter V:4), and the saying can without any hesitation be regarded as Bion’s. He may have found his inspiration in some lines by Antiphanes: *τὸ γῆρας ὥσπερ βωμός ἐστι τῶν κακῶν / πάντ’ ἔστ’ ἰδεῖν εἰς τοῦτο καταπεφευγότα* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.50b.49 = fr. 255 Kock II, who following Meineke, unnecessarily emends *βωμός* to *ὄρμος*; cf. O. Hense’s note on Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.50b.49).

If the text of this fragment is accepted as it is given in the MSS. it must be taken as condemnation of old age. The idea as such is not impossible as old age for the Greek mind in general was a severe trial; see e.g. Euripides *HF* 637–640: *ἄχθος δὲ τὸ γῆρας αἰεὶ βαρύτερον Αἴτνας σκοπέλων ἐπὶ κρατὶ κεῖται*, Xenophon *Apol.* 8: *γῆρα, εἰς ὃ πάντα χαλεπὰ συρρεῖ* and Ps-Plato *Axiochus* 367 B: *εἶτα λαθὼν ὑπῆλθεν τὸ γῆρας, εἰς ὃ πᾶν συρρεῖ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ κήρον καὶ δυσάλθές* to give just a few examples; see further Stobaeus *Flor.*

4.50b.32–86, where a rich material is collected and B.E. Richardson, ‘Old Age among the Ancient Greeks’, *The John Hopkins University Studies in Archeology*, 16 (Baltimore, 1933) pp. 7 f.

However, there are great difficulties in accepting this as a saying of Bion, especially when it is compared with the following fragments. This has led to a lively discussion of the meaning of the passage. Hense 1909, p. LXXXIX assumed as often in order to solve a problem, that the saying was expressed by the assumed interlocutor, which is a rather unsatisfactory explanation. H. Usener, ‘Epikureische Spruchsammlung’, *Wiener Studien*, 10 (1888) p. 184 tried to read into it an attack on Epicurus by Bion and T. Gomperz, ‘Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griechischer Schriftsteller’, *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Classe, 83 (1876) pp. 576 f saw it as an ironical joke on someone, who had been praising old age. These different explanations may be correct, as well as the assumption that Bion gave both points of view. However, I do not find any of these explanations fully satisfactory and shall propose a small textual correction, which gives the fragment a meaning, in accordance with Bion’s views on old age as we know them from other fragments.

ὄρμον

Similes and metaphors, drawn from the sea and seafaring, are very popular in Greek literature. For this marine picture of the haven see B. Lier, ‘Topica carminum sepulcralium latinorum II’ *Philologus*, 62 (16) (1903) pp. 566 f and C. Bonner, ‘Desired Haven’, *The Harvard Theological Review*, 34 (1941) pp. 49 ff, where a rich material is collected. The answer to the whole question of the meaning of the fragment depends on the interpretation of the phrase ὄρμον . . . κακῶν, which is usually understood as meaning “harbour for evil”. Now the meaning “harbour from evil” is equally possible and more what we should expect, as the notion of “harbour” has usually a positive meaning as an escape from various problems; cf. Bonner, art. cit. p. 53. There are several parallels: Aeschylus *Supp.* 471: κοῦδαμοῦ λιμὴν κακῶν, Critias fr. B 6.20 *FVS* II: ὕπνον . . . τὸν καμάτων λιμένα, Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 9.7: λιμὴν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος, Trag. adesp. fr. 359 Nauck: λιμὴν γὰρ Αἰδᾶς ἀνιᾶν; cf. also Epictetus 4.10.27, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.40.117, Seneca *Ep.* 70.3, *De brevitate vitae* 18.1 and *De consolatione ad Polybium* 9.7. There are also passages where old age is compared with a harbour, e.g. Heraclitus *Hom. probl.* 61.5: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ γῆρας, ἱεροὶ τῶν τελευταίων χρόνων λιμένες, ἀσφαλὲς ἀνθρώποις ὄρμισμα, Ἐπικούρου προσφώνησις 17 Wotke: ὁ δὲ γέρων καθάπερ ἐν λιμένι τῷ γῆρα καθώρμικε τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατακλείσας χάρακι and Plutarch *An seni respublica gerenda sit* 4.785 E.

πάντα καταφεύγειν

Καταφεύγω, like *ὄρμος*, usually has a good meaning: “flee for refuge, flee for

protection” (LSJ, s.v. *καταφευγω* 1). The word *πάντα*, found in all the MSS., must, if it is kept, refer to *κακῶν*, which does not make sense. The obvious and very easy correction would be from *πάντα* to *πάντας*. *Γοῦν* can in this sentence mean that Bion here gives a reason for his first statement, or that just the pronoun *αὐτό* is stressed. The first possibility seems to me the more probable; cf. J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* 2. ed. (Oxford, 1954) pp. 450 ff. The present infinitive should here be understood as a case of conative present, as none can be sure that he will attain the aim; cf. KG, I pp. 140 ff and Schwyzler, II pp. 258 f. The sense of this fragment seems perfectly clear: old age is a harbour from evil; at least all try to take refuge there. This should be compared with the following fragment.

If this interpretation is correct, the underlying idea may be the same as in Cicero *Cato maior De senectute* 12.39, where it is regarded as a good thing that the old lose interest in pleasures: *o praeclarum munus aetatis, siquidem id aufert a nobis quod est in adolescentia vitiosissimum!* The same idea can be found in Seneca *Ep.* 12.5 when discussing old age: *aut hoc ipsum succedit in locum voluptatum, nullis egere. Quam dulce est cupiditates fatigasse ac reliquisse* and in Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 5.525 A: *ἐλεύθερος γέγωνα λυττῶντας καὶ ἀγρίους δεσπότας διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἀποφυγών* and *An seni respublica gerenda sit* 8.788 E–F, which is a reference to Plato *Resp.* 1.329 C. On the other hand it is pointed out that old age brings wisdom, e.g. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.39.94: *nihil enim est profecto homini prudentia dulcius, quam, ut cetera auferat, adfert certe senectus* (cf. also F65 with commentary). Both these aspects are combined by Favorinus: *ἡδονῆς γάρ, ὃ μὲν ἐκὼν εἰργόμενος σοφός, ὃ δὲ μὴ δεόμενος μακάριος. τὸ δὲ γῆρας πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω ἐπιτῆδειον, καὶ γὰρ φρονιμωτέρους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπεργάζεται καὶ τῶν ἡδέων ἀμελεστέρους* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.50a.23 = fr. 13 Barigazzi). For praise of old age in general see the material collected in Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.50a.1–31.

F63 *ἔφασκεν . . . ἔφη*

This double expression is at first somewhat surprising; the reason for the second verb must be that Diog. Laert. here wants to stress that we have a verbal quotation, as we can see from the rather abrupt transition to direct speech — *εὐχόμεθα*.

The inspiration of this saying should, according to Hense 1909, pp. CXIX f, be found in a quotation from Antiphanes: *ὠνείδισάς μοι γῆρας ὥς κακὸν μέγα / οὐ μὴ τυχόντι θάνατός ἐσθ' ἢ ζημία / οὐ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, ἂν δ' ἔλθῃ ποτέ / ἀνιώμεθ'· οὕτως ἐσμὲν ἀχάριστοι φύσει* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.50a.8 = fr. 238 Kock II). J. Schröter, *De Ciceronis Catone maiore* (Diss. Leipzig, 1911) pp. 46 f, however, pointed out that the idea is very common and almost of proverbial

character. Cf. Euripides fr. 1080 Nauck: ὦ γῆρας, οἶαν ἐλπίδ' ἡδονῆς ἔχεις / καὶ πᾶς τις εἰς σέ βούλετ' ἀνθρώπων μολεῖν / λαβὼν δὲ πεῖραν, μεταμέλειαν λαμβάνει, / ὥς οὐδὲν ἔστι χειρὸν ἐν θνητῷ γένει, Menander fr. 644 Körte: ὁχληρὸν ὁ χρόνος ὁ πολὺς. ὦ γῆρας βαρὺ, / ὥς οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, δυσχερῆ δὲ πόλλ' ἔχεις / τοῖς ζῶσι καὶ λυπηρά. πάντες εἰς σέ δὲ / ἐλθεῖν ὁμῶς εὐχόμεθα καὶ σπουδάζομεν, Hippocrates *Ep.* 17.40–41: ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι . . . γῆρας ἠϋζαντο, εἴτα ἐς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενοι στενάζουσι, Apostolius 5.41 d: γῆρας ἐπὶ μὲν ἀπῆ, πᾶς εὐχεται ἥν δέ ποτ' ἔλθῃ, μέμφεται (see E.L. v. Leutsch-F.G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* II (Göttingen, 1851) p. 344), Cicero *Cato maior De senectute* 2.4: *quo in genere est in primis senectus, quam ut adipiscantur omnes optant, eandem accusant adepti: tanta est stultitiae inconstantia atque perversitas* and St. Augustine *In evang. Ioannis* 32.9 (= *PL*, 35 col. 1647): *quam* (sc. *senectutem*) *omnes optant antequam veniat, omnes de illa, cum venerit, murmurant*; for more parallels see A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig, 1890) p. 316.

To regard old age as nothing evil or at least as something ἀδιάφορον was typical of popular philosophy. We find this idea in e.g. Teles p. 8:6–7, pp. 11.10–12.2 and p. 12.5–8, Dio of Prusa 13.3 and Seneca *Ep.* 12.4–5, *Ep.* 26.2 and *De constantia sapientis* 17.2; cf. also Oltramare, p. 48 and p. 268.

F64

λείψανον

This word seems to be mainly poetic and found in tragedy and Plato. It also occurs in later prose-writers, such as Ps-Longinus *De sublimitate* 9.12, Dio of Prusa 12.12, Lucian *Imagines* 13, *Peregrinus* 39 etc., Aelianus fr. 320 and Diog. Laert. 4.22, where Polemon and Crates are described by Arcesilaus as λείψανα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους. The proposal of Usener, art. cit. p. 184 n. 4 to read λειψανοθήκη instead of λείψανον does not seem very convincing to me, as the word cannot be found anywhere else. Furthermore we have a parallel for this expression in Cicero *Cato maior De senectute* 20.72, where old age is referred to as *illud breve vitae reliquum*.

This saying is not very witty and could be used both by the defender and by the accuser of old age. Cf. Hense 1909, p. XC, who even here unnecessarily assumes that the sentence originally belonged to the assumed interlocutor. Although we cannot find the usual satire here and the saying is neutral, there is no reason to doubt that it was said by Bion. We could compare it with Diog. Laert. 4.48, where Bion gives some very short and pointed definitions of different ideas such as γῆρας, δόξα, κάλλος and πλοῦτος. We can see that Bion's definition of old age is not unduly pessimistic from a comparison with the description given in Ps-Plato *Def.* 411 C: γῆρας φθίσις ἐμψύχου ὑπὸ χρόνου γιγνομένη.

F65 τῇ μὲν ἀνδρεία . . . τῇ δὲ φρονήσει

The idea that φρόνησις belongs in a higher degree to the old than to the young is both old and common. Cf. e.g. Homer *Il.* 19.217–219, Aeschines 1.24: οὐκ ἡγνόει οἶμαι ὁ νομοθέτης ὅτι οἱ πρεσβύτεροι τῷ μὲν εὖ φρονεῖν ἀκμάζουσιν, ἡ δὲ τόλμα ἤδη αὐτοὺς ἄρχεται ἐπιλείπειν διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων, Euripides *Bellerophon* fr. 291 Nauck: ὦ παῖ, νέων τοι δρᾶν μὲν εὐτόνοι χέρες / γνῶμαι δ' ἀμείνους εἰσὶ τῶν γεραιτέρων (preserved in Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.50a.1 and Cornutus *Theol.* p. 64.6–7 Lang), Heraclitus *Hom. probl.* 61.5: πολιά δὲ καὶ γῆρας ἱεροὶ τῶν τελευταίων χρόνων λιμένες, ἀσφαλὲς ἀνθρώποις ὄρμισμα, καὶ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺς ὑποφθίνει, τοσοῦτον ἡ τῆς διανοίας αὖξεται ῥῶσις, Lucian *Patriae laudatio* 9: τοῖς δὲ ἤδη γεγηρακόσιν ὅσω πλεῖον τοῦ φρονεῖν ἢ τοῖς νέοις μέτεστι, Maximus of Tyre 16.5 f–h, Cicero *Cato maior De senectute* 6.17: *non faciat (sc. senectus) ea, quae iuvenes; at vero multa maiora et meliora faciat. Non viribus aut velocitate aut celeritate corporum res magnae geruntur, sed consilio auctoritate sententia; quibus non modo non orbari, sed etiam augeri senectus solet* (cf. also 6.15, 6.19, 19.67 and Schröter, op. cit. p. 48). There is even a proverb νέοις μὲν ἔργα, βουλὰς δὲ γεραιτέροις; cf. E.L. v. Leutsch-F.G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* I (Göttingen, 1839) p. 436 with many parallels.

For Bion's attitude to the different virtues see F12–14 and F16–17 with commentary.

νέους ὄντας . . . γηράσκοντας

In this saying we find human life divided into two parts, youth and old age, each of which is associated with a special virtue; cf. F. Boll, 'Das Lebensalter: Ein Beitrag zur antiken Ethologie und zur Geschichte der Zahlen', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 31 (1913) pp. 93 ff and O. Kunsemüller, *Die Herkunft der platonischen Kardinaltugenden* (Diss. Erlangen, 1935) pp. 26 f.

F62–65 If the interpretation given above is correct we find in Bion no condemnation of old age. On the other hand there is no explicit praise either, and his attitude may be defined as acceptance with the consolation that the old are endowed with more φρόνησις than the young.

The discussion of old age is of long standing in Greek literature and has mostly an apologetic aim, as we can see from the debate between Mimnermus (fr. 6 Diehl) and Solon (fr. 22 Diehl). For this early period see W. Schadewaldt, 'Lebenszeit und Greisenalter im frühen Griechentum', *Die Antike*, 9 (1933) pp. 282 ff (= *Hellas und Hesperien* I (Zürich-Stuttgart, 1970) pp. 109 ff). It is of certain interest in Bion's case that considerable attention was devoted to the subject in the Peripatetic school. Theophrastus wrote a work with the title *Περὶ γήρωος* (Diog. Laert. 5.43), as did Demetrius of Phaleron (Diog. Laert. 2.13,

5.81 and 9.20 = frs. 82–83 Wehrli IV). Ariston of Ceos or Chios wrote *Tithonus* on the same subject and this is one of the sources of Cicero's *Cato maior De senectute* (see 1.3 = fr. 12 Wehrli VI with commentary and introd. Chapter IV and n. 9). Later authors writing on the same subject include Plutarch, Favorinus, Musonius and Iuncus; cf. Schröter, *op. cit.* p. 46 and Barigazzi, pp. 153 f. It is difficult to discern the extent to which Bion could have been influenced in regard to this question by the different philosophical schools, in which he studied, as hardly any material is left. It seems however to be a philosophical commonplace, in contrast to the general opinion, not to regard old age as an evil.

10. On death (F66–72)

F66

εὐκόλον

The use of this adjective with the meaning “easy” (LSJ, s.v. *εὐκόλος* II) is fully classical; cf. e.g. Plato *Parmenides* 131 E and *Resp.* 5.453 D.

καταμύοντας

This saying is an example of Bion's sometimes rather grim humour; cf. A. Dieterich, *Nekyia: Beiträge zur Erklärung der neuentdeckten Petrusapokalypse* (Leipzig, 1893) p. 141. The verb *καταμύω*, which is here used with a double meaning, occurs in the sense *καταθνήσκω* also in Lucian *Dial. mer.* 7.2: *ἦν ὁ γέρων καταμύση*. We find the same picture in Leonidas of Tarentum: *κῆκ μεμυκότων ὁδεύεται* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.52b.28 = fr. 96 Geffcken), who may be using Bion's saying; cf. G. Knaack, ‘Coniectanea IV (Bionis a Diogene Laertio servatum (IV,49) et Leonidas Tarent. ap. Stob. flor. t. IV p. 103)’, *Progr. des Marienstifts-Gymnasiums Stettin* 1883 p. 3, J. Geffcken, ‘Leonidas von Tarent’, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, hrsg. v. A. Fleckeisen, Suppl. b. 23 (1897) p. 127 and Hense 1909, p. LIX n. 1; for a sceptical view see Susemihl 1891–92, II p. 538 n. 90 and Gerhard 1909, p. 279 n. 3. We also possess a saying of Stratoniceus, which is very similar to Bion's: *ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος* ‘τίνα λειοτάτην ὁδὸν ἐπίστασαι;’ ἔφη ‘τὴν <εἰς> Ἄιδου ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ μύοντες οὐ προσκόπτουσιν’ (*Gnom. Vat.* 528).

F67

This saying is also ascribed to Bias (*Flor. Mon.* 171) and Anaxagoras (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.52b.39 = Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 36 (= PG, 91 col. 905 A) = Arsenius *Violetum* p. 104 Walz = *Gnom. Bas.* 20 p. 146 = *Gnom. cod. Pal.* 122 f. 139^v no. 26 = fr. A 34 *FVS* II). The attribution to Bias is rather uncertain as the saying comes at the end of a number of sayings, introduced by *ὁ αὐτός*. The similarity between the two names Bias and Bion may explain this confusion; cf. introd. Chapter V:4 and Hense 1909, p. LIX n. 1.

However it is not possible to say anything with certainty about the choice between Anaxagoras and Bion.

τόν τε πρό τοῦ γενέσθαι χρόνον

The idea that death is very similar to the state before birth is common as we can see from the following instances: Euripides *Tro.* 636: τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τῷ θανεῖν ἴσον λέγω, Hyperides 6.43: εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ὁμοιον τῷ μὴ γενέσθαι. Ps-Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 15.109 E: εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οὖν τάξιν οἱ τελευτήσαντες καθίστανται τῇ πρό τῆς γενέσεως, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.38.91: *ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem pertinebit*, Seneca *Troades* 407–408: *quaeris quo iaceas post obitum loco? / quo non nata iacent*, *De consolatione ad Polybium* 9.2: *nam si nullus defunctis sensus superest, evasit omnia frater meus vitae incommoda et in eum restitutus est locum, in quo fuerat antequam nasceretur, et expers omnis mali nihil timet, nihil cupit, nihil patitur*, *De consolatione ad Marciam* 19.5: *si mortuorum aliquis miseretur, et non natorum misereatur*, *Ep.* 54.5: *quidquid ante nos fuit, mors est* and *Ep.* 77.11: *haec paria sunt; non eris nec fuisti. Utrumque tempus alienum est*. For this topos see B. Lier, ‘Topica carminum sepulcralium latinorum II’, *Philologus*, 62 (16) (1903) pp. 590 ff with material from funeral epigrams and R. Kassel, ‘Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur’, *Zetemata*, 18 (Munich, 1958) pp. 79 f.

τὸν ὕπνον

The comparison of death with sleep is very old and widespread. We find Ὕπνος and Θάνατος as brothers already in Homer *Il.* 14.231 and 16.672 and 682 and in Hesiod *Theog.* 212 and 756–759 and they are often portrayed together in art; cf. *ML*, III:2 (1902–09) s.v. Personificationen cols. 2111 f (Deubner) and I. Hjertén, ‘Hypnos och Thanatos i dikt och konst’, *Svenska Humanistiska Förbundet, Skrifter*, 62 (Stockholm, 1951). Cf. also Socrates in Plato *Apol.* 40 C: καὶ εἴτε μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οἷόν ὕπνος, the following saying ascribed to Plato: ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφησε τὸν μὲν ὕπνον ὀλιγοχρόνιον θάνατον, τὸν δὲ θάνατον πολυχρόνιον ὕπνον (*Gnom. Vat.* 446), Ps-Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 12.107 D–F, where this idea is more fully developed, Lucretius 3.919–930, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.38.92: *quam (sc. mortem) qui leviolem faciunt, somni simillimam volunt esse*, 1.41.97 (quoting Plato *Apol.* 40 C) and 1.49.117: *sin autem perimit ac delet omnino, quid melius quam in mediis vitae laboribus obdormiscere et ita coniventem somno consopiri sempiterno?* and Seneca *Herc. fur.* 1065–1069: *o domitor Somne malorum ... frater durae languide mortis*. For this topos see Lier, art. cit. p. 595 n. 46 and Kassel, op. cit. pp. 77 f.

- F68** The length of this fragment is quite clear, as it contains and develops one comparison; for commentary see also Hense 1909, p. CXVI. Favorinus may be

using this passage in ὅτι παραπλήσια τοῖς μετοικιζομένοις πάσχομεν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων οἱ μὲν εὐγνώμονες ταχέως ἐξίσσιν, οἱ δὲ μὴ βουλόμενοι πρὸς βίαν (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.51.27 = fr. 16 Barigazzi with commentary). The idea behind the two following comparisons between house and body, banquet and life, is that both body and life are given to us on loan. This idea can be found already in Euripides *Supp.* 534–536: οὔτι γὰρ κεκτημέθα / ἡμέτερον αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ σῶμα) πλὴν ἐνοικῆσαι βίον / κάπειτα τὴν θρέψασαν αὐτὸ δεῖ λαβεῖν; cf. F. Dümmler, in *Kleine Schriften I* (Leipzig, 1901) pp. 161 ff, and for this kind of imagery in general Colardeau, pp. 310 ff.

ἐξ οἰκίας . . . ἐκ τοῦ σωματίου

This comparison between the human body or life and a house seems to have enjoyed a certain popularity. Cf. e.g. Cicero *Cato maior De senectute* 23.84: *ex vita ita discedo tamquam ex hospitio, non tamquam e domo; commorandi enim natura devorsorium nobis, non habitandi dedit* and Seneca *Ep.* 70.16: *nemo nostrum cogitat quandoque sibi ex hoc domicilio exeundum* and *Ep.* 120.14: *nec domum esse hoc corpus, sed hospitium, et quidem breve hospitium, quod relinquendum est, ubi te gravem esse hospiti videas*. The same picture occurs in E. Waller: “The Soul’s dark Cottage, batter’d and decay’d / Lets in new Light thro’ chinks that time has made”, *The Oxford Book of Seventeenth Century Verse* (Oxford, 1934) p. 447.

σωματίου

Here the diminutive conveys a certain contempt for the body, or at least for the importance attached to it, a use which is well known from Epictetus; for Bion’s use of diminutives see introd. Chapter II:2.

ἢ μισθώσασα φύσις . . . ἀφαιρῆται

For this idea of nature as lender of body or life see Ps-Plato *Axiochus* 367 B: *κἂν μή τις θᾶπτον ὥς χρέος ἀποδιδῶ τὸ ζῆν, ὥς ὀβολοστάτις ἢ φύσις ἐπιστᾶσα ἐνεχυράζει τοῦ μὲν ὄψιν, τοῦ δὲ ἀκοήν, πολλάκις δὲ ἄμφω*, Epictetus fr. A 23 Schenkl: *διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνέχεσθε, ὅταν ἡ δοῦσα ἡμῖν φύσις τὸ σῶμα ἀφαιρῆται*, which is so close to Bion’s text that it may reproduce it, and Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1. 39.93: *at ea (sc. natura) quidem dedit usuram vitae tamquam pecuniae nulla praestituta die*.

ὥσπερ ἐκ συμποσίου ἀπαλλάττομαι . . . οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βίου

This comparison between life and a banquet also seems to have been very popular and there are many parallels. Cf. the saying ascribed to Aristotle: *ἐκ τοῦ βίου κράτιστόν ἐστιν ὑπεξελθεῖν ὥς ἐκ συμποσίου, μήτε διψῶντα, μήτε μεθύοντα* (Maximus Confessor *Loci communes Sermo* 36 (= PG, 91 col. 901 C) and Antonius Melissa *Loci communes I Sermo* 58 (= PG, 136 col. 957 B), Demophilus *Sim.* 13: *τὸν πεπαιδευμένον, ὥσπερ ἐκ συμποσίου, ἐκ τοῦ βίου εὐσχημονοῦντα δεῖ ἀναλύειν*, Epicurus in Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.41.118 (= fr. 499

Usener): *mihi quidem in vita servanda videtur illa lex, quae in Graecorum convivii obtinetur: Aut bibat, inquit, aut abeat*, Chrysippus fr. 768 SVF III: ἔοικε γάρ, φησιν, ὁ βίος μακρῷ συμποσίῳ, ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ παρ' ὅσους τρόπους λύεται τὸ συμπόσιον, παρὰ τούτους τρόπους γίνονται καὶ εὐλογοὶ ἐξαγωγαί, Ps-Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 34.120 B: προαπεφοίτησε τοῦ θνητοῦ βίου, καθάπερ ἐκ του συμποσίου and *An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum* 4.1129 A: εἰ δ' ἐκ τοῦ βίου καθάπερ ἐκ συμποσίου φῶς ἀναιρεῖς τὴν γνῶσιν, Epictetus 2.16.37: ᾧ γὰρ ἔξεστιν ἐξελθεῖν, ὅταν θέλῃ, τοῦ συμποσίου καὶ μηκέτι παίζειν, ἔτι οὗτος ἀνιᾶται μένων (cf. also 1.24.20, *Ench.* 15 and fr. A 17 Schenkl), Dio of Prusa 30.29–44, where this comparison is developed at great length, Lucretius 3.938–940: *cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis / aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem* (cf. also 3.960), Horace *Sat.* 1.1.118–119: *et exacto contentus tempore vita / cedat uti conviva satur* (cf. also *Ep.* 2.2.214–215) and Seneca *Ep.* 77.8 and *Ep.* 98.15. Cf. also Heinze 1889, p. 21 and n. 1.

There are a number of similar comparisons, where life is compared with a πανηγύρησις or a πομπή. The first type is said to go back to Pythagoras (Diog. Laert. 8.8) and occurs in, e.g., Teles p. 15.11 (cf. also O. Hense's note ad loc.), Menander fr. 416.8–9 Körte, Alexis fr. 219.11–14 Kock II, Menander *Mon.* 627, Epictetus 2.24.23 and 28, 3.5.10 and 4.1.105–110. For the second type of comparison see e.g. Epictetus 4.1.105, Favorinus "Dio of Prusa" 64.27 (= fr. 94 Barigazzi) and Lucian *Menippus* 16.

Should this part of the fragment be interpreted as meaning that Bion accepts suicide? This seems to be the opinion of Höistad, p. 68. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that we find the expression ὥσπερ οὖν ἐκ συμποσίου ἀπελύσαντο used of suicide in Aelianus *VH* 4.23, and that the verb ἀπαλλάττομαι can be used as an euphemism of suicide, e.g. Euripides *Hel.* 102 and *Hipp.* 356–357. Furthermore the Cynics accepted suicide as an expression of complete freedom. Cf. e.g. the following saying of Diogenes: συνεχές τε ἔλεγεν εἰς τὸν βίον παρεσκευάσθαι δεῖν λόγον ἢ βρόχον (Diog. Laert. 6.24). For the Greek attitude to suicide in general see K.A. Geiger, *Der Selbstmord im klassischen Altertum* (Augsburg, 1888), R. Hirzel, 'Der Selbstmord', *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 11 (1908) pp. 75 ff, pp. 243 ff and pp. 417 ff, A. Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart, 1894) pp. 29 ff and Rist, pp. 233 ff.

οὐθὲν δυσχεραίνων

For the form οὐθέν see introd. Chapter II:2. This phrase can be compared with Marcus Aurelius 10.8: ἔξιτι τοῦ βίου, μὴ ὀργιζόμενος.

ὅταν [ἡ] ὥρα ἧ, 'ἔμβα πορθμίδος ἔρμα'

There are some textual difficulties in this passage; ἡ was rejected by Nauck

and rightly so. The emendations of Diels: *ὅταν ἡ ὥρα*, 'εἰ' *ἔμβα* *κτλ.* and v. Müller: *ὅταν ὥρα ἦκη* 'ἔμβα' *κτλ.* (following Xenophon *Mem.* 2.1.2) are not convincing; *ὥρα ἐστὶ* seems to be the ordinary form of expression (cf. LSJ, s.v. *ὥρα* B I 3).

The MSS. have *ἔρυμα*, which does not make much sense, although it was defended by Wilamowitz, and I have therefore adopted the emendation of Nauck *ἔρμα*, which Hense was also inclined to accept. *Πορθμίδος ἔρμα* should here be understood as a wordy expression, meaning little more than *πορθμὶς* and in this connection *ἔρμα* makes sense (cf. LSJ, s.v. *ἔρμα* 4). Cf. Euripides *Cyc.* 362: *πορθμίδος σκάφος*, a wordy expression of the same kind. *Νεὼς σκάφος* is often used poetically for *ναῦς*; cf. Euripides *IT* 742 and 1345 and *Cyc.* 467.

ἔμβα πορθμίδος ἔρμα

This is obviously a poetical quotation referring to the boat of Charon; cf. *ML*, I:1 (1884—86) s.v. Charon cols. 884 ff (Steuding). The author is unknown. Nauck placed the quotation as a tragic fragment under *adespota* (no. 520), while Bergk and Wilamowitz placed it among the fragments of Timotheus (fr. 11 b Wilamowitz). These suggestions can only remain guesses. If we would look for an author, Euripides would be the obvious guess. He is especially popular among authors with philosophical interests; cf. introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 60. Furthermore Euripides is familiar with the character of Charon (see *RE*, III (1899) s.v. Charon (no. 1) cols. 2177 f (Waser)) and he uses the word *πορθμὶς* on several occasions: *Hipp.* 753, *Hel.* 1061, *IT* 355 and *Cyc.* 362.

Hense 1909, p. 16 noted a parallel for this situation in Epictetus *Ench.* 7: *ἐὰν δὲ ὁ κυβερνήτης καλέσῃ, τρέχε ἐπὶ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφείς ἐκεῖνα πάντα μηδὲ ἐπιστρεφόμενος.*

F69

genera lugendi

For a survey of different obvious forms of mourning see E. Reiner, 'Die rituelle Totenklage der Griechen', *Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 30 (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1938) pp. 42 ff.

Agamemno Homericus et Accianus

Cf. *Il.* 10.15: *πολλὰς ἐκ κεφαλῆς προθελύμνους ἔλκετο χαίτας* and Accius fr. inc. 672 Ribbeck I.

facetum

This is a stylistic feature, which is typical for apophthegma, gnome or chreia; cf. T17 and F3 with commentary.

stultissimum regem

To treat Homer and the Homeric heroes as well as mythological characters in general with such disrespect is typical both of the Cynics and of Bion; cf. introd. Chapter II:2. For similar expressions see Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 3.12.26: *o*

stultissime Aeeta and Horace *Ep.* 1.2.8: *stultorum regum*, referring to the Greek heroes at Troy, and *Ep.* 1.2.14: *quidquid delirant reges*.

Some passages where Agamemnon is ridiculed are of special interest. Cf. Epictetus 3.22.30, where the same Homeric line (*Il.* 10.15) is quoted and where Agamemnon is taken as an example of an unhappy man, even if he is not as badly treated as by Bion. As reason for his unhappiness is given: ἀγνοεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρὸς ἣν πέφυκε καὶ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τί ἴδιον ἔχει καὶ τί ἀλλότριον (3.22.32); cf. Giesecke, pp. 33 f and Colardeau, p. 307 n. 1, who assume that Epictetus was inspired by Bion. Agamemnon is ridiculed in Diogenes *Ep.* 19: εἰ δὲ μὴ καρηκομόω** νέος ἦν ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων, γέρων δ' ἄν γενόμενος ἐψιλοκόρησε and in Horace *Sat.* 2.3.187–207, although his baldness is not mentioned in this passage. For Cynic jokes on baldness see F44 with commentary.

capillum sibi evellere

This is a typical expression of violent grief, which Bion here ridicules without mercy. The custom is known from Homer: *Il.* 18.27, 22.77 and 405–406, 24.710–711 and *Od.* 10.566 and referred to in, e.g., Sophocles *Ajax* 634, Cebes *Tabula* 10.2: ἡ δὲ τὰς τρίχας τίλλουσα ἑαυτῆς ὀδύνη, Ps-Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 21.112 E: ἀλλ' ἐκτρέπονται πρὸς τὰς ἐσχάτας τάλαιπωρίας, τὸ μὴδὲν αἴτιον σῶμα τιμωρούμενοι, Lucian *Peregrinus* 6: τὰς τρίχας ἐτίλλετο, *De luctu* 12: καὶ παρὰ πάντων δάκρυα καὶ στέρνα τυπτόμενα καὶ σπαραττομένη κόμη καὶ φοινισσόμεναι παρειαί and *De luctu* 16: παῦσαι τιλλόμενος τὴν κόμην καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς ἀμύσσω and Seneca *Oedipus* 592: *luctus avellens comam*; in Seneca *De ira* 1.19.4: *capillos evellere* is a sign of anger.

Montaigne refers to this fragment: “Et le philosophe Bion, de ce roi qui de deuil s'arrachait les poils, fut-il pas plaisant: cettui-ci pense-t-il que la pelade soulage le deuil” (*Essais* I.4 p. 27 Aux Éditions du Seuil).

F70

ἀγωνία

The MSS. have ἄγνοια, *ἀγωνία* being an emendation by Jacobs, followed by Nauck and Hense. This change seems feasible, in view of the context in Teles, who shows a complete indifference to questions concerned with burial, which is a source of anxiety to people without a philosophical conviction.

τραγωδίας

Problems arising from burials have provided the subject for many tragedies. Bion may here be thinking especially of Antigone and her burial of her brother Polyneices, as a quotation of Euripides *Phoen.* 1447–1450 follows in the text of Teles. Cf. *ML*, I:1 (1884–86) s. v. Antigone cols. 370 ff (Stoll).

For the comparison between one's own sufferings and those performed on the stage cf. the remark of Epictetus 2.16.31, when a man mourns because he

has been deprived of his usual water: ἴδε πῶς τραγωδία γίνεται, ὅταν εἰς μωροῦς ἀνθρώπους πράγματα τὰ τυγχάνοντ' ἐμπέσῃ and the saying of Diogenes: εἰώθει δὲ λέγειν τὰς τραγικὰς ἀρὰς αὐτῷ συνηνητέναι· εἶναι γοῦν ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος, / πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοῦφ' ἡμέραν (Diog. Laert. 6.38 = Trag. adesp. fr. 284 Nauck).

A proper funeral was extremely important to the ordinary Greek mind; cf. Dover, p. 267. A more indifferent attitude can be found in Socrates, who answers the question θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον as follows: ὅπως ἄν . . . βούλησθε (Plato *Phaedo* 115 C). We find the same opinion in several Socratic schools. Cf. e.g. the saying of Diogenes: ἔνιοι δέ φασι τελευτῶντα αὐτὸν [καί] ἐντεῖλσθαι ἄταφον ῥῖψαι (Diog. Laert. 6.79; cf. also Diogenes *Ep.* 25, Diog. Laert. 6.52, Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.55.11 and Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.43.104), and the anecdote about Theodorus: *Theodori quidem nihil interest humine an sublimē putescat* (Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.43.102 and Seneca *De tranquillitate animi* 14.3 = fr. 258 A-B Mannebach; cf. also Plutarch *An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficit* 3.499 D = fr. 257 Mannebach and v. Fritz, pp. 50 ff). Therefore Bion in his attitude to burial may be influenced both by the Cynics and the Cyrenaics, and this attitude is very common in authors with philosophical interests. Cf. further K. Praechter, 'Zur kynischen Polemik gegen die Bräuche bei Totenbestattung und Totenklage', *Philologus*, 57 (11) (1898) pp. 504 ff, Joel 1893–1901, II p. 198 and n. 3, Helm 1906, pp. 348 ff, Gerhard 1909, pp. 82 f and Hense 1909, pp. CII ff.

F71

The text of this fragment cannot be correct, as found in the MSS., as we can see from the impossible translation by Hicks and all the different emendations. I have decided to leave παρακαόντων and replace αἰσθανομένους by αἰσθανομένοις, which is the smallest change and has an excellent meaning, especially as we have a very close parallel in a saying ascribed to Anacharsis: ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί ἐθεάσατο ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι παράδοξον εἶπε, τὸ τοὺς νεκροὺς καίεσθαι μὲν ὡς ἀναισθήτους, ἀποκαίεσθαι δὲ αὐτοῖς ὡς αἰσθανομένοις (*Gnom. Vat.* 20).

κατεγίνωσκε

This is a common expression in sayings ascribed to moral philosophers such as Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2.78 = fr. 20 Mannebach) and Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.28).

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους

The meaning here is a problem, as the word must have the same meaning as τοὺς νεκρούς. It is however very unusual for the word ἄνθρωπος to be used of the dead, although there are some examples in Homer: *Il.* 3.279 and 19.260 and *Od.* 4.565.

παρακαόντων

This verb, which is not common in this kind of context, is used of some ceremonies at a tomb in *Suppl. Epigr.* 2.415.

This fragment proves that Bion criticized the cult of the dead. Far from disappearing during the Hellenistic period this cult was celebrated with great luxury; cf. M.P. Nilsson, 'Geschichte der griechischen Religion' II, 2. ed. *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, V:2:2 (Munich, 1961) p. 233 and Schneider, II pp. 212 ff. We here have a criticism of a religious custom, which is closely related to Bion's general view of death, corpses and funerals, a view dominated by contempt. Bion is probably influenced by Cynic ideas in this respect. We find this custom ridiculed by Lucian *Charon* 22: καίουσίν τε ταυτὶ τὰ πολυτελῆ δεῖπνα . . . ὥς οἷόν τε περιπετομένας τὴν κνῖσαν καὶ τὸν κάπνον . . . Ἐκείνους ἔτι πίνειν ἢ ἐσθίειν, ὧν τὰ κρανία ξηρότατα and *De luctu* 9, 14 and 19: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν καθαρισμῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁρᾶτε, οἶμαι, ὥς τὸ μὲν νοστιμώτατον τῶν παρεσκευασμένων ὁ καπνὸς παραλαβὼν ἄνω εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν οἴχεται μηδέν τι ἡμᾶς ὀνῆσαν τοὺς κάτω, τὸ δὲ καταλειπόμενον, ἡ κόνις, ἀχρεῖον, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ τὴν σποδὸν ἡμᾶς σιτεῖσθαι πεπιστεύκατε.

F72

The text of this fragment is far from certain. The text of the MSS., *conceptum. nichilo nat;*, makes no sense and the deletion of *nichilo nat;* which was done by e.g. Fichert, is not very satisfactory. I have adopted the reading of L.D. Reynolds, which is an improvement upon the Bücheler's suggested reading (*in nihilum recidere de*) *nihilo natos*. *Nasci ex* is the regular form of expression (cf. LS, s.v. *nascor* I 1) and for *redigere* cf. Seneca *De consolatione ad Marciam* 19.5: *quod vero ipsum nihil est et omnia in nihilum redigit* and *Nat. quaest.* 1.15.2: *redigantur ad nihilum*.

This saying of Bion emphasizes both the brevity and the unimportance of life and can be said to be an expression of a pessimistic attitude. For Greek pessimism in general see W. Nestle, 'Der Pessimismus und seine Überwindung bei den Griechen', *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, 47 (24) (1921) pp. 81 ff and H. Diels, 'Der antike Pessimismus', *Schule und Leben, Schriften zu den Bildungs- und Kulturfragen der Gegenwart*, 1 (Berlin, 1921). There was a strong element of pessimism in the Cynic school, which was pointed out, e.g., by Joel 1893–1901, II pp. 181 ff and Joel 1921, p. 909 and n. 3.

The closest parallel for this saying of Bion is a fragment of the sophist Antiphon: εὐκατηγόρητος πᾶς ὁ βίος θαυμαστῶς, ὦ μακάριε, [καὶ] οὐδὲν ἔχων περιττὸν οὐδὲ μέγα καὶ σεμνόν, ἀλλὰ πάντα σμικρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆ καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνια καὶ ἀναμειγμένα λύπαις μεγάλαις (fr. B 51 *FVS* II). Cf. the saying of Diogenes: εὐγενέστατοι . . . οἱ καταφρονοῦντες . . . ζωῆς (Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.29a.19) and the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who followed Hegesias: τὴν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον αἰρετόν . . . καὶ τῷ μὲν ἄφρονι τὸ ζῆν λυσιτελὲς εἶναι τῷ δὲ φρονίμῳ

ἀδιάφορον (Diog. Laert. 2.94–96 = fr. 249B–C Mannebach). It may be of interest that Theophrastus stressed and deplored the brevity of life: ἡμεῖς γὰρ ὁπότε ἀρχόμεθα ζῆν, τότ' ἀποθνήσκομεν . . . τὸ δὲ κενὸν τοῦ βίου πλέον τοῦ συμφέροντος (Diog. Laert. 5.41; cf. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 3.28.69).

It is very common among later authors with philosophical interests to stress the brevity and even the meaningslessness of life; cf. e.g. Musonius fr. VI p. 26.15–17 Hense: οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος ζωὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ τι ἕτερον τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων ἀρετῆς, Lucian *Charon* 19, where the life of men is compared with bubbles in water: οἱ μὲν ὀλιγοχρόνιον ἔχουσι καὶ ὠκύμορον τὸ φύσημα, οἱ δὲ ἅμα τῷ συστήναι ἐπαύσαντο, Ps-Lucian *Halcyon* 3: τῷ ὄντι γὰρ νήπιος ἔοικεν εἶναι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὁ πάνυ γέρων, ἐπεὶ τοι μικρὸς πάνυ καὶ νεογιλὸς ὁ τοῦ βίου χρόνος πρὸς τὸν πάντα αἰῶνα, Ps-Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 6.104 A: ἀνθρώπων γὰρ ὄντως θνητὰ μὲν καὶ ἐφήμερα τὰ σώματα, θνηταὶ δὲ τύχαι καὶ πάθη καὶ πάνθ' ἀπλῶς τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον and 31.117 E: καὶ γὰρ ὁ μακρότατος βίος ὀλίγος ἐστὶ καὶ στιγμιαίος πρὸς τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα, Marcus Aurelius 2.14: καὶ ὁ πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ ὁ τάχιστα τεθνηζόμενος τὸ ἴσον ἀποβάλλει, 2.17: τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου ὁ μὲν χρόνος, στιγμή and 4.50, Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.38.91: *mors . . . propter brevitatem vitae numquam potest longe abesse* and 1.39.94: *quae vero aetas longa est aut quid omnino homini longum* and Seneca *Ep.* 77.20: *nulla vita est non brevis*, *Ep.* 99.31: *hoc quod vivimus, proximum nihil est*, *De consolatione ad Marciam* 10.5: *mors enim illi denuntiata nascenti est*, 21.1: *ad brevissimum tempus editi*, 21.2: *minorem portionem aetas nostra quam puncti habet* and 21.3: *nulla erit illa brevissimi longissimique aevi differentia*. See also E. Bickel, 'Das Ennius-Zitat aus Euripides bei Seneca De brev. vit. 2,2 und der Topos des ΝΕΚΡΟΣ ΒΙΟΣ in der Antike', *Rheinisches Museum NF*, 94 (1951) pp. 242 ff and v. Geytenbeek, pp. 155 ff.

F66–72 Bion's aim in this group of fragments is to free people from all fear of death, and from anxiety about their funeral, a fear which was as strong during the Hellenistic period as at any other time; cf. Schneider, II pp. 208 ff. Bion points out, sometimes with rather cruel humour, that death is not frightening and that all problems usually connected with funerals are completely without any importance. Nevertheless Bion has little of positive value to offer his audience. There is no trace of a belief in life after death, which we would not expect to find, but Bion also seems to have a rather pessimistic outlook on life as being short and comparatively meaningless. The same ideas and the same aims, which we have found in Bion, are shared by philosophers in general and there was a large literature dealing with the subject of death and funerals, written for purposes of consolation, with such titles as *Περὶ θανάτου* or *Περὶ πένθους*. Here I shall confine myself to the philosophical schools which are of special interest in Bion's case. From the Academy it is reported that Xenocrates wrote *Περὶ θανάτου* (Diog. Laert. 4.12) and Crantor *Περὶ πένθους* (Diog. Laert.

4.27; cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.44.135). This treatise of Crantor became very famous and may even have been known to Bion, thanks to his connections with the Academy; cf. H.J. Johann, 'Trauer und Trost', *Studia et Testimonia Antiqua*, 5 (Munich, 1968) p. 13 and n. 19. From the Cynic school we find the following titles attested for Antisthenes: *Περὶ τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν*, *Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου* and *Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾿Αἰδοῦ* (Diog. Laert. 6.17 = fr. 1 Caizzi) and for Diogenes: *Περὶ θανάτου* (Diog. Laert. 6.80). Concerning the Cyrenaic school we may remember that Hegesias, called *Πεισιθάνατος* (Diog. Laert. 2.86 = fr. 131A Mannebach), left a work with the title *Ἀποκαρτερῶν* (Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.34.84 = fr. 248 Mannebach). In the case of the Peripatos it can be noted that Aristotle wrote *Εὐδημος ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς* (see frs. 37–48 Rose) and Theophrastus *Καλλισθένης ἡ περὶ πένθους*. (Diog. Laert. 5.44; cf. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.9.25). This kind of literature was also well represented among later authors, as we can see from Ps-Plutarch, Cicero and Seneca. Since we are here dealing with a subject which mostly uses commonplaces, there is no point in trying to ascribe the sayings of Bion to different philosophical schools. Hense 1909, pp. CII ff assumed that there was a treatise *Περὶ ταφῆς* by Bion, which was used by Teles. This assumption is plausible enough but cannot be proved. For a general survey of this kind of literature and the related consolation-literature see C. Buresch, 'Consolationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia critica', *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie*, 9 (Leipzig, 1886) pp. 1 ff, Kassel, op. cit., Johann, op. cit. and J. Hani, 'La consolation antique: Aperçus sur une forme d'ascèse mystico-rationnelle', *Revue des Études Anciennes*, 75 (1973) pp. 103 ff.

11. Anecdotes (F73–81)

F73

χαριέντως

This stylistic feature belongs to apophthegma, gnome and chreia; cf. F3 with commentary.

ἔφη . . . εἶπε

This rather careless double expression is due to the interposed explanation *θεασάμενος . . . Κιτιᾶ*.

χαλκῆν εἰκόνα

Statues of brass were more common than those of marble in antiquity; cf. *RAC*, VI (1966) s.v. Erz col. 457 (Hill) and for the use of brass in general H. Blümner, *Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Künste bei Griechen und Römern* IV (Leipzig, 1887) pp. 178 ff, K. Kluge-K. Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die antiken Grossbronzen I: Die antike Erzgestaltung und ihre technischen Grundlagen* (Berlin, 1927) with a very rich material and R.J. For-

bes, *Studies in Ancient Technology* VIII (Leyden, 1964) pp. 265 ff.

There are several statues of brass reported for different ancient philosophers, e.g. for Socrates: *Σωκράτην δὲ χαλκῇ εἰκόνι ἐτίμησαν* (Diog. Laert. 2.43), for Diogenes: *ὕστερον δὲ καὶ οἱ πολῖται αὐτοῦ χαλκαῖς εἰκόσιν ἐτίμησαν αὐτόν* (Diog. Laert. 6.78), Zeno: *ἐτίμων δὴ οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι σφόδρα τὸν Ζήνωνα, οὕτως ὥς . . . χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ τιμῆσαι καὶ χαλκῇ εἰκόνι* (Diog. Laert. 7.6) and Epicurus: *ἥ τε πατρίς χαλκαῖς εἰκόσι τιμήσασα* (Diog. Laert. 10.9); cf. also Lucian *Demonax* 58, where Demonax declines the offer of an *εἰκόνα χαλκῇν*. For more information on statues of Greek philosophers see K. Schefold, *Die Bildnisse der antiken Dichter Redner und Denker* (Basel, 1943) and G. Richter, *The Portraits of the Greeks I–III* (London, 1965).

Περσαῖον

For this Stoic philosopher see F1 with commentary, where references are given.

Περσαῖον Ζήνωνος Κιτιᾶ

Summers, p. XXIII n. 2 objected to the accusative. This is however the usual case for names in inscriptions of this kind; cf. G. Gerlach, *Griechische Ehreninschriften* (Halle a.S., 1908) p. 33 and n. 1. In this case the accusative may very well have been dependent on a verb, as we do not know whether Bion gives the complete inscription. For the literary form of inscriptions see Gerlach, op.cit. with much valuable information and G. Klaffenbach, 'Griechische Epigraphik', 2. ed. *Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 6 (Göttingen, 1966) pp. 62 ff.

Περσαῖον Ζήνωνος Κιτιᾶ . . . Περσαῖον Ζήνωνος οἰκετιᾶ

In the real inscription the genitive Ζήνωνος must have indicated that Persaeus was the pupil of Zeno, which is essential, if there is to be a pun (therefore C.B. Gulick's translation in the Loeb-edition is wrong). This kind of genitive can be used to express different relations, often in an ambiguous way; cf. KG, I p. 268 and pp. 333 f and Schwyzer, II pp. 119 f. However, there are other instances, where it is used to express the pupil–teacher relation: *Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ Πλάτωνος* (Ps-Plutarch *De musica* 22 = fr. 47 Rose) and especially *Περσαῖος ὁ τοῦ Ζήνωνος* (Dio of Prusa 53.5). *Κιτιᾶ* refers to his birth-place, the town Citium on Cyprus (cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.6 and 7.36 = frs. 435 and 439 *SVF* I). Bion, here influenced by the double meaning of the genitive Ζήνωνος, made a play on the word *Κιτιᾶ*, which is a favourite device of his, and so rather maliciously indicated that Persaeus was Zeno's slave. The word *οἰκετιᾶ* as if from *οἰκετιεύς* instead of the ordinary word *οἰκέτης* is obviously created by Bion *ad hoc*.

Puns of this kind are very popular among the Greeks and we find many plays on ethnics; cf. e.g. the anecdote about Socrates: *ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης βέλτιον*,

οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος, οὐδὲ Ἕλληνα, ἀλλὰ Ῥόδιος εἶναι φήσας, ὡς ἂν τις Ῥόδιος εἶπεν ἢ Κορινθίος, ὅτι μηδὲ Σουνίῳ μηδὲ Ταινάρῳ μηδὲ τοῖς Κεραυνίοις ἐνέκλεισεν ἑαυτὸν (Plutarch *De exilio* 5.600 F-601 A; cf. also Epictetus 1.9.1 and Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.37.108). Puns of this kind are very common in Aristophanes, especially when referring to someone's demos; most of the cases are given in J. v. Leeuwen's notes on *Eq.* 79 and *Ranae* 427; cf. also L. Radermacher, in 'Aristophanes' Frösche', *Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 198:4 (Vienna, 1921) pp. 204 f. It can be assumed that this kind of pun appealed very much to the Cynics; cf. the saying of Diogenes: περὶ παιδὸς πεπορνευκότος ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἶη, 'Τεγεάτης', ἔφη (Diog. Laert. 6.61–62) and Wachsmuth, pp. 71 f.

Bion's form of joke is an example of σκῶμμα περὶ γράμμα, which is defined by Aristotle *Rhet.* 3.11.6 p. 1412a33–34: τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὁ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὁ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, while Hermogenes *Meth.* 34 p. 451 Rabe regards such a change of letters as a case of τὸ κατὰ παρωδίαν σχῆμα. Cf. E.M. Cope-J.F. Sandy, in *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1877) III pp. 132 f, R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* 2. ed. (Leipzig, 1885) p. 238 and introd. Chapter II:4.

For the question whether Persaeus really was Zeno's slave cf. Susemihl 1891–92, I p. 69 n. 263 and Tarn, p. 232 n. 32. It is probable that we here have an act of revenge on Bion's part, as he had previously been slandered by Persaeus (cf. Diog. Laert. 4.47 = F1A with commentary). Furthermore it was a common form of abuse to call someone a slave; cf. F1–2 with commentary.

Νικίας ὁ Νικαεύς

For this doxographer and for literature of this kind see T1 with commentary.

F74

τὸν ἀδολέσχην

Cf. Theophrastus *Char.* 3.1, where the following definition of ἀδολεσχία is given: ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ μὲν διήγησις λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων. Other interesting passages are Bion F52 and especially Horace *Sat.* 1.9.35 ff, as the talkative person asks for the support of Horace in a legal case as an *advocatus*.

τὸ ἱκανὸν . . . ποιήσω

This phrase is thought to be a legal expression meaning "give security" (so LSJ, s.v. ἱκανός II 2 and F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden* I (Berlin, 1925) s.v. ἱκανός col. 693). However, this sense fits hardly any of the known instances and a more general meaning "satisfy" is required in Bion's case (so W.F. Arndt-F.W. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (Cambridge, 1957) s.v. ἱκανός 1 c). The expression can be found in, e.g., Polybius 32.3.13, Appianus 8.11.74, Justinianus *Nov.* 86.4, N.T. *Ev. Marc.* 15.15, Hermas *Sim.* 6.5.5 etc. If the saying of Bion is authentic, this

is the earliest known case of the expression. It is usually assumed that this phrase is a Latinism and a translation of *satisfacere* in a legal sense. This is the opinion of, e.g., BD, § 5.3. It is true that the expression occurs in a Roman context in both Polybius and Appianus, but without a strongly technical meaning. Therefore I doubt if it should be considered as a Latinism. Cf. also J.-A. Foucault, *Recherches sur la langue et le style de Polybe* (Paris, 1972), who does not treat this phrase among the Latinisms of Polybius. If it is accepted that the phrase was used by Bion, it cannot be regarded as a Latinism, as it would be out of the question to find a Latinism in Bion's language.

παράκλητους

The word seems to signify an assistant in court, but of a less professional kind than *σύνδικος* or *συνήγορος*; cf. e.g. Demosthenes 19.1. Later it is used, not of a legal assistant but of people who by their presence try to influence the judges. We find the word with this meaning in Lycurgus fr. 102, Philo *In Flaccum* 4.22–23: *δεῖ δὴ παράκλητον ἡμᾶς εὐρεῖν δυνατώτατον, ὅφ' οὗ Γάιος ἐξευμενισθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ παράκλητος ἡ πόλις Ἀλεξανδρέων ἐστίν* and Heraclitus *Probl. Hom.* 59.9, where Hermes is referred to as *τῆς ἰκετείας παράκλητον*. For the meaning of the term see K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* I, 6. ed. (Freiburg i. B.-Tübingen, 1884) pp. 579 f, H. Usener, 'Precator', *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik* II (Leipzig, 1885) pp. 228 ff, K. Schodorf, 'Beiträge zur genaueren Kenntnis der Attischen Gerichtssprache aus den zehn Rednern', *Beiträge zur historischen Syntax der griechischen Sprache*, hrsg. v. M. v. Schanz, 17 (Würzburg, 1905) p. 102, J.H. Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* II:2 (Leipzig, 1915) p. 906 n. 22 and pp. 919 f, *RE*, XVIII:2 (1949) s.v. *Παράκλητοι* cols. 1202 f (Schulz) and *ThW*, V (1954) s.v. *Παράκλητος* pp. 798 ff (Behm).

καὶ αὐτὸς μὴ ἔλθης

The last part of the sentence was deleted by Hense 1909, p. CI on grounds which to me seem insufficient. On the contrary I think that this part of the sentence may contain a rather cruel joke on Bion's part. Notwithstanding that someone had *παράκλητοι*, he had to appear in person in court, and the *παράκλητοι* were supposed to work only by means of their presence and not of their speech; for this condition see the literature given above. So by reason of this rule and according to the comparison with a court, Bion is not acceding to the man's request for help.

The fact that the company of a talkative person should be avoided is clear from a saying of Theocritus: *Θεόκριτος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ ἀδολέσχου ὅπου αὐτὸν αὖριον ὄψοιτο 'ὅπου' ἔφη 'ἐγὼ σὲ οὐκ ὄψομαι'* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 3.11.15).

F75

ὠφελεῖ . . . ὠφελοῦνται

This is a common word in writings of the Cynics and expresses their

φιλανθρωπία. Cf. e.g. the saying of Peregrinus *ὠφελῆσαι . . . βούλομαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους* (Lucian *Peregrinus* 33) and Gerhard 1909, pp. 32 ff.

αἱ πυξίδες

This post-classical word, meaning some sort of box, is often used to indicate medical purposes as we can see from the following references: Philo *Mechanicus Bel.* p. 77.28 Wescher: *πυξίδες ἱατρικαί*, Lucian *Philopseudes* 21, Dioscorides *De mat. med.* 3.11: *ἀποτίθεσθαι δὲ δεῖ τὸ φάρμακον εἰς χαλκῆν πυξίδα*, Galenus *De comp. med. per genera* 4 p. 743 Kühn XIII and Hermas *Vis.* 3.9.7: *οἱ φαρμακοὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ φάρμακα ἑαυτῶν εἰς τὰς πυξίδας βαστάζουσιν*. Thanks to its everyday character the word seems to have enjoyed a certain popularity in writings influenced by popular philosophy: Diogenes *Ep.* 50, where it is used in a comparison: *ἅ ταῖς κεναῖς καὶ δυσανοίκτοις πυξίσιν ἔοικεν*, Lucian *Asinus* 12, 13, 14 and *Amores* 39, Cicero *Pro Caelio* 27.65, Petronius *Sat.* 110, Seneca *Suas.* 2.21, Martial 9.37.4, Juvenal *Sat.* 2.141 and 13.25 (cf. Mayor, II p. 251) and Seneca *Ep.* 95.18, *De beneficiis* 5.13.3 and especially fr. IX.18 Haase: (*philosophorum*) . . . *quos non aliter intueri decet quam medicos, quorum tituli remedia habent, pyxides venena*, which has a certain similarity to Bion's saying. For *πυξίς* in general see K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* IV, 3. ed. (Freiburg i.B.-Tübingen, 1882) p. 170, DS, IV:1 (1904–07) s.v. Pyxis pp. 794 f (Pottier) and L. Curtius, 'Penteus', 88. *Winckelmanns-programm der Archäologischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1929).

αἱ πυξίδες . . . φάρμακα

The Cynics were very fond of comparisons and similes from the medical field; see introd. Chapter II:2.

ἀπ' αὐτῶν

The MS. has *ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν*, which was preserved by Hense 1909, p. LXXIII. The very easy correction, which I have adopted here, was proposed by P. Wendland, in 'Teletis reliquiae. Ed. O. Hense 1889', *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* (1891) col. 458 and obviously accepted by Oltramare, p. 37 and n. 4. Both readings make sense but only *ἀπ' αὐτῶν* gives the sense which is required here. I take *αὐτόν* to refer to the interlocutor, which is the most natural interpretation, and not to Bion. As the interlocutor, who has access to Bion, is not helped by him, so the boxes, which have access to the best medicines, are not helped by them. The interpretation of Oltramare, p. 37 that this is a defence on Bion's part, when it was noticed that his way of life and his teaching did not coincide, so that Bion compares his relation to philosophy with the relation of boxes to medicines, does not seem convincing to me. It was common that people did not find the teaching of philosophers to be of any use, and this is often given as the opinion and the objection to philosophy of people in general. Cf. Stobaeus *Flor.* 4.8.23; where Dionysius addresses Aristippus: *οὐδὲν ὠφέ-*

λημαι ὑπὸ σοῦ, Epictetus 2.21.15: εἶτα λέγουσιν ‘οὐδεὶς ὠφελεῖται ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς’, Dio of Prusa 8.10: οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾤοντο οὐδὲν ὠφεληθῆσθαι, ὅτι καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐώρων αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Διογένη) ἐν Κορίνθῳ and 9.4, Lucian *Icaromenipus* 30 and *Hermotimus* 81, Joannes Chrysostomus *Hom.* 35.4 (= *PG*, 61 col. 302), where the following description of Diogenes is given: ἐξέπληξε μὲν πολλούς, ὠφέλησε δὲ οὐδένα and Seneca *Ep.* 108.5: *quid ergo? Non novimus quosdam, qui multis apud philosophum annis persederint et ne colorem quidem duxerint?*

F76

παιδάρια

For the use of diminutives see introd. Chapter II:2.

In this fragment we find a compassion for animals, which is very unusual in antiquity; cf. Tarn, p. 239. It is of interest that similar thoughts were expressed by Xenocrates, who had some connection with Bion (Diog. Laert. 4.10 = T22; cf. also introd. Chapter I). We have got the following statement about Xenocrates: πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἡλέει (Aelianus *VH* 13.31; cf. also Diog. Laert. 4.10 = fr. 101 Heinze). Xenocrates was also interested in vegetarianism; cf. frs. 98–100 Heinze, R. Heinze, *Xenokrates: Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig, 1892) pp. 151 ff and J. Haussleiter, ‘Der Vegetarismus in der Antike’, *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, 24 (Berlin, 1935) pp. 198 ff. In the case of the Cynics, no sayings expressing compassion are preserved, but we may remember that, according to the doctrine of the Cynics, animals were examples for man; cf. Gerhard 1909, pp. 48 ff, S.O. Dickermann, *De argumentis quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis* (Diss. Halle, 1909) and A.O. Lovejoy-G. Boas, ‘Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity’, *A Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas*, 1 (Baltimore, 1935) pp. 389 ff, also for a more general survey of the idea of the superiority of animals. For the Cynics and vegetarianism see F17 with commentary. The opinion of Bion’s teacher Theophrastus is of great interest for this question. He seems to have assumed a certain kinship between man and animals and to have argued against the killing of animals; cf. Haussleiter, op. cit. pp. 237 ff, C.O. Brink, ‘Οἰκείωσις and Οἰκειότης: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory’, *Phronesis*, 1 (1955–56) pp. 124 ff and Baldry, pp. 142 f. For this question as a whole Haussleiter, op. cit. is of great interest.

F77

This saying is also ascribed to Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. 5.40 = *Gnom. Vat.* 333 = *Gnom. Par.* 180 = Arsenius *Violetum* p. 295 Walz = Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 20 (= *PG*, 91 col. 848 B) = Antonius Melissa *Loci communes* I Sermo 73 (= *PG*, 136 col. 992 D) = *cod. Vat. Gr.* 1144 f. 229^r = *Flor. Ottobon. Gr.* 192 f. 208^r) and to Simonides (Plutarch *Quaestiones conviviales* 3.644 F). It also occurs anonymously in *Anecd. Gr.* II p. 467 Boissonade.

As we have seen, the saying is closely connected with Theophrastus. Its attribution to Bion can be explained by saying that Bion here quotes his teacher; cf. introd. Chapter III:4.

παρὰ πότον

The MS. reads *παρὰ πάντων*, which is preserved by Sternbach. Hense 1892, p. 236 n. 1 made the convincing emendation *παρὰ πότον*. When ascribed to Theophrastus the saying has the phrase *ἐν συμποσίῳ* (e.g. Diog. Laert. 5.40 and *Gnom. Vat.* 333), which is an argument for Hense's emendation. Furthermore the expression *παρὰ πότον* is common in various apophthegmata: Diog. Laert. 2.78 and 6.6, *Gnom. Vat.* 207 and 339, *Gnom. Par.* 182, *App. Vat.* 62 and *Wien. Apophtheg.* 65.

Two ideas underlie this rhetorical, not to say sophistic expression, as far as the form and thought are concerned. On the one hand it was considered good for a stupid man to remain silent; cf. Publilius Syrus 693: *taciturnitas stulto homini pro sapientia est*. On the other hand it was considered bad behaviour to remain silent at symposia and not take part in the conversation, which was of central importance. Cf. Xenophon *Symp.* 6.2: *σὺ νῦν ἡμᾶς λυπεῖς σιωπῶν*, Aulus Gellius *NA* 13.11.3: '*nec loquaces autem*', inquit, '*convivas nec mutos legere oportet, quia eloquentia in foro et apud subsellia, silentium vero non in convivio, set in cubiculo esse debet*' and Petronius *Sat.* 46: *quid iste argutat molestus? quia tu, qui potes loquere, non loquis*. There were many different rules concerning the Greek symposium; cf. K. Bielowlawek, 'Gastmahls- und Symposionlehren bei griechischen Dichtern', *Wiener Studien*, 48 (1940) pp. 11 ff.

It is also of interest that the symposium came to be a literary form, used by different philosophical schools; for a survey see J. Martin, 'Symposion: Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form', *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums*, 17 (Paderborn, 1931), *RE*, IVA:2 (1932) s.v. Symposion-Literatur cols. 1273 ff (Hug) and *RAC*, III (1957) s.v. Deipnonliteratur cols. 658 ff (Martin).

F78A–B *Ἡσίοδον*

Bion here refers to the description of the first three periods in Hesiod *Erga* 109–155; for the use of Hesiod cf. introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 61.

A similar use of the three ages is found in Antipater of Thessalonica *Anth. Pal.* 5.31: *χρύσεος ἦν γενεὴ καὶ χάλκεος ἀργυρὴ τε / πρόσθεν, παντοίῃ δ' ἡ Κυνθήρεια τὰ νῦν*. For the use of this Hesiodic myth in later authors see B. Gatz, 'Weltalter, goldene Zeit und sinnverwandte Vorstellungen', *Spudasmata*, 16 (Hildesheim, 1967) pp. 52 ff.

[μη] *μανθανόντων* . . . [μη] *μανθανόντων*

This correction is due to Bergk and seems convincing to me. Pohlenz 1955, p.

86 and n. (p. 196) tried to defend the text of the MSS. with the argument that the men of the Golden Age had no need to learn anything, since everything came to them *ἄτερ πόνων* (*Erga* 113). It is not likely that Bion expressed a belief that some people did not need any instruction. Furthermore Bion is here talking about the fees which the students had to pay, and not about the Golden Age as such.

The interest of this fragment lies in the fact that it gives us an idea of Bion's opinion on payment for teaching. Notwithstanding that Bion does not say so explicitly, it is highly probable that he himself does not condemn the practice of receiving payment and actually did take money for his teaching. The problem is old and very much discussed. The old sophists accepted payment and were much criticized on this ground by Plato; cf. Guthrie, pp. 36 ff and E.L. Harrison, 'Was Gorgias a Sophist?', *Phoenix*, 18 (1964) p. 191 and especially n. 44. Plato followed Socrates in this criticism as we can see from, e.g., Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.6, 1.2.60 and 1.6.5. However not all the followers of Socrates held fast to the rule of teaching without payment. So it is said about Aeschines of Sphettus: *ἐμμίσθους δ' ἀκροάσεις ποιεῖσθαι* (Diog. Laert. 2.62 = test. 1 p. 251 Dittmar) and the same applies to the Academic Speusippus: *καὶ Πλάτων μὲν ἀτελεῖς φόρων τοὺς παρ' αὐτὸν φοιτῶντας ἐποίει. σὺ δὲ δασμολογεῖς καὶ παρ' ἐκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων λαμβάνεις* (Diog. Laert. 4.2). The attitude of these schools in which Bion studied is of more interest here. We see that the founder of the Cynic school, Antisthenes, was probably not completely averse to the idea of accepting fees, which seems to be the point of the following anecdote: *ἐρωτώμενος διὰ τί ὀλίγους ἔχει μαθητάς, ἔφη, 'ὅτι ἀργυρέα αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλλω ῥάβδῳ'* (Diog. Laert. 6.4 = fr. 184 Caizzi). For the Cynics of a more rigid type, like Diogenes, it must have been impossible to receive any sort of payment. Aristippus, on the other hand, had no objection to this practice: *πρῶτος τῶν Σωκρατικῶν μισθοὺς εἰσεπράξατο καὶ ἀπέστελλε χρήματα τῷ διδασκάλῳ* (Diog. Laert. 2.65; cf. further frs. 3–8 Mannebach, Zeller, II:1⁴ p. 338 and n. 5 and Gigon, I pp. 89 f). In this respect Bion followed the practice of the old sophists and the Cyrenaics, but it should be remembered that this influence applies more to his way of life and his form of teaching than to his actual doctrine. For this question in general see C.A. Forbes, 'Teachers' Pay in Ancient Greece', *University of Nebraska Studies, Studies in the Humanities*, 2 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1942).

F79

πλέων μετὰ πονηρῶν

Marine pictures are very common in the Greek literature (cf. e.g. F62A–B) and anecdotes about people being shipwrecked, meeting pirates or facing a storm are numerous. They are often used to show the calm and presence of mind of the philosopher; cf. Gerhard 1909, pp. 98 ff. We can especial-

ly compare with the anecdotes about Bias: ὁ αὐτὸς συμπλέων ποτὲ πονηροῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χειμάζεσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπικαλουμένων αὐτῶν ‘μηδαμῶς’, εἶπεν, ‘ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ πειραθῶμεν αὐτοὺς λαθεῖν, μὴ αἰσθωνται ὑμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλέοντας (Gnom. Vat. 148 = Diog. Laert. 1.86 = Flor. Mon. 169 = Arsenius *Violetum* p. 148 Walz = Maximus Confessor *Loci communes* Sermo 14 (= PG, 91 col. 812 C)) and Diagoras: Διαγόρας ἐν τῷ πλέειν χειμαζομένου τοῦ σκάφους (καὶ) τῶν ἐπιβατῶν λεγόντων, ὅτι ‘διὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου ἀπολλύμεθα,’ δείξας πλησίον ἑτερον πλοῖον κινδυνεύον εἶπεν ‘μή τι κακείνοις Διαγόρας συμπλέει’ (*Ἄριστον καὶ πρῶτον μάθημα* 38 Schenkl); cf. also Babrius 117. The anecdotes about Bion and Bias agree in that they are both sailing with bad men; the meeting with pirates applies only to Bion but occurs elsewhere; cf. e.g. for Diogenes Diog. Laert. 6.74. On the other hand, the content of the sayings of Bion and Bias are completely different. The anecdote about Bion is without any deeper meaning and seeks only to show his wit and his presence of mind.

It should be noted that Bion by sailing μετὰ πονηρῶν showed his disregard for the superstitious belief that it was dangerous to sail with unholy persons. There are many references to such a belief: Aeschylus *Septem* 602–604: ἡ γὰρ ξυνεισβὰς πλοῖον εὖσεβῆς ἀνὴρ / ναῦταισι θερμοῖς καὶ πανουργία τινὶ / ὄλωλεν ἀνδρῶν σὺν θεοπτύστῳ γένει, Euripides *El.* 1354–1355: οὕτως ἀδικεῖν μηδεὶς θελέτω / μηδ’ ἐπιόρκων μέτα συμπλείτω, HF 1223–1225: χάριν δὲ γηράσκουσιν ἐχθαίρω φίλων / καὶ τῶν καλῶν μὲν ὅστις ἀπολαύειν θέλει, / συμπλεῖν δὲ τοῖς φίλοις δυστυχοῦσιν οὐ and fr. 852.3–5 Nauck: ὅστις δὲ τοὺς φύσαντας μὴ τιμᾶν θέλῃ, / μὴ μοι γένοιτο μήτε συνθύτης τοῖς θεοῖς / μήτ’ ἐν θαλάσῃ κοινόπλου στέλλοι σκάφος, Antiphon 5.82: οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι πολλοὶ ἤδη ἄνθρωποι μὴ καθαροὶ χεῖρας ἢ ἄλλο τι μῖασμα ἔχοντες συνεισβάντες εἰς τὸ πλοῖον συναπώλεσαν μετὰ τῆς αὐτῶν ψυχῆς τοὺς ὁσίως διακειμένους τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, Lysias 6.19: ἐπεδείξατο δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ὅτι θεοὺς οὐ νομίζει. οὐ γὰρ ὥς δεδιὼς τὰ πεποιημένα, ἀλλ’ ὥς θαρρῶν, ναυκληρίᾳ ἐπιθέμενος τὴν θάλατταν ἔπλει, Xenophon *Cyr.* 8.1.25: λογιζόμενος ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖν αἰρούμενοι μετὰ τῶν εὖσεβῶν μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τῶν ἡσεβηκέναι τι δοκούντων, Diogenes in Gnom. Vat. 197: ὁ αὐτὸς καταμαθὼν τινα τῶν γνωρίμων μοχθηροῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλοῦντα ‘ἄτοπὸν γε’, εἶπεν, ‘εἰ πλεῖν μὲν βουλόμενοι σύμπλους βελτίστους ἐπιλεξόμεθα, βιοῦν δὲ ὀρθῶς προαιρούμενοι κοινωνοὺς τοῦ βίου τοὺς τυχόντας αἰρησόμεθα’ Theophrastus *Char.* 25.2: ὁ δὲ δειλὸς τοιοῦτός τις . . . καὶ κλυδωνίου γενομένου ἐρωτᾷ εἴ τις μὴ μεμύηται τῶν πλεόντων, Babrius 117.3–4: ἐνὸς γὰρ ἀσεβοῦς ἐμβεβηκότος πλοῖω, / πολλοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ μηδὲν αἰτίους θνήσκειν and Horace *Carm.* 3.2.26–29: vetabo, qui Cere-
ris sacrum / vulgarit arcanae, sub isdem / sit trabibus fragilemque mecum / solvat phaselon. Cf. also Ussher, p. 211.

F80 The same anecdote is also ascribed to Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.40 = Arsenius *Violetum* p. 205 Walz). Many scholars are of the opinion that the originator of

this anecdote is Bion, who may have told it about Diogenes in order to make him more useful for Bion's own form of Cynicism, which is supposed to be more hedonistic in character; we find such a view in Hense 1892, pp. 239 f, Hense 1909, pp. LII f, Gerhard 1912, p. 400 n. 6 and v. Fritz, pp. 42 ff. However, this is far from clear and the anecdote can hardly be taken as an expression of a hedonistic attitude. Furthermore it should be regarded more as an example of Cynic wit than as a philosophical statement. For Cynicism and hedonism see introd. Chapter III:2.

F81

Βίων

G. Kaibel, in *Athenaei Naucraticae Dipnosophistarum libri XI III* (Leipzig, 1890) Ind. nom. p. 697 wrongly attributes this saying to an unknown *Βίων ὀψοφάγος*. There seems to be no doubt that Bion of Borysthenes is the person meant here. Such a view is supported both by the character of the anecdote and the witty quotation of Euripides; cf. Hense 1909, p. 100 and Gerhard 1912, p. 402 n. 5. It is of interest that a very similar anecdote is told about the Stoic Zeno: *ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ἐπεὶ τις τῶν παρόντων ὀψοφάγων ἀπέσυρεν ἅμα τῷ παρατεθῆναι τὸ ἐπάνω τοῦ ἰχθύος, στρέψας καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν ἰχθὺν ἀπέσυρεν ἐπιλέγων 'Ἰνὼ δὲ τὰπὶ θάτερ' ἐξεργάζετο* (Athenaeus 5.186 D = fr. 291 SVF I; cf. also Athenaeus 8.345 D and Diog. Laert. 7.19 = fr. 290 SVF I). Cf. also Quintilian 6.3.90, where we have a similar anecdote: *et Galba de piscibus, qui cum pridie ex parte adesi et versati postera die appositi essent, 'Festinemus, alii subcenant', inquit.*

τὰ ἐπάνω τοῦ ἰχθύος

Fish seems in many cases to have been regarded as a luxurious food. This becomes clear from, e.g., many references in comedy, which have been collected in Ussher, p. 80, and Juvenal *Sat.* 4.15 ff and *Sat.* 5.92 ff. Dio of Prusa is of the opinion that Homer gave an example of a good life in the lives of the Homeric heroes: *ἰχθύων δὲ οὐδέποτε γευσάμενους αὐτοὺς ἐποίησε* (2.47). For the Greek attitude to fish as food in general see K.F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten* IV, 3. ed. (Freiburg i.B.-Tübingen, 1882) pp. 225 ff, *RE*, XI:1 (1921) s.v. Kochkunst cols. 950 ff (Orth) and A. Lesky, *Thalatta: Der Weg der Griechen zum Meer* (Vienna, 1947) pp. 17 ff.

δαψιλῶς φαγών

For this phrase cf. Antiphanes fr. 286 Kock II: *δεῖ γὰρ φαγόντας δαψιλῶς βρέχειν*.

Ἰνὼ . . . ἐξεργάζετο

We here have a quotation of Euripides *Bacchae* 1129. It may be noted that Euripides was especially popular among writers of a philosophical turn of mind; cf. introd. Chapter II:2 and n. 60. The quotation here is both witty and sur-

prising, but very much in Bion's style, as he compares himself, tearing a fish, with Ino, tearing Pentheus to pieces.

I do not believe that this anecdote entitles us to draw any wider conclusions about Bion's form of Cynicism. Gerhard 1912, p. 402 and n. 5 holds that it is an expression of a hedonistic attitude, which assumption is not convincing. The form of the Zeno anecdote probably gives us a clue to the understanding of the anecdote in Bion's case, i.e. it had originally an educational aim. Hardly anything is left of this aspect in Bion's case, and it is possible that this anecdote was used by the tradition hostile to Bion in order to portray him as a glutton. It is a feature of the antiphilosophical tradition to picture philosophers as over-eating or fighting with each other about food; cf. e.g. Lucian *Convivium* 11 and 42–43 and *Hermotimus* 11; see further Helm 1906, p. 264 and pp. 382 ff for the same motive in comedy.

CONCORDANCE

MULLACH	KINDSTRAND
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
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